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This practice-oriented research examines the presence of the image in an artistic vision 
from the Byzantine perspective of an icon-maker. To do so, I extract a list of Byzantine canonic 
guidelines and explain how the technical (realistic) and conceptual (symbolic) construction of an 
iconic/idolic vision performs at the level of an aesthetic judgment.  
Using the epistemological definition of the image affirmed by the Second Council of 
Nicaea (787 CE) in conjunction with Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological framing of the icon 
and idol, I outline three underlying modes of artistic vision that expose the metaphysical issues 
of representation within today’s spectacle of technological screens: 1) a symbolic (Platonic) 
seeing of the invisible as totally absent from the visible, 2) a realistic (Nietzschean) seeing that 
claims the invisible as really present in the space defined by a viewer’s perspectival gaze, and 3) 
a symbolic-realistic (Byzantine) vision of evoking the presence of an absent, invisible image 
through a tangible creative experience—specifically, although the image stays ontologically 
transparent, it becomes a visible trace of its absence left on a frame for representation. 
While delineating the three visions in terms of abstract and naturalistic depictions, I also 
present my own Byzantine-inspired method of painting on wood panels to point key iconic 
elements for evoking an image in a concrete aesthetic context. I particularly do this through a 
performative inquiry (as video documented in Portrait of an Icon Maker and Performing the 
Icon) into a canonically contextualized aesthetic experience that is sensitive to the Incarnational 
dimension of the image. This Byzantine artistic framework opens up an interdisciplinary field of 
artistic research into the metaphysics of presence that bridges visual criticism, performance 
theory, and Byzantine theological convictions pictured by a range of contemporary thinkers, such 
as Fischer-Lichte, Nanna Verhoeff, Eric Jenkins, John Lechte, and Nicoletta Isar. It not only 
 iv 
places visual criticism inside of what it means to iconically craft an image, but also allows 
image-makers to see, in a non-referential way, how the symbolic and realistic visions look 
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The icon has as its only interest the crossing of gazes—thus, strictly speaking, love.1 
          
 
Concerned with the Nietzschean state of metaphysical iconoclasm today, the philosopher 
Jean-Luc Marion points to the concept of icon as a mode of seeing that resists the spectacle of 
idols within our commoditized audiovisual culture—a site of representation shaped by 
commercial techniques of image production.2 Specifically, the spectacle reverses the Platonic 
logic of mimesis, in which the material world (a copy of the ideal world of Forms) functions as a 
referent for visual representations, in order to generate self-referential (idolic) images.3 The 
image is trapped in the visible through self-idolatry when it acts as its own origin (or it refers to 
its own visibility) before an idolic human gaze that emphasizes the visible just for mirroring 
desires. From a phenomenological perspective, this idolic process manifests within the limits of 
the constituting power of the knowing subject. The importance of the self-idolatrous image in 
shaping human identity within our age of consumerism and technological communication is 
revealed in the viewer’s wish to become an image in a world where the act of seeing and of 
being seen is the formula through which one experiences his/her own existence.  
In this contemporary context, Marion suggests that we should look to the Byzantine icon 
(and the modes of its perception) as a point of departure for our interpretation of contemporary 
iconoclastic gestures. According to the Second Council of Nicaea (Actio 7), the icon is a type of 
representation that erases its visibility in order for the invisible (the prototype) to intersect with 
                                                
1 Jean-Luc Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, Trans. James K. A. Smith (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 87.  
2 Metaphysical idolatry is a mode of claiming a definite image of existence or reality that is ultimately 
criticized as idealistic. When the metaphysical idol is assimilated with a material object, the iconoclastic gesture can 
turn into a violent physical act. In its religious sense, iconoclasm is directed against the sin of idolatry as a wrong 
way of seeing and venerating God or the worshiping of illusory gods/idols. Since its first use in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, the word idol has taken various non-religious meanings through time (as in philosophy or entertainment 
industry), however, from a metaphysical iconoclastic perspective the idol connotes a false image of reality. 
In the Crossing of the Visible, Marion refers to the term televisual screen as a general mode of defining the 
idolic state of contemporary visual culture—in the sense that the image is used through various modern technologies 
(from print to digital media) for commodifying the visible phenomena and trigger materialistic desires and 
consumption. The Marxist theorist Guy Debord has originally coined this commoditized world of images as the 
spectacle.  
3 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 87. 
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the visible.4 For the Byzantine thought, this relationship between the type and prototype disrupts 
the Platonic logic of mimesis, whereby the visible is frozen in the material and the invisible in 
the ideal world of Forms.  
While Marion indicates the counter-intuitive power of the icon to disrupt today’s 
metaphysical spectacle of images through the intersection of two gazes (the viewer and the 
icon’s gaze), this thesis argues for a new epistemological understanding of the icon that takes a 
creative (artistic) practice approach to the Byzantine theology of image. It claims that in order to 
define and negotiate iconoclastic controversies, the icon and viewer’s physical bodies do not 
have to evaporate into thin air. Seeing an image is not just a mode of accessing symbolic 
meaning, away from the senses and the visible world. In fact, the Byzantine iconophiles 
defended the epistemological mode of experiencing the icon to claim that the communion 
between the visible and invisible takes place when the prototype is perceived in the type by 
means of all bodily senses.5  
As a Byzantine iconographer, I bring a practical inquiry to the debates surrounding the 
notion of image within the academia. Specifically, in building an iconic vision through the 
Byzantine canonic way of painting an icon, I propose to demonstrate how an iconic image differs 
from an idolic picture (seen as a semi-transparent image) in light of the current metaphysical 
state of imagery. Beyond the teachings about icons formulated at the Second Council of Nicaea, 
as re-contextualized in Marion’s phenomenology, the Byzantine icon can show us many things 
about vision—not least among these, the power of the hierotopic aspect of an image and the 
particular aesthetic and spatial elements that form an iconic vision.6 By considering these aspects 
of an image, we might be incited to reflection upon the nature of our own relationship to various 
consumer goods and/or to the cult value of screen media images on which these are borne. A 
more specific consideration of the Orthodox concept of symbolic-realism (which is, as I will 
explain in this thesis, the compositional structure of an iconic vision), might even encourage us 
to re-evaluate our disposition toward images in general with perhaps a greater appreciation for 
the ideological implications they can carry. 
                                                
4 The Second Council of Nicaea is also known as The Seventh Ecumenical Council, which took place in 
787 CE. 
5 Recent studies by art historians Alexei Mikhailovich Lidov in 2001, Nicoletta Isar in 2009, and Bissera 
Pentcheva in 2010 have also approached the Byzantine icon from an epistemological view. 
6 Alexei Lidov, “Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces as a form of Creativity and Subject of Cultural 
History,” Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces in Byzantium and Medieval Russia. (Moscow: Progress-
Tradition, 2006), 32-58.  
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The Nietzschean/idolic relationship with images (as I discuss in Chapter 2) marks an 
essential target of contemporary iconoclastic criticism surrounding the metaphysical limits of 
screen-mediated images (as well outlined in Marion’s critique of the televisual spectacle). This 
thesis investigates these critical responses to the technologist/consumerist mode of seeing reality 
as holding viewers captive in metaphysical illusions. It focuses on how the practice of seeing 
emerges as idolic (or as its counterpart, the iconic) from the relationship between the material 
world (seen realistically as visible through the natural perception of the two eyes), the human 
thought and affect (the inner capacity to invest with symbolic meaning the realm of senses) and 
the image (the ability to imagine or represent the world as derived from both the visible/realistic 
and invisible/symbolic realms). It also positions the iconoclastic critique of the image as unable 
to be driven exclusively by a metaphysical imperative to conceptualize reality away from the 
contemplative practice of seeing both idolically and iconically. The actual meditative practice of 
seeing is an activity that involves all bodily senses, therefore, an iconoclastic judgment requires a 
more complex approach to the image that involves the modes of seeing both symbolically and 
realistically.  
In light of recent studies on the Byzantine icon’s performative aspect and its relevance to 
the present-day Western conceptualization of visual images by a wide range of contemporary 
thinkers, such as Marie-José Mondzain, John Lechte, Eric Jenkins, and Nicoletta Isar, I continue 
and probe, at a visual-aesthetic level, the metaphysical beliefs on the way images should be 
made, seen, and desired in commoditized viewing conditions. As such, this research explores the 
possibility of the Byzantine theology of the icon to act as a contemporary artistic mode of image 
making (beyond the limits of religious thought) to better understand iconoclastic/consumptive 
discourses directed at ways of seeing, conceiving, and using images (religious or otherwise). 
Particularly, I investigate from a theological (in Chapter 1), phenomenological (in Chapter 2), 
technological/performative (in Chapter 3) and artistic/aesthetic view (in Chapter 4), how the 
Byzantine symbolic-realistic way of simultaneously seeing an image conceptually (symbolically) 
and practically (realistically) might offer an Incarnational approach to critiquing the human urge 
to build metaphysical pictures of reality.7  
                                                
7 While the word performativity means different things based on who is using it and for what reason, in this 
thesis I will employ Erika Fisher-Lichte’s version of the term, as I explain in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5 A form of 
performativity in the Byzantine performance. For Fisher-Lichte, performativity is the transformative power of self-
referential acts (physical acts that do not represent an original model or event) within an art performance that draws 
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By redefining the Byzantine model of vision as an alternative to visual criticism, I do not 
suggest an end to metaphysical iconoclasm. Instead, I create an opportunity for incorporating in 
today’s iconoclastic judgments what the metaphysical language overlooks: an iconic vision that 
includes a multisensory experience of images as being completely immersed in a particular time 
and place. I am not concerned with offering new types of Byzantine icons to be 
critiqued/worshiped over the idols of the technological era we are living in. Through the lens of 
an ongoing icon-making/seeing activity that incorporates a mix of handmade and technological 
image processes, this dissertation offers, at the visual, audio, and video documentary level, a 
chance for seeing how an icon performs and is performed. Hence, the creative exploration of this 
study is a meditation on the dynamic between matter and form, signifier and signified in our 
(living) practices of seeing symbolic values with iconoclastic implications—a dynamic that 
reflects not only metaphysical principles, but the actual embodied experience of seeing.  
It is important to note here that my Byzantine reflective artistic activity is framed at the 
technical level of painting on wood panels in relation to the Platonic (symbolic) and Nietzschean 
(realistic) ways of representing form and matter—to opposite modes of 
circumscribing/uncircumscribing a picture of reality that, according to Marion, trigger 
metaphysical controversies.8 By defining the Platonic and Nietzschean modes of image making 
(in Chapter 2) in terms of artistic production, it helps me explain how the symbolic-realism 
inherent in the Byzantine icon forms a phenomenological orientation that depicts the 
transcendent in a tangible embodiment, allowing viewers to revere the message behind images 
while deflecting the fear aroused by its ideological implications. More specifically, it allows me 
to discuss how the Byzantine painting technique constructs a unique type of resemblance 
between the image and its signified meaning in order to embody the abstract aspect of a symbol 
in a naturalistic, yet non-mimetic representation. And it is with this canonical mode of seeing 
                                                                                                                                                       
the audience (together with the artist) into a creative state—thus forming new meanings and realities. The 
transformation of the audience into a source of creativity is expressed at the level of “perceptible physical 
expressions” (Fisher-Lichte 12). 
8 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 78-83. The Platonic idea of the image imposes an irreconcilable 
distance between an unreal/earthly signifier and a real/divine signified. Since reality is beyond the visible, I identify 
Plato’s view of reality as symbolic. This form of Platonic symbolism was questioned by Nietzsche for its ideological 
implications in imposing moral values that enslave humanity and stop creativity. In order to re-evaluate predefined 
(Platonic) values, Nietzsche takes a radical approach to the image of reality by eliminating the distance between a 
signifier and signified. In other words, Nietzsche’s quest for reality is not somewhere in an illusory symbolic world, 
but within the concrete world of human experiences. I identify the Nietzschean view of the image as realistic for the 
reason that the signifier and signified are brought into the same world of visible phenomena.  
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(which balances the abstract and the concrete) that I argue in my artistic research for an 
alternative mode of understanding iconoclastic issues around the objectification or idealization of 
reality in the age of screen-mediated consumption.  
Another essential point to make is that it is possible to develop an artistic symbolic-
realistic vision, insofar as we actively see how the Byzantine image economy is performed 
through the practice of seeing and making an icon. This sort of vision (which I endeavor to video 
document) reveals how the Byzantine icon functions as an image in space to enact/perform (in its 
making and viewing experiences) the presence (tangible/type) of absence (intangible/prototype). 
The icon turns every spatial element involved in its performance into a hierotopic space by 
constructing a non-referential relation of similitude between ontological dichotomies, such as 
subject and object, signifier and signified.  
To sum up, this practice-oriented thesis takes up the challenge of considering the 
Byzantine theology of the icon as a contemporary mode of shaping an artistic vision that will 
incite viewers/image makers to see through the uncertainty in the metaphysical meaning of an 
image. First, it will analyze the transparency of the image, as it was understood by the Byzantine 
iconophiles Patriarch Nicephorus and St. Theodore the Studite in the 8th and 9th centuries. 
Second, this research will build on Marion’s critique of the idolatrous regime of the image 
imposed by technological screens to outline the symbolic and realistic lenses that are used within 
metaphysical iconoclasm for positioning the image in a mimetic relationship to two extremes: a 
visible and invisible spectacle. In isolating these two conflicting interpretive lenses (the symbolic 
and realistic), it will allow us to understand the icon in relation to the iconoclastic implications of 
seeing an image as a metaphysical visualization that unlocks notions of truth, reality, or 
objectivity. It will also help us to know how my icon practice could create a hierotopic space for 
symbolic-realistic experiences in a consumer-driven society and reveal why a theory of iconicity 
should be addressed at a practical, artistic level. Third and fourth, this research will define a 
symbolic-realistic criterion of analyzing and experiencing imagery within a visual culture that 
constantly questions the relations between viewers and images for their metaphysical 
significances. In particular, it will formulate, through my Byzantine canonized practice of image 
making, symbolic-realistic aesthetic guidelines for image-makers in our rapidly developing 
consumer industry and technological screen culture.  
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Therefore, by shifting the tradition of icon making from a mimetic practice to an 
interdisciplinary analysis and practice that encompasses art criticism and 
theological/metaphysical studies, I expect to craft and identify: 1) a symbolic-realistic mode of 
viewing images that challenges their representational/metaphysical limits and 2) a canonized 
artistic practice that facilitates a concrete, aesthetic understanding of the visual language within 
and beyond consumer/screen culture. Moreover, this thesis offers (and this is where it makes an 
original contribution) an alternative to contemporary metaphysical iconoclastic accounts of the 
visual by analyzing the solitary Byzantine practice of constructing an iconic artistic experience, 



































CHAPTER 1: THE BYZANTINE DIMENSION OF MY ARTISTIC RESEARCH 
 
This chapter covers the theological and methodological part of the dissertation, which 
sets a Byzantine framework of my artistic practice that regards the notion of the image as 
invisible. With this theological understanding of the image, I define the following nine key visual 
and theoretical terms of my research-creation project into the meaning of the Contemporary 
Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision: the Byzantine icon, Byzantine image, mimesis, symbolic-
realism, economy, hierotopy, performance, performativity, and orthopraxis. Since some of these 
concepts are widely discussed with alternative and meandering connotations according to the 
theories in which they are presented, this chapter is essential for clarifying their exact meaning as 
I employ them in my icon practice through a hierotopic vision and critique.  Firstly, these notions 
are presented to describe what, I see, is constituted in the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired 
Iconic Vision (together with its iconoclastic implications)—a concern that is at the core of this 
thesis. Secondly, they will help in outlining the methodology (for both the theoretical and 
practical investigations) and in situating the main research question within today’s 
iconoclastic/consumptive debates. Specifically, how might the Byzantine theology of the icon 
offer a practical artistic/hierotopic means for crafting an iconic vision in order to understand 
iconoclastic gestures directed toward ways of seeing, conceiving, and using images in our 
present commoditized viewing conditions. I explore this question at a practical level by testing 
various Byzantine canons that bring the iconic image to presence for the beholder.  
It must be mentioned to my readers from the start that, on the one hand, this thesis is not 
a comprehensive history of iconoclastic/metaphysical debates regarding the notion of image as 
containing reality (real-presence). This thesis is a companion study to my icon painting as a form 
of making an iconic vision. On the other hand, it is not just a descriptive analysis of the concepts 
employed in my creative process either. Both my icon practice and writing contribute equally to 
understanding what it means to create a contemporary iconic vision based on the Byzantine 
canons—a merging of theory and practice that will be explained later in the notion of 
orthopraxis. So, I must ask my readers a little effort of creativity and interdisciplinarity in the 
textual analysis of the nine proposed concepts not only as a traditional scholarly/scientific 
examination of specific theological and metaphysical ideas in a text, but as a mode of 
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recollecting (and not simply collecting) past and recent information.9 In doing so, it will help in 
clarifying the solitary artistic mode of experiencing the stages of making a Byzantine icon and 




1.1 Why the Byzantine icon and a (hierotopic) practice-oriented research?  
 
Before discussing the Byzantine iconoclastic debates surrounding the image and how the 
nine concepts reveal where the icon meets and diverts from contemporary art, I need first to 
address how does this theological past reverberate within today’s theorization of the image. In 
other words, given the strict theological nature of the iconoclastic crisis, it is fair to ask why it is 
important to focus on the Byzantine icon to understand the status of the image in our 
commoditized screen culture.  
First, in her 2004 book, Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the 
Contemporary Imaginary, Marie-José Mondzain provides a study of the Byzantine iconoclastic 
debates that sets the term divine economy—the distribution of the invisible in the created world 
or God’s administration of the invisible in the visible—as an explanation to understand the 
contemporary development of imagery. Her contribution to visual criticism reveals how the 
image acts, outside the realm of the theological debates, in a transparent way for humans to 
experience the world as present. She also makes known that iconoclasm did not disappear after 
Second Council of Nicaea (787 CE), but rather it assumes various guises. Mondzain’s analysis 
helps to explain more clearly what type of presence really remains following image making in 
the age of the spectacle. I do not look at the Byzantine understanding of divine economy for an 
absolute arbiter in deciding what is an icon (as this would be a metaphysical endeavor). My 
position is less about outlining a binary opposition between the iconic and idolic, but more about 
finding a set of Byzantine principles to guide me in my practical judgment as to what modes of 
art making might lead to a contemporary hierotopic experience. 
                                                
9 The intention behind my request will become clearer later in the methodology where I elaborate on the 
specific characteristic of the artistic research in relation to the mainstream scholarly research. 
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Second, the postmodern interrogation of the image has a fixation with the problem of 
commodities’ cult value, which has the effect of objectifying/commodifying human identity and 
blocking the access to reality. More specifically, corporations employ the ideological power of 
images to market their abstractions as reality and prompt consumers into not only buying them, 
but also worshiping their brand images. This concern comes from the consumer’s conviction that 
what we see must be the truth, that an attractive label represents the actual physical body of a 
commodity. In the visual criticism of today’s spectacle, the image has reached its highest level of 
simulacrum—an idolic state of the image that merely mirrors the viewer’s expectations. One of 
the leading postmodern philosophers to theologically address the issue of (metaphysical) idolatry 
is Jean-Luc Marion. In his four essays entitled, The Crossing of the Visible, Marion analyzes 
various works of art (from abstract to representational) to develop an iconic (phenomenological) 
mode of seeing the dominance of the televisual spectacle over human perception of reality, 
which in turn affects the metaphysical understanding of the image. While openly iconoclastic, he 
offers a subtle Byzantine analysis of the image as structured by three visible instances: the work 
of art, televisual/screen culture, and icon.10 In a Marionian sense, the icon differs from the 
metaphysical mimesis by way of addressing the viewer (at a phenomenological level) with an 
opposing gaze. The icon does not create a new spectacle because its “visible spectacle (a painted 
face) is radicalized to its prototype, type of an invisible counter-intentionality (a gaze in 
person).”11 Thus, the aesthetic boundary between idol and icon is founded on the power of the 
iconic gaze to disrupt the viewer’s intention of gazing at his/her own desires. The viewer’s gaze 
is directed through the icon “beyond its own reality”12—towards a referent unconstituted by the 
power of the thinking subject or the Übermensch’s will to constitute the world.13 As opposed to 
the idol, which only reveals a sense of divine according to the measure of human perspective, the 
icon inverses the logic of perspective in a counter-intuitive experience of love so that the viewer 
is constituted by the other as gift. Although Marion refers to the icon's transformative power of 
challenging the dominance of vision in contemporary society, his meaning of the icon overlooks 
its performative and tangible aspect, namely that the icon exists in an actual place from where it 
                                                
10 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 105, 58. 
11 Ibid., 84. 
12 Steven Grimwood. “Iconography and Postmodernity,” Literature & Theology 17, no. 1 (2003): 77. 
13 In his book, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche refers to the Übermensch as connected to the human body 
that accounts for its own existence: “[b]ut the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; and 
soul is only a word for something about the body” (1954, 146). The Übermensch is the overman’s will to power.   
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engages the viewer as a participant. Marion’s abstract way of seeing the icon will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, where I emphasize his tendency to vaporize materiality  (both the icon and the 
viewer’s physical aspect) in the crossing of the invisible gazes between the icon and the viewer.   
Finally, the visual media critic, Eric Scott Jenkins initiated a new Byzantine-inspired 
method of analyzing the commoditized image’s quality to creatively perform an iconic vision. 
He suggests that the Byzantine practice of the symbolic-realistic mode of seeing is employed in 
the advertisement industry to facilitate unique (quasi-hypostatic) consuming experiences. 
However, Jenkins notes that what visual criticism fails to observe is how corporate image-
makers play with the Byzantine quality of the image (by manipulating specific symbolic-realistic 
elements for the production and reception of products) to subvert materialistic claims and how 
consumers become devoted to particular brands such as Apple. It must be stated here (which is 
an argument that I emphasize in this dissertation) that an image needs not be in its specific 
Byzantine form to activate a symbolic-realistic mode of seeing. Moreover, Jenkins argues that 
the main emphasis in visual criticism has been on seeing what triggers a hypostatic event that 
celebrates a commoditized identity by questioning the validity of a symbolic or realistic 
interpretation. Instead, Jenkins points to the techniques of the Byzantine icon to unveil the reason 
for the cult following of products. Marion also describes the entire history of visual 
representation and iconoclastic/consumptive debates as revolving around these two modes of 
seeing (the symbolic/Platonic and realistic/Nietzschean)—a row between two interpretive lenses 
which culminated into a Westernized spectacle of televisual idols. For this reason, Chapter 2 
elaborates on the symbolic and realistic as a certain dualistic conception of representation that 
has triggered metaphysical iconoclasm. 
 Despite all of the above assessments of how the Byzantine icon might break the authority 
of the spectacle and liberate postmodern experiences of the image from its metaphysical 
determinations, there is still work to be done. Specifically, in understanding how the Byzantine 
icon’s performance might function as an artistic mode of seeing what visual elements and 
techniques contribute to forming an iconic vision (or to claiming notions of real-presence) in art 
spaces (such as in art-gallery settings) or advertisement/corporate environments.  Understanding 
the construction of such an iconic vision through my version of a Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision is the major scope of my study. In my research practice, I do not question 
the importance of hermeneutical legitimacy in the critique of images (particularly the spectacle 
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of idolic images), as this is an essential metaphysical issue of all iconoclastic interpretations 
within academia, politics, and culture. But this limitation to metaphysical matters, which 
questions the aesthetics of representation based on its realism and truthfulness does not explain 
the basic visual techniques of constructing the cult value of images (religious, artistic, or 
commercial). Besides being a mode of visual perception aimed at material or spiritual gain (just 
as Jenkins and Marion were attempting to do when defining the icon), a hierotopic experience 
involves the ability to make or perform in the iconic/idolic event. The Byzantine physical senses 
such as touch, smell, and sound should all be literally included in the academic debate—
therefore, the necessity to include the actual monastic practice of painting the icon as an essential 
component of this thesis. 
In her analysis of monastic practices of meditation, termed orthopraxis, Mary Carruthers 
explains that “people do not ‘have’ ideas, they ‘make’ them.”14 Orthopraxis refers to a 
monastic15 way of imitating specific meditational techniques of crafting mind imagery for a 
mode of living and understanding the world that would potentially lead to a hierotopic 
experience. Such ritualistic practices, passed down from a monk-mentor to an apprentice, engage 
all bodily senses to craft prayers from a combination of visual and audible media (from 
architecture to chants, liturgical objects and paintings). These monastic techniques of crafting 
knowledge can also be found in various non-monastic trade activities such as carpentry. 
However, the final goal of orthopraxis within a monastery (particularly in the Christian Orthodox 
monastic tradition) is not to achieve aesthetic or technical excellences in producing an object per 
se, but to compose a prayer from a set of “cognitive ‘pictures,’”16 shared by the entire religious 
community. A prayer or the making of an icon, then, is a creative way of visualizing the mneme17 
(memory) of God. The memory of God is the experience of continuously making thoughts as 
prayers/icons.   
The monastic aesthetic of memoria should not be confused with a form of reproduction of 
some original events encoded and later retrieved when cued by a trigger (a memorial object or 
anything that is used to recall a memory).  A monastic memory is not located in an outside object 
                                                
14 Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5. 
15 I expressly refer here to the Christian tradition; however, monasticism is practiced in various forms in 
other faiths such as in Buddhism and Hinduism.  
16 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 3. 
17 Ibid. 
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(books, paintings, photographs, etc.) in the sense that it calls back information recorded in the 
brain. In other words, the memory of God is not set in the brain (symbolically) or in the object 
(realistically), but in the experience itself of imitating His image. For that reason, the memory 
overcomes dualistic thinking by incorporating both the cognitive (internal/symbolic) aspect of 
thinking/meditating and the physical (external/realistic) activities of learning and practicing 
various skills/techniques (painting, writing, praying, etc.) in relation to material media (books, 
pigments, wood panels, liturgical objects, etc.). Carruthers clarifies that the composition of the 
prayer is not based on the rules of Platonic mimesis (the art of representation); rather, it is 
formed by the activity of mneme. The goal is to reenact a pattern of actions based on an intense 
physical labor as in meditative reading or icon painting so that the sacred text or painted image is 
embodied in the monk’s experience.  
These ritualized performances are learned and mastered in imitating a monk-mentor to 
achieve a type of knowledge that can never be completely defined into words or from any mode 
of interpreting notions of realism and representation. Instead of stressing the mimetic 
verisimilitude of a representation, orthopraxis draws attention to the tools of monastic aesthetics 
(books, brushes, pigments, etc.) to “’thinking about’ and for ‘meditating upon’”18 the divine 
image. For example, an icon does not function as an art object in the sense that the final product, 
produced by human hands, becomes the center of the viewer’s aesthetic interpretation. 
Orthopraxis is not about hermeneutics. It concerns how knowledge is constructed as 
(mental/invisible) images in the process of making and using the meditative tools. Carruthers 
explains that:  
 
The emphasis upon the need for human beings to “see” their thoughts in their minds as 
organized schemata of images, or “pictures,” and then to use these for further thinking, is 
a striking and continuous feature of medieval monastic rhetoric, with significant interest 
even for our own contemporary understanding of the role of images in thinking. 19 
 
By considering my studied practice of icon painting as a critical activity, I hope to bring 
into our consciousness that the locus for understanding an iconic experience in commoditized 
and artistic environments is in the cognitive uses and the instrumentality of images. In an age of 
televisual screens (and mass-produced products), I believe that the role of images in inducing an 
iconic vision (whatever their content, religious, artistic, or commercial) can be best understood 




through the lens of symbolic-realism, not metaphysical interpretations. A closer look at the 
Byzantine canonized chōraic movement of evoking images (as Nicoletta Isar and John Lechte 
exemplify with icons and artworks) may also question the notion of performativity featured in 
contemporary art, which in turn impacts discussion on iconic vision. In particular, how the lack 
of the iconic gaze in artistic-performative strategies against the spectacle reveals the 
metaphysical problem with the imposition of subjectivity onto the material world. If, indeed, the 
production of commodities has evolved into a mode of making images based on the logic of the 
iconic gaze (as Jenkins suggests), the artist must see beyond an ideological or materialistic 
explanation of the spectacle—specifically, how the image acts like a Byzantine icon in 
stimulating the desire for participation in consumptive/aesthetic experiences.  
 
 
1.2 The Byzantine Icon 
 
1.2.1 Before the Byzantine iconoclasm: the Platonic view about the image 
 
The challenge with the theorization of the image in Byzantine iconoclasm resonated with 
the ancient Greek issues (as revealed in the Platonic framework of mimesis) of imitating an 
invisible model or essence through a visible representation or appearance embedded in the finite, 
material world of substances.20 Therefore, I will begin by presenting Plato’s metaphysical view 
of the image.21 
                                                
20 Byzantine iconoclasm took place between 730 and 843 CE and involved a critical response to the 
devotional practices surrounding icons and their physical destruction. Besançon explains that the “iconic arguments 
relied both on the biblical prohibition and on the Greek philosophical critique” (3). In his analysis of John 
Damascene’s doctrine of the image, Schönborn states that “it has been asserted time and again that the Eastern 
Church derives its concept of the image from Plato’s doctrine of Idea and Phenomenon” (212). For more on the 
influence of the Platonic theme of representation within iconoclasm see: Alain Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An 
Intellectual History of Iconoclasm. Trans. Jane Marie Todd. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000), 1-5. Jaś Elsner, 
“Iconoclasm as Discourse: From Antiquity to Byzantium.” Art Bulletin 94, no. 3 (September 2012): 369, Christoph 
von Schönborn, God's Human Face: The Christ-Icon. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 161, 229-30, Marie-
José Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the Contemporary Imaginary, (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 73, Bissera V. Pentcheva, “The performative icon.” The Art Bulletin 88 (2006): 
636. 
21 In this specific Byzantine (mimetic) context, I take the word essence to mean the Platonic notion of 
Idea/Form. In his Republic, Plato refers to the notion of Form as a true universal being or first principle that 
transcends time and space. Although separate from materiality, the Form (such as the idea of tableness) corresponds 
to a multitude of particular objects (various physical versions of a table) (Republic 596). Also, the term substance as 
a kind of stuff, that materially grounds (under the same name, e.g. table) the copies (objects) of a Form, does not 
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The Platonic critique of mimesis conceptualizes the image as eikōn—an appearance-being 
that bears a likeness to a real Form (essence) or prototype. An eikōn-appearance is similar to the 
Greek word ousia (being), which stands for the appearance of essence in material substances. 
Plato’s eikōn-appearance is imperfect. It is, then not identical to its model (essence or true being) 
due to its existence as likeness—a referential property of the eikōn-appearance in the temporal 
phenomena of materiality. It is essential to underline that the eikōn-appearance refers to a being 
that copies the essence of a real given model and that it does not relate to anything imagined 
(unreal). A being that does not make any reference to the world of essences turns into an eidôlon-
appearance-being (idol or false being). Examples of eidôla-appearances, for Plato, are the Greek 
mythological gods, which are illusory images of something non-existent and without essence.  
The contemporary social theorist, John Lechte further clarifies that the Greek word eikōn 
differs from the Latin word imago (image). While the Roman meaning of the image regards the 
visual perception as confined to the viewer’s faculty to imagine, the eikōn is an imitation of a 
“real model” that appears independently from the perceiving subject.22 For Lechte, this “post-
Roman” position towards the image has a direct genealogical link to the conceptualization of 
                                                                                                                                                       
have the meaning of a universal driving force of reality. Since the Platonic material world is not actual/real, the 
material substance is not perceived in a pre-Socratic sense of fire, water, air, etc. that governs and constructs the 
world. From a Platonic view, the pre-Socratic concept of substance can be interpreted in two opposite ways: it can 
either turn into an instance of non-being, restricted to what constitutes a temporal thing that appears in the world of 
material phenomena or it can be assimilated into the notion of pure essence or Form, in the sense that it stands for 
the First Principle of reality. 
Furthermore, in taking an Aristotelian view, Saint Thomas Aquinas explains that essence possesses 
existence in acts of both material and immaterial existences that give shape to substances. Essence is, then, the force 
that defines (individuates) existence while it is distinct in nature from it (one can comprehend the essence of a star or 
a bird without any knowledge of its existence). Essence represents and defines what a substance is, and it can also 
denote what Plato sees in the unmoving Forms. On the other hand, for Aquinas, a substance is the material or 
immaterial result of the essence’s participation in existence or what is made up from a combination of an essence 
and existence. Examples of material substances are the animal species, which includes acts of existence such as 
humans and cats. Examples of immaterial substances are spiritual beings such as angels. Both material and 
immaterial substances cannot exist without the participation of an essence in an act of existence. For an extensive 
explanation regarding the difference between essence, existence (esse), and substance in Thomas’ metaphysics see 
Chapter 4 in On Being and Essence. 
In the modern history of metaphysics, Marion clarifies that the notion of substance was generally 
understood as a material medium for existence (an incomprehensible existence contingent on outer actions/accidents 
for its existence) on which events as properties occur by chance. From its Aristotelian meaning as ousia/οὐσία (a 
being constituted by essence and substance), substance came to be successively interpreted in light of Descartes, 
Kant, and Nietzsche’s philosophy as a material substrate, a category of epistemology, and finally, a metaphysical 
idol (2002a, 5). Marion concludes that after Descartes, the notion of essence in philosophy became insignificant 
(2002a, 6), thus underlying the source of metaphysical iconoclasm. 
22 This might be explained by the fact that the ancient Greek philosophy did not have a fully developed 
concept of a person. Historical theologian, Lucian Turcescu demonstrates this fact in his book entitled Gregory of 
Nyssa and the concept of Divine Persons, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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“the image in Western thought,” in which the viewer is perceived as the center of consciousness, 
volition, and cognition.23  
There is a contradiction in Plato’s ontological position towards the eikōn-appearance that 
can be phrased as follows: although an eikōn-appearance is a representational image in the 
material world, it somehow exists between reality/being and unreality/non-being.24 This 
ontological paradox comes from placing the image in a space between two irreconcilable worlds:  
the visible false reality (ousia) and invisible true reality (eidos or essence). An eikōn-appearance 
acquires the properties of both worlds, but does not belong to either. It is not a totally true being 
or totally false being. First of all, Plato makes a distinction between eikōn-appearance and 
eidôlon-appearance. On the one hand, an eidôlon-appearance is fully immersed in the world of 
material substances from where it poses as its own reality of non-beings that are completely 
removed from essences. On the other hand, an eikōn-appearance is always formed in the 
appearing of essence in substance. The eidôlon is a non-being for the reason that something 
without essence can never appear. An eidôlon-appearance, thus, is an illusion of an appearance-
being (a mere copy of the eikōn-appearance) that forms its own simulacrum of non-beings. 
Simulacrum denies ousia by simulating its possibility to appear without any relation to the real-
presence of essence—an impossibility presented as appearance. Plato’s idea of eidôlon-
appearance is as relevant in today’s critique of the idolatrous spectacle, particularly in Marion’s 
concern regarding our disastrous relationship with televisual screens. 
While the eikōn-appearance appears in the unpredictability and temporality of material 
substances, it has as well the crucial role of imitating the eternal unchanging true/real being. It is 
an appearance that relates to some degree of likeness with the true reality of Forms, thus an eikōn 
cannot be exclusively understood in terms of an idolic connection to materiality. As opposed to 
the eidôlon-appearance, the eikōn-appearance is not all in the visible since it becomes 
transparent, through a camouflaging technique (dubbed likeness), in the process of imitating its 
original model. However, although eikōn-appearance has some invisibility, it is not similar to the 
essence since this would defeat its purpose as a signifier—an appearance exists only in the virtue 
of indicating an essence.  
                                                
23 John Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 12. 
24 Plato, “Sophist 240a10-11; b1-16,” Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper. (USA: Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1997), 261. 
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Seeing that the eikōn-appearance is not entirely cut off from the visible and invisible 
realities, while at the same time, is placed outside of both realms, Plato wonders if it is, in fact, 
unreal or non-being. But then, one can question how something false/unreal is able to mediate a 
sense of true reality in the phenomenal world. Plato never found the answer to this dilemma of 
the image, and therefore, he underestimated the eikōn-appearance in the process of attaining true 
knowledge.  Since no form of appearance-being can fully access the reality of essences, Plato 
believed that only a believer, as opposed to a philosopher, can be mislead in thinking that an 
appearance can easily approximate the Idea of the essential form.25 
Plato’s difficulty in positioning the image either in the world of false/visible/non-beings 
or in the true world of invisible beings proves that he never thought of a genuine mediational 
power of the image in merging the two radically separate worlds. The Platonic image remains in 
a state of non-being from where it provides some access to a true being (essence), but is 
condemned as deceiving. From a metaphysical perspective, this ontological ambiguity of the 
image as a situation of being and non-being has been the source of the Byzantine iconoclastic 
debate. 
In the next section, 1.2.2 The Byzantine view about the image, I will elaborate on the 
importance of Christ’s image for the Byzantine iconophiles to explain how the eikōn-appearance 
can have a form of being. Through the iconicity of Incarnation, appearance and essence form a 
hypostatic union that overcomes the Platonic paradox of the being of non-being (that which is 
not as also an instance of that which is). The Byzantine version of the eikōn (icon) liberates the 
image caught between real and unreal through faith in the eikōn-appearance—the very method of 
gaining insights into notions of truth that was despised by Plato. The Byzantine faith-based 
method saves the image from metaphysical iconoclasm without claiming any real-presence of 
essence in appearance, thus avoiding the simulacral effect of the eidôlon-appearance. Christ’s 
being affirms through His Incarnation the realness of both the visible and invisible worlds by 




                                                
25 Plato, “Republic 476b,” Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper. (USA: Hacket Publishing Company, 
1997),1102-1103. 
 17 
1.2.2 The Byzantine view about the image 
 
Before examining how the Platonic ontological problem of the image came to resonate in 
Byzantine iconoclasm and provided the vocabulary for the icon, it is important to summarize 
three dilemmatic questions regarding the mimetic appearance as existing between the visible and 
invisible. Firstly, does the eikōn-appearance of a statue, for example, exist as an opaque object 
(that is, an appearance-being containing or belonging only to materiality) in the spatio-temporal 
phenomena of the sensible world? This is a question about the real-presence of the prototype in a 
human-made image.26 Secondly, does the eikōn-appearance retain, by necessity of its nature, a 
sense of transparency in order to provide access to an abstract model (a prototype on which a 
being is formed in the material substance)? Here, the point of inquiry is not about the image as a 
material object per se, but about its role as an instrument for likeness through which it acquires 
invisibility. Thirdly, when the eikōn-appearance appears as its own double—that is, a simulation 
of its material being—does it turn into an eidôlon, an idolic/false visual representation with a 
ghostlike appearance? This latter question is still a pressing issue in contemporary visual 
criticism—as stated above, Marion thinks that the eidôlon-appearance forms today’s spectacle of 
empty media simulations, which have no referent (essence) and pose as reality themselves. 
The aforementioned mimetic dilemmas, at the very center of the Platonic thought, 
translated into a specific question during the Byzantine iconoclastic period: Can the materiality 
of the eikōn-appearance be impregnated with invisibility (divine presence) in the representation 
of Christ? The answer is in the creation of the Byzantine icon. The icon is formed on the role of 
the image to preserve the memory of Christ’s divinity as an imprint (type) into the eikōn-
appearance’s materiality. It is crucial to emphasis here two key aspects of the Byzantine icon, 
which were used at the end of iconoclasm in 843 CE to articulate a non-essentialist27 response to 
                                                
26 The power of the image to convey memories, in a way that it projects someone’s existence into posterity, 
has often contributed to iconoclastic events in human history. According to the art historian Jaś Elsner, “iconoclasm 
in all premodern contexts from antiquity to the Byzantine iconoclastic controversy was about ‘real-presence.’ The 
damage done to the image is an attack on its prototype, at least until Byzantine iconoclasm, and it presupposes some 
kind of assault on real-presence as contained in the image” (369). 
27 According to art historian Bissera V. Pentcheva, the Byzantine theory of the image developed in two 
consecutive models: the essentialist and non-essentialist (2006, 632). The essentialist definition of the icon takes the 
ontological claim that the essence emanates in the material substance through image. The non-essentialist approach 
perceives the image as one with the essence and separate from the material substance. In the latter case, the image as 
essence appears in the material substance only through an epistemological relation between the human and the 
visible.   
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the Greek ontological paradox of the image: 1) the image of Christ is identical to His essence and 
2) although the image is imprinted in the icon’s pictorial medium, the real-presence of essence 
remains absent. 
If for Plato, the material (unreal) and non-material (real) worlds are separate, the icon 
then essentially brings both worlds together into one single reality. Plato’s dualistic view comes 
from his mistrust in the visible phenomena that portrays the material existence of the eikōn-
appearance as an instance of non-being (unreal) and its non-material existence as an instance of 
being (real). The Byzantine holistic view of reality (as it was developed based on the Byzantine 
canons in the post-Iconoclastic era) comes from associating the instance of being in the eikōn-
appearance to the image of Christ as essence, and the materiality of the eikōn-appearance to the 
icon’s existential role of carrying the imprint/form of Christ’s image. Particularly, the Byzantine 
iconophiles (those who loved the icons) justified the existence of the non-being (unreal) part of 
the eikōn-appearance through the Incarnational logic of the icon: the Son of God became 
flesh/form, thus uniting (but not mixing) the divine essence and material substance.28 The 
Incarnational construction of the Byzantine icon merges the two irreconcilable, Platonic aspects 
of the eikōn-appearance by declaring them both necessary and real as follows: 1) the eikōn-
appearance-being stands for the participation (presence) of the invisible image/divine essence of 
Christ in the icon and 2) the eikōn-appearance-non-being stands for the participation of matter as 
an imprint (absence as form) of the invisible image (Christ’s presence).  
The manifestation of the divine image’s form (eikōn-appearance-being) in materiality 
(eikōn-appearance-non-being) is a tension “between absence and presence” that “lurks on the 
icon’s surface” to underline the participatory role of the beholder in bringing both the visible and 
invisible into one existence.29 Christ’s image is not realistically seen as real-presence or 
symbolically seen through a Platonic copy of an original, but acknowledged as absent in the 
icon’s imprint of form through the direct and tangible interaction between the icon’s wood panel 
and the human body.30 The Byzantine image stays ontologically transparent31 in order to saturate 
                                                
28 I will return to the Christological/ontological argument when discussing John of Damascus’s defense of 
the icon, which is based on the fundamental teaching that “the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we 
beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth” (John 1:14, American 
Standard Version (ASV)). 
29 Pentcheva, “The Performative Icon,” 632. 
30 This form of action mimics the invisible image (the memory of God incarnate). It should not be 
understood too hastily as a mimetic representation of the original (Incarnational) event, but rather as an interaction 
intended to manifest the divine as present.  
 19 
the material substance of the icon (the painted object) with divine presence (essence) for an 
image cannot be seen—thus, avoiding the ontological paradox of the image. By extension, the 
Byzantine icon is not an embodied (circumscribed) or a disembodied symbol, but a hand-made 
physical object that mimetically records a trace of the invisible image in the material phenomena. 
Referring to the essential role of the viewers’ physical engagement with the icon in feeling the 
absence of presence, the art historian Bissera Pentcheva clarifies that there is a difference in 
meaning between the Byzantine icon as a portable wood panel painting32 and the wider 
description that includes various visual media, from large-scale paintings and mosaics to small-
scale coins and seals.33 Compared to the monumental and other iconic representations that are 
designed mostly for public and narrative/didactical use, such as for political, 
ceremonial/commemorative, or commercial reasons, the wooden panel icon is precisely crafted 
to engage the worshiper into a direct tangible and intimate experience through gazing, hearing, 
touching, kissing (aspasmos), holding, bowing (proskynesis), and smelling. My particular 
attention to the practice of portable wood panel painting is given for its rich pallet of material 
and symbolic elements that are specifically choreographed by the Byzantine iconographer for its 
devotional/liturgical role of performing mimetically the logic of Incarnation—a solitary, 
epistemological, and hierotopic view on the use of images that is essential for investigating the 
meaning of the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision at the artistic level. 
The defense of the Byzantine icon was articulated in two subsequent stages of 
interpretation: the ontological position (seeing the icon in terms of God’s being) initiated by John 
of Damascus (ca. 675-749 CE) and the shift towards the epistemological definition (using the 
icon as a mode of thinking/knowing God) as developed by Patriarch Nikephoros (ca. 750-828 





                                                                                                                                                       
31 Pentcheva, “The Performative Icon,” 632. As I will explain in this thesis, the Byzantine sense of the word 
image refers to a natural invisible image that is different from an artificial visible image of a two-dimensional 
picture or a three-dimensional object (Mondzain 74).  
32 The essential (mimetic) role of the icon-maker in bringing to presence the iconic event of the Incarnation 
will be explained in the next section 1.2.2.2 The epistemological position of the image: the symbolic-realistic vision. 
33 Pentcheva, “The Performative Icon,” 631. 
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1.2.2.1 The ontological position of the image 
 
The ontological justification of the icon aimed at resolving the dispute regarding God’s 
nature in relation to invisibility (essence) and visibility (material substance). Connecting the 
Incarnation of Christ with the icon, John of Damascus offers an essentialist explanation 
concerning the rightness of hand-made representations of the holy: 
 
When the invisible becomes visible in the flesh, then you may depict the likeness of 
something seen; when one who, by transcending his own nature, is bodiless, formless, 
incommensurable, without magnitude or size, that is, one who is in the form of God, 
taking the form of a slave, by this reduction to quantity and magnitude puts on the 
characteristics of a body, then depict him on a board and set up to view the One who has 
accepted to be seen.34 
 
Damascene’s Christological argument addresses the issue of Christ’s being both human 
and divine through Incarnation. This dual nature of Christ provides an ontological legality to the 
material form of icons in the face of those who emphasize only His divine nature. If Jesus lived 
as a historical person, having the physical form of a human some 2000 years ago, then He is not 
without a visible image. Subsequently, His likeness, expressed in material form through icons, is 
a valid, non-idolatrous, way to be remembered by a believer—thereby linking, through a spiritual 
experience, the perceptible and intelligible worlds.  
 For Damascene, the image of Christ manifests the Godhead to humanity. Since “the 
image of Christ is Christ”35 and the icon imitates and incarnates His image, the icon is similar to 
Christ’s presence in the world. To avoid accusations of idolatry, Damascene carefully 
differentiates the image (Christ) from the prototype (Father): Christ is the physical “image of the 
Father,…equal to him in every respect, differing only in being caused. For the Father is the 
natural cause, and the Son is caused; for the Father is not from the Son, but the Son from the 
Father.”36 In this line of thought, the image and prototype are mutually necessary, nonetheless 
clearly distinguished for the reason that “the image of the emperor is called the emperor, yet 
there are not two emperors.”37 Damascene also differentiates between the veneration of image-
                                                
34 Saint John of Damascus, Three Treatises on the Divine Images, Trans. Andrew Louth, (New York: St 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003), 24. 
35 Ibid., 42. 
36 Ibid., 25. 
37 Ibid. 
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matter (Christ offered in the icon) and the adoration of God. The Creator of matter is worshiped 
by honoring the matter that formed Christ’s image to save humanity. 
Nevertheless, in identifying the icon with Christ’s body, in the sense that it possesses or 
incarnates His image as real-presence, the ontological case remained susceptible to 
epistemological concerns of idolatry. For instance, the iconoclast position of the Council of 
Hiereia (754) did not focus on the attack of the icon as a blasphemous image that affirms the 
presence of God; instead, it claimed that the making and viewing of the icon is an inadequate 
method of knowing and venerating God. According to Hiereia, the icon should be an 
interiorization rather than an externalization of Christ’s image in a lifeless object. This is an 
epistemological critique over ontological concerns regarding the right way to venerate the 
prototype. The main objections to Damascene’s Incarnational logic of the icon were that it 
circumscribed and confused the divine and human elements of Christ.38 The knowledge of God, 
limited to an icon that is composed of matter, circumscribes the transcendental essence to the 
materiality of substances. Correspondingly, a painting of Christ's flesh, made out of pigments 
and other earthly materials, breaks Christ's hypostatic union by mistaking His divinity for His 
humanity or by totally splitting apart His dual nature.  
By the end of the ninth century, which marks the final defeat of the Byzantine 
iconoclasts, the defense of the icon focused more on the epistemological nature of rituals and 
how the veneration or prostration before the matter of the image is directed towards the 
prototype. There is a major shift in Patriarch Nicephorus and St. Theodore the Studite’s (759-
826) redefinition of the Incarnational arguments to consider the image as fundamentally without 
material substance (entirely invisible). This epistemological position on icons (rooted 
ontologically in the logic of Incarnation) enabled an economical39 relation between the invisible 
image (the eikōn-appearance-being of Christ), visual image (the medium or eikōn-appearance-
                                                
38 Elsner, "Iconoclasm as Discourse,” 379. 
39 Stemming from Paul’s writings, the term economy, in its broader sense, refers to the relation between 
humanity and God, whereby the image of Christ is the fundamental link between the invisible and visible, Trinity 
and human. Also, the Incarnational economy, in which the Son and the Holy Spirit manifests in the historical time 
and space “the secret will of the economy [that] ‘organizes unity into trinity,’ invests the icon with a 
political/administrative power to form the Christian community (Mondzain 26)—an aspect that will be elaborated in 
the next section 1.2.3 The Byzantine view about economy. Mondzain summarizes the Christian concept of economy 
in the following terms: “From Paul onward, the economy designated not only the Second Person of the Trinity 
[Christ manifesting the economy of the Godhead], but the whole of the redemptive plan, from the conception of the 
Virgin to the resurrection, including Christ's evangelical life and the passion. The notion of a divine plan with the 
aim of administering and managing fallen creation, and thus of saving it, makes the economy interdependent with 
the whole of creation from the beginning of time” (21). 
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non-being) and the model (the Godhead or prototype) that liberated the discourse of iconoclasm 
from the Platonic issue of mimesis. From the attack on the visual image as referencing or 
containing a model, the subject matter had become the visual economy of the icon in relation to 
notions of mimesis and performance—terms that are outlined and explained next in their 
Byzantine sense.  
 
 
1.2.2.2 The epistemological position of the image: the symbolic-realistic vision 
 
When Nicephorus questioned the mimetic logic of the image inherited from the Greek 
philosophical tradition, he disputed that the icon’s reference to a model implies a direct relation 
of identity, in the sense that the goal of a copy is always to replicate an original. What the icon 
offers, instead, is a novel way to deal with the iconoclastic issue of real-presence in 
representation through God’s Trinitarian logic of relations between persons (God as one will, but 
triple in organization: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Specifically, the Trinitarian economy 
that organizes God’s inner, inseparable unity of the three Persons is translated into the iconic 
realm as the prototype (Father), the image (Son) and the voice (Holy Spirit).40 It is important to 
mention here that since my focus in this section is on the image per say, I will limit my 
discussion on the Trinitarian economy to the icon’s Incarnational economy of the Son’s image. 
The structure of the icon reveals the triple union of the divine persons by subsuming “the 
properly imaginal character of…the Son and his redemptive iconicity.”41 The icon’s formal 
likeness (also called the Son’s artificial image or type) of the Son’s natural image (which is 
                                                
40 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 77. For Nicephorus, the Trinity relates to the icon as follows: “Just as 
the Persons are one and not removed from each other in the Trinity, so the Father [prototype], his image [Son], and 
his voice [Holy Spirit] are united in the icon…(Mondzain 105). The Trinitarian unity is organized in the icon based 
on the mode of understanding the imaginal (figural) aspect of the Incarnation without depending on the referential 
thinking between signs and significations. Instead of connecting the notion of image to meaning via the referential 
sign, Nicephorus regards the image as directly connected to meaning. Following this thought, the Father has a non-
referential relation to the icon through the Son’s image that is depicted through the human form (morphé)—a form 
understood as a trace of presence left as absence on the surface of the icon. Moreover, the “incarnation of the 
Father’s Word” is affirmed in the beholders’ space by the “breath of the Holy Spirit” through a homonymic relation 
with inscription of the Son’s name (epigraph) in the icon (Mondzain 105-107). Mondzain explains that “by means of 
the epigraph’s voice, the image pronounces itself” (102). Likewise, the monadic and dronic Byzantine music that 
accompanies the veneration of the icon has a homonymic reference to the voice of the Holy Spirit that “rests only on 
the rhythms of breathing (pneuma) (Mondzain 107). I will return to the icon’s homonymic relation to the Holy Spirit 
when discussing the term hierotopy in Chapter 3.  
41 Ibid., 27.  
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identical to the Father’s divine essence) brings to the beholder’s presence the invisible face of the 
Father (the prototype) through the Holy Spirit (the “source of the incarnational operation”).42 It 
follows then that the natural image is the essential similitude between the Son and Father, apart 
from the Son’s incarnate form. Moreover, the icon carries His human form, which closely links 
the human nature to the image of God. In Genesis 1:26–27, God said: “Let us make mankind in 
our [the plural our stands for the Trinitarian unity] image, in our likeness” and, therefore, “God 
created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he 
created them.”43 Humanity is the image of Trinity and this “imaginal…relationship of 
similitude” defines the formula of the Byzantine economy, which I further explore in the next 
section. By the same token, Nicephorus understands the Incarnation not as an “in-corporation” 
but as an ”in-imagination.”44   
The likeness between the divine and human makes humanity an integral part in the 
historical manifestation of the Trinitarian economy. The role of humanity in fulfilling the 
Incarnational economy is, then, to mimic their shared image with God. The image is not a 
signifier or a signified, but the knowledge acquired through the crossing of the human and divine 
gazes in the icon—it is the highest form of knowledge that envisages human nature as a divine 
mystery. Said differently, the icon calls two gazes (the human eye and the Trinitarian eye) to 
contemplate their common image visualized through Christ’s in-imagination. This reciprocal 
contemplation is what Nicephorus understands by mimesis: it is a “christic mimetic…act by 
which the image [of the human] rejoins the image [of the divine], because it is the image [of the 
human and divine] that is the prototype.”45  
Like in the relationship between the icon’s materiality and Son’s form, the relation 
between the Son’s image and His prototype (the Father) does not follow the logic of 
referentiality between two elements that impose a separation through representation. Instead, 
they have an intimate consubstantial relation, which Nicephorus calls schesis.46 The meaning of 
schesis defines the casual relation of love between the Father and the Son at the level of the 
natural invisible image (the Father is the cause of the Son), which, in turn, establishes the 
intimate relation of the artificial image’s form (type) to its symbolic content (prototype) in an 
                                                
42 Ibid.  
43 New International Version (NIV). 
44 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 77. 
45 Ibid., 84.  
46 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology, 37.  
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iconic representation.47 According to fourth-century Cappadocian Father Basil of Caesarea, the 
Son (the image’s form) relates to the Father (the image’s content) in the same sense that when:  
 
We speak of a king, and of the king's image…[we do not speak] of two kings. The 
majesty is not cloven in two, nor the glory divided. The sovereignty and authority over us 
is one, and so the doxology ascribed by us is not plural but one; because the honour paid 
to the image passes on to the prototype. Now what in the one case the image is by reason 
of imitation, that in the other case the Son is by nature; and as in works of art the likeness 
is dependent on the form, so in the case or the divine and uncompounded nature the union 
consists in the communion of the Godhead.48 
 
In analyzing the above quote in order to define the Byzantine theology of the image, 
Mondzain connects the Christ’s hypostatic image and His artificial visible image to “the king and 
the image of the king.”49 This parallelism clarifies how the Christian economy works as a 
“science of relations and relative terms” among the invisible and visible realities.50 In particular, 
Mondzain explains that the word king connects the image of the king with the original king in a 
homonymic way.51 While the form of the word is the same—that is, the king and his image are 
both called the king—the material substance of the king and the material substance of his 
representation are different. This association, pronounced through the same word/form king, does 
not imply that the original king is duplicated in his image as a different identity. As Theodore 
puts it, “obviously we do not contemplate Peter’s form, for example, in Paul; nor conversely 
does anyone see Paul’s form in Peter’s form.”52 At the level of the image, there is only one 
source for the identity that is consolidated in the economic relation of schesis between form and 
symbolic content. And the identity is preserved from a union between the utterance of the word, 
the image’s form and the prototype signified without claiming the real-presence or total absence 
of the signified in a representation. Accordingly, the Son does not signify the Father; He is the 
resemblance of the prototype that takes the form of an imprint in the icon (type) to reveal the 
Father. The natural image stays invisible and the form marks its presence in the artificial visible 
image (the icon). Hence, it is impossible to worship the natural image alone, without the artificial 
                                                
47 According to the Orthodox doctrine, “the Son was generated (Gr. proienai) eternally by the Father, while 
the Spirit proceeded (Gr. ekporeuesthai) from the Father” (Manastireanu, 177).  
48 Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit, XVIII.45. accessed January 19, 2015, 
http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/basil_spiritu_18.html 
49 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 30. 
50 Ibid., 20. 
51 Mondzain defines a “homonymic relation” as “an equivalence of signs in the unity of the signified” (77). 
52 St. Theodore the Studite, On the Holy Icons, Trans. Catharine P. Roth, (New York: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press Crestwood, 1981), 105. 
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image’s form. 
The invisibility of the image is realized by its “relative comprehension” in the process of 
icon painting.53 Specifically, it leaves, through the hands of the iconographer, an absence of its 
presence in the visible. Rather than aiming to replace a Platonic model with a quantitative or 
qualitative copy, the icon painter performs on the materiality of the icon (the artificial visible 
image) the mimetic act of imitating and marking the form of Christ’s natural invisible image. 
The representation of the form is not an end in itself, but it turns into a method of recognizing 
that the image is absent. What is presented to the viewer, then, acts as a likeness of the image 
without claiming equivalence to the essence (real-presence)—the type is a likeness that does not 
substitute for the divine.  
So, the trace of Christ’s body in the icon is an impression (type) that has a non-
essentialist connection to His image for the reason that they (the icon and the image) are not 
united through divine essence, but through form.54 By receiving Christ’s form like a wax sealed 
stamp, which is the absence (negative) of His image’s physical (positive) form, the icon becomes 
a likeness of the image’s presence (instead of a copy of a form)—a presence seen as absence. 
Correspondingly, the icon is also an acknowledgment of Christ’s absence. In this non-essentialist 
manifestation of absence and presence in the icon, the Greek concept of mimesis transforms 
from a matter of observing a signifier as separated from its signified into a mode of knowing “the 
image of that Trinity in man.”55 This epistemological approach was Nicephorus’ response to 
Aristotelian notion of relation as pros ti, which implies that a signified comes always before a 
signifier. For example, according to pros ti a son is logically linked to his father based on a 
distance imposed by two succeeding identities—that is, the son comes into existence after the 
father. Conversely, in the relation of schesis, the Father is not detached from His Son, but 
directly seen in His Son. The Father is intimately acknowledged in the Son “because homoïosis 
[the artificial image’s “formal resemblance” to the natural image] is a knowledge  (gnosis), [and] 
the model cannot, therefore participate in the same type of anteriority as the object of science 
itself.”56 This implies that the image imprinted in the icon does not have a relation of identity 
with the prototype. Instead, the prototype transforms the icon into a living (as opposed to an 
                                                
53 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 75. 
54 See especially Theodore of Stoudios, Antirrheticus II, sec. 11, in PG, vol. 99, col. 357D and Bissera, 
“The Performative Icon,” 634. 
55 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 28.  
56 Ibid., 87.  
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analytical) relation.57 A viewer’s Byzantine mimetic behavior before an icon is, then, a relation 
of schesis in which the prototype is not seen as a separate identity existing in the past, but 
simultaneously participating with the type (the imprint of form) in the icon.  
In light of Nicephorus’ epistemological view of mimesis, it can be said that the matter of 
the icon is an object to think with58 in which the image withdraws itself to inform the beholder of 
the presence of an absence. The term withdrawal refers to the interaction between absence and 
presence that “lurks on the icon's surface…a tension that will be resolved in the icon's 
performance (mimesis): the way it plays with appearances before the faithful.”59 The 
performance of the icon expresses the Byzantine visual economy at its pictorial level in the 
sensorial realm that is present, transforming, material, and tangible. The icon’s performance is 
something that I unveil in the practical component of this thesis. What this study offers is a new 
epistemological method of subjectively engaging with iconic images that is largely unexplored in 
the academic discourse60 concerning the complex of iconoclastic attitudes within our screen 
media culture. The Byzantine iconic method, as I am using and discussing it in Chapter 4, stems 
directly from my life experience of painting traditional icons for Christian orthodox churches and 
monasteries in Romania. I have learned how Byzantine icons perform in rituals to induce a 
feeling that something powerful and invisible is present in the physical space (an iconic vision). 
In experiencing the interesting situation of seeing viewers prostrate before the icons I had made, 
I was left with a longing to paint more icons and understand how viewers connect to images in 
general. However, the monastic experience of seeing my icon-work venerated seems to be quite 
a challenging viewing experience in our commercialized visual culture. For this reason, I turned 
to contemporary artistic techniques to further explore the feeling of an iconic vision and how this 
vision functions in today’s spectacle of screen mediated images. And in doing so, I present the 
importance of literally including the Byzantine notion of performance in the academic 
framework regarding the topic of the icon in particular, and the notion of image in general. 
According to Theodore, the mimetic role of the icon-maker is crucial in the epistemological 
understanding of the icon. Particularly, in revealing how the icon manifests Christ’s form 
                                                
57 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology, 38. 
58 Jaś Elsner, "Iconoclasm as Discourse,” 385. 
59 Pentcheva, “The Performative Icon,” 632. 
60 The term discourse is used here in the way James Clifford described it: an analysis that is not interested 
“in what they [authors] have to say or feel as subjects, but is concerned merely with statements as related to other 
statements in a field” (270). 
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without circumscribing and confusing the divine nature: “the crafted icon modeled after its 
prototype brings the likeness of the prototype into matter and participates in its form by means of 
the thought of the…[iconographer] and the impress of his hands.”61 There are two steps for the 
appearance of the form on matter: firstly, the icon-maker sees the form of the prototype, as it is 
preserved through the Byzantine canonical painting techniques since the earliest known 
depictions of Christ in the sixth century—the time when symbols such as the lamb or Cross were 
replaced with Christ’s human form. Some of Byzantine visual canons of making an image 
integrate the eternal prototype, reverse perspective, light, color, and gesture. Once the image 
stamps its form in the icon-maker’s memory and the breath of the Holy Spirit touches his/her 
thoughts, the second stage is to imprint (hand made) or perform the likeness of the image, “like a 
seal” in wax, onto the surface of a wood panel.62   
The iconic depiction of Christ is not a simple, static painting or a historical museum item; 
it is a living image. The icon has a face of its own (his/her own gaze) that looks back at the 
believer’s face (a crossing of the gazes that will be discussed later in relation to Jean-Luc 
Marion’s phenomenology). Specifically, the icon performs the Incarnational economy directly 
with the viewer to construct a (symbolic-realistic) mode of seeing the image that is not entirely 
imaginary (symbolic) and not totally naturalistic (realistic). In considering the rules of Byzantine 
iconography through my icon practice, the close connection between the experiences of making 
and viewing an icon becomes apparent. Each of these acts, for example, are performed from the 
perspective of a symbolic-realistic mode of seeing; that is, both viewers and makers of an icon 
recognize the icon as (1) a realistic depiction of a person and (2) as an abstract symbol. It is a 
hypostatic fusion between the abstract and concrete in the icon that allows for the appearance of 
the divine without claiming real-presence in the visible.  
As noted, Byzantine iconography engages a symbolic-realistic mode of seeing. Byzantine 
icons are intended to appear as a palpable absence of a metaphysical state revealing a “hypostasis 
of the spiritual and the material.”63 To engage these icons in a fitting manner, then (that is, to 
experience the transcendent as present), requires that viewers balance both symbolic (seeing 
through a screen) and realistic (seeing the screen itself) modes of seeing. Referring on the 
                                                
61 St. Theodore the Studite, qtd. in Pentcheva, “The Performative Icon,” 634.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Eric Jenkins, "My iPod, My iCon: How and Why do Images Become Icons?" Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 25. no. 5 (2008): 470. 
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viewing of icons, Eric Jenkins defines symbolic-realism as seeing with the divine eye.64 In 
Byzantine iconography, this divine eye sees with both the physical and the mental components of 
the eye by creating a union of (1) subject and content, and (2) object and form, both at the 
physical level in space and time. Such a union makes the icon “neither wholly secular nor sacred, 
neither body nor spirit, neither concrete nor abstract, neither mere appearance nor mere 
representation, neither grossly material nor solely symbolic.”65 Ultimately, by its tangible display 
of a transcendental experience, the icon encourages a viewer's participation in an incomplete 
scenario where (prior to the viewing of the icon) the missing component is the viewer him- or 
herself. The scenario becomes complete only when the viewer performs the ritual of seeing the 
icon in a manner that completes the lack of divine’s real-presence within the icon (which is 
accomplished through the direct interaction with a screen for representation). The symbolic-
realistic mode of seeing enables viewers to revere the sacred message of an image by taking part 
in the void of that image, thereby deflecting any negative ideological implications that an 
image—as an image made by human hands—might carry. 
Therefore, Byzantine mimesis problematizes metaphysical issues to mimesis based solely 
on a relationship to the real through analogies that stress either the viewer’s perception (realistic) 
or the mind’s eye (imaginative/symbolic). The icon’s mimesis is not limited to the imagistic 
quality of material substances in simulating or reproducing (symbolically or realistically) an 
essence. Instead, Byzantine mimesis is located in a temporal space through a synergy between 
the viewers and Christ’s invisible image imprinted on the icon to perform His appearance in the 
present time. Again, it is necessary to specify here that for the Byzantines, the term appearance 
does not refer to showing an illusion or reality in itself. The holy trace (the presence of absence) 
is not an appearance defined by a Platonic distance between a copy and model, as this would 
place the Incarnational economy of the icon under a metaphysical mode of thinking that 
questions the real-presence in the image. As the trace of Christ’s appearance, the Byzantine icon 
lacks the real-presence of essence, thus avoiding accusations of idolatry. Since Christ’s 
hypostatic nature overcomes the separation of mortality and immortality, being and non-being, 
His iconic appearance is unveiled in belief through a symbolic-realistic vision that eludes 
description and the Platonic notion of appearance-being. I now turn my attention to the icon’s 
                                                
64 Ibid., 481. 
65 Léonide Ouspensky, Theology of the Icon. Trans. Anthony Gythiel. (1. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1992a), 178. 
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economy in forming a Christian community.  
 
 
1.2.3 The Byzantine view about economy  
 
As it will become apparent throughout this thesis, the term symbolic-realism (discussed 
in the previous section) parallels Marie-Jose Mondzain’s theological account of the Byzantine 
iconic economy of vision. She argues that the icon was at the center of all political, social, and 
ritualistic relations in Byzantine society.66 The economy of faith positions the divine authority in 
the world as present in a way that avoids metaphysical idolatry. This parallel between presence 
and sovereignty is realized by investing the image of Christ with economical organization over 
both realms of mortality and immortality. In this economical relation between God and 
humanity, the iconicity of Incarnation becomes the key element in forming and administrating 
the Christian community. 
It is essential to clarify that the Christian use of the word economy differs from its 
modern, secularized interpretation that originates from Aristotle’s pragmatic law of organizing 
the household. The Aristotelian concept of economy—a term that combines oikos (household) 
and nomos (law)—is limited to the management and distribution of wealth within the earthly 
world of substances, which legitimates unequal social relations based on the master-slave logic. 
The church fathers reversed this worldly order of inequality to establish a new political and 
social economy founded on the historical event of Incarnation:  “all are equal, including slaves; 
all are ‘brothers,’ including women; church administrators are not masters, but themselves 
‘slaves’ who do God's work.”67 In the Byzantine society, the iconophile emperor was not 
perceived as emanating divine power, but as having the divine duty to bring “into alliance the 
economy of belief and the economy of power.”68 In prostrating before the icon and subjecting 
himself to the Incarnational economy, the emperor received a sovereign power to merge 
temporal and eternal economies69—a viewpoint that was used in the defense of icons by the 
                                                
66 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 18-66.  
67 Susan Buck-Morss, “Visual Empire” Diacritics, 37. 2/3 (2007): 175. 
68 Ibid., 178. Mondzain states that “God is the first King and natural legislator. The king only becomes him 
by imitation” (165). 
69 In the political philosophy of the icon, the Aristotelian and Incarnational economies are combined so that 
"the theocracy of the visual becomes the key to all authority" (Mondzain 166). 
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Church against the imperial policies that triggered the Byzantine iconoclasm.  
In Byzantium, coins were minted with Christ and the emperor’s face on each side.70 This 
is not to say that the iconic economy was an instrument for political authorities to manipulate the 
masses. The very Byzantine image of power (Christ, the sovereign figure) stays invisible. As a 
result, the iconophile emperor did not have control over the presence of truth or real in 
representation. Without an authority over the image, the earthly rulers cannot be the presence of 
a true power—a fundamental condition for the legitimization of authority to receive the 
obedience of the citizens. If power is denied or validated according to the ruler’s ability to create 
his/her own reign of images, then the imperial order that is faithful to the Incarnation cannot lay 
claim to the world for its own good. Mondzain also emphasizes this point when analyzing the 
imperial reason behind the attack on icons: “what interests the iconoclast emperors is to become, 
in the name of a fight against idols, the absolute masters of political, juridicial, administrative 
and military representation, and the sole practitioners of earthly mimesis.”71  
To this end, all icon venerators take part in the Christian economy “[f]or the people as a 
whole, the sign of the cross would have to suffice; for the clergy, the celebration of the 
Eucharistic sacrament; for the king, administration and justice.”72 Since humans embody the 
image of God, the icon calls for the participation in one visual economy to form a sacred space 
(hierotopy). The contemporary art historian, Alexei Lidov has already reconstructed the icon’s 
performance as a hierotopic engagement of viewers in space to recall the image of God and 
preserve the memory of Incarnation. And, it is this creative mode of enacting the image of the 
divine in a contemporary visual context that will be explored in the next section and throughout 







                                                
70 “The folding of spiritual power into the religious economy finds expression in the public visibility of 
belief that reached a high point under Justinian I, whose image is depicted as mirroring that of Christ” (Buck-Morss 
177). 
71 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 165. 
72 Ibid. 
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1.2.4 The Byzantine view about the sacred space and Contemporary hierotopy 
 
God paid a great price for you. So use your body to honor God.73 
 
The term performance and its transformative power frequently comes into play in the 
recent spatial/hierotopic redefinition of the Byzantine theory of image.74 Art historians Alexei 
Lidov (2011), Bissera Pentcheva (2006), and Nicoletta Isar (2009) link the iconic performance of 
a sacred space (hierotopy) with the icon’s living economical bond between the image and the 
human body that is grounded in the visible reality.  
Lidov has originally coined the term hierotopy to define a Byzantine creative way of 
making or performing a sacred space that is similar to “pictorial, literary, musical or other arts.”75 
The meaning of hierotopy is taken as an act of doing sacred images in a physical space, rather 
than a mode of analyzing and describing various (historical, phenomenological, etc.) aspects of 
the sacred. Lidov’s understanding of hierotopic creativity is based on an epistemological inquiry 
into the role of the Byzantine iconographer to direct and visualize the Incarnational narrative 
while guiding the faithful in the attainment of that vision. Thus, he compares the Byzantine 
activity of creating sacred spaces in interior or exterior public locations, as in Orthodox churches 
or outdoor (profane) markets during religious ceremonies, with the role of a contemporary film 
director in staging a film’s artistic, conceptual, and technical features. Moreover, a hierotopy is 
formed when the icon performs like a living being (image) to create an environment in which 
audio, visual, and tactile human perceptions become integral parts and in continual movement 
                                                
73 1 Corinthians 6:20, Contemporary English Version (CEV). 
74 The word performance will appear often in this thesis. This word is considered in a wide spectrum of 
disciplines from humanities to social sciences. At the center of performance studies is the concept of performativity, 
which originates from theater studies, anthropology and philosophy of language (some of the primary leading 
figures are the anthropologist Victor Turner, the theatre scholar Richard Schechner, and the philosopher Jhon L. 
Austin). As I mentioned in footnote 7, I employ Erika Fisher-Lichte’s meaning of performativity as she applies it to 
contemporary art performances. For Fisher-Lichte, the sense perception becomes the foundational aesthetic resource 
for the performative act. And the performative act is defined by its innate power to break the traditional 
meaning/function of a performance to represent a story, myth, or an original event. Although contradicting the 
Byzantine theology of the image, as it will become apparent in the next section, 1.2.5 A form of performativity in 
the Byzantine performance, Fisher-Lichte’s account of performativity in relation to the self-referentiality of physical 
acts offers an interesting perspective on both the construction of the Byzantine icon and its transition into an event.  
75 Alexei Lidov, The Comparative Hierotopy, Ed. A. Lidov. (Moscow, 2006), 12-13. In 2001, Lidov 
introduced the notion of hierotopy–a term that merges two Greek words hieros (sacred) and topos (place, space, 
notion). A hierotopic space is a sacred space formed through the interaction of the icon and beholder in the physical 
space—I call this interaction an iconic vision. Nonetheless, hierotopy is a term that emphasizes more the importance 
of the Byzantine iconographer’s artistic skills in making the icons to facilitate such an iconic interaction in 3D 
spaces. 
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with a feeling of divine presence. As Pentcheva notes, the icon's performance saturates all senses 
of the faithful through a play of absence/appearance and presence/essence at its material 
surface.76  
Nicoletta Isar employs the hierotopic vision to offer a new approach to the field of 
performance and installation art in revealing how traditional rituals (modes of incarnating the 
invisible through rituals as a process of cleansing) are readapted to revitalize the transformative 
power of contemporary ritual performances. She believes that the Byzantine icon’s performance 
provides essential analytical and practical means for the contemporary aesthetic eye to discover a 
“metaphysics of presence”77 (the sacred) that is performed in hidden and unconventional ways. 
However, this hierotopic analysis should not be an aim of demonstrating that contemporary 
performances have the power to embed the sacred to the point of claiming real-presence. Such an 
endeavor is bound to the ontological paradox of the image discussed above—an iconoclastic 
implication of art performances that is of little concern to Isar. The task is, then, to develop a 
new resourceful aesthetic vocabulary obtained from the Byzantine hierotopic elements of space, 
representation, body, and image that would help to comprehend how contemporary attempts to 
reveal a sense of a real-presence employ “transcendental signifiers” and “ritual patterns”78—art 
performances that break boundaries between the subject and object, artist and audience, thereby 
creating a transformative event. What the Byzantine icon has in common with contemporary art 
is the mode of creating imagery in the tangible space by directly engaging the viewers into the 
act of creation—a mode of meaning-making that brings the absence of the image into presence, 
thus forming an event.79 Referring to the relation between multimedia and performance art and 
the icon, Lidov states that:  
                                                
76 Pentcheva, “The performative icon,” 632. I will return to this argument in 1.2.5 A form of performativity 
in the Byzantine performance, when comparing and contrasting the icon’s performance to the art performance’s 
performative/transformative aspect as it stems from its Austian sense. 
77 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play,” Discourse of the Human Sciences // Writing and Difference. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 280–281.   
78 Nicoletta Isar, "Vision and Performance. A Hierotopic Approach to Contemporary Art," Hierotopy. 
Comparative studies of sacred spaces, ed. A. Lidov, (Moscow: Indrik, 2009): 329-330. 
79 The Byzantines did not perceive the icon as art. Buck-Morss explains that the discipline of art history has 
generally treated the icon as a Christian aesthetic object, which provides an incomplete understanding of how the 
icon’s visual economy works. That is, the two mimetic levels of correlations between Father (prototype) - Son 
(image), and Son - icon (type). Indeed, one can trace historically how the established Roman art underlined and gave 
an aesthetic Platonic framework (copy versus model) to the Byzantine visual culture. The historian Alain Besançon 
describes the various pagan imperial themes that were readapted to Christianity: “The philosopher became Christ, 
the apostle, or the prophet. The theme of imperial apotheosis was transformed into the Ascension of Christ. The 
offering of presents corresponded to the Adoration of the Magi, the adventus (the triumphal entrance of the 
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Byzantine ‘spatial icons,’ most unusual in modern European context, have a typological 
parallel in the contemporary art of performances and multi-media installations, which 
have nothing to do with the Byzantine tradition historically or symbolically. What they 
share is the basic principle of absence of a single source of images, the imagery is created 
in space by numerous dynamically changing forms. The most significant is the role of the 
beholder, who actively participates in the re-creation of the spatial imagery. All the 
differences of the contents, technologies and aesthetics notwithstanding, one may speak 
about one and the same type of the perception of images.80  
 
Based on the above argument that an artwork also performs in the physical space like an 
icon by mediating invisible images that make the world present to viewers, Isar investigates 
contemporary forms of hierotopy, ranging from experimental theater to body art and video 
performances. She explains, for example, how artists as Bill Viola and Marina Abramović 
develop a performative language of the image that breaks the boundary between the subject and 
object. The resulting spatial effect between image, artwork, viewers, and artist creates an 
event/ritual of presence (of absence) beyond symbolic referentiality (a Byzantine analysis that 
will be done in Chapter 4 of this dissertation). These adapted art forms of hierotopy allow for a 
broader range of what might constitute an icon’s performance, including criteria that represent 
specific technical, conceptual, commercial, and subjective imperatives. 
My concern, however, is that while contemporary art too may present its own version of 
hierotopy, artists who deviate too far from the Incarnational dimension of the image run the 
critical situation of creating works that impose notions of reality. Placing an emphasis on the role 
of the artist’s body (as in Abramović’s performances), requires a careful analysis of those 
hierotopic elements that transform the space of a gallery into an creative space. An artistic 
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereign) to Christ’s arrival in Jerusalem…. Just as artists represented [copied] the emperor and empress on their 
thrones [the model], surrounded by their entourage, they depicted Christ and the Virgin among the saints and 
angels” (110). However, this historical examination of the shift from the pagan to the Christian art limits the 
discussion of the icon to an aesthetic referential axis between a signifier and signified. For example, the art historian, 
Charles Barber, whose area of specialization is particularly focused on the Byzantine icon, takes this very aesthetic 
approach when resuming the defense of the icon to an artifact of a true “formal cause” that never comes from the 
icon makers’ artistic imagination (2002, 111). Barber pushes aside the core non-metaphysical argument of the 
economy: the appearance of the essences as presence of absence in substance before the believers gaze. And this 
economical aspect of the image responds to the ontological status of the image in general. All types of images 
(religious or secular) require a certain kind of faith/involvement in visualizing them. Otherwise, the image cannot be 
seen, analyzed, or said to exist. Lechte argues that the image is not “constituted by its non-differentiation (however 
minimal) with what is imaged” (40). In other words, even in a non-religious experience of the image, the viewer 
needs to filter what is imaged through a form of conviction. If the art historical analysis of the icon treats the image 
as an object (artifact) separate from the eye of the analyst, then the innate human condition of being immersed in the 
act of seeing is disregarded. 
80 Lidov, “Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces,” 42. 
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hierotopic project might approach the notion of the icon as an artifact/artwork or consider the 
hierotopic ritual as a presentation of the sacred that follows the referential (Platonic) logic of 
myth and ritual,81 thus constructing an artistic vision that is susceptible to iconoclastic debates 
and accusations of metaphysical idolatry. The question then arises, what are the effects of 
incorporating ritual forms of “incarnating the invisible” into a postmodern language of 
performance/art-installation that moved away “from ritual to anti-ritual of the very opposites: 
‘the very flaws, hesitations, personal factors, incomplete, elliptical situations.’”82 Are modern 
ritual performances as powerful as Byzantine rituals in presenting the invisible? Addressing 
these questions in this thesis through my own hierotopic practice (see video documentation, 
Portrait of an Icon Maker, Fig. 21)83 will directly respond to the study of the hierotopic 
phenomena by probing the limits and possibilities of the language of performance art to manifest 
and contain sacred dimensions. One of the goals of this dissertation is to show (under both the 
theoretical and practical framework) that an artistic form of iconic vision is inconceivable 
without the Byzantine (Incarnational) premise of the image: while the image always stays 
ontologically transparent, its visibility engages both 1) the bodily senses that make intimate our 
affectivity and 2) the hand-made icon, which implies the artistic capacity to signify and 
understand in a non-referential way concepts and symbols. In other words, there is no effective 
understanding of a contemporary form of hierotopy without a symbolic-realistic vision between 
the human body and a non-referential depiction of the image.   
It is possible to understand the concept of hierotopy in a postmodern re-contextualization 
of the Byzantine icon that combines performance theory and contemporary art, only after the 
icon’s performance of the economy is clearly outlined in relation to the notions of referentiality 
and performativity that drive contemporary artistic creativity. This topic will be taken up in the 
following section where I elaborate on the semioticity and materiality of the aesthetics of a 
performative act that transforms a work of art into an event. For delineating a performative 
feature of the Byzantine icon, I will look into the performative turn in the arts of which Erika 
Fisher-Lichte speaks—a transformative experience at the level of sensual perception. Building 
on such a performative view of the Byzantine icon (through my artistic practice and theoretical 
                                                
81 Here, ritual refers to the repetitive enactment of an original paradigmatic event (myth) in particular 
locations and times.  
82 Isar, "Vision and Performance,” 328. 
83 The video documentation can be viewed at: http://youtu.be/wvF-kDpBtk8. 
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investigations), I will put forth (in the last chapter) a series of hierotopic principles for 
establishing a set of iconic components that help to define a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired 
Iconic Vision. However, one of the main points of this dissertation is that although the creation 
of a Byzantine hierotopic event involves a certain level of artistic skill, the parallel between the 
icon and artworks must not be pressed too far, since the Incarnational economy can never be 
fully assimilated into the metaphysical aesthetics of the art. What is unique in the creative power 
of the Byzantine iconographer is the semiotic status of the hierotopic vision in making a living 
icon84 that equally integrates the performative and referential use of materiality. Specifically, the 
idea of a spatial living icon differs from Fisher-Lichte’s notion of art performance in the way it 
mediates a “quasi-consubstantial link to the prototype”85—an economy of the icon that was 
defined in Nicephorus’ epistemology. This is not a matter of proving that the Byzantine icon is 
more visually effective than a work of art at claiming the real-presence of an image. Once the 
non-metaphysical implications of the Byzantine nature of the image is understood, the analysis 
of those creative (hierotopic) energies in visual arts that challenge any metaphysical limitations 
(together with their subsequent iconoclastic critiques) will be an important step towards coming 
to grips with the role of today’s images (outside the specific Byzantine context) to actualize the 
world for us. That is, and as Mondzain also argues, to understand the fundamental function of the 
image in making the invisible (symbolic/absence) present (real) to human beings. 
 
 
1.2.5 A form of performativity in the Byzantine performance 
 
We have learned that for Plato, image (eikōn) is the appearance of essence in the 
limitation of the visible. For the Byzantines, image is the invisibility of essence that appears as 
absence in visibility. According to Fischer-Lichte’s analysis of the performative turn in the arts, 
contemporary discourses of performativity perceive the image as the visible itself. This section 
applies the term performativity to the Byzantine icon to see the theological and artistic 
possibilities and limitations in describing a contemporary artistic form of a Byzantine 
transformative vision. And for this, I will draw a parallel between the transformation of art into 
an event and the role of the icon’s performance in forming a hierotopic spatial effect. While I 
                                                
84 Lidov, “Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces,” 32. 
85 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 44. 
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will argue for a similarity between the Byzantine icon and the performative act in overcoming 
notion of dualism, I will also discuss how the image in Fischer-Lichte’s analysis of performance 
art is presented through a metaphysical limitation of the creative (performative) event to the role 
of the sensual perception.  
Fischer-Lichte’s point of departure is John L. Austin’s foundational definition of the 
performative utterance in speech acts,86 which regards the subject and object of the performance 
being “self-referential and constitutive of reality”—that is, neither of them can depend upon any 
predefined meaning assigned to them.87 From an Austinian view, a performance that refers to an 
original event (such as a narrative/script in a theater play) is illusory and does not bring anything 
transformative to reality. A true performance creates new realities based on the quality of 
(speech) acts to be performative: 
 
When the words “I name this ship the ‘Queen Elizabeth’” are uttered while a bottle is 
smashed against the stern of a ship or when a man speaks the words “I do [take this 
woman to be my lawful wedded wife]” in the course of a marriage ceremony, these 
statements do not simply assert a preexisting circumstance [an essence]…. Instead, these 
utterances create an entirely new social reality: the ship now carries the name Queen 
Elizabeth; Ms. X and Mr. Y are now married to each other. Uttering these sentences 
effectively changes the world. 88  
 
Differentiating between constative and performative utterances, Austin claims that 
“linguistic utterances not only serve to make statements but they also perform actions.”89 The 
term performative is applied by Fischer-Lichte to art performances today in particular relation to 
the physical acts of the artist and the spectators.90 These acts are a mode of seeing in which an 
object is perceived in its specific materiality and sensuality—that is, the object is seen as self-
                                                
86 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics, trans. Saskya Jain. 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 24. 
87 Ibid., 21. 
88 Ibid., 24. 
89 Ibid., 21 
90 Offering the example of Marina Abramović’s performance of Lips of Thomas, performed in 1975, 1993 
and 2005 at the Guggenheim Museum in New York, Fischer-Lichte points to the transformation of Abramović and 
her spectators into co-subjects in the experience of Abramović’s performance. Through a shifting relationship, she 
observes, (both of) their action(s) simultaneously determines the course of the art event. In the span of seven hours, 
Ambramović tested the limits of her body by consuming one kilogram of honey and one liter of red wine followed 
by whipping herself, cutting a five pointed star on her stomach and laying down in a crucified position on ice blocks 
shaped into a cross. Embedded with religious symbols, her performance ends when members of the audience cannot 
stand seeing her pain anymore and finally remove her. This intervention of the public into her performance 
challenged the modern relation between viewers and artworks. Also, the video documentation of cutting a star on 
herself with a razor blade became iconic in the history of performance art.  
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referential. When one perceives an object as self-referential, the secret meaning of the 
phenomenal world is unveiled “in and through the act of perception.”91 This tangible mode of 
seeing differs from that involved in a theatrical experience where the performance is secondary 
to the written screenplay—a similar visual experience might take place in front of a 
cinematic/televisual screen. According to Fischer-Lichte, the referential relationship between 
theatrical performance and text emerged from a tradition of religious studies that focused on the 
role of rituals to simply illustrate myth.92 In the “hierarchy of myth over ritual,” which is a 
Platonic relation between a copy and model, the object would only exist as a mere sign or 
artifact93—thus impeding the viewer’s experience of art as an event. Moreover, the traditional 
way of viewing a work of art (as a generator of signs waiting to be interpreted by viewers), 
creates a distance between the observer and the observed—a distance which blocks the 
possibility of a genuine transformative experience (for both sides). As opposed to a more passive 
engagement with the object of a performance, when an audience perceives the object of a 
performance as self-referential, that audience begins to assume an active role in the art itself; in 
this way, the audience is made a co-producer of the art event.  
Based on Austin’s linguistic philosophy, Fischer-Lichte classifies a real art performance 
in terms of materializing its own social/artistic event—the meaning of the image, in this case, 
corresponds to an understanding of materiality that supersedes its (predefined) semiotic values.  
Image, therefore, is the performance of the appearance without a connection to an authoritative 
essence. As a matter of fact, essence becomes the visible itself (image) and the ground for 
creativity turns into any performative act within spaces of representation that defines human 
activity, including the presentation of the self or “what was once perceived as ‘impure’” or 
idolic.94  
Although Fischer-Lichte’s analysis of performativity contradicts the Christian economy 
of the image (as invisible), an interpretation of performativity can be extracted to understand the 
role of perception in a contemporary hierotopic performance. Fischer-Lichte asserts that when a 
viewer directly engages in the process of creation, the binary opposition between an artist and a 
                                                
91 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance,17. 
92 Fischer-Lichte points out that a similar performative turn took place in religious studies at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, when ritual became the central point of research, instead of doctrinal texts, in explaining 
the social function of religion.  
93 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance, 30. 
94 Isar, "Vision and Performance,” 328.  
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spectator is destabilized.95 By establishing an oscillatory connection between a signifier and 
signified or an artist and viewer, an artistic event offers an audience the opportunity to undergo a 
metamorphosis which generates new meanings and identities. In order to be observed and 
decoded in this context, an art object must not function independently of either its creator or its 
viewer. This same form of participation takes place through the symbolic-realistic mode of 
seeing called upon by Byzantine iconography (where the beholder becomes engaged in the 
Incarnational event). The non-dualistic relationship between the artist and spectator in the 
performative act parallels the typical relationship between the icon and beholder in the way they 
create a transformative artistic/hypostatic experience. The difference, however, is that in the 
icon’s performance the symbolic (the predefined Incarnational meaning) significance of the icon 
is as important as its sensual (realistic) perception. In Fischer-Lichte’s de-semanticization thesis 
of performativity, symbolism is excluded by redefining the art performance as incorporating acts 
without referential meaning.96 Referring to the emergence of meaning in the performativity of an 
art performance, Fischer-Lichte states: 
 
Materiality does not act as a signifier to which this or that signified can be attributed. 
Rather, materiality itself has to be seen as the signified already given in the materiality 
perceived by the subject. To use a tautology, the thing’s materiality adopts the meaning 
of its materiality, that is, of its phenomenal being. What the object is perceived as is what 
it signifies.97 
 
The isolation of the materiality of an object from any preset contexts is essential for 
Fischer-Lichte to determine (in different ways) how the various elements of that object are 
perceived. The bodies of actors or performance artists (and other theatrical elements such as 
costumes, music, and dance) need to appear in their phenomenal being or self-referentiality in 
order to perform the performative act.98 When these elements are apprehended without any 
predefined meaning, a viewer is able to make a connection to new phenomena, ideas, feelings, 
and memories. It is clear that in Fischer-Lichte’s view, the icon’s Christian-symbolic meaning 
becomes an impediment to the performative act. But, this is true only if Nicephorus’ 
epistemological (non-metaphysical) defense of the icon is not taken into consideration. As 
previously stated, since the image (meaning) of the divine is revealed as presence of absence, the 
                                                
95 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance,17. 
96 Ibid., 140. 
97 Ibid., 141. 
98 Ibid. 
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icon does not impose a notion of reality and does not merely illustrate doctrinal teachings 
through the logic of referentiality. Hence, it is possible to apply the notion of performativity to 
the icon due to the Byzantine non-referential (economical) relation between the image and visual 
representations. I see that Austin’s theory of speech acts is equally relevant to understanding the 
symbolic-realistic way of seeing a Byzantine icon—of course, as long as the iconic viewing in 
the Byzantine hierotopic event is not considered a predefined act. Due to the economical logic of 
the Byzantine (invisible) image, the beholder performs the icon without relying on “pre-existing 
conditions, such as an inner essence, substance” and without expressing any “fixed, stable 
identit[ies]” and narratives.99 This is the same sense in which Fischer-Lichte describes the “de-
semanticized” appearance of a phenomenal being in a contemporary art performance.   
The performative understanding of the Byzantine icon helps to see how a hierotopic 
space might be constructed as a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. For example, 
on the one hand, Fischer-Lichte explains how Marina Abramović’s gesture in cutting a 
pentagram on her body in her performance Lips of Thomas was not interpreted by her viewers 
symbolically (that is, it was not understood as a Platonic representation of the historical or 
religious connotations of the geometrical shape). On the other hand, in respect of her gesture, 
Abramović’s performance “was not perceived as insignificant, but merely as that which it 
performed,” allowing for “an immense pluralization of potential meaning.”100 The multitude of 
potential meanings generated by this sort of art (as event) facilitates the viewers’ engagement in 
the art event itself. It is this engagement that eventually completes or fulfills the original scenario 
of an artwork. The semiotic possibilities opened up by the de-semanticization of the pentagram 
in Abramović’s performance offers an instructive basis of comparison with respect to the 
Byzantine elements employed non-referentially in the creation of hierotopy.  
To that end, this practice-oriented research treads very carefully when analyzing 
contemporary forms of transformative (iconic) visions (such as attempted by Fischer-Lichte’s 
analysis of Abramović’s work) through performative explications, acknowledging that artistic 
interpretations of hierotopy might still mediate images under a metaphysical mode of thought. In 
order to understand performativity as a way out of the division between the aesthetics of 
production—semioticity—of a piece of art (on one side), from the reception of that art—
                                                
99 Ibid., 27. 
100 Ibid., 140. 
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materiality—by viewers (on the other side), Fischer-Lichte relies on the truthfulness of the 
sensual perception. Human perception, therefore, becomes a new metaphysical imposition of a 
first-principle or prototype to claim the real-presence of the image. In other words, Fischer-
Lichte fails to acknowledge the nature of perception in constituting reality. The problem of 
perception in the notion of performativity parallels John Lechte’s critique of the contemporary 
semiotic approach to iconism:  
 
As concerns the icon, semiotics as [Umberto] Eco practices it is therefore caught up in a 
spiral of circularity: in an effort to prove the conventional and arbitrary character of all 
items classified as ‘iconic,’ recourse is made to the features of the actual prototype. This 
though, simply displaces the question of how the prototype is perceived. Attention is then 
focused on perception itself. But in order to demonstrate the realist or conventional nature 
of perception, recourse must once again be made to the qualities of the prototype, the key 
question being: is the prototype as I perceive it to be at a given moment?101    
 
In short, Lechte explains that the semiotician Umberto Eco’s version of an iconic sign 
(for instance, a painting of Queen Elizabeth) does not have the power to make present the 
absence of a model (the real Queen).102 Furthermore, Eco critiques the icon for the reason that no 
sign can be equal to its signified. If the opposite were the case, then the sign would not exist or 
transform into the signified itself. As long as the nature of a sign (representation) is determined 
(conventionally) by its referential relationship or by difference to a model, it cannot record 
realistically/iconically. This semiotic argument is based on “the natural iconism of perception”—
a fundamental principle of judgment that is taken as reality itself by semioticians in a similar way 
as Fischer-Lichte formulates the existence of the phenomenal being at the perceptive level.103 
Thus, Lechte points to the inadequacy of perception in relation to the idea of a prototype when 
questioning the real (performative) knowledge of a three-dimensional object that is restricted to 
space (by perspective) at a certain moment in time. The question is if the prototype is more than 
what is accessed through human perception. Since the nature of the prototype is defined by its 
impossibility to be fully revealed and understood, the critique of the iconic level of a sign (or any 
representational object) with recourse to the performative perception of a real model turns into a 
paradox. This repeats Plato’s ontological dilemma, previously mentioned, regarding the eikōn’s 
property to be similar to what it represents. For both the semiotic and Platonic thought, an icon is 
                                                
101 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 45. 
102 Ibid., 43. 
103 Ibid., 45. 
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an instance of the impossibility to circumscribe/encode the real prototype. Precisely the same 
argument can be made with respect to the way Fischer-Lichte uses the materiality of a real body 
in the performative act. Again, what must the image be in order to access the knowledge of a 
prototype without circumscription? It is a question of mediation between a signifier and signified 
to which the Byzantines provided an answer to in the icon’s economy.  
In his/her hierotopic encounter with the icon, the Byzantine beholder does not reenact a 
predefined notion of the prototype (as the image stays invisible). Additionally, materiality and 
semiotics are not mutually exclusive, but rather coexist together in the very perception of the 
icons. Where the performativity of the artistic event excludes any hierarchical structure between 
a ritual/copy and myth/prototype by denying referentiality in favor of perception alone, the icon 
performs the original event of Incarnation through performative non-referential acts. On one 
hand, Fischer-Lichte’s notion of performativity presupposes human perception as real-presence, 
which is in fact a semioticity of self-referential objects that are still related to an original 
phenomenon—that is, the fundamental metaphysical cause of human perception. On the other 
hand, the icon includes both the relation between a copy and prototype and the mediation of the 
image (by avoiding referentiality) through the performative perception of materiality without 






1.3.1 Overall overview  
 
This practice-oriented research functions as a testing ground for articulating a Byzantine 
framework that will help to understand how contemporary images transform into an iconic 
vision. While drawing from the iconoclastic/consumptive theories and controversies as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, my hierotopic practice investigates key symbolic-realistic elements in 
the construction of an iconic vision by applying the Orthodox tradition of icon painting with 
tempera and gold leaf on wooden panels. Thus, in my attempt to grasp the Byzantine visual 
technique and poly-sensory (hierotopic) qualities of the icon, the research-creation components 
of this doctorate will take three forms: a) video documentations of my performances of an iconic 
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vision, b) an actual hierotopic installation formed of wooden panel paintings, tools, and sound, 
and c) textual analysis. These three research outcomes will be more thoroughly 
explained/elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
Guided by my written reflections on my practice and the theoretical perspectives (as 
outlined in Chapter 1) of the icon, I will contrast and contextualize my Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision to other artistic or commercial forms that incorporate iconic elements. 
Specifically, I propose a case study that focuses on how Jean-Luc Marion, Nanna Verhoeff, Eric 
Jenkins, John Lechte, and Nicoletta Isar (among other important scholars of Byzantine 
hierotopy) interpret works of art and commodities with iconic/hierotopic implications. Following 
such an analysis, the final research result will consist of a novel hierotopic framework that 
integrates direct practical insight for analyzing how an iconic vision is performed in an artistic 
and commercial context. 
 
 
1.3.2 Artistic research as a valid methodological approach to the Contemporary 
Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision 
 
In order to address the specific methodologies employed in this doctorate, it is important 
to briefly address the following issue with the doctoral level practice-oriented research in the 
arts: How should we understand the nature of art practice as research104 in relation to the more 
scholarly research that claim the power of the true scientific argument? A contemporary 
authority on the topic of art as academic study, Henk Borgdorff analyses the reflective nature105 
of the art practice in order to explain it as a legitimate, autonomous academic/scientific 
discipline. By using critical thinking, Borgdorff provides the subsequent definition through a 
series of ontological, epistemological, and methodological inquiries: 
                                                
104 In relation to various expressions surrounding the notion of artistic research within academia, such as 
practice-based research or practice-led research, the art theorist, Henk Borgdorff prefers the term practice as 
research as it denotes the fullest meaning of what is understood by artistic research (2006, 7). While the former two 
terms refer to a general way of studying art practice as research, he claims that the latter term specifically refers to 
the unique synchronization between practice and research—a union that parallels Fischer-Lichte’s notion of the 
performative turn in the arts. Thus, Borgdorff analyses the expression practice as research from a performative lens 
(which will be explained in this section when referring to his types of art research methods) to define the unique 
methodological approach in the arts that sets apart artistic research from the more scientific academic methods.  
105 Borgdorff’s analysis stems from education scholar, Donald Schön’s methods of reflective practice, 
developed in the book The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (1983). 
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Art practice qualifies as research if its purpose is to expand our knowledge and 
understanding by conducting an original investigation in and through art objects [an 
ontological question] and creative processes [an epistemological question]. Art research 
begins by addressing questions that are pertinent in the research context and in the art 
world. Researchers employ experimental and hermeneutic methods [a methodological 
question] that reveal and articulate the tacit knowledge that is situated and embodied in 
specific artworks and artistic processes. Research processes and outcomes are 
documented and disseminated in an appropriate manner to the research community and 
the wider public.106 
 
Taking the above definition as a starting point, it is possible to conceive an 
interdisciplinary doctoral level of artistic research into the construction of the Contemporary 
Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision by considering the following three facets of art practice as 
research:  
1) The ontological critique should focus on the invisible element embedded in the icon’s 
materiality and its sensorial role of creating a hierotopic space. Borgdorff explains that “what is 
characteristic for artistic products, processes and experiences is that, in and through the 
materiality of the medium, something is presented which transcends materiality.”107 When the 
ontological research question is applied to an artistic study of the iconic vision, then it should 
particularly address the communion between the visible and the invisible in the icon (taking into 
consideration how the hierotopic space is formed through mimetic and performative experiences 
as well as reflecting on the influence of the historical, economical, cultural, and social 
environments).  
2) The type of knowledge embodied in an iconic vision cannot be accessed by intellect 
only (as in the disciplines of theology and art history). As previously explained in the concept of 
orthopraxis, the pattern of actions involved in performing the image of God (to create an iconic 
vision), cannot be pinpointed into conventional academic forms of knowledge. What makes the 
artistic research method different from other academic disciplines is its access to the 
performative knowledge involved in the painting of an icon—a practical, nonconceptual 
knowledge that, according to Borgdorff, can be (coherently) disseminated in the academia only 
through artistic research.  
3) The methodology of researching and unveiling the practical knowledge in an iconic 
vision poses the question on the academic role of an image-maker’s individuality to use artistic 
                                                
106 Henk Borgdorff, The Debate on Research in the Arts. (Kunsthøgskolen i Bergen, 2006), 9. 
107 Ibid., 13. 
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means to generate knowledge—a subjective privileged way of seeing the world that might 
induce the idolatry of the ego. Borgdorff emphasizes this point in stating that artistic research is 
“inextricably bound up with the creative personality” of the artist-researcher.108  However, in 
contrast to other academic disciplines, Borgdorff argues that this personal participation in the 
artistic research allows to “incorporate a wide spectrum of methods, from both experimentation 
and participation in practice and the interpretation of that practice.”109 Yet, in order to classify 
the direct tangible involvement of the artist-researcher in the artistic research as scientifically 
valid, the personal claim to wealth and artistic fame should not be privileged over the academic 
activity at issue. Said differently, if the artist-researcher confines the artistic research to 
promoting his/her own oeuvre, then the artistic research outcome might not be regarded as truly 
qualified, objective research. This is also an important ethical requirement for a Byzantine 
iconographer in the sense that the final hand made icon painting should not be a reason to praise 
the iconographer’s artistic skills.   
 
 
1.3.3 Symbolic, realistic and symbolic-realistic methodologies 
 
With regards to the types of art research methodologies, Borgdorff identifies two 
methods of assessment that are relevant for this thesis: 1) research on the arts or the 
“interpretative perspective” and 2) research in the arts or the “performative perspective.”110  
Research on the arts focuses on the research object alone. That is, “the ‘work of art’: the 
composition, the image, the performance, the design, as well as for the dramatic structure, the 
scenario, the stage [hierotopic] setup, the material, the score.”111 Commonly used in the social 
science and humanities disciplines, this method takes a symbolic or reflective lens through a 
certain analytical distance between the subject (the researcher) and the object of research—a 
separation is needed to draw objective conclusions. In the case of my project, on the one hand, 
                                                
108 Ibid., 16. 
109 Ibid., 18. 
110 Both methodologies were originally coined by Schön in the field of teacher and professional education 
as reflection on action and reflection in action. Borgdorff adds a third category in the field of research in the arts, 
research for the arts or the instrumental perspective, which informs the artist on the technical/scientific aspects of 
art materials and develops new tolls for their use in art practices. See Henk Borgdorff, The Debate on Research in 
the Arts. (Kunsthøgskolen i Bergen, 2006), 6.  
111 Borgdorff, The Debate on Research in the Arts, 8. 
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the object of inquiry will be the wood panel paintings, as contextualized in an installation, and 
my symbolic reflections on their hierotopic aspects as drawn from the creative process of 
constructing an iconic vision. Additionally, I will employ this method when interpreting other 
contemporary forms of iconic vision, as described by Marion, Isar, Jenkins, and others. On the 
other hand, the disadvantage of this symbolic method is that it does not have access to the 
invisible element that forms an iconic vision.  
Research in the arts takes a performative approach to break the distance between the 
researcher and the object of study, theory, and practice in order to gain a more direct, realistic 
kind of knowledge. The art researcher’s own physical existence and research practice become the 
very object of inquiry and the basis for the research outcome (as documented through various 
media). For this reason, I will put into practice the performative method to gain access to the 
embodied/tacit knowledge in the making of an icon. In visually documenting this experience, I 
can 1) reflect on how the icon’s theological theory and performance inform each other and 2) 
retrospectively study how the process (the actual artistic reasoning and decisions in the 
performative act) and context (the space in which I perform) determines the final object/icon. 
Moreover, the documented material (video or photography) are important descriptive/technical 
research components in creating future hierotopic practices and installations.    
The method of research in the arts parallels the monastic method of orthopraxis. Both 
methods make-visible “the construction of thinking” through an “activity of recollection” which 
encompasses “the essential roles of emotion, imagination, and cognition.”112 As previously 
explained, this monastic model of understanding any form of “craft ‘knowledge’ which is 
learned” (for making thoughts as images) draws attention to the actual experience of using tools 
and techniques.113 The usefulness of this method is that it facilitates important conceptual 
scaffolding when applied to my practice of externalizing and sharing (through video 
documentation, wood panel painting, or sound) the Byzantine kind of knowledge that supports 
the image/meaning making process in the icon’s performance. However, the concept of 
orthopraxis as meditation provides with a more complex (symbolic-realistic) view of the 
Byzantine icon practice of recalling and mimicking the memory of God (the transparent image). 
The symbolic-realistic view moves beyond reflective and artistic practices (interpretative, 
                                                
112 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 2. 
113 Ibid., 1. 
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aesthetic, or performative) to a type of knowledge of the unknown/invisible that eludes 
classifications and human intentionality.114 In other words, the practical component of this thesis 
is not just a method for expanding knowledge and information through hermeneutic results 
shoehorned into the confines of academia, but also a faith-based search for reacquainting myself 
with the tradition of icon painting in a commoditized environment—a personal research 
experience that raises questions about the possibility of a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired 
Iconic Vision.  
 
 
1.3.4 Chapters overview 
 
1.3.4.1 Recapitulation of Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 covered the theological part of this thesis, which sets the very Byzantine 
fundamental principal: the invisibility of the image. This theological foundation provides the 
necessary knowledge to navigate through my discussion, in the subsequent chapters, on how I 
use Marion’s solution to metaphysics in order to offer (based on my art practice) an 
alternative/non-iconoclastic mode of critiquing the image. The main concepts described in this 
chapter are: 1) Platonic mimesis versus Byzantine mimesis in light of the economy of 
Incarnation and hierotopy, 2) the icon’s epistemological solution to Plato’s ontological paradox 
of the image based on the symbolic-realistic mode of seeing and 3) the difference between 
performativity and the icon’s performance. The Byzantine theology of the image will also help to 
see how my artistic research departs from Marion’s dematerialized idea of the icon and how it 




                                                
114 Borgdorff refers to a similar unknown component in the artistic research that evades the more explicit 
knowledge expressed through customary academic research, however it is not clear how this “openness for the 
unknown” is determined by the intentional power of the thinking subject in artistic events (8). As we will see in 
Marion’s phenomenological analysis of the icon in Chapter 2, the counter intentionality of the icon in relation to the 
human gaze has a fundamental implication for experiencing the presence of absence or the unexpected feeling of the 
unknown. 
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1.3.4.2 Chapter 2 
 
To outline the possibility of a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision as an 
alternative to the iconoclastic/consumptive critique of the spectacle, Chapter 2 will first deal with 
Marion’s approach to metaphysical iconoclasm. The chapter proceeds by conceptually defining 
the two modes of seeing, the Nietzschean (realistic) and Platonic (symbolic), out of Marion’s 
phenomenological analysis of iconic and idolic appearances in his book, The Crossing of the 
Visible. I chose this study as it particularly focuses on the artwork—specifically, the iconic 
versus idolic painting—and the phenomenon of the image in relation to its iconoclastic 
implications in contemporary visual culture. As Marion’s reflections on the phenomenology of 
the (in)visible in the arts are based on the critique of the abstract versus naturalistic works of art 
and of Plato, Nietzsche, and Husserl’s metaphysical imposition of a first-principle, I shall also 
refer to selected artist works representative of each style and the teachings of the latter three. I 
would like to clarify from the start that this dissertation deals with Marion’s concept of the icon 
(and Byzantine theology of the image) for the specific purpose of 1) understanding in Chapter 2 
and 3 how a phenomenological perspective of the iconic vision responds to the contemporary 
iconoclastic critique on human’s objectification in the commercialized visual culture and 2) 
developing in Chapter 4 a critical understanding of how the symbolic-realistic mode of seeing is 
constructed based on a (subjective) aesthetic judgment 
Moreover, this chapter presents the problematic points in Marion’s notion of the icon as a 
way beyond ontology by drawing attention to his tendency to vaporize materiality (both the icon 
and the viewer’s body). This leads to the main argument of this dissertation that the Byzantine 
theology of the image can provide a non-metaphysical mode of thinking only if we understand 
the icon at a practical level. Iconoclastic/consumptive controversies are not just conceptual 
issues, but a mode of human experience and we need to start from the position of where we stand 




                                                
115 Janice L. Deary, “A Picture Held Us Captive": Investigations Towards An Iconoclastic Praxeology, PhD 
diss., (University of St. Andrews, 2007), 6. 
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1.3.4.3 Chapter 3 
 
After developing from Marion’s reflections on icons the Nietzschean and Platonic modes 
of seeing that trigger metaphysical iconoclasm, Chapter 3 returns to the notion of the idolic 
spectacle from the perspective of contemporary iconoclastic gestures manifested in today’s 
screen culture of mobile screens, mass media and advertisement industry. It provides an 
overview of how metaphysical iconoclasm drives today’s status of the image and elaborates on 
the media theorist, Nanna Verhoeff’ critique of mobile digital technology and media theorist, 
Eric Jenkins’ (Byzantine) symbolic-realistic critique of the commoditized visual culture.  
This chapter focuses on the concept of performativity in relation to hierotopy by 
comparing and contrasting Verhoeff’ ideas of screenspace to the Byzantine icon to point out in 
the next chapter those iconic components (canons) that are relevant for the construction of a 
Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. 
In contrast to Marion, Jenkins’s Byzantine method of critiquing the spectacle 
(particularly the brand image of Apple products) takes into account the performative aspect of 
the icon, thus providing the ground for developing a hierotopic/canonized methodology for 
making a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. More specifically, Jenkins’s view of 
how symbolic-realism opens the visual and commodity to the experience of the invisible allows 
for an aesthetic reconceptualization of the epistemological and non-essentialist definition of the 
icon by the Byzantine iconophiles Patriarch Nicephorus and St. Theodore the Studite.  
 
 
1.3.4.4 Chapter 4 
 
This chapter explores my artistic method of combining Byzantine canons of painting an 
icon with a (subjective) aesthetic judgment of the spectacle that incorporates pop-culture 
elements. I examine where the Byzantine icon relates to an aesthetic experience (in its Kantian 
sense) and how Byzantine interpretations of contemporary artworks inform my practical work 
into the construction of an iconic/idolic vision. Here, I particularly consider John Lechte’s idea 
of evocation and Nicoletta Isar’s idea of chōraic movement and hierotopy to see how symbolic-
realism extends into what is critiqued as the idolic aspect of the spectacle.  
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Moreover, based on my Byzantine reflective artistic practice, specifically in the video 
documentation, Portrait of an Icon Maker and the installation, Performing the Icon (Fig. 21 and 
26) I offer 1) a canonized aesthetic visualization of the Byzantine icon’s mediational possibilities 
between a signifier and signified and 2) a practical/technical estimate of how effective the 
symbolic-realistic structure of an iconic vision is in providing an artistic alternative to the 
metaphysical critique of the spectacle. Subsequently, these two research points bring a new 
Byzantine understanding on how to craft an image within the contemporary art context.  
This chapter ends by reflecting on the practical level of this research in meeting the goal 
of this study, which is to validate and test a contemporary Byzantine version on the image and 
the arts that exposes them to notions of real-presence. The Byzantine basic rules outlined in my 
artistic research do not function as a visual experiment in measuring their iconic or metaphysical 
impact on viewers. Such an approach requires an observational study on the possible aesthetic 
effects on subjects that is beyond the scope of this artistic research. The task of my icon 
practice/hierotopic installation is to inform and reinforce through the orthopraxis method the two 
aforementioned methodologies employed in this thesis (research on the arts and research in the 
















CHAPTER 2: METAPHYSICAL ICONOCLASM AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
ICONIC AND IDOLIC VISIONS 
 
This chapter presents some of the phenomenological challenges of creating an iconic 
vision in the midst of today’s metaphysical debates over the images’ ability to depict notions of 
truth and reality. Jean-Luc Marion connects the metaphysical state of the image with the Platonic 
and Nietzschean opposing mimetic positions on the visible phenomena, which places the image 
between two spectacles (the visible and invisible).116 I see that these two contrasting 
metaphysical phases of the image parallel the clash between the realistic and symbolic ways of 
apprehending the image during the Byzantine dispute, as discussed in Chapter 1. While Plato 
initiated metaphysical iconoclasm, which mistrusts the image as a mimetic representation of an 
immaterial original Form, Nietzsche freed the image from its Platonic status by reversing the 
relation of similitude between the visible and the invisible—that is, the image is not an imperfect 
symbolic imitation of an invisible reality, but becomes the real, visible itself (Fig. 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: The image for Plato and Nietzsche 
 
As previously noted, Marion believes that Nietzsche’s anthropocentric interpretive lens 
of the image drives our relationship with the spectacle in the age of televisual screens—a world 
of idolic images turned, in fact, into Platonic idols, that is, pure simulations of reality. In 
                                                
116 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 78-83. In today’s iconoclastic/consumptive controversies and 
practices of seeing images, the Platonic and Nietzschean stages of the image construct two opposite spectacles that 
claim the real-presence of reality.  
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presenting how the Nietzschean thought defines the nature of our current consumerist 
environment, it helps to comprehend the symbolic-realistic structure of the Byzantine iconic 
vision and sets the ground for situating my Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision 
(discussed in Chapter 4) within metaphysical visual criticism. For this reason, this chapter 
explores, through a Marionian lens, how the representational (figurative and naturalistic117) and 
non-representational (abstract) painting styles respond to the Nietzschean/realistic and 
Platonic/symbolic view of reality. As explained in Chapter 1, the Platonic/symbolic perspective 
refers to the critique of the image that concerns its mimetic resemblance to a signified meaning. 
From this symbolic perspective both the naturalistic and abstract painting styles are seen as 
illusory (idolic). Conversely, the Nietzschean/realistic perspective regards the image as 
dissociated from any Platonic ideals to the point where it acts as its own signifier, in the sense 
that the image is both the signified and signifier. From this realistic perspective, a naturalistic or 
abstract painting is seen as real as long as its meaning is constituted by the power of the 
intentional gaze. Nonetheless, in order to understand why Marion perceives that both types of 
artistic representations (figurative and abstract) have the tendency to emphasize the visible (thus 
inducing an idolic gaze), I elaborate first on his phenomenology of the human gaze to see an 
artwork through various degrees of linear perspective. For Marion, the perspectival capability of 
the human gaze and its ability to address an intentional object (a referent of consciousness) in 
spatial perspective becomes more than just a “historically situated pictorial theory.”118 The 
notion of perspective turns into the essential phenomenological mode of being in the world. 
Examples of artworks that speak to his view are also included, such as Kazimir Malevich’s 
Suprematist Composition: White on White (1918) and Albrecht Dürer’s Lamentation for Christ 
(c. 1500).  
The major concern with the idolic (metaphysical) vision is that it limits human perception 
to a Nietzschean mimetic relationship with the physical world in which everything becomes an 
instrument for satisfying human desires—that is, the image mirrors one’s desires, thus of 
himself/herself. From his phenomenological position, Marion reconsiders the Byzantine icon as a 
type of image that does not reflect, but counteracts human intentionality through an exchange of 
invisible gazes between the human gaze and the other. The phenomenon of otherness is given to 
                                                
117 The idea of a naturalistic painting refers to the Nietzschean aesthetics of the Übermensch-artist to depict 
life as it is (realistically), beautiful and ugly.  
118 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 4. 
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intuition as gift through phenomenological reduction, beyond the horizons imposed by the 
thinking I.119 So, the aim in this chapter is to present how Marion opens the painting’s 
phenomenality to take up the role of the icon and save today’s image from metaphysical 
iconoclasm. At the same time, however, it concludes with an account of where metaphysics still 
maintains a grip on Marion’s version of iconic vision—in the sense that his thought surrounding 
the Byzantine icon as established in the Second Council of Nicaea in 787 CE does not 
sufficiently merge the symbolic and realistic modes of seeing in order to avoid claims to real-
presence. Following these concluding remarks, I point to the importance 1) of discussing in 
Chapter 3 the hierotopic view of technological screen forms of iconic visions in the Nietzschean 




2.1 The phenomenology of the idolic vision 
 
If we entrust our eye to the eye of a painter, as though one were following in the footsteps 
of a guide, this would only be in order to see something other than what is visible to 
us….The painter, with each painting, adds yet another phenomenon to the indefinite flow 
of the visible. He completes the world because he does not imitate nature. He deepens a 
seam or fault line, in the night of the inapparent, in order to extract, lovingly or more 
often by force, with strokes and patches of color, blocks of the visible.120 
 
In his book, The Crossing of the Visible, Marion chooses the phenomenology of painting 
(in contrast to all other forms of visual media) as the mode of rehabilitating the image from its 
subjection to the spectacle. Based on two key aesthetic approaches, the figurative and abstract 
styles of depicting a visual perspective, he provides an analytical reading of several artworks 
without necessarily defending the phenomenology of the iconic painting against the idolic 
painting. Both types of painting styles reveal certain intensities of invisibility in the visible, 
depending on various degrees of fusion between a realistic and symbolic vision of the material 
world. However, what differentiates an idolic painting (figurative or abstract) from an iconic 
painting is its lack of a counter gaze that envisages and saves the viewer from his/her own 
                                                
119 Jean-Luc Marion, The reason of the gift. Trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2011), 2-3. 
120  Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 24-25. 
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desires and objectification by the idolic gaze of the thinking I. The idol, instead, violates the 
viewer by inducing the desire to become an image of his/her own desires. But, before discussing 
in more depth Marion’s iconic vision, I will further elaborate on the metaphysics of the idolic 
vision and its iconoclastic implications.   
According to Marion’s phenomenology of the idolic vision, on the one hand, an artwork 
is considered figurative/naturalistic when it maintains a spatial contiguity with a material referent 
(as objectively as possible) through the artist’s rendition of shadows, colors, textures, etc.—the 
aim here is to generate a natural (realistic) vision to see the referent in a linear perspective as if is 
really present. On the other hand, an abstract artwork involves the symbolic framing (an 
expressive-aesthetic treatment) of a conceptual or material referent in a way that the viewer’s 
reception is directed towards interpreting what the referent is intended to mean, rather than its 3D 
appearance in the physical space. For example, a painting might accept or reject the 
representation of a linear perspective depending on its emphasis on either the visibility of the 
referent (naturalistically illustrated such as in the work of the Renaissance painter Albrecht 
Dürer) or the invisibility of the referent  (as exemplified by the abstraction of perspective in the 
work of the suprematist painter Kazimir Malevich). The inclusion or exclusion of the human 
figure in an artistic representation is also a deciding visual factor in the analysis of an idolic and 
iconic vision. This particular human element in the construction of both the idolic and iconic 
vision will be further discussed in the next section 2.2 The symbolic and realistic artistic visions. 
In Marion’s phenomenological thought, the meaning of the idol is not necessarily 
perceived in a pejorative or iconoclastic way as the Byzantines’ thought from a theological 
stance. In his attempt to transcend the Platonic dualism between image and reality, Marion 
redefines the theological view of the idol as a “half-presence of the semidivine.”121 In the idol, 
the divine invisibility is revealed “by a lack of light” while in the icon it is revealed “by excess of 
light.”122 This means that the idol (in a material/naturalistic or conceptual/abstract123 form) can 
reveal low intensities of divine phenomena, although it is not transparent enough to fully reveal 
                                                
121 Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies. Trans. Thomas A. Carlson, (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001), 29. 
  122 Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Saturated Phenomenon,’ Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The 
French Debate. Trans. Bernard G. Prusak (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 196-7. 
123 I make a parallel between conceptual and abstract art in the sense that both forms do not make a claim 
for the real-presence of the referent in the material/sensible world. However, as opposed to abstract art, conceptual 
art might include, in an installation form, various representational elements, but the main concern remains the 
invisible (Platonic) concept or idea.  
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the world beyond materiality, as in the icon. Thus, the idol is veiled in shadows due to its 
opaqueness in presenting a counter iconic gaze that crosses the viewer’s own.  
The role of invisibility in an idolic representation demands a more extensive 
phenomenological explanation of intentionality in Marionian terms. In brief: without the 
conscious intervention of our gaze to optically define the physical space in which we walk and 
distinguish a multitude of tangible objects, the visual experience of the world would be a flat 
plane of color tones and fuzzy shapes. The perception of objects as three-dimensional forms is 
the result of the power of the gaze to construct physical shapes in perspective from random 
patches of colors. Particularly, we are able to inhabit the world as things among other things124 
due to the intention of our gaze to insert invisibility in what we see as visible. The invisible 
opens up certain distances of visible spaces according to the amount of invisibility added by the 
gaze from different points of view. In relation to a linear perspective, the meaning of invisibility 
could be related to the transparency of air that occupies the space between the intentional gaze 
and the intentional object. For instance, in its aim to constitute a tangible object in space, the 
intentional gaze perceives the air as invisible. In Marion’s phenomenology, this relation between 
the invisible and visible is the foundation of our ordinary vision of reality. Applied to a painting, 
the intentionality of a gaze forms an ideal space in the flat surface of a canvas whereby the 
visible increases proportionally with the gaze’s insertion of the invisible into the painted/drawn 
linear perspective. If in ordinary vision the invisible stimulates the visible to perceive a space in 
which we are able to perform physically, the invisible in a painting works only to create an ideal 
sense of three-dimensionality. However, Marion does not consider the unreal space produced in 
a painted perspective as deceptive when compared to the real/physical perspective of the 
ordinary vision, as both types of spaces are products of the intentionality of our gaze. In 
actuality, the unreal space in a painting constructs more visibility, thus it expands our perception 
of reality. This is explained by the fact that the perspectival gaze generates more than one level 
of visible surfaces when it infuses invisibility into the flatness of a canvas—that is, “the eye sets 
itself straight by refusing to give in to the appearance of the painting as a mere tabula rasa.”125 
And since the concept of the idol is defined by the very power of the perspectival gaze (as I will 
                                                
124 In Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, everything that is physically defined by our gaze is equivalent to 
an intentional object, which is the outcome of an intentional experience in the same manner “the perspectival 
spectacle results from the production of the visible by the invisible” (Marion 2004, 13).  
125 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 11. 
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elaborate in the next sections), Marion finds the reason to take a more optimistic light on it in 
relation to metaphysical iconoclasm.  
In analyzing Dürer’s figurative painting,126 Lamentation for Christ (Fig. 2), Marion 
elaborates on the idolic mode of taking perspective,127 which is the viewer’s mode of creating a 
spectacle through an illusion of depth in a painted surface. Durer’s painting (as any other 
painting that depicts a linear perspective) is idolic for the reason that the mental process of taking 
perspective solely depends on the aim of the viewers’ intentionality. And when the viewer’s 
perception is simply resumed to the I’s constitutive power of inserting a void/invisibility in the 
visible, it means that the painting “does not add anything to the real visible.”128 That is, the 
painting (as idol) does not bring new visibility in addition to what the intentional gaze can 
already perceive on its own in a linear perspective (real visibility).129  
In the Lamentation for Christ, Dürer places the real on a 
stage to create an invisible space as follows: the composition of 
the painting is constructed in ten successive levels of perspective 
to portray a number of characters and landscapes. The repeated 
pyramidal structure of each visible layer emphasizes the invisible 
depth of the perspective. Conversely, one can notice that at the 
bottom of the panel, in the foreground, Dürer painted five small 
figures representing the individuals who commissioned the 
painting. The five personages are disproportionally small in 
relation to the rest of the figures, which contradicts the logic of 
the linear perspective. In noticing this inconsistency in Dürer’s 
depiction of the visual space, Marion underlines that the “perspective clearly acts as a distinct 
element of the visible, in accordance with a marked boundary that demands it….”130 The 
invisible aspect of the linear perspective depends only on the viewer’s capacity to see it, thus 
                                                
126 In his paintings and drawings of Biblical events, the German artist, Albrecht Dürer, who converted to 
Protestantism at around the year 1519, drew influence from the doctrines of Luther. 
127 Kimberly Jackson, “The resurrection of the image.” Theory, Culture & Society 26. 5 (2009): 34. Marion 
parallels the process of taking perspective to the “aim of intentionality” in Husserlian phenomenology (Marion 
2004a 12). The perspectival vision stems “from the production of the visible by the invisible” in a similar fashion as 
“the intentional object results from a production of experience by intentionality” (Marion 2004a, 13). 
128 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 3. 
129 As I will explain later, the icon is the type of painting that adds more invisibility to the real visible or to 
what the viewer’s gaze can see in a perspective.  
130 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 9.  
Figure 2: Lamentation for Christ 
(c. 1500) by Albrecht Dürer 
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making the Lamentation for Christ an idol. The type of invisibility revealed in a linear 
perspective is just a “simple choreographing of the visible” to produce a spectacle.131 For an 
image to become iconic, the human gaze needs to encounter a different gaze that urges him/her 
to see beyond the physical world. Dürer’s Lamentation for Christ lacks that iconic gaze. We can 
observe that the figures in the painting focus towards the center where Jesus’ dead body lies. 
Therefore, the viewer’s gaze is directed towards the first level of the perspective painted by 
Dürer, which is a space in the material world. 
On the contrary, the invisible in abstract art exists autonomously from the conscious 
intentional experience. As mentioned, for the viewer to produce a perspective in a painting—that 
is, to insert invisibility in the visible—his/her gaze needs to recognize or empirically observe an 
object and constitutes its form in invisibility. Marion explains that the intentional object does not 
exist in an abstract painting (as well as in any other forms of nonrepresentational painting). For 
example, the viewer cannot see in Kazimir Malevich’s Suprematist Composition: White on White 
(Fig. 3) any recognizable material objects, thus his/her gaze is not able to find a place in its 
visibility to insert the invisible—all the viewer sees is a white square on a white background. 
Due to its lack of signifiers, therefore, the invisible in abstract 
painting manifests independently from any act of consciousness. 
Malevich wished to represent pure reality, and in doing so, he 
liberated the image from the conscious intervention of the viewer 
and his/her subjective (impure) aesthetic needs. Consequently, the 
gazing aim is resumed to recognizing what is already present in the 
painting without deploying the invisible. In contrast to figurative 
painting, abstract painting does not allow the invisible to play 
between “the aim of the gaze and the visible but rather, contrary to 
the gazing aim, [the invisible manifests] in the visible itself—and is merged with it, inasmuch as 
the white square is merged with its white base.”132 But this does not mean that abstract art brings 
more invisibility to the real visible (as the icon does) as it still appears within the limits of the 
viewers’ intentional gaze. 
                                                
131 Ibid., 20. 
132 Ibid., 19. 
Figure 3: Suprematist 
Composition: White on White 
(1918) by Kazimir Malevich 
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In summary then, Marion discusses the aesthetic experience in terms of two categories, 
the idolic and iconic—the iconic viewing being the alternative to the spectacle, which I explore 
as I progress with my discussion. While both types of experience aim at the divine invisibility, 
they differ in their phenomenality. A painting functions as an idolic phenomenon when it 
emphasizes unseen visibilities in order to attract the gaze. Thus, the idolic seeing rests on the 
power of the viewer’s intentionality to add certain amounts of invisibility/meaning in a visual 
perspective/intentional object. The iconic seeing reverses the relationship between the gazing 
aim/human intentionality and what is presented to intuition.133 Marion does not see the idol as 
opposed to the icon (in theological terms), but as two different intensities of revealing invisibility 
(in phenomenological terms). His phenomenology attempts to broaden the relationship between 
the visible and the invisible by examining the role of the idolic gazes (symbolic and realistic) to 
invest the artistic representation (figurative or abstract) with the presence of the invisible. This 
reveals the manner in which the viewer constructs an image in the visible with the invisible. Yet, 
the type of visibility offered through a perspectival or non-perspectival gaze is problematic for 
Marion, as it does not challenge the viewer’s gaze beyond his/her own consciousness to the 
extent of feeling a sense of alterity (a phenomenological approach to attaining an essence).  
In the next section, I elaborate on the two idolic visions (the Platonic and Nietzschean) 
that either trap or cut off the invisible in and from the material in relation to abstract and 
naturalistic modes of claiming real-presence. To illustrate the two phenomenological modes of 
constructing an idolic vision, I will refer to the conceptual artwork, One and Three Chairs (1965) 
by Joseph Kosuth, and the performative narrative-art project Cremaster (1994-2002) by Matthew 
Barney. These examples clarify that: 1) from a Platonic perspective, the image is valued as a 
resource for symbolic meaning, which leads the viewer (through a mental process) beyond the 
realistic vision of the world, and 2) from a Nietzschean perspective, the image does not point 
towards a supersensible world that enforces predefined symbolic values, but to a paradoxical 




                                                
133 Robyn Horner explains that “[i]ntentionality is ordered towards intuition (Anschauung), which in 
Husserl’s work is basically about seeing, bringing to light, knowing, understanding, or grasping meaning (2005, 28). 
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2.2 The symbolic and realistic artistic visions  
 
The art critic and curator, Demetrio Paparoni explains that, nowadays, there is a return of 
narration and representation of the human figure in contemporary art, a growing interest that is 
becoming more evident in the way artists produce works that reference a Platonic type of 
invisibility (essence).134 This brings an interesting art historical perspective on the development 
of the symbolic and realistic visions in relation to the perspectival and non-perspectival 
representational approaches to notions of reality. Particularly, the elimination of the human 
figure in modern art and the consequent renewed interest of contemporary artists in the 
traditional principles of representation and narration calls for the Platonic and Nietzschean 
doctrines of the image, which Marion argues, continue to shape today’s idolic relation between 
the viewer and visible world.  
Referring to the shift from the figurative painting that characterizes Christian 
iconography towards abstraction in modern art, Paparoni explains that classical painting rules,135 
such as linear perspective and chiaroscuro, came to be seen as restricting art in conceiving the 
truth. For modern artists (from the 1860s to the 1970s), the naturalistic logic of a painting 
underscores a Platonic reference between a signifier and signified that imposes a predefined 
narrative or an authoritative mode of seeing an essence. Consequently, the naturalistic depiction 
of the human body, which was particularly developed in Western Christian iconography (as 
opposed to the symbolic realistic character of Byzantine iconography) to reveal the invisible, was 
rejected by modern artists due to their ideological power of guiding viewers towards 
conventional moral values and predetermined modes of thinking. Ironically, the art historian, 
Maurice Tuchman notes that the distancing of modern art from the traditional figurative art was 
motivated by an interest in expressing ideas of invisibility that could not be communicated 
otherwise.136 Moreover, Paparoni points that when notable artists137 from the modern time have 
                                                
134 Demetrio Paparoni, Eretica: The Transcendent and the Profane in Contemporary Art. (Milan, IT: Skira, 
2007), 21. Paparoni discusses contemporary artistic interpretations of classical religious themes by artists as 
Matthew Barney (Cremaster 1994-2002) and Jenny Saville (Atonement Studies, 2005-6), Marina Abramovic (Pieta, 
2002), Damien Hirst (Twelve Pills, 2004-05), Marc Quinn (Angel, 2006), Andres Serrano (Piss Light, 1987), and 
Ron Mueck (Angel, 1997). 
135 In the next section, 2.2.1 The symbolic artistic vision, I explain that the naturalistic rules of 
representation originated from an incidental link between the signifier and signified activated by the ancient Greek 
notion of mimesis. 
136 Maurice Tuchman, et al. The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting, 1890-1985. (New York: Abbeville 
Press, 1986), 17. 
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directly referenced traditional narratives, they provided a subjective pictorial and conceptual 
interpretation of collectively recognized symbolism that entirely excluded the theological 
function of the human body in art. This break from the Incarnational symbolism of a painting is 
an implication that avant-garde movements were concerned with generating new (Nietzschean) 
ways of visual expression that eliminated the human figure—a key motif in Byzantine 
iconography that reveals the absence of presence (through Incarnation).  
By the end of this chapter, it will become apparent that the contemporary artistic move 
toward narration, perspectival representation, and the human body does not imply a complete 
separation from the non-Platonic values of the modernist/non-naturalistic artists.  But rather, both 
naturalistic and abstract approaches can be closely associated to a Nietzschean vision in creating 
one’s own aesthetic ideal, myth, and image. This shift to a re-evaluation of metaphysical values 
was also intensified in today’s televisual culture by the increasing experience of reality in 
response to consumerist desires. Particularly, as analyzed in Chapter 3, the technological mode 
of seeing the world through mobile (touch) screens inclines the human gaze to lay emphasis on 
visible reality according to the viewer’s intentionality alone. As Marion puts it, the image 
transformed into a means to see “the satisfaction of…[one’s] desire, thus of himself 
[/herself].”138 Every image turned into an idol for the viewer based on claims to reality as if 
really present (realistic seeing) or totally absent (symbolic seeing) in a frame for representation. 
It is a metaphysical/dualistic frame of thinking in our age of consumerism and technologically 
fashioned images that triggers ongoing bouts of iconoclastic controversies around the 
objectification and alienation of human identity. In his book, The Idols of the Market, the art 
historian Sven Lütticken further declares that the viewing attitude of judging/esteeming the 
truthfulness of images disseminated in the media spectacle thrived in the late capitalist society by 
taking a fundamentalist form.139 In fact, commenting on the modern production of images and 
                                                                                                                                                       
137 Some of the modern artists enumerated by Paparoni who referenced religious iconography are Max 
Beckman (The Descent from the Cross, 1917), Marc Chagall (White Crucifixions, 1938), Paul Gauguin (The Yellow 
Christ, 1889), James Ensor (Entry of Christ into Brussels, 1888) Edward Munch (Madonna With Bare Breast, 1864) 
and Van Gogh who was profoundly influenced by the Christian faith (20).  
138 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 51. 
139 Sven Lütticken, Idols of the Market: Modern Iconoclasm and the Fundamentalist Spectacle. (Berlin; 
New York: Sternberg Press, 2009),11. Lutticken’s notion of the fundamentalist spectacle refers to the radicalization 
of monotheistic attitudes by political and religious factions in Eastern and Western societies toward mass media 
images. Due to the events of the current economical, social, and military crisis, the realm of mass media became a 
global battlefield between far-right politicians, such as the Dutch populist Greet Wilders and terrorist organizations, 
as Islamist fanatics, who ‘exploit’ the ideological power of image to promote religious and secular values.  
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their capacity to incite iconoclasm, French sociologist and anthropologist, Bruno Latour states 
that the controversy over images reached a point “where being an iconoclast seems the highest 
virtue, the highest piety, in intellectual circles.”140 
Before analyzing the symbolic and realistic visions in two separate subsections by 
attempting to delineate them in terms of artistic production, I need to specify that the difference 
between the two modes of seeing cannot be made clear-cut when applied to abstract and 
naturalistic paintings. While from a phenomenological perspective there is a straightforward 
distinction according to the notion of perspective (as explained in the previous section, 2.1 The 
phenomenology of the idolic vision, abstract=realism and naturalism=symbolism), from a 
metaphysical perspective the differentiation is less obvious, particularly in relation to the realistic 
vision.  
On one hand, the phenomenology of the idol reveals that according to the amount of 
invisibility added by the human gaze in a linear perspective, a painting shows an abstract or 
representational space. The abstract appearance (without a linear perspective) prompts the 
realistic vision of the visible world in its concrete, measurable materiality and the naturalistic 
depiction of objects (in a linear perspective) stimulates the symbolic vision as if seeing in an 
invisible space.  
On the other hand, the metaphysical description of symbolic and realistic visions blurs 
the boundaries between abstraction and naturalism according to the Platonic vision, which I 
elaborate on in the next subsection 2.2.1 The symbolic artistic vision, and the Nietzschean stage 
of the image that I analyze in the subsequent subsection 2.2.2 The realistic artistic vision. 
The Platonic view of the image can be seen both symbolically and realistically.141  
Firstly, the visible world acquires a symbolic/abstract meaning on the ground that reality is 
somewhere beyond the tangible (un-real) world. This is the primary Platonic interpretation that I 
use in the next section. Secondly, the visible world can take a realistic meaning, depending on its 
mimetic/naturalistic resemblance to the real (the invisible Forms). True art needs to reproduce 
reality as accurately as possible, without interpretations. While the Platonic sense of the real 
remains an invisible reality, the realistic vision acts a mode of seeing the real as if in a dream or 
clouded by illusory appearances. The implication is that an appearance-being acquires a degree 
                                                
140 Bruno Latour, Iconoclash, (Karlsruhe, Germany, and Cambridge, MA: ZKM and MIT Press, 2002), 14. 
141 Willis H. Truitt, “Realism,” Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism 37 (1978): 141. 
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of realism based on its symbolic power to direct the gaze (albeit in a mimetic, imperfect way) in 
seeing the invisible Forms.  
With the Nietzschean stage of the image, the differentiation between the symbolic and 
realistic visions becomes even more paradoxical than the Platonic view. In his aim to discover 
reality, Nietzsche rejects the abstract Platonic referent to de-mythologize and re-evaluate the 
visible world. The image seems to function solely as a realistic form of visibility, freed from the 
power of pre-established/metaphysical models of truth. This Nietzschean attitude of re-valuating 
and creating new values affirms the postmodern thought on the disappearance of transcendence. 
However, as I analyze in the subsection, 2.3.2 Metaphysical iconoclasm: the problem with the 
death of the Death of God, Nietzsche turns out to impose, yet, another fundamental principle of 
reality founded on the idea of the will to power.142 In particular, Marion suggests that he simply 
replaces Plato’s essence with the Übermensch-artist’s will in esteeming his/her own life.  So, in 
the post-Nietzschean state of the image, symbolism and realism persist to manifest as two 
opposite lenses in seeing reality, but with the difference that now they operate within the limits 
of human consciousness and desire. And, since the metaphysical thought lingers in its dualistic 
structure, iconoclastic/consumptive debates continue to drive today’s spectacle of image. In 
short, the Nietzschean realistic vision can be described as bringing the symbolic vision within the 
world of perceptible reality. The contemporary return to the traditional language of narration and 
performance art, as I will exemplify in subsection 2.2.2 The realistic artistic vision, can be 
justified by this paradoxical (postmodern) coexistence of the symbolic and realistic visions 
within the same Nietzschean condition of the image. Subsequently, the realistic vision, in terms 
of its phenomenological (mimetic) depiction of a perspective, can be challenging to pinpoint in 
terms of an artistic production. According to the viewer’s will to power, the realistic vision 
applies to both the abstract and naturalistic/performative artworks.  
To that end, while the concern of the next two subsections is restricted to the Platonic and 
Nietzschean aspects of the symbolic and realistic visions, the remaining sections of this chapter 
focus on Marion’s critique of the post-Nietzschean metaphysical consequence of the image, 
which is reflected in the cult value of today’s spectacle of entertainment imagery.  Elaborating on 
the Byzantine theology of the icon from a phenomenological point of view, Marion proposes a 
                                                
142 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spake Zarathustra,” The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1954), 227. For Nietzsche, the will to power stands for humans’ natural instincts, desires 
and aspirations to live and achieve excellence.  
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postmodern theology without declaring the death of the Platonic referent. Following his 
phenomenology of the icon, I will propose, in Chapter 4, a Byzantine alternative to visual 
criticism for seeing how images acquire metaphysical values from the perspective of an image-
maker. In this creative context, I suggest that it is neither the realistic nor symbolic visions that 
offer a non-iconoclastic solution to the contemporary crisis of images (as idols of real-presence). 
In their place, the performative consideration of the Byzantine technique of creating images 
allows to escape the metaphysical paradox between the two modes of vision. Specifically, 
through the performative interaction of my body (image-maker) with a canonically 
contextualized frame for representation, visual criticism attains a broader understanding of the 
image when critiquing how an artwork is limited to a metaphysical perspective.   
I now return to the Platonic artistic, symbolic vision that triggered metaphysical 
iconoclasm to provide a framework in understanding Marion’s discussion of the Nietzschean 
idolic art. Moreover, to exemplify the Platonic perspective on the image, I discuss Joseph 
Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs.  
 
 
2.2.1 The symbolic artistic vision  
 
The metaphysical iconoclasm introduced by Plato’s 
theory of Forms downgrades art as three times removed from 
the eternal Forms based on the example of three ways of 
seeing a bed.143 God made the first ideal bed as part of 
nature, the second bed is the carpenter’s imitation of the 
original one, and the third bed is the painter’s imitation of the 
carpenter’s bed. Comparing the Idea of the bed (the truly real 
and yet invisible bed) and its copy into tangible phenomena 
of three-dimensional objects to the painter’s work, Plato claims that the painting of the bed 
presents an appearance of another appearance (the carpenter’s imitation of the ideal bed). A 
painted image is then, twice disconnected from its referent. The real world distances from human 
perception based on the level of its imitation in visibility. The light of truth becomes detectable 
                                                
143 Plato, “Republic, 596-599,” Complete Works, 971-1224. 
Figure 4: One and Three Chairs 
(1965) by Joseph Kosuth 
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when the mimetic alteration of Forms by visible intermediaries is annihilated. This imitative 
aspect of the sensible representation, in correlation with the imperceptible original, defines the 
metaphysical iconoclasm, which denounces “the image to the rank of an idol.”144 
Plato’s model of the three beds is reflected in the chair installation entitled One and 
Three Chairs (Fig. 4) by the conceptual artist, Joseph Kosuth. The work is composed of an actual 
chair in the manner that a carpenter would build. Displayed on the wall and placed on the left 
side of the chair, there is a photographic image of the same chair, which stands for the Platonic 
sense of a pictorial imitation of the physical world. On the right side of the wall, Kosuth 
positioned a dictionary definition of a chair, a description that invites the viewer to mentally 
picture the Idea of the chair. Each time the installation is moved to a new gallery space, the artist 
uses a different physical chair and photograph. The only element that remains unchanged is the 
textual meaning of the chair. Therefore, in One and Three Chairs, the artist presents three ways 
of seeing a chair to challenge the viewer in asking which one is real. In Plato’s view, the real 
chair is the invisible one described by the text. While its means of presentation in the material 
world is constantly transforming, the concept of the chair remains invariable and experienced 
beyond sensory perception. Kosuth’s “reverential awe of cognition” conforms to the Platonic 
cognitive theory in search for knowledge and truth.145 
The ancient Greek aesthetic idea of mimesis,146 a recent aesthetic invention during 
Plato’s life,147 is foundational in understanding how art came to function as a mimetic 
representation of reality. The contemporary philosopher, Bert Mosselmans, and professor of film 
studies, Ernest Mathijs, explain that in the beginning of human existence, all forms of artistic 
representation (cave paintings, dance, stone carvings, etc.) were considered to be reality itself 
(real-presence) and had the power to re-enact the original sacred event that gave birth to a 
                                                
144 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 80. 
145 Thomas Mcevilley, “Ways of Seeing God,” 100 Artists See God, curated by John Baldessari And Meg 
Cranston (New York: Independent Curators International, 2004), 11. 
146 Ernest Mathijs and Bert Mosselmans, “Mimesis And The Representation Of Reality: A Historical World 
View,” Foundations Of Science 5 (2000): 61–102. Mathijs and Mosselmans write that between the 5th and 6th 
century BC, Greek artists invented the aesthetic principles of beauty, dramatization, and mimesis (72). All these new 
artistic motives triggered a process of formalization in the representation of cultural reality, history, and traditions, 
which led to “the classical premises for literature, poetry, and theatre, for sculpture, painting, and architecture…” 
(Mathijs and Mosselmans 72). The content of art became subordinated to conventional aesthetic forms such as in the 
case of religious objects that were no longer seen in their original ritualistic function, but as decorative objects. For 
example, humans transformed (or distorted) sacrificial stones and knives into objects for aesthetic pleasure by 
embellishing them (Mathijs and Mosselmans 73).  
 147 Ernst Hans Gombrich, Art and Illusion; a Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. (London: 
Paidon Press. 1972), 99.  
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cultural order.148 The arts had a causal link with the physical existence in the way that it led the 
viewer into direct experiences with the world through rites and myths.149 Consequently, with the 
introduction of mimesis by the Greek artists, the arts acquired an incidental connection with 
reality that detached the represented from its pictorial representation.150 If the mimetic image is a 
copy of the original and not a part of it, then the relation between the image and reality is not 
causally determined. This process of separation between the depicted and depiction is defined as 
the aesthetic formalization of art that substitutes the presence of “truth (content)” with the 
“formal variation (form).”151 When the Greeks realized the difference between a mimetic 
representation and the real-presence of a referent, “it led to an accelerated evolution towards the 
perfect depiction of humans.”152 Finally, in the incidental phase, the artistic image is considered 
independent from its referent, whereas in the causal stage it is perceived as consubstantial with 
the real (referent). 
Plato’s objection regarding the aesthetic rules of mimesis and beauty was that it allows 
illusion to dominate the link between image and reality. In other words, the distinction between a 
true (real) and a false image becomes difficult due to mimesis and aesthetic pleasure. This 
alteration or replacement of reality through formal representation was the reason for Plato to 
banish visual arts from his ideal city-state as described in The Republic.153  His main concern 
with mimesis was that the aesthetic motive provides artists with means to depict fictitious forms, 
characters, and events as real. Hence, these naturalistic illustrations, generated by the artists’ 
imagination, establish a blurring line between the image and its referent allowing appearance-
being to conceal the real. As a result, art becomes “a pretension for marveling or contemplation, 
                                                
 148 Mathijs and Mosselmans, Mimesis, 73. The authors’ arguments on the origin of the arts are based on the 
French philosopher René Girard's theory of the origin of culture. 
 149 Ibid., 82. To exemplify the casual relation between art and reality before the 5th century B.C., Mathijs 
and Mosselmans explain that the Egyptian Sphinx was considered God itself and not a mere image of it. Also, after 
Nefertite’s death, her son ordered all her portraits to be destroyed as they were considered to be Nefertite herself 
(Mathijs and Mosselmans 84). For that reason, the portrayal of an individual in Egyptian art stands for an identical 
existence of the original. 
 150 Mathijs and Mosselmans, Mimesis, 82. 
 151 Ibid, 74. 
 152 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 125. 
 153 Plato, “Republic 607e-b,” Complete Works, 1102-1103. On the other hand, Aristotle’s metaphysics 
appreciated the power of art to realistically depict the material world in order to trigger feelings of wonder. Mathijs 
and Mosselmans underline that “Aristotle…puts the motive of mimesis forward, to discuss representation’s 
incidental link with reality. He also links it with the emotion of perception, through which some of the original truth 
is still passed on, albeit obfuscated” (98). 
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rather than a search for truth.”154 In that respect, therefore, Plato’s view of art restricts artist to 
copying phenomena with imperfect tangible materials that are available to a craftsman. Since art 
cannot extract anything from the perfect Forms or add to them, a realistic representation is, 
actually, not realistic.155 And based on this dilemma of the eikōn-appearance, the visible in the 
Platonic/symbolic vision qualifies only as an idolic spectacle. As Marion argues, this 
metaphysical reduction of the image to an intermediary, indirect, and mimetic means to 
invisibility, led to the complete dissociation of representation (signifier) from an original source 
(signified) in today’s virtual reality of technologically fashioned images. Instead of indicating a 
referent (an invisible Form), the visible becomes its own origin in the new era of the 
Übermensch156—to which I turn to next. On the other hand, Michel Henry’s phenomenological 
approach to abstract painting in the early 20th century reevaluated the Platonic symbolic artistic 
vision in order to revitalize the visible as a response to the Nietzschean realistic artistic vision. I 
will investigate this shift to invisible Forms in abstract art after discussing Nietzsche’s influence 
on the idolic spectacle of the contemporary visual culture. To illustrate the Nietzschean realistic 
vision within the representational structure of a narrative, I will refer to Matthew Barney’s 




2.2.2 The realistic artistic vision   
 
The idolatrous aspect of image achieved its highest level with Nietzsche’s announcement 
of the metaphysical God as dead—the aim of humanity to self-realize in the will to power. In his 
book, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche refers to the Übermensch as connected to the human 
body that accounts for its own existence: “[b]ut the awakened and knowing say: body am I 
entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body.”157  And so, the 
body is not an imitation of a real invisible Form, but on the contrary, it is the origin of life that 
the soul imitates. The soul is just an aspect of the human’s corporeal existence. Nietzsche 
                                                
154 Mathijs and Mosselmans, Mimesis, 86. 
155 Ibid., 89. 
156 The Übermensch refers to the overman. The idea of God as dead is mentioned by Nietzsche in his 
works, The Gay Science: With a prelude in German Rhymes an Appendix of Songs and Thus Spake Zarathustra.  
157 Nietzsche, “Thus Spake Zarathustra,” 146. 
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liberates the body from its inferior position as an image (copy) of something invisible in order to 
subject it to the human’s own will to see, evaluate, and create new values. The body acquires its 
own reality as image according to the viewer’s desires:  
 
Therefore, he calls himself “man,” which means: the esteemer. To esteem is to create: 
hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable 
treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of 
existence would be hollow. Hear this, you creators!158  
 
Through his/her will to power, the viewer creates and esteems his/her own spectacle. In 
spite of releasing the image from the rule of Platonic values, Marion argues that, in fact, 
Nietzsche “radicalizes the idolatrous interpretation of every image.”159 The visible does not 
imitate the invisible through an incidental link between the depiction and depicted, but instead it 
represents the evaluators’ values. Thus, the image imitates its viewer and the visible turns into a 
spectacle saturated with human emotions and desires. From a Marionian phenomenological 
perspective, the viewer becomes the origin of the image as he/she manipulates the visible 
according to the intentional power of the gaze to constitute and fashion images. The viewer is 
trapped in a visible restricted by the aim of his/her own gaze to comply in self-idolatry. This self-
idolization in a spectacle that merely mirrors the viewer’s values characterizes the faith of 
contemporary visual culture.  
Nietzsche’s statement of the Death of God160 implies the replacement of a supersensible 
world with the Übermensch. Since the abstract Platonic referent, that is believed to precede the 
material world, no longer produces values, Nietzsche presents the Übermensch-artist as the 
provider of a new set of values and ways of thinking. The godless artist is the source of his own 
values and creates “monologue art or art before witnesses” to question the “herd-instinct” of 
human nature in ascribing standard moral values for everyone in a community.161 For Nietzsche, 
those who belong to a social, cultural, religious group will always be attracted to the power of 
metaphysical theories, myths, and ideas as metaphysics offers comfort and escapism from 
worldly frustrations. Contrarily, a Übermensch-artist is self-sufficient and does not need the 
audiences’ admiration. This admiration parallels a feeling of appreciation that induces a sense of 
                                                
158 Ibid., 171. 
159 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 81. 
160 Nietzsche, et al. The gay science: With a prelude in German rhymes an appendix of songs. (Cambridge, 
U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xiii. 
161 Ibid., 231, 114-115. 
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consolation—a similar feeling is experienced when believing in the Platonic existence of an 
invisible, divine original. Through monological work, the artist constructs his self as he desires, 
and acts as the esteemer of his own life on earth. In a world of values defined by the inversion of 
Platonism, the Nietzschean-artist’s self-evaluation parallels Marion’s view of self-idolization in 
the sense that the creative act is similar to the way of producing an idolic spectacle in which the 
gaze does not have a single access beyond the visible material world. I discuss now 
contemporary artists Matthew Barney’s Cremaster Cycle (Fig. 5) as representative of how 
monological art can turn into a naturalistic language of the visible world by inverting the 
Platonic mimesis.162 His work can be associated with the typical Übermensch-artist in fabricating 
his own image as he constructs and evaluate his own body, self, and desires inside the sphere of 
visibility in a way that representation stops existing as a counterpart to invisibility.  
In his artistic project, Cremaster Cycle, Barney redesigns 
(esteems) himself through an aesthetic determined by modern 
technology. Creating his own mythology and iconography, Barney 
performs a narrative through a sequence of passages that involves a 
test of will to self-transform and overcome his biological condition. 
He fabricates a fictitious religio-mythical universe to look for the 
original unity that was lost through gender division after the early 
stage of sexual development—a time of gender ambiguity and total 
equilibrium. This implies that the divine reality for Barney is not 
transcendent as in Christian iconography,163 but exists within the 
world before the biological split of the human body into males and females. If in Cremaster 
Cycle, the body becomes a mechanism whose components can be manipulated through 
biogenetics and prostatic effects to overcome death, in Christianity, the human body is a means 
                                                
162 The Cremaster Cycle is an art project that Barney began in 1994 and took eight years to complete. It 
includes five films, sculptures, photographs, installations, and drawings. The meaning of the title stands for the 
cremaster muscle, which holds and protects the testicles. The conceptual foundation of the art project investigates 
the idea of creation based on the separation of the male and female sexual organs in their embryonic stage of 
development.  
163 The professor of philosophy, Jean Grondin writes that Christian theology is “couched in Platonic 
terminology; and…when the Church Fathers articulated the dogma of the trinity, they relied heavily on the neo-
platonic vocabulary of emanation” (98). However, Christianity reconciles the visible and the invisible in the icon 
based on the crucifixion of Christ. As discussed in Chapter 1, the icon breaks the firm separation and Platonic 
mimetic relation between the material and immaterial worlds—a topic that is also elaborated when referring to 
Marion’s phenomenology of the icon in the section 2.4 The phenomenology of the iconic vision. 
Figure 5: Cremaster 4 
(1994) by Matthew Barney 
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to redemption and eternity164 through death and resurrection. The effect of sin inherited from 
Adam and Eve is the death of the physical body, “therefore, just as through one man sin entered 
into the world, and death through sin, and so death spread to all men, because all sinned.”165 The 
significance of Christ’s death on the cross is the salvation of humans from the deadly original 
sin. As written in the Holy Scripture, humans are freed from death only through the sacrificial 
death of the Son of God. Thinking that one can accomplish salvation and an everlasting life 
without God’s help, one positions oneself in a state of self-sufficiency/self-idolatry and excessive 
pride that has the opposite effect of being redeemed.166 In Cremaster 4, the artist relies on 
science and new media to transcend his original self into a supernatural being that may give him 
a sense of immortality.167 Barney reconfigures himself as an animal-human like creature 
resembling a satyr from Greek mythology. One could also interpret the alteration of his body as 
an upcoming phase in the Darwinian adaptation of the human body to a new age of highly 
developed genetics and informatics.  
While Barney’s naturalistic/performative approach to esteeming his own image exhibits a 
Nietzschean realistic vision by establishing a new mythical/metaphysical origin within bounds of 
the natural world, Clement Greenberg’s formalist interpretation of art exemplifies how 
abstractionism also functions in a realistic way by eliminating any metaphysical 
secrets/signifiers. Influencing modern-art criticism from the 1940s to the late 1960s, Greenberg, 
for example, praised the formal properties of Wassily Kandinsky, Barnett Newman, and Jackson 
Pollock’s abstract paintings, but disregarded the presence of any invisible, social, or political 
meaning in artworks. Focusing exclusively on aesthetic issues, the formalists analyzed the 
                                                
164 1 John 3:2, New International Version, http://www.biblegateway.com, accessed February 2014. 
165 Romans 5:12, New American Standard Bible, http://www.biblegateway.com, accessed May 2014. 
166 Central to Christian faith is the symbolic meaning of the cross as the place of salvation and 
reconciliation with God: “For He Himself is our peace, who made both groups into one and broke down the barrier 
of the dividing wall, by abolishing in His flesh the enmity, which is the Law of commandments contained in 
ordinances, so that in Himself He might make the two into one new man, thus establishing peace, and might 
reconcile them both in one body to God through the cross, by it having put to death the enmity” (Ephesians 2:14-
16). 
167 Cremaster 4 was filmed on the Isle of Man, an island located between England and Ireland that is 
famous for hosting an early road-racing competition. Through visual and sound, the silent film narrates Barney’s 
desire to transcend his biological condition into a sphere of pregenital oneness. As a tap-dancing satyr, Barney is 
ritualistically prepared by bisexual fairies for a sacred trip to reach a state of pure unity. We see a constant camera 
shift between the satyr and a motorcycle race. The gelatinous gonadal forms that exude from the rider’s pockets 
symbolize the stage of sexual oneness before the differentiation of sexual organs into female and male. As stated on 
his official website, Cremaster 4 is about combining “[m]yth and machine…to narrate a story of candidacy, which 
involves a trial of the will articulated by a series of passages and transformations” (www.cremaster.net/crem4.htm).  
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abstract form as indistinguishable from artistic media.168 Any reference to existential questions 
or hidden meanings in artworks regarding the colors, shapes, and signs was seen irrelevant. The 
formalist critique aimed at eliminating any representational subject matter from art to exclude 
symbolic values from the aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, since the 1960s, Greenberg’s 
materialistic values began to dissolve and more contemporary artists become interested in 
narratives, myths, and figurative content.169 
In the next section, I turn to Marion’s critique of Nietzsche’s view of mimesis in 
relationship to visible phenomena—a mimesis built on the critique of Plato’s mimesis and 
Christianity that emphasizes materiality as the privilege of the human intentionality.  
 
 
2.3 The ongoing metaphysical iconoclasm: Nietzsche’s real image of reality 
 
2.3.1 Nietzsche and the image of the Christian God 
 
The madman. – Haven’t you heard of that madman who in the bright morning lit a lantern 
and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, ‘I’m looking for God! I’m looking for 
God!’ Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together 
just then, he caused great laughter. Has he been lost, then? Asked one. Did he lose his 
way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding?  Is he afraid of us? Has he gone to sea? 
Emigrated? –Thus they shouted and laughed, one interrupting the other. The madman 
                                                
168 From a formalist view, Pollock’s work is seen as paint left on a canvas by the free gestures of the artist’s 
body. In this case, painting is not a space of mimetic representation, but a way to act and create events outside of 
socially constructed values. According to Greenberg, Abstract Expressionism unified the aesthetic experience with 
the materiality of the artwork. However, Tuchman explains that Pollock’s painting method was embedded in Native 
American spiritual practices and Greenberg refused to see his ritualistic methods of art making (Tuchman 50).  
169 Paparoni, Eretica, 21. I would make here a Marxist comment in explaining the reason for the 
resurrection of the narrative in contemporary art. In view of today’s commercialization of art, a commodity never 
appears to the consuming gaze from Greenberg’s formalist perspective for the reason that capitalist ideology is built 
on role of the product to fulfill more than basic human needs. This deeper meaning of the commodity responds to an 
innate metaphysical character of the human being, whose consuming gaze constantly strives for something more 
than the actual product; something invisible which can elevate to human desire to a sublime experience. Therefore, 
the metaphysical aura of the capitalist system demands the traditional language of narration based on the 
relationship between a signifier and signified in order to address this transcendental need of the product. A 
commodity bereft of signifiers would make it difficult for the general public to seek the sublime, which builds the 
cult value of a commodity. For instance, contemporary artist Jeff Koons’ sculpture, Michael Jackson and Bubbles is 
exemplary for the contemporary mode of adapting traditional representational strategies that incarnate 
transcendental signifiers. Comparing to Barney’s realistic vision from the perspective of the artists, Koons addresses 
Nietzsche’s approach to image from the perspective of the viewer.  Particularly, Michael Jackson and Bubbles 
includes figurative forms to conform the sublime to new consumerist forms of devotion surrounding the cult status 
of the pop star, Michael Jackson. In Chapter 3, I will further explore how the Byzantine icon reveals the complex 
process between a signifier and signified in elevating the status of a product, such as the iPod to the level of a divine 
experience. 
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jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Where is God? He cried; ‘I’ll 
tell you! We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers. But how did we do 
this? How were we able to drink up the sea?170   
 
The concern of this section is restricted to how Marion interprets the famous declaration 
of the Death of God to explain the metaphysical process of creating new idols. It will elaborate 
on Nietzsche’s genealogical project of liberating human consciousness from physiological 
inventions of Platonic gods, such as the Christian God, that confine the will to power into 
predefined moral values. In conclusion, this section points to the Nietzschean metaphysical 
framework that drives today’s metaphysical iconoclasm—a topic that is carried on in the 
following section. 
The madman, in the above quote, indicates a paradox regarding the image of God: while 
he desires to see God, he proclaims His inexistence (death). In his book titled Human, All Too 
Human, Nietzsche explains that the believer feels the presence of God in a temple when His 
sculpture (idol)171 is veiled in darkness (in the semi-obscurity of the dim chambers of a temple), 
thus allowing the “inner eye” (imagination) to picture (invent) the representation of the sacred as 
a mysterious, incomprehensible visible form.172  The idol can stay as an idol of God without 
necessarily being seen. Furthermore, when the idol of God is seen in full daylight as carved and 
painted stone or wood, it seizes to “harbour and at the same time conceal the god—to intimate 
his presence but not expose it to view.”173  
If seeing God is killing Him, then God’s death is its concealment as visible image. From 
a Marionian interpretation, the madman’s announcement, We are all his murderers, represents 
the process in which the viewer turns the idol of God into his/her own idol—the human gaze 
desires to see and possess the idol for itself. As soon as the worshipper directly and clearly sees 
the idol of God, the gaze becomes enslaved by the idol’s own dazzling appearance. Due to the 
fact that its own visibility competes with its very role of making the divine presence known, the 
                                                
170 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 119. 
171 The madman attacks a Christian God that appears as an idol, thus Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity 
remains within the limits of metaphysics. Another point made by Marion is that in its aim towards the divine, the 
idolic gaze stops to contemplate its own reflection as materialized desires. 




idol has a reduced capacity to reveal God’s invisibility.174 The idol’s visibility is a low-quality 
image of God that induces skepticism in the viewer’s mind. This doubt of the idol leads to the 
Death of God in a material representation and its transformation into the viewer’s own idol. 
Upon seeing God, the madman discovers the very nature of the idol as illusory: “how if God 
were not the truth and it were precisely this which is proved? if he were the vanity, the lust for 
power, the impatience, the terror, the enraptured and fearful delusion of men?”175 The madman’s 
suspicion is nothing but the revocation of God as “God.”176 The quotation marks in the word 
“God” stand for the rejection of God after being touched conceptually or physically or through 
other intermediary means. When God is a thing to be grasped, it turns into a concept, i.e. “God.” 
Hence, Nietzsche refers to “God” as a lie promoted by priests and theologians as the truth of the 
scripture that opposes life.177 In his discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, Marion 
points to the importance of referring to what the madman or Zarathustra saw as the “God,” for 
the quotation marks frame the concept of God as idol. Otherwise, any analysis of the 
Nietzschean text would be irrelevant by ignoring the fact that the “’concept of God’ can neither 
permit nor promise anything concerning God, since it is ‘a divine privilege to be conceptually 
inconceivable (unbegreiflich)’ (Daybreak, V, § 544).”178 
In his genealogical project, Nietzsche correlates the idea of “God” with the psychological 
process of inventing the image of Christ as “God.” As the mind of an epileptic, the Christian 
mind sees the physical and mental powers of a strong person as extra human or as given/gifted 
by a mysterious, supernatural entity. Since the natural condition of the human species is defined 
by suffering and misery, feelings of faith, bliss, and atonement are seen as out of the ordinary, 
thus it requires an atypical justification. The psychological invention of an external power 
becomes the foundational condition for the possibility of a sick person, for example, to feel 
peace and freedom from sin or for an artist to feel creative and inspired. In undergoing these 
“conditions of power,” the human turns into an “effect” caused by a psychologically fabricated 
godly authority to account for any “feeling of power.”179 In sum, Nietzsche argues that “God” is 
                                                
174 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 29.  
175 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 54. 
176 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 30. 
177 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), 91.  
178 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 30-31. 
179 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 31, 86.  
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a Platonic/made-up entity of a split personality disorder, whose image stems from humans’ own 
weakness in recognizing that they are the sole source for experiencing extraordinary feelings. 
Questioning his integrity as a person through ressentiment and moral ideals, the Christian 
separates himself/herself “into a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and another which 
he calls God (redeemer, savior).”180 In this psychological process, consciousness is altered as an 
outcome of a hypothetical agent that conditions human will. Consequently, humans as an 
outcome do not perform willed acts. Faced with conditions of power, the Christian creates a 
product (idol) to picture the “free will”181 (Christ), which he/she refuses for himself/herself as an 
external entity. In return, this externalization of the will to power in the image of Christ is 
encountered as grace and love—in Nietzsche’s view, an idol of morality.  
And so when Nietzsche describes “God” as a byproduct of a physiological process, we 
are left to interpret Christianity, and all other forms of religion founded on the repression of the 
will to power, that is simply a metaphysical method of creating idols. He argues, instead, for a 
virtuous mode of employing the instinct of making/inventing gods than human’s “self-
crucifixion and self-abuse, ways in which Europe excelled during the last millennia.”182 As 
opposed to the Christian production of “God” that only sterilizes life and the will to power based 
on dissociated personality states, Nietzschean aesthetics proposes a Dionysian lifestyle that 
favors the senses of the flesh, and that which unites every natural/physical and spiritual impulse. 
The Platonic/Christian psychological division between man and “God” is merged in one 
indivisible self and will to power.  
Contrary to Christianity, the Dionysian meaning of suffering in life signifies the fair 
method of differentiating the “strong” from the “weak.”183  The overman (der Übermensch) is 
powerful and divine enough to embrace pain cheerfully as a healthy attitude to life—the 
perpetual fertility and recurrence of life generates suffering, devastation, and the will to total 
destruction. In a world of conflicting forces that relentlessly change life’s nature, the overman’s 
will to evaluate and re-create himself remains a constant aspect of his being. If the Dionysian life 
                                                
180 Ibid., 87. One’s mind is contaminated by ressentiment when it forges a soul to leave in “dark corners, 
secret paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being his world, his security, his comfort; he 
knows all about keeping quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing himself” (Nietzsche 2006, 
21). 
181 Ibid. 
182 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New 
York: Vintage Book, 1969), 64. 
183 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 87. 
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is affirmed through suffering by making pain just, the innocent Christ died on the cross to indict 
pain as unfair. For the Christian, life can only be loved if it is made accountable for God’s 
suffering and redeemed. For Nietzsche, this is a salvation from life that is, in fact, a way out of 
life itself. The Crucified dispossessed the Christian of his/her own will to make him/her suffer 
“from life in whatever form he[/she] meets it.”184 The cross reveals a conflict and the means of 
dealing with it: Christ condemned humans to a weak position in facing suffering without drawing 
power from their own will and, in turn, situated them in need of salvation while suffering at the 
mercy of God’s will. Conversely, the overman takes control over his own will to overcome the 
Christian paradox of suffering/salvation and affirm his own life and values.  
Marion reinforces that the phrase Death of God is not an atheistic proclamation, for the 
existence of “God” is its non-existence. Nietzsche’s declaration is thinkable only if God is 
surrounded by quotation marks imposed by the Christian ethos—an idol “of itself—of a self that 
marks and advances itself therein.”185 In this Nietzschean manner, Christ is the moral “God” that 
rests upon the Platonic principle that the divine must be the truth, the unquestioned will to 
truth.186 However, Marion points that Nietzsche’s critique of the Christian faith should not be 
limited to morality; the “genealogical inquiry” also reveals that “God” operates within the limits 
of onto-theology.187 The “God” who died is a Platonic super-being (the absolute moral example) 
existing beyond materiality in the world of ideal Forms. Christ, the free will (the cause) that 
determines/effects human’s will and life (the effect), finds its end as an idol in the metaphysical 
mirror of morality. This perennial human tendency to constrain the image of God under 
fundamental notions of reality, exposed in the full light of the day, is the source of metaphysical 





                                                
184 Ibid., 543. 
185 Marion, Idol and Distance, 32. 
186 Here, the production of the idol lies on seeking the truth through morality. Nietzsche questioned the 
Christian moral necessity of the notion of truth. Thus, the Christian image of free will (which for Nietzsche is the 
moral idol that conditions human will) is overcome in the event of seeing the death of “God”; the gaze discovers the 
source of the moral impulse, the reason for its ressentiment and the possibility to become free of any theistic 
fulfillments. 
187 Marion, Idol and Distance, 31. 
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2.3.2 Metaphysical iconoclasm: the problem with the death of the Death of God 
 
In light of Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, this section focuses on Marion’s 
examination of the conceptual understanding of God, a metaphysical standpoint shaped by the 
power of the Supreme Subject. In his historiographical review of metaphysics, Marion refers to 
the idolatrous imposition of the human subject in restricting God according to the measures of 
thought. In fact, Nietzsche’s text reveals the limitations of the metaphysical determination of 
God, a failure of metaphysics that guides Marion in seeking a decisive break between the image 
of Christ and the concept of Being. The announcement of the Death of God sets the ground for 
the Marionian interpretation of the death of metaphysics, which parallels the end of modernism 
and the primacy of the subject.  
In his attempt to overcome metaphysics, Nietzsche produced his own idol based on the 
Dionysian aesthetics of the will to power. The following question exposes his idolatry: is there a 
contradiction regarding the notion of naturalism as reality at the core of Nietzsche’s thought? 
The contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologian, David Bentley Hart denounces him of randomly 
choosing words like life and nature to question the Christian notion of truth based on a sudden 
outburst of “romantic enthusiasm,” a “blind and idiotic…upward thrusting of an empty will.”188 
The notion of being in the overman’s pagan vision of the natural world has a subtle hint of a 
metaphysical tone. Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical arguments are based on an ontological conflict 
between force and anti-force and his rhetoric of life and violence can only be consumed through 
an opposition of weak and strong elements that perpetually yield, resist, appropriate, and 
overpower each other. At this point, it is required to briefly outline Marion’s historiographical 
account of metaphysics in order to understand why it has been the subject of criticism from both 
Nietzsche and Christian thought.  
In the first chapter of his book In Excess, Marion provides an overview of metaphysics 
based on three moments. Firstly, he starts with Aristotle’s interest in defining a “first 
philosophy”189 of things or a first-principle (cause, being, reason, etc.).190 The objective of 
metaphysics is to methodically analyze the fundamental nature of being—metaphysics attempts 
                                                
188 David Bentley Hart, The beauty of the infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
W.B. Eerdmans. 2004), 102. 
189 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent 
Berraud. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 4. 
190 Ibid., 17. 
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to explain abstract notions such as cause, effect, knowledge, being, substance, time, and reality. 
Aristotle’s philosophy is concerned with the nature of being (onta) or the science of being as 
being that is labeled as ontology.191 Moreover, the absolute knowledge of being relates to an 
abiding, superior, and immutable Being—a divine form of being that Nietzsche, in his vision of 
nature (of being), despised as a metaphysical idol. The concept of an unchanging 
substance/essence (ousia) defines the first moment of metaphysics and its limits.  
Secondly, Marion turns to Thomas Aquinas who distinguishes three definitions of 
metaphysics derived from Aristotle:  
 
It is called divine science or theology inasmuch as it considers the…substances [that are 
completely immaterial in their being].192 It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers 
being and the attributes, which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend 
the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are 
discovered after the less common).193 And it is called first philosophy inasmuch as it 
considers the first causes of things. Therefore it is evident what the subject of this science 
is, and how it is related to the other sciences, and by what names it is designated.194 
 
The Thomistic moment of metaphysics is the purely intellectualized mode of knowing 
ousia; it is the rational discipline that focuses on the nature of being and its causes. Marion takes 
a strong position in interpreting Aquinas’s idea of God as esse (being)—the metaphysical 
thinking of the Christian God that will be violently questioned by Nietzsche. Regarding the 
                                                
191 Robyn Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co. 
2005), 18. 
192 In the prologue to his book, Commentary on the Metaphysics, Aquinas explains that theology is the 
divine science that considers the things that are intangible substances in the sense that they are completely removed 
from matter and movement. These divine intangible things (God and angels) are comprehended only through 
revelation. On the other hand, metaphysics is a divine science insofar as it studies the things (intelligible objects) 
that are independent from signate and sensible matter and movement, although they can be encountered therein. 
Thus, the proper subject matter of metaphysics is the study of these neutral intelligible objects, which are common 
to all beings (ens commune). Such common aspects are “being, substance, potency form, act, one and many” (Kerr). 
Ens commune differs from the divine intangible things, which are removed from matter not only at the abstract level 
of mathematical thinking (ratio), but also at the level of their being (esse or existence). The difference between ens 
commune (being as being in general) and divine being (totally immaterial substances) is that the latter does not 
depend on matter/movement for its being and for its possibility to be understood. In Thomism, essence and esse in 
ens commune are joined as two separate things while in the divine being they merge in a consubstantial union. 
193 In contrast to the knowledge acquired by means of senses, which only relates to the perception of 
particulars, metaphysics is the most intelligent science that grasps being as universals—the ens commune as the 
universal aspect of all things that includes the attributes “such as unity and plurality, potency and act” (Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics, Prologue).    
194 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Trans. P. Rowan, (Chicago: 1961), 
Prologue. For Aquinas, metaphysics combines the study of ousia, ontology, and causes of beings.  
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problem whether Aquinas clearly understood God in terms of Being or not, Marion states in his 
preface to God Without Being that:  
He [Aquinas] does not chain God to Being because the divine esse immeasurably 
surpasses (and hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens commune of creatures, which 
are characterized by the real distinction between esse and their essence, whereas God, 
and He alone, absolutely merges essence with esse: but this esse is expressed only of 
God, not of the beings of metaphysics.195  
 
Essence and esse (existence) are the two different elements that constitute created beings. 
All creatures are finite beings that exist as being given in matter (as caused) and determined by 
an essence, but this is not the case for God. The divine essence is one with its existence, thus 
Saint Thomas positions God beyond the limits of causality and metaphysics. The divine is not 
the object, but the principles of the objects studied within Thomistic metaphysics. God is the 
uncaused absolute existence that causes existence to be actuated by essence as substance.196 
Marion clarifies that although Aquinas spoke of God in terms of esse, he did not conceive God as 
the final destination of the scientific knowledge of the causes. Specifically, the Thomistic esse is 
divine in the sense that it should not be confused with ens commune. God exceeds human reason, 
ontic causality, and the Being studied in metaphysics and Marion aims to continue the Thomistic 
project to sketch a non-onto-theo-logic path to God as revealed knowledge under “the horizon of 
the gift itself.”197  
In the modern re-articulation of metaphysics, Aquinas’ emphasis on the investigation of 
the first causes, as well as other related attempts to uncover the absolute nature of what is such as 
God, the immutable ousia (substance/essence), or ens commune, shift into the epistemological 
analysis of the pure knowledge. This third moment in Marion’s historical account of metaphysics 
is methodically established by Immanuel Kant and René Descartes, who place at the center of 
attention, the absolute authority of the thinking individual over Being. The certainty of the being 
presupposed from ontic mixtures (different essences partaking in acts of existence to shape 
substances) does not define the priority of metaphysics, instead the truth is derived from things 
that can be first known as certain by the cogitable being. In this respect, the ontological function 
                                                
195 Jean-Luc Marion, God without being, Hors-Texte. Trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), xxiv. 
196 As Aquinas explains in On Being and Essence, God is uncaused because his existence cannot be 
multiplied as it happens with the genus, species or particular things. The multiplication of things is made possible 
when essence adds a difference to existence to create such beings as humans. For example, the rational is added to 
the genus animal to create the human. Since God stands for perfection, his Being is not subjected to any additions.   
197 Marion, God Without Being, xxiv. The concept of gift is discussed in the last section of the paper. 
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of metaphysics is reaffirmed through the faculty of the mind to know being as being (ens 
commune) not as it is in itself, but as it becomes conceivable to an ego cogito. On the other hand, 
this epistemological framework, which allows the noetic198 dominance over the etiological 
discourse, introduces a dichotomy in the ego that, in turn, marks the terminal stage of 
metaphysics. Following Marion’s thought, the modern post-Cartesian metaphysics is premised 
on the foundational power of the I or ego, which takes two forms in the process of exercising “its 
noetic primacy”: the transcendental and the empirical.199 The noetic primacy of the thinking 
subject (the empirical I) depends on the foundational power of the transcendental I (being) to 
detach the ego from the world of objects that it studies (objects insofar as they are known by the 
empirical I in relation to time and space). Without this transcendental status, the ego will be 
confused with the objects from which it draws self-knowledge, thus losing its legitimacy as the 
new first-principle of metaphysics. The empirical I cannot know the transcendental I that gives 
its being and the power to know an object, for the reason that the latter (transcendental I) 
surpasses the ontic and ontological conditions that make an object possible to be known by the 
former (empirical I). Marion claims that if the transcendental I cannot be considered by the 
empirical I as its own object of study, the ego cannot be thought substantially (as Kant 
argued)200—substantially in the sense that what I am is an individual character that interacts with 
other individuals. Since what I am cannot be known as an object, my ego is resumed to know 
everything about the I, but what the I truly is (the transcendental I). In this way, the ego becomes 
a generalized non-substantial and non-ontic way of seeing the one who exercises the noetic 
primacy (the ego does not have an identity since it cannot be known in its being), therefore, 
allowing the empirical I to strip and decrease one’s individual character to the level of an 
object—people are objectified and dehumanized through the lens of the empirical eye. The 
irresolvable internal contradiction lies in the fact of promoting noetic primacy (empirical 
knowledge of the first-principle) through an empirical I who cannot know “the one who plays 
the role of first” (the transcendental I or the being).201 This lack of ontic identity and 
                                                
198 Marion, In Excess, 10. 
199 Ibid., 11. 
200 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 20. 
201 Marion, In Excess, 12. 
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substantiality of the I defines the epistemological limits of post-Cartesian metaphysics and its 
failure to set the ego cogito as the foundation of knowledge and primacy for philosophy.202  
Marion’s analysis of metaphysics presents the problem of securing a primacy for 
philosophy based firstly on a first-principle that would provide an explanation, and secondly on 
effects (the created world as events, shapes, ontic, and ontological constructions, etc.) which 
would supply facts and evidence. Nietzsche critiqued this very problem of metaphysics in the 
most virulent way. He underlined the randomness of choosing a first-principle as the grounds for 
metaphysical inquiries: “’virtue’, ‘duty’, ‘goodness in itself,’ goodness that has been stamped 
with the character of the impersonal and universally valid - these are fantasies and manifestations 
of decline, of the final exhaustion of life…”203 Any of the metaphysical convictions advanced by 
means of ousia, cause or noetic are destructive of life since their unconditional validity is 
premised on the “need of the weak” to be respectful and feel dependent or faithful to an external 
concept of truth.204 Instead of assuming a goal for himself from out of himself and be skeptical of 
all other (external) convictions, the weak is programmed to understand the world through false 
constructions of what might be the ultimate reality: “he instinctively holds a morality of self-
abnegation in the greatest honour; everything urges him to adopt it, his shrewdness, experience, 
vanity.”205 The greatest freedom, for Nietzsche, comes from doubting the metaphysical 
constructions of the world, which are all based on the fear of the beyond, whilst asserting one’s 
own will to choose a meaning for life. Marion associates the proclamation of the Death of God 
with the erosion of the metaphysical convictions (idols) concerning “God” within the 
philosophical framework that is defined as modernism.206 Nietzsche provoked a crisis into the 
onto-theological structure of the metaphysical thought, which draws notions of truth, real, and 
morality from an ultimate Being that guarantees the ground for the ens commune of created 
beings. Consequently, postmodernity developed out of the chaos brought by the overman’s own 
                                                
202 After the third moment of metaphysics and its crisis of establishing a principle for reality, analytical 
philosophy placed, instead, an emphasis on the use of language, logic, and pragmatism. Also, within continental 
philosophy, phenomenology and hermeneutics took a path that analyses the relationship between consciousness and 
appearance. 
203 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and other writings. Trans. Judith Norman, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 9. 
204 Ibid., 54. 
205 Ibid. 
206 In God Without Being, Marion argues that modernism used reason to transform God into conceptual 
idols. The entire Western metaphysical tradition is “littered with idols” because of its limitation of seeing God and 
subjectivity in terms of Being (Marion 1991, xiii). Postmodernity begins when the metaphysical determination of 
God is called into question.  
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values into the idolatrous world of metaphysics.207  
The “’death of God’ implies the death of the ‘death of God,’”208 meaning that Nietzsche 
solely refers to the collapse of the metaphysical conceptualization of “God.” Would this imply 
then that Nietzsche freed up a non-onto-theological space to save God from any metaphysical 
functions? In Marion’s view, this particular question was not properly answered in 
postmodernity, for to speak of God outside onto-theology (as Nietzsche and Heidegger 
endeavored) does not immediately imply that the notion of Being is no longer applied/enforced 
to Him. Marion suspects that the “’death of God’ offers only an inverted face of certain cults of 
“God”: nothing has changed except the violent lighting that freezes the “God” in the stone of its 
image.”209 Nietzsche does not complete the non-metaphysical project of effacing the idolatrous 
mask of “God” since he offers only two options: either the overman replaces the metaphysical 
idol with his own idol as a copy of himself (he kills “God” by refusing to imitate him in order to 
imitate himself) or he makes the metaphysical idolatry to stand out by rejecting it (the idol “God” 
is affirmed and consecrated in its very negation). Thus, the Death of God announces the 
production of new (televisual) idols within the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics.  
 
 
2.3.3 The (metaphysical) consequences of the spectacular image 
 
This section is restricted to two opposing views of the Byzantine icon in the post-
Nietzschean age of today’s spectacle of metaphysical idols. It will focus on a parallel between 
Jean-Luc Marion and Jean Baudrillard’s views of the Byzantine icon that reveals its paradoxical 
status within contemporary iconoclastic/consumptive debates. While Marion discovers a way out 
                                                
207 Marion, God Without Being, xx-xxi. 
208 Ibid., xxi. 
209 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 35-6. The madman saw an idol of God that he transformed into an idol 
of himself. That is, the overman inverses the Platonic mimesis to create his own (idolic) image and values. On the 
same note, Hart agrees with Marion’s questioning of the anti-metaphysical strictness of Nietzsche’s analysis. 
Referring to the fact that the noble man has no soul (as Nietzsche states in On the Genealogy of Morals), Hart argues 
that it is not required for the weak ones to invent a moral interval between agency and action in order to disapprove 
of violent acts committed on them. Particularly, the necessity of the weak person (the slave) to blame and judge an 
imaginary soul or an eternal self instead of the actual presence of the strong person (the master) in order to cope 
with suffering. This is based on the argument that there is already a metonymic shift revealed in the actions 
performed by the noble person. For example, in literally imitating powerful animals and mythological characters, the 
ancient hunters and heroes took different unnatural personas to be able to manifest great strength. Then, one might 
deduce that the slave acknowledges the metaphorical nature of the master and contests the need for its aggressive 
behavior. As a result, the Christians (weak ones) took a path that “depends not upon the romance of strength and 
acquisition but upon the primordiality of love” (Hart 2004, 110). 
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of the spectacle’s idolic mirror in the icon, Baudrillard refers to the icon as the best example of 
today’s spectacle. This section is especially important in introducing my discussion, in the next 
section, of Marion’s apophatic approach to the Byzantine icon for articulating a non- 
metaphysical experience of the divine image. 
When Marion claims that the spectacle has reached a fully developed state of self-
idolatry in the Western “audiovisual civilization,” he takes an iconoclastic position by making 
responsible the advances in imaging technology for the “disaster of the image.”210 In providing a 
historical account of the spectacle from theater and cinema to televisual/digital screens, Marion 
states that the former screens of representation (theater and cinema) keep a sense of 
reality/essence. Although theater provides us with images originated from fiction, the actor’s 
body, performing in front of his/her viewers, is always present. In the case of cinema, although 
the medium of film prevents the viewer in having a sensible experience with what is referenced 
in the screen, the actors can still be seen in reality such as in film festivals. Televisual image 
instead, disconnects the real from screen by eliminating the time and space of the events of 
reality. While cinematic or theatrical events imply that a viewer would sit and watch for a certain 
duration, the televisual screen has removed “this time; there is neither a first nor a last showing: 
without interruption the electron gun bombards the screen and there reconstitutes the images, day 
and night, around the clock….”211 The homogenization of reality with fiction is also accentuated 
by the broadcasting of various events from different regions of the world that gives a distorted 
sense of space—a clutter of spaces that attains its own reality as a TV screen.  
So, the technological screen (from TV to the Internet access via the digital touch screens) 
becomes the origin of the image and abolishes reality by transmitting 24 hours a day an illusory 
world of images that completely removes the viewer from his/her real space and time—a 
spectacle that deprives the audience of real experiences.212 Emitted according to the expectation 
                                                
210 Marion The Crossing of the Visible, 82-83. The iconoclastic aspect of Marion’s critique of the spectacle, 
however, will become apparent by the end of this chapter when I pinpoint where the metaphysical thought continues 
to frame his dematerialized notion of the icon.  
211 Ibid., 48. 
212 Similar to Marion’s discussion of the spectacle’s simulation of reality that is formed on the dissociation 
of representation from its original source, the philosopher of religion, Mark C. Taylor states that the real has been 
concealed and virtualized through computerized/fashioned images: “The infinite play of signifiers dramatizes the 
death of the signified. This death is not a simple disappearance but a complex refiguring through which the signified 
returns as signifiers. Just as God dies and is reborn in the believer, so the real disappears only to reappear in 
fashioned images. With the recognition that the real is a fabrication, fashioning becomes all-consuming and reality is 
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of the spectator, the televisual image turns into the idol of its viewer. As a consequence, an 
intimate connection is established between the viewer and the screen in which the image is 
consumed by the gaze for its own pleasure. This is particularly evident in the latest development 
of mobile touch screens and their integration into almost every aspect of our personal, social, and 
cultural life (a topic that I elaborate on in the next chapter). With the interactive screen 
technologies, the spectacle of images became not only an instrument of satisfying consumptive 
urges but also a way of imagining/performing the material world as a mirror of the self.213 
Nowadays, we do not have to learn how to paint, draw, or operate complicated photo cameras 
and use professional image software to expand our ability to create imagery. This is because all 
screen devices (from laptops to iPads and iPhones) come now with a built in camera and easy 
photo editing techniques that make image-creation accessible with a swipe of a finger. The 
screen provides a subjective sense of power over images as it allows to visualize the inner and 
outer life by means of generating and managing digital files—that is, we can capture, save, 
name, and crop images of our creative, working, and social life and place them in different 
categories/folders and websites. This feeling of control recalls the Nietzschean proclamation of 
the cultural age of the Übermensch in which the aim of humanity is to self-realize in the will to 
power. The constitution of individuality through the will to power implies that the viewer 
becomes the evaluator of his/her own spectacle—the creator of images who accounts for his/her 
own existence.  In the age of interactive technology, the image achieves its highest Nietzschean 
level of imitating/reflecting the viewer’s thoughts and desires. Moreover, in this nexus between 
image and the will to power, the technological products play almost a sacred role in mediating 
individualized modes of perceiving reality, which eventually turn the visible into a 
commoditized spectacle saturated with the self to be seen and esteemed.  
Moreover, the technological mode of seeing the world through screens directs our gaze to 
lay emphasis on visible reality similarly to the way the figures in Plato’s allegory of the Cave 
perceived moving shadows on a wall. While chained to the back of a cave, the figures in Plato’s 
cave saw mimetic representations of reality animated by a wooden fire that also mimicked the 
true light of the sun. Likewise, the light emanating from media screens mimics reality through 
                                                                                                                                                       
rendered immaterial. The immateriality of the real is a function of its virtualization. In the world of fashion, all 
‘reality’ is virtual reality” (Taylor 1997, 210– 211). 
213 The historical advancement of media screen technologies (from traditional forms of painting to the latest 
mobile screen devices) is beyond the scope of this study. My use of the word screen takes the general meaning of a 
site for representation or an interface for mediation as the main target of contemporary metaphysical iconoclasm.  
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digital reflections that trap today’s viewers into a virtual world. This analogy reveals that 
technological images (like the shadows on the wall in the back of Plato’s cave) become their own 
origin to be consumed as reality itself. However, in contrast to the Platonic viewers who are 
passive spectators of what they perceive as reality, the touch screen users are free to engage with 
the shadows and esteem them according to their own needs and desires. In a culture of screens, 
the viewer acts like the doubting Thomas, the apostle whose trust in vision is deeply connected 
to the sense of touch as the very act of knowing. And by touching the screen, the image 
transforms into a mimetic representation of the viewers’ individuality that is directed towards the 
cult of the Übermensch—the digital shadows do not mimic the divine light of Forms, instead 
they are now reshaped and manipulated to reflect the viewer’s gaze. For the Nietzschean 
viewers, the true/divine light does not seem to be situated outside the cave, somewhere in an 
invisible divine world, but located in the very personal experience of touching/performing one's 
own self-image. This assumption that the image operates within the limits of human 
consciousness and desires has triggered bouts of iconoclastic controversies around the 
objectification and alienation of human identity in our age of consumerism and technologically 
fashioned images.214  
In opposition to Marion, Baudrillard considers that the (televisual) spectacle is not a 
mirror of desires, but the real itself. More precisely, Baudrillard thinks that the actual reality is 
the spectacle’s form as simulacrum. The simulacrum acquires an illusory effect before the human 
gaze when its quality to simulate masks itself through various forms of representation. 
Baudrillard pushes the critique of the spectacle to such an extent that even questions the 
overman’s will to power to create his/her own images. He says that the spectacle cannot 
                                                
214 While iconoclasm is not always violent, where it does occur the tendency to destroy images seems to 
erupt with as much vigor and impetuosity as those reverse trends inspiring the creation of art. The art historian Sven 
Lütticken claims that we are currently witnessing a “fundamentalist version of ‘the society of the spectacle’” 
(Lütticken 2009, 22). In his Idols of the Market, Lütticken suggests that Christian, Muslim, and Enlightenment 
fundamentalists are increasingly imposing their monotheistic values over images projected through the mass media. 
One of the latest examples of this trend, proffered by Lütticken, is the protests of Presbyterian, Catholic, and 
Anglican Church leaders against a Christmas nativity scene installed in 2004 at the Waxwork Museum of London, 
England. Widely advertised throughout mass media, the sculpture features David and Victoria Beckham as the 
figures of Joseph and the Virgin Mary. The controversy this sculpture has aroused is not incomparable with the 
intense debates that surrounded the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad published by the Danish newspaper, 
Jyllands-Poster, in 2005. The controversy engendered by both the wax sculpture and the caricatures of Muhammad 
seem to affirm a statement made by French sociologist and anthropologist Bruno Latour that, “since 11 September 
2001 a state of emergency has been proclaimed on how we deal with images of all sorts, in religion, politics, 
science, art and criticism—and a frantic search for the roots of fanaticism has begun” (Latour and Weibel 2002, 
37). 
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reference any Nietzschean values or deny Platonic realities for the simple reason that there are no 
such realities (outside or beyond the spectacle) to begin with. And to outline the role of 
simulation in the spectacle, Baudrillard poses the following questions in relation to the Byzantine 
icon:  
 
But what becomes of the divinity when it reveals itself in icons, when it is multiplied in 
simulacra? Does it remain the supreme power that is simply incarnated in images as a 
visible theology? Or does it volatilize itself in the simulacra that, alone, deploy their 
power and pomp of fascination—the visible machinery of icons substituted for the pure 
and intelligible Idea of God?215  
 
In other words, the Byzantine icon does not reject, but hides the non-existence of God. It 
simulates its own existence as simulacrum, which misleads the viewers’ gaze in locating the 
actual signified—that is, the simulation itself. As Baudrillard puts it, “we live in a world of 
simulation, a world where the highest function of the sign is to make reality disappear and to 
mask this disappearance at the same time.”216  
Without analyzing Baudrillard’s idea of the spectacle in depth, it is important to reflect 
now on the above questions surrounding the Byzantine icon’s method of simulation to provide a 
contrasting view and, therefore, a deeper understanding of Marion’s theological use of the icon 
within metaphysical iconoclasm. Baudrillard notes that all methods of signification (including 
“the Byzantine icon or the postmodern simulacrum”217) not only act “as simulation but also 
[offer themselves] as a system of simulation….Which means that it [simulation] becomes its own 
reference. It becomes a kind of pure object or pure event, something like [a performative] act.”218  
Simulation seems to liquidate the relationship between the signifier and signified through the 
illusion that there is such thing as a representation of reality. And in our postindustrial consumer 
society, all that is left is simulation and its play of signs and codes in various forms of 
simulacra.219 For example, Baudrillard points to the dangerous, ideological power of the 
                                                
215 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994), 4. 
216 Jean Baudrillard “Simulation and Transaesthetics: Towards the Vanishing Point of Art,” International 
Journal of Baudrillard Studies 5.2. 2008.   
217 Helena Bodin, “Into Golden Dusk”; Orthodox Icons as Objects of Late Modern and Postmodern 
Desire,” Ingela Nilsson & Paul Stephenson (ed.), Wanted: Byzantium. The Desire for a Lost Empire. Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis: Studia Byzantina Upsaliensia 15 (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet 2014), 204. 
218 Judith Williamson, “An Interview with Jean Baudrillard,” The Block Reader in Visual Culture ed. 
George Robertson, et al (London: Routledge, 1996), 306–313. 
219 Here, the meaning of symbol, sign, and code is used in the sense given by the semiotician-iconographer 
Leonid Ouspensky. According to Ouspensky, a sign indicates and depicts an outer referent, whereas a symbol enacts 
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Byzantine icon/simulacrum to induce metaphysical beliefs in simulating Platonic ideals, such as 
God. For this reason, he esteems the Byzantine iconoclasts for their courage in destroying the 
icons and realizing the vicious way in which simulacra’s systems of signification (based of a 
signifier and signified relationship) mask the inexistence of God. This power to hide the unreal 
as if real is what Baudrillard calls “the murderous capacity of images.”220 The idea of God is 
conceived within the images of simulacra and not outside of them. Accordingly, the 
understanding that God can exist only as a simulacral image “is precisely what was feared by 
Iconoclasts, whose millennial quarrel is still with us today.”221  
 
This is precisely because they predicted this omnipotence of simulacra, the faculty 
simulacra have of effacing God from the conscience of man, and the destructive, 
annihilating truth that they allow to appear—that deep down God never existed, that only 
the simulacrum ever existed, even that God himself was never anything but his own 
simulacrum-from this came their urge to destroy the images. If they could have believed 
that these images only obfuscated or masked the Platonic Idea of God, there would have 
been no reason to destroy them. One can live with the idea of distorted truth. But their 
metaphysical despair came from the idea that the image didn’t conceal anything at all, 
and that these images were in essence not images, such as an original model would have 
made them, but perfect simulacra, forever radiant with their own fascination. Thus this 
death of the divine referential must be exorcised at all costs.222   
 
This means that the aftermath of the Second Council of Nicaea stands for the moment 
when the dualism between the signifier and signified was resolved through simulation, which, 
subsequently, it impacts human’s ability to distinguish between the simulacral images and 
ideology. Therefore, Baudrillard thinks that if the spectacle, which transcended into simulacra 
driven by simulation, is not a representation of the real, but the real itself, then the image should 
no longer be seen in a metaphysical manner or based on a relation between a copy and 
                                                                                                                                                       
what it denotes allowing the signifier and signified to merge (1992a, 17). Following this differentiation, Steven 
Grimwood (2003) describes the simulacrum’s code as opposed to the symbol since it does not point to anything 
beyond itself. While not entirely similar, the code resembles the sign in its signifying function. The difference 
between the sign and the code, is that the latter always points to another code within the space of the simulacrum. 
Also, the code parallels Marion’s idol, which both function as Roland Barthes’ concept of studium in a photographic 
image (Barthes 2000, 27). Like the code, the studium encompasses the culturally recognizable photographic 
elements that define what is represented such as location, gestures, and clothing. These coded elements that form the 
studium/simulacrum define specific meanings that constrict the viewing experience. The viewer is prevented from 
creating new meaning in the image. Additionally, Barthes’ concept of punctum resembles the Byzantine icon in the 
way it directs the gaze beyond representation. 
220 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, 5. 
221 Ibid., 4. 
222 Ibid. 
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original.223 The destruction of metaphysical myths, artificially built by a symbolic vision, is, in 
fact, tenable through a realistic mode of seeing the games of representation without signifieds. 
Baudrillard supports the fact that the critical eye should be able to see that reality turns (in the 
space of a simulacrum) into nothing more than its own simulation as image, dubbed as 
hyperreal.224 It is a realistic eye that sees everything as part of a “gigantic simulacrum—not 
unreal, but a simulacrum, that is to say never exchanged for the real, but exchanged for itself, in 
an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference.”225  
At the core of both Baudrillard and Marion’s critique of the spectacle lies the semiotic 
problem of mediating an image of reality between the viewer and a representation. To conclude, 
for Baudrillard, the Byzantine icon clarifies how simulation operates within all cultural systems 
of simulacra by hiding reality (the simulation itself). However, in following Marion’s discussion 
(from the previous section) on the metaphysical imposition of the transcendental I, Baudrillard 
seems to take the term simulation as a first-principle in producing the simulacrum, whereby an 
origin is placed before all metaphysical binary oppositions. Like Nietzsche’s will to power, the 
idea of simulation acts as a metaphysical driving force that unites representation and reality. 
Since the concept of simulation entails that reality (in a Platonic, symbolic way) dissolves in the 
space of simulacra, Baudrillard advocates a realistic mode of seeing that perceives the spectacle 
as no longer an illusion opposed to an ideal/real world, but as a concrete resemblance/simulation 
of reality—in the sense that the signifier (even if simulated) is one with the signified. This 
realistic mode of seeing the image as a literal embodiment of a concept is an effect of the new 
cultural age of the Übermensch.226 Nietzsche’s philosophy denies the existence of an invisible 
reality and reverses the metaphysical dogmatism in conforming the visual image to the 
truthfulness of an ideal origin. The simulacral image becomes its own origin and is grounded in 
what it specifically represents. Therefore, Baudrillard can be seen as a metaphysical iconoclast 
by condoning the proclamation of the Death of God only to position another fundamental source 
(simulation), prior to the image and reality, for generating  “the visible and intelligible mediation 
                                                
223 For instance, Baudrillard challenges the Situationists’ understanding of the spectacle as objectifying 
human desires based on blocking the access to real individual and contextualized experiences. See Guy Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle, Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 12.  
224 Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations”, Selected Writings, Ed. Mark Poster (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), 166. 
225 Ibid., 6. 
226 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 81. 
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of the Real.”227 And, the notion of simulation traps symbolism and realism in a place for an 
idolic kind of desire with no point of contact beyond the limits of the perceiving world.  
Opposed to Baudrillard’s Nietzschean approach to the spectacle, Marion finds a solution 
to the closed circuit of signifiers without the signified in the icon’s relationship between a type 
and prototype. For Marion, the Byzantine icon designates the (saturated) phenomenon that, as 
opposed to the spectacle’s “visible freezing of life,”228 presents “many meanings, or an infinity 
of meanings, each equally legitimate and rigorous, without managing either to unify them or to 
organize them.”229 He discovers in the Byzantine icon the necessary semiotic structure to make 
present a signified through its signifier and, thus, to move beyond the spectacle. Specifically, as I 
will analyze in the next section, Marion takes the Byzantine theology of the image in an 
apophatic sense based on Husserl’s idea of phenomenological reduction to claim that even 
though the signified cannot be represented, it can be felt as through an experience of the other.230 




2.4 The phenomenology of the iconic vision 
 
“Every painting participates in a resurrection, every painting imitates Christ, by bringing 
the unseen to light.” 231 
 
In this section, I analyze Marion’s extreme form of iconolatry as an alternative to the 
symbolic and realistic modes of critiquing the objectification of consumers in the postmodern 
(idolic) visual culture. This section begins by analysing how his phenomenology of the icon has 
developed in response to abstract art. Nietzsche’s impact on the objectification of phenomena 
and his idea of the Übermensch-artist contributed to a return in abstract art to Platonic values for 
rethinking an aesthetic of the invisible in a non-mimetic way. Nevertheless, Marion critiques the 
                                                
227 Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations,” 1994, 5. 
228 Debord qtd. in Anselm Jappe, “Sic Transit Gloria Artis: 'the End of Art' for Theodor Adorno and Guy 
Debord.” Substance: A Review of Theory & Literary Criticism 28.3 (1999): 115.  
229 Marion, In Excess, 112. 
230 Peter Joseph Fritz, “Black Holes and Revelations: Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion on the Aesthetics 
of the Invisible,” Modern Theology 25, no. 3 (2009): 417. 
231 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 27. 
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limits of abstract art in revealing an ideal reality by rethinking the painting as a saturated 
phenomenon (Fig. 6). It will then discuss his apophatic theology of the icon and how it responds 
to the idolic nature of today’s commercialized visual culture. Through the experience of the 
other, Marion reaches back to Christianity, specifically to the Byzantine theology of the image 
affirmed by the Second Council of Nicaea. He aims toward an iconic moment that refuses to be 
constituted by the human gaze and that forces the viewer beyond his/her own grasp/imagination. 
The icon is, as I will discuss in detail below, the type of image that solves the problem with the 
imposition of the I in metaphysics. 
Finally, it concludes with metaphysical concerns regarding Marion’s dis-consideration of 
the material aspect of an iconic vision. This performative quality of the icon will, then, be 
analyzed next in Chapter 3 and 4.  
 
 
Figure 6: The image for Henry and Marion 
 
 
2.4.1 Abstract painting as an aesthetic of the invisible 
 
In view of how the icon came to be considered a solution to metaphysical iconoclasm and 
“the savior of images,”232 this section contrasts and compares Marion and Henry’s aesthetic 
opinion on how the invisible is revealed in the visibility of a painting. The limitation of the 
image to visibility in metaphysics—a reduction that corresponds to the importance placed by the 
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modern society on “the external [commoditized] world and objectivity”233—has determined both 
Marion and Henry to reassess the power of painting in revealing the invisible. Much like Marion, 
Henry finds the two contrasting mimetic relationships of the image to either the world of Ideas or 
the will to power too constrictive for the experience of phenomena. More specifically, in Henry’s 
view, these two metaphysical perspectives result in the humans’ inability to see the inner force of 
their own life. Consequently, he advocates the power of abstract art, in particular Kandinsky’s 
type of abstraction, to restore our sensible faculty to experience feelings that awaken subjective 
consciousness. 
At this point, I turn to Henry’s mission of rethinking the appearance of phenomena 
through pathos, to situate Marion’s version of the iconic painting within a broader 
phenomenological approach to painting as a vehicle for invisibility.234 Discussing the spiritual 
quest of Wassily Kandinsky’s work, Henry argues that abstract art succeeds in freeing the image 
from the Platonic and Nietzschean logic of mimesis and all the problems associated with the 
contemporary crisis of image. Kandinsky’s abstraction disrupts the aesthetic association of vision 
with the material world in order to elevate art to the role of revealing the essence of life, i.e. the 
pure world of Ideas.235 Moving away from the objective/imitative forms of representational art, 
Kandinsky desired to visually express the invisible aspect of phenomena in a non-objective way 
that avoids the metaphysical mistrust of the image. 
                                                
233 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: on Kandinsky. Trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Continuum, 
2009), ix. 
234 Ibid. In Henry’s phenomenology the word pathos/pathetique stands for its Greek definition as a 
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explains that the meaning of a song becomes meaningless when one experiences affect through music. Likewise, 
Kandinsky aimed at emptying the content of the painting in order to transmit affect through vision.  Thus, it is affect 
and not feelings or emotions that Kandinsky wanted to transmit through abstract art. 
235 In comparing Kandinsky’s abstract painting to the work of other modern artists, Henry claims that the 
majority of avant-garde movements such as Impressionism, Cubism, and Constructivism were still strongly 
influenced by the classical Western representation of the human body (1). In fact, even the painting styles of Picasso 
and Matisse were not entirely liberated from the constrains of the visible/material world. Criticizing the work of 
Picasso and Matisse, Kandinsky defined two opposite approaches to abstraction that any artists interested in 
revealing the invisible reality should avoid. While Picasso deconstructed materiality by breaking it into separate 
“corporeal form[s],” Matisse overemphasized the decorative aspect of color (Tuchamn 35). The use of abstraction in 
these two extreme forms do not find the right balance between the form and content of a painting—an essential 
requirement in breaking from the representational art. 
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From Henry’s phenomenological standpoint, the nature of our existence is defined by two 
modes of experiencing the world: internal and external.236 On the one hand, our eye detects the 
external aspect of every phenomenon by receiving light from the visible world. On the other 
hand, the internal manifestation of a phenomenon appears to us through different intensities of 
pathos in our body. Although no phenomenological position can apprehend the materiality of the 
canvas and paint as invisible, Henry believed that the secret of the Kandinskyian abstract style in 
non-objectively revealing the invisible is to visibly capture the variations of pathos through 
colors and forms. 
To shed light on the phenomenological split between the visible and invisible generated 
by Kandinsky’s work, Henry refers to the internal and external sides of the human body. Our 
biological body manifests from an outside position in the sense that we are able to sensibly 
perceive it in the same manner as we relate to other tangible objects. This very ability to see and 
touch our own body as an external reality determined the naturalistic representation of the human 
body in Western art based on light and perspective—that is, image was reduced to an illustration 
of the visible. Conversely, we experience our body from an internal perspective when feelings of 
pain or pleasure become indistinguishable from our essential being—Henry defines this inside 
experience as being in a state of “pure subjectivity.”237 As a result of the dual mode of living, the 
human body becomes the model on which the nature of all phenomena is perceived internally 
and externally.238  
Another important idea in Henry’s phenomenology is that the external and internal do not 
manifest in a similar fashion. While the external reveals itself 
through visibility, the internal is directly experienced in an 
invisible way as affect. But the invisible interiority “is not the 
fold turned inward of a first Outside.”239 The concept of 
interiority does not stand for the interior space of a cardboard 
box, for example, that appears visibly once it is opened. The 
internal should not be understood as the opposite of the 
                                                
236 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 5. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Henry does not refer to the content of the phenomena as having an internal and external side, but to the 
manner in which we perceive any phenomena. 
239 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 7. 
Figure 7: Last Judgment (1912) 
by Wassily Kandinsky 
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external as this would imply that the invisible is part of the visible world. Therefore, the internal 
“is revealed to itself, in which life lives itself, in which the impression immediately imprints 
itself and in which feeling affects itself.”240 In sum, the internal is the inexplicable and 
immediate experience of life as pathos/affect. 
A contradiction in Kandinsky’s belief in abstract art is that the visible/material quality of 
the paint and canvas literally exhibits the invisible. Once the painting is considered outside of its 
mimetic tradition, the answer to Kandinsky’s paradox lies in the phenomenological explanation 
of colors and forms as both visible and invisible. In Last Judgment (Fig. 7), for instance, the 
colors red, yellow, and blue are meant to physically reveal the invisible by affecting the viewer’s 
sensibility through vibrations.241 The selection of colors do not mimic the colors of the visible 
objects; on the contrary, the colors are apprehended from an invisible source and combined on 
the basis of their internal dynamic power to intensify pathos in the viewer’s body. Another 
interpretation of Kandinsky’s way of painting the invisible resides in the power of pictorial 
forms, generated from points and lines, to affectively communicate the sensation of life itself. 
The black lines in the Last Judgment are not the contours of physical objects, but traces of inner 
forces “pulsating within our body, that is, the bodily powers of moving, feeling and desire.”242 In 
other words, instead of representing the human body from an exterior point of view, Kandinsky 
directly expresses the affect experienced within his body when his hand presses the paintbrush 
on the flat surface of the canvas.  
Henry explains that until the development of abstraction, painting (and image) was bound 
to the visible through “the light of the world.”243 The Greek model of the phenomenon, from 
which Plato’s understanding of mimesis originated, reduced art to phenomena displayed in the 
natural light of our imperfect/material world. Kandinsky radically challenges the Platonic 
relation of art with the visible when claiming that the content of painting is not homogenous with 
material means of representation. The abstract artist’s task is not to imitate the form of objects, 
                                                
240 Ibid. 
241 According to Kandinsky’s theory of color, the warmth of red has the energy to intensify inner vibrations 
in the viewer, the light effect of yellow aggressively moves outward by placing the spectator into an uncomfortable 
position, and the depth of blue allows for a sense of tranquility. White elevates the viewer’s feelings and black 
dissolves them into the silence of death. (Henry 2009, 78). 
242 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, xi. 
243 Ibid., 8. 
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but to find the true content of painting as the original meaning of life, based on the following 
formula: “Interior = interiority = invisible = life = pathos = abstract.”244  
In the case of Marion’s phenomenological analysis of the visible, abstract art reveals a 
minimum or no amount of invisibility, depending on its degree of staging a perspective. Since 
the invisible is either connected to the viewer’s ability to take perspective (in the linear 
perspective of an idol) or to the iconic interaction of two intentional gazes (a counter-intuitive 
experience of the iconic gaze that I examine next), Kandinsky’s non-figurative work appears to 
be an instance of tabula rasa that emphasizes the autonomy of the visible from the constitutive 
power of the viewer’s gaze.245 Like Malevich (as previously discussed), Kandinsky desired to 
release the color (content) from the limitations of form—in other words, from the limits imposed 
by the viewer’s consciousness as in the viewing experience of a figurative painting. But this 
freedom of content from form indicates “the departure [of the visible] from the perspectival 
consciousness.”246 And the lack of form in a painting “confuses and distresses consciousness, to 
the point that it [the human gaze] is rendered incapable of exercising the invisible.”247 Marion’s 
argument depends on the fact that the abstract image, as a “’nonobjective phenomenon,’”248 
lacks the visual elements that define an intentional object, which is essential for the 
manifestation of the invisible as a play between the gaze and the visible.  
 In the next section, I discuss how Marion’s idea of invisibility in a painting (a saturated 
phenomenon) is further developed through a theological and phenomenological turn to the 
Byzantine dogmatic affirmation of the icon. Marion argues that the true painting is the form of 
visibility that “participates in a resurrection…[which] imitates Christ, by bringing the unseen 
[the invisible] to light.”249 Marion’s critique of metaphysics is based on privileging the icon as a 
type of painting that has a different phenomenality than an abstract painting (an idolic “instance 
of total visibility” that blocks the insertion of invisibility in a linear perspective through the 
conscious intervention of the intentional gaze) or naturalistic painting (an idolic intentional 
object depicted in a linear perspective).250 
 
                                                
244 Ibid., 11. 
245 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 17. 
246 Ibid., 18. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid., 19. 
249 Ibid., 27. 
250 Balazs M. Mezei, Religion and Revelation after Auschwitz (USA/UK: A&amp; C Black, 2013), 288. 
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2.4.2 Marion’s icon and metaphysical iconoclasm 
 
…can the conceptual thought of God (conceptual, or rational, and not intuitive or 
“mystical” in the vulgar sense) be developed outside of the doctrine of Being (in the 
metaphysical sense, or even in the nonmetaphysical sense)? Does God give himself to be 
known according to the horizon of Being or according to a more radical horizon?251 
 
If the Death of God invalidates the idols of morality and metaphysics to give birth to 
another idolic mask for the divine, could the icon (the image of Christ that Nietzsche attacked 
most virulently) then be a solution to overcoming metaphysics? Marion’s theological and 
phenomenological investigations regarding the notion of the icon provide a thorough critique of 
“God” and its identification with Being.252 His main concern is not to define God as Being, but 
rather, to see if the notion of Being can be used to define God. Is Being the conceptual 
framework that equally determines both the divine and human existence? Can we 
perceive/contemplate and receive God only within the limits of Being? Advancing from 
Heidegger’s question of being as a critique of metaphysics, Marion grounds his thought on 
questioning the onto-theo-logical determination of God. In God Without Being, he argues that 
God should not be reduced to anything that defines existence (including Heidegger’s notion of 
Being). Everything that applies to predetermined beings is reversed in God’s case, in a way that 
if “’God is love,’ then God loves before being.”253 Humans need to be first in order to love. But 
God, instead, is not conditioned by existence—Being is just the medium through which He 
reveals Himself as love and gift to finite beings.254 Although Marion can be positioned among 
other postmodern thinkers such as Derrida and Levinas, his theological emphasis on revelation 
through the contemplation of the icon, selfless-love, and charity does not belong to neither “pre-, 
nor to post-, nor to modernity, but rather, at once abandoned to and removed from historical 
destiny, it dominates any situation of thought.”255   
                                                
251 Marion, God Without Being, xxiv. 
252 I refer here to Being in the metaphysical sense as cause and in the Heideggerian sense as thought that 
moves beyond metaphysics. 
253 Marion, God Without Being, xx. 
254 The four theological concepts in Marion’s work are the icon, gift, love, and distance. These motives are 
used in describing the way God reveals Himself as free from all forms of metaphysical determinations. Love 
represents the content of faith in Christ. The gift stands for the method and the body of God’s revelation—“the 
Eucharist and the confession of faith” (Marion 1991, xxiv). The meaning of distance is difficult to comprehend and 
should not be perceived in spatial terms since it exceeds the limits of meaning based on concepts to the point of 
coinciding with God itself (see Marion 1991, 75). 
255 Marion, God Without Being, xxii.  
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As indicated in 1 Corinthians 1:18-31, the “wisdom of God” revealed in “the message of 
the cross” is foolishness to the “wisdom of the world.”256 The revelatory experience of God, 
given as love in the form of a gift by God Himself, flows over the limits of thought. For the fact 
that it operates beyond human control, the gift enters and overflows thought in a non-idolatrous 
way. Hence, any aesthetic mode of thinking of God outside revelation turns into an idol.  
Marion’s phenomenological approach to the theology of the icon is a mode of seeing God 
devoid of Being in a counter-intuitive aesthetic experience of a saturated phenomenon that soars 
beyond mental powers.257 However, it is important to clarify here the nuances between a 
theological and phenomenological view regarding the icon and idol. While from a Byzantine 
theological view the difference between the icon and idol is well delineated at the 
epistemological level (Fig 8), in the latter 
view it is less pronounced or important. 
That is, the phenomenological quality of 
the icon and idol are both significant in 
understanding notions of invisibility.  
A saturated phenomenon differs 
from all ordinary phenomena in the fact 
that it is a paradox and never 
determined/objectified by an I.258 The 
occurrence of a saturated phenomenon 
implies an intuitive259 perception of the 
                                                
256 New International Version, http://www.biblegateway.com, accessed February 20, 2014. 
257 Saturated phenomena are characterized by various degrees of excessiveness in relation to human 
intention (the conveyer of meaning) in a sense that parallels Kant’s aesthetic experience of the sublime. However 
saturated phenomena differ from the sublime in the way they escape the limitations of concepts. Although Kant 
considers intuition a deficient way of reaching high-levels of abstract thinking, he referred to the sublime as the 
aesthetic experience that overwhelms human reason. But the sublime experience in the Kantian thought is taken as a 
test for the knowing subject to arrive at a state of absolute knowledge. The knower aims to contain the 
sublime/saturated phenomena within the rules of the concept. In opposition, Marion interprets the sublime/saturated 
phenomena experience as the saturation of thought by intuition similar to being blinded by an excess of knowledge 
that “demands an endless hermeneutics” (Horner 123).  
258 I refer here to ordinary phenomena in the non-aesthetic sense of experiencing the world. 
259 Intuition (the attainment of knowledge) is the making sense of human existence based on mental and 
physical activities (intentions). Intuition is guided by intentionality towards intentional objects (meanings). Husserl 
explains that intentionality is formed from noema and noesis (1969, 272). Noema is the cogitated object. Noesis is 
the process of consciousness that ascribes meaning.   
Figure 8: The idolic and iconic image for the Byzantines 
 94 
phenomenon in its givenness,260 which is a term that stresses the importance of the 
phenomenon’s state of being given to consciousness without perceptual and or cognitive 
misconstructions. According to Marion, the icon encompasses and merges the characteristics of 
three types of saturated phenomena: “the historical event, the idol, and the flesh [face].”261 It is 
essential to mention here that I specifically focus on Marion’s icon as the only saturated 
phenomenon that completely (and not partially as it happens with the idol or other saturated 
phenomena) exceeds the aim of human intention. In presenting itself as the face of the other, the 
icon envisages the viewer with a revelatory light that overpowers and renders sightless the 
human vision. This is due to the saturated phenomenon of the divine light, which God gives as 
gift to the human mind and senses in the icon, turns into a deep “Invisible Darkness” that 
“exceeds the visible light.”262  
If in metaphysics, sure knowledge depends on a matter of proving that the appearance-
beings (phenomena) are certain or justifiable for a belief, in the Marionian phenomenological 
mode of thinking it is a matter of “letting appearances appear in such a way that they accomplish 
their own apparition, so as to be received exactly as they give themselves.”263 The process in 
which the saturated phenomena present themselves to intuition involves a purification of 
consciousness from all theoretical and empirical assumptions. In his analysis of the saturated 
phenomena, Marion draws and redefines some fundamental Husserlian concepts such as subject-
object dichotomy, intentionality, phenomenological reduction or epochê,264 intuition, and 
                                                
260 A term taken from Husserl, givenness (gegebenheit) refers to the “self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit) of 
phenomena, and a consequent recognition that the subject is not first a constituting I, but a screen upon which 
phenomena become visible” (Horner 106). Marion analyses the idea of givenness in his book Being Given (2002b), 
from page 62 to 70.  
261 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002b), 234. In Being Given, from page 228 to 247, Marion analyses five 
types of saturated phenomena: the event, flesh, idol, icon, and revelation. An event is a saturated phenomenon for 
the reason that no matter how much information is collected regarding a specific historical event, it is impossible to 
assign a definite cause or meaning: in its aim to the phenomenon of the event, the concept is overwhelmed by it. The 
flesh (face) is the absolute type of phenomena that gives itself to the ego without analogy. As explained in section 
2.1 The phenomenology of the idolic vision, the idol and icon reveal various levels of invisibility—the former 
returns the viewer’s own gaze and reveals a minimum amount of divine invisibility and the latter reveals a radical 
form of invisibility. The saturated phenomenon of revelation integrates all the other four saturated phenomena (the 
event, flesh, idol, and icon). Nonetheless, Horner explains that Marion has initially thought of revelation as similar 
to the icon (106). 
262 Clarence Edwin Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite: On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2000), 93. 
263 Marion, Being Given, 7. 
264 Edmund Husserl, Ideas; General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. (London: Allen & Unwin. 
1969), §32, 110. 
 95 
presence. Although phenomenology as a philosophical movement is not the focus of this thesis, a 
brief examination of these concepts in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology will assist in our later 
discussion of how they arise in the phenomenological interpretation of the Byzantine icon.  
Husserl’s work is premised on a transcendental phenomenological approach to 
knowledge that describes the universal objects (essences) of consciousness:  
 
As over against this psychological “phenomenology” [empirical science], pure or 
transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a 
science of essential Being (as “eidetic” Science); a science which aims exclusively at 
establishing “knowledge of essences” (Wesenserkenntnisse) and absolutely no “facts.” 
The corresponding Reduction which leads from the psychological phenomenon to the 
pure “essence”, or, in respect of the judging thought, from factual (“empirical”) to 
“essential” universality, is the eidetic Reduction.265 
 
From Husserl’s view, natural science is restricted to objects of observation that do not 
explain reality in its entirety. Specifically, empirical knowledge cannot account for the role of 
subjective consciousness in constituting/bestowing meaning (meaning as different from facts) to 
the world as it is exposed to human perception. Therefore, the data of senses should not be taken 
as the sole ground for objective knowledge, since consciousness preconditions the very 
possibility of ontic reality.266 Science is able to provide a comprehensive meaning of the real 
world if the limitations of the rational/psychological viewpoints are compensated with a 
phenomenological examination of the pure essential elements of consciousness. This procedure 
of articulating ideal truths in the Husserlian eidetic science of consciousness is called ideation.267 
The eidetic universal meanings are formed from transcendental reflections that extract 
fundamental principles or essences from factual insights of individual acts of consciousness. 
These acts are “lived experiences [erlebnis] of consciousness” that determine (and unite) the 
subjective and objective sides of existence.268 The data of consciousness is composed, then, of 
absolute/invariable phenomena that are transcendent to the psychological/tangible knowledge. 
As opposed to empirical realism that obtains “psychological facts” from the temporal/changing 
constitution of material objects and the events of everyday life, phenomenology provides 
                                                
265 Ibid., 44. 
266 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 25. 
267 Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction, 57. 
268 Rudolf Bernet, “Husserl,” trans. Lilian Alweiss and Steven Kupfer, A Companion to Continental 
Philosophy, eds. Simon Critchley and William R. Schroeder, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy (Malden, MA; 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 199. 
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essential insights into the what of the world from “acts of consciousness” that are independent 
from the logic of reason.269 
Husserl creates a void of meaning between consciousness and the physical world to 
position subjectivity in two different spheres: one in the transcendental space defined as Being as 
Experience and the second one in the realm of senses described as Being as Thing.270 
Transcendental subjectivity apprehends directly the immanent objects of consciousness in their 
totality without any adumbrations (Abschattungen)—that is, without the restrictions of human 
vision to apprehend material objects from different perspectival/spatial angles.271 Psychological 
subjectivity apprehends the objects that are transcendent (or external) to consciousness—
explicitly the objects of the natural world given to consciousness in adumbrations.272  
In spite of this separation between consciousness and materiality, Husserl sees the 
spatial-temporal objects and consciousness coming together as a whole in the lived experience.273 
But this union in the experience of life is made possible only by the conscious cogito itself, thus 
Husserl’s valorization of consciousness as transcendental. Life is lived when the I (cogito) 
intentionally addresses cogitationes.274 The cogito’s intention continuously aims at the elements 
of life (intentional objects or appearances of phenomena that are made known to consciousness 
through lived experiences). In this way, Husserl defines the true knowledge of reality by 
considering both the objects that are in a consciousness (immanent objects) and the objects that 
stay outside that consciousness (transcendent objects). Through the force of cogito’s 
intentionality, the world appears as one Being (Being as Experience together with Being as 
Thing) in the lived experience of immanent and transcendent objects. Although Husserl believed 
that phenomenology overcomes metaphysical dualism in the unifying aspect of the lived 
experience, the professor of theology Robyn Horner points to the radicalization of the Cartesian 
                                                
269 Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction, 54, 113. 
270 Taylor Carman, “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty” Philosophical Topics 27. 2 (1999): 209. 
271 Ibid.  
272 The professor of philosophy, Taylor Carman clarifies that for Husserl “[a]n object is ‘transcendent,’…if 
it is given to consciousness perspectivally…so that only one side or aspect of the thing is immediately present to us 
at any one time. An object is immanent if it is given to consciousness all at once, transparently, so that no 
perspectival variation mediates our apprehension of it. Physical bodies and worldly states of affairs are transcendent 
objects, for Husserl, and so too are the abstract entities of mathematics and formal ontology” (209). 
273 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 25. 
274 Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction, 119.  
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subjectivity, which underlines a Platonic dichotomy between the transcendental structure of 
subjectivity and spatial-temporal organization of objectivity.275  
Returning to the concept of eidetic Reduction, Marion critiques the metaphysical aspect 
of Husserl’s phenomenology due to the cogito’s role in constituting the self-appearance of 
phenomena. The Husserlian phenomenological reduction comprises a conceptual method of 
abstracting or bracketing276 the facts produced “in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the 
basis of direct present (aktueller) experience.”277 While not denying the existence of Nature, 
consciousness disconnects itself from all empirical suppositions regarding the notion of Being in 
order to describe phenomena as they present themselves to intuition. According to Husserl, the 
tangible experience of the world does not play an equal role with the internal conscious 
experience of the immanent objects in constructing objective knowledge. In comparison to 
immanent objects, physical objects present themselves to intuition in an ambiguous/inferior way, 
that is, intuition perceives them fragmentarily from various (linear/spatial) perspectives. Husserl 
refers to the transitory presence of material objects as being translated or constituted by 
consciousness into evidence.278 The concept of evidence defines the phenomena’s level of 
coherence in its givenness to intuition—the amount of evidence determines the phenomena’s 
adequacy in being constituted by consciousness. For example, the ideal type of intuition is when:  
 
[the] intentional object is given or made present “in person,” which means that what is 
intentionally meant coincides either with the actual presence of the transcendent object, 
or the immanent presence of an object of insight (such as a mathematical truth).279  
 
If phenomena arise with full evidence in intuition, then their presence is revealed in an 
absolute form, a mode of seeing beyond any sensible form of representation such as pictures, 
signs, names, letters, and recollections. The evidence for sensed objects is always deficient in 
defining the truth. Contrarily, the presence of the immanent objects within the transcendental 
consciousness is pure. Nevertheless, Husserl has been criticized for his concept of evidence, 
since the pure presence of eidetic images can also imply conceptual representations in a 
metaphysical sense. Marion is concerned that the Husserlian version of phenomenology treats 
the subject-object relationship in a Kantian fashion because the conceptual faculty is considered 
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to prevail over phenomena. Particularly, he doubts that cognition can take a leading role over the 
intuition in describing notions of truth or pure essences. In Marionian phenomenology, the 
human mind is not adequate (adaequatio)280 to the capacity of intuition to receive phenomena, 
instead it finds itself in a position of being flooded/saturated by the phenomena’s givenness.  
Marion rethinks the Husserlian theme of the phenomenological removal of material 
barriers to explain how saturated phenomena manifest themselves. When the phenomena present 
themselves outside of conceptual definitions, they appear as “saturating in…[their] 
givenness.”281 Rather than being constituted/comprehended, the saturated phenomena give 
themselves to consciousness not “from a deficiency in the giving intuition, but from…[their] 
excess, which neither concept nor signification nor intention can foresee, organize, or 
contain.”282 The phenomenological reduction takes a new apophatic sense in Marion’s theology 
of the icon: the conceptual experience provides an acknowledgment of the phenomena’s 
apparition and not a fixed formulation of their meaning according to a priori knowledge.283 It is 
not a matter of producing definite significations—constituting does not mean defining in advance 
the possibilities for the phenomena to present themselves—but rather to use the reduction of 
false physiological attitudes for providing an unobstructed way for the appearance of the things 
into lived experience. The process of reduction is continuously at work and never finalized by 
means of imposing value judgments on the unknowable and invisible in the manner established 
by Kant, Husserl, and all other metaphysical projects.  
When perceived as a process of “letting apparition show itself in its appearance according 
to its appearing,” the phenomenological reduction shifts the emphasis from the constituting 
power of the knowing subject to the question of what presents itself to consciousness.284 As I 
explain in Chapter 4, I take a similar type of Marionian reduction in relation to my psychological 
subjectivity in my own artistic practice by employing the Byzantine canons. This Marionian 
shift, from a matter of proving and controlling the existence of phenomena (as Nietzsche and 
Husserl do) to a matter of working toward removing the obstacles that prevent their 
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manifestation,285 seems to shift (at this very moment in my discussion) phenomenology beyond 
metaphysics. The term manifestation means more than a Husserlian question of simply defining 
the visibility of phenomena—a situation in which their apparition is under the (idolic) control of 
the gazing cogito. For Marion, it implies an active exercise of the phenomenological reduction in 
the honor of phenomena’s appearance: a “manifestation of the thing starting from itself and as 
itself, privilege of rendering itself manifest, of making itself visible, of showing itself.“286  
Husserl’s concept of presence is also redeveloped by Marion to emphasize the aesthetic 
power of saturated phenomena in exceeding the knower’s intuition and capacity to make 
meaning (including metaphysical knowledge). The knowing subject always analyses a 
phenomenon through a restricted opening from one or more vantage points. This means that the 
presence of a phenomenon, in any possible form such as from an artistic representation to an 
event or tangible object, is perceived and described as a “ready-to-hand” or a “thingly” object for 
empiric analysis.287 It is not that this materialistic understanding is unimportant in apprehending 
phenomena’s appearance. Marion is simply affirming that the apprehension of phenomena’s 
properties in their thingness cannot describe their aesthetic lived experience.288 As an example, to 
see an object as a painting (idol), the viewer’s intuition needs to be overflown by its aesthetic 
meaning. The aesthetic phenomenality of the painting can only be experienced (lived) as an 
unexpected inner event outside the limits of a subject’s capacity to attain knowledge from the 
properties of tangible objects. This unexplainable/unforeseen aesthetic experience is exemplary 
to all forms of saturated phenomena. However, Marion refers here to Christ’s event as the 
absolute/par excellence type of saturated phenomenon (the Icon): 
 
[W]hat characterizes the icon painted on wood does not come from the hand of a man but 
from the infinite depth that crosses it—or better, orients it following the intention of a 
gaze. The essential in the icon—the intention that envisages comes to it from elsewhere, 
or comes to it as that elsewhere whose invisible strangeness saturates the visibility of the 
face with meaning.289 
 
The icon differs from the other types of saturated phenomena in the way it connects to 
the viewer’s gaze to disrupt his/her expectations. It demands the viewer to decrease the icon’s 
                                                
285 Ibid.  
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid., 46. 
288 Ibid.  
289 Marion, God Without Being, 21.  
 100 
visibility to reveal the gaze of another (a holy viewer, say, the Virgin Mary) from an invisible 
source. The icon’s visibility needs to withdraw before the believer’s gaze to allow the invisible 
gaze of the iconistic face (the Byzantine image) to pass through the icon. The invisible, therefore, 
reveals itself in the intentionality of another gaze, which marks itself on the surface of the icon 
and envisages the viewer himself/herself. This act of eliminating the visible when seeing the icon 
stands for the effacement of Christ’s visibility through His crucifixion.290 Christ incarnated to 
become an image in order to undergo effacement in the presence of the divine will. The Cross 
does not merely represent the visible aspect of Christ’s stigmata, as an idol does, but rather 
points to the invisibility that is revealed in the traces of violence left on Jesus’ body. Moreover, 
the Cross is not an imitation of an original, a copy of a copy, or an artistic representation that 
reflects people’s wishes. Instead of reproducing the bodily wounds of Christ and lay emphasis on 
His physical pain (as in a naturalistic/perspectival painting), the Cross refers to a visible trace, 
the type, or an opening in Christ’s body to unveil the invisible, the prototype.291 The invisible 
becomes present as absence through Jesus’ wounds to meet the human gaze. Likewise, the empty 
space of the pupils designates an opening through which the invisible gazes (the divine gaze 
painted on the wood panel of the icon belonging to a saint or Christ and the viewer’s gaze) can 
peer.292 This interchange of invisible gazes through the visibility of the blank space in the pupils 
differentiates an icon from an idol: 
 
…the visible surface of the wood there gives to be seen, surrounded by a face, two eyes; 
these two painted eyes, however, permit themselves to be intentionally pierced (thus 
under a mode that is [unreal]/irreal) by the invisible weight of a gaze; in short, in these 
two dots of basically black paint, I discern not only the visible image of a gaze that is 
                                                
290 Marion explains that the Cross became the model for Christian iconography in providing the theological 
foundation against idolatry and iconoclasm. In compliance with canon Actio 7 of the Second Council of Nicaea, the 
Cross is a type that reveals a prototype. The prototype is an incomprehensible invisible “nontype” (Marion 2004, 
69). All artistic representations that follow the typical quality of the Cross in relation to Christ’s stigmata are 
produced as material types. In opposition to only representing “something invisible,” the Actio 7 established the 
theology of the icon as a type that gives “an approximation toward the prototype” (Marion 2004, 72). This means 
that the icon does not display a spectacle of abstract or realistic images to substitute the original body of Christ. An 
icon is not a copy of another icon either. The iconic image is a way of “carrying” through its visibility “the mark of 
violence on the innocence of the invisible” (Marion 2004, 70). The typical status of the Cross is fundamental to all 
icons. The type inspires the veneration “of that which has no type” without in fact showing/simulating it, hence 
avoiding the idolatrous gaze (Marion 2004, 69). 
291 Referring to the Actio 7 decreed by the Second Council of Nicaea, Marion explains that “the icon is 
given not to be seen but to be venerated, because it thus offers its prototype [the invisible] to be seen” (Marion 2004, 
60).  
292 Referring to the dark space of the pupils, Marion states: “I can never see the eye of another human; or 
rather, even if I see his iris and so on, I cannot see his gaze, since it comes out of his pupils, which are empty 
spaces…the source of the invisible, at the center of the visible” (2004, 21). 
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(like all gazes) invisible but, provided that I acquiesce to it, this gaze in person, which, in 
fact, envisage me. Through the merely painted icon, I discover myself visible and seen by 
a gaze that, though present in the sensible, remains invisible, remains invisible to me.293 
 
In phenomenological terms, the crucifixion of Christ made possible “the intentional 
transitivity of the visible and the invisible.”294 The intention of the holy gaze pierces through the 
painted eyes (of the saints or Christ) outside the material side of the icon to meet the aim of the 
viewer’s gaze through the circular, dark opening which is located at the center of the visible eye. 
So, the painted black pupils are not a representation of the dark space from the inside of the 
biological human eye, but a mark of the unforeseeable phenomena. The aesthetic of the icon 
follows the formula: the viewer sees God and God sees the viewer. The transitive quality of the 
verb sees is guaranteed by the economical relation uttered by Christ himself: “He who has seen 
Me has seen the Father.”295  
In icons, the human figure is the most important visual element in seeing/feeling the 
presence of divine invisibility—hence, taking part in the Byzantine economy. The invisible in 
the icon differs from the invisible employed in a linear perspective, or the sheer visibility of an 
abstract painting, in its manifestation of the otherness as an opposing intentionality. Also, the 
visual features of the icon stand solely for the inimitability of the 
otherness. The experience of otherness is key in preventing the viewer 
from seeing his/her own desires reflected in the visible and, instead, 
exploring a sense of identity beyond his/her own intentionality. More 
specifically, in opposition to an idolic image (a mirror) that only reflects 
back one’s own image, the icon directs “the gaze to surpass itself by 
never freezing on a visible, since the visible only presents itself here in 
view of the invisible."296 For example, Marion compares the icon to the 
idolic aspect of Albrecht Dürer’s painting entitled Self-Portrait (Fig. 9) 
by saying that:  
 
“the icon exchanges two invisible gazes, that of the one in prayer and that of the 
benevolent one; here [in Dürer’s self-portrait], a gaze attempts to play both roles; the 
                                                
293 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 83. 
294 Ibid., 84.  
295 John 14:9. 
296 Marion, God Without Being, 18. 
Figure 9: Self-Portrait 
(1500) by Albrecht Dürer 
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gaze of the painter does not exchange itself with any other invisible but deposits itself in 
visibility to become its own spectacle.”297  
 
Dürer’s self-portrait appears to be an idol due to the artists’ intention to mirror his desires 
to see himself (as a Christ like figure) at the center of the viewer’s attention. As the theologian 
Brian Robinette states:  “[the v]icious circularity characterizes the gaze upon the Idol, be it a 
physical object or a concept. The seer can never ultimately escape the fascination of its own 
productions, since what is seen is its desire reified.”298 Here, however, Marion does not explain 
how the viewer’s intention might be idolic in relation to the visible aspect of the painting. It 
might be true that Dürer’s intention was to paint his eyes in such a way to not return the gaze in 
the crossing of the gazes, but his argument requires a clearer understanding of the visual 
techniques of painting an iconic gaze. For instance, the Byzantine mode of painting icons 
portrays the human face based on a mandatory set of canons that differ from Dürer’s naturalistic 
style. In The Crossing of the Visible, Marion pays little or no attention to these technical canons, 
which are fundamental to the visual construction of the icon. One of the arguments in this thesis 
is that the critique of the idol and icon requires a practical understanding of the Byzantine 
techniques of painting an iconic gaze, which I provide reflectively in the final chapter and 
practically through the visual documentation of this thesis. Specifically, I pick up on Marion’s 
reading of the iconic painted gaze, assimilating its important phenomenological elements into my 
own contemporary Byzantine-inspired practice of contemplating and making an iconic vision. 
My attempt is to complement Marion’s analysis by pointing to the (practical) logic of the 
Byzantine economy: the invisibility as the face of the other is 
universalized on the account that the image of Christ is the image 
of every human. As explained in Chapter 1, the face of Christ is, 
in fact, the face of the viewer’s own image. For this reason, the 
Byzantine depiction of Christ is painted in a symbolic-realistic 
manner. The wood panel painting included in Performing the 
Icon (Fig. 10), illustrates the Byzantine visual technique by 
portraying the face of Christ somewhere between an abstract and 
a naturalistic representation without (realistically as in Dürer’s 
                                                
297 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 23. 
298 Robinette, “A Gift To Theology?” 88. 
Figure 10: Still image from the 




self-portrait) capturing the particular human features of Christ’s appearance on earth. As I 
discuss in Chapter 4, this symbolic-realistic mode of painting follows an aesthetic formula that is 
applied to every human figure (saints, angels, etc.) within Byzantine iconography. The point is to 
visually depict His face in such a way to project His image into the believers’ image. Christ’s 
face is generalized through the concept of the other and the felling of otherness is not an image 
observed from a referential distance but, in fact, the very common image between humanity and 
the divine.  
Marion explains that the saturated phenomenon of the face cannot be 
objectified/constituted in terms of concepts and senses as if perceived from an outside 
viewpoint.299 Like the flesh, the face has the same immediate connection with the self beyond 
phenomenality: “in the same way that the…[flesh] only feels in feeling itself feeling, the…[face] 
only gives itself to be seen in seeing itself.”300 Due to the impossibility to see and feel the face in 
the same manner human intuition receives phenomena, the sense of otherness cannot be defined 
through any form of representation (including the notion of Being).301 This very impossibility to 
constitute the face of the other is exemplified by Marion with the pupils or the dark void of all 
human eyes: the only part of the human body that offers nothing to be constituted by 
intentionality. However, in response to his designation of the human eyes as the central point of 
attention in the icon, this thesis argues that the Byzantines found a more complex (hierotopic) 
way to avoid the objectification of the other in the symbolic-realistic painting technique of 
constructing of an iconic vision, which I employ in my own artistic practice. Moreover, the main 
attention should not be on the human eyes only as the gate to eternity, but also on the entire 
physical environment in which the veneration of the icon takes place—I will return to this 
argument when discussing the practical component of this thesis.  
Marion’s description of the icon as the face of the other is connected with the Christian 
belief that humanity will face God in eternity. The Christ event is the saturated phenomenon in 
which the Father comes into phenomenality as the iconic face of Christ. What makes the image 
of Christ an icon is its power to call the viewer’s gaze generating a sense of faith in his/her own 
eternity. And like the black pupils of every human being, eternity cannot be conceptualized or 
reduced to a finite meaning of a subjective constitution. The Christic gaze that comes from the 
                                                
299 Marion, In Excess, 113. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid., 114. 
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black pupils painted on icon-panels, summons or counters the viewer’s gaze by exceeding the 
visibility subjected to the estimation of human intentionality. The viewer finds himself/herself 
envisaged and constituted by an opposing iconistic intentionality. But this divine counter-look 
appears only when the viewer submits himself/herself through contemplation to the ethical 
implications in his/her constitution by the face of otherness: “that I must not kill,”302 that is not 
to objectify the other. Emmanuel Levinas refers to the objectification of the face of the other 
“under a generic category, such as humanity, ethnicity, gender or nationality” as a “violent 
act.”303 Also, the will to self-constitute (as Nietzsche desired) and to constitute the other is 
essentially a violent act for it dehumanizes the individual to the status of an object—a reduction 
of the other that manufactures idols.  
Since the meaning of the face of the other exceeds human comprehension, one might 
question if the iconic gaze can be seen in terms of an individual. Marion explains that our 
individuation is actually preserved through love by the very incomprehensibility of the other: 
 
If you say you know someone and have nothing more to learn from him, no need to 
know him better, what does that mean? You deny to the other the quality of a face. Any 
love relationship implies eternity. Why? It is not a question of fidelity or moral 
standards. It is because, if you have no need of more time to know the other, you are not 
directly committed to him. To love somebody is always to need more time to know him. 
You don’t have enough information about him. You will never have enough 
information. This is the infinite hermeneutics of the other.304  
 
The contemplation of the icon involves a total acceptance and receptivity of the face’s 
authoritative call to constitute the viewer’s self as gift.305 The viewer’s self is not subjectively 
constituted but gifted through love by the iconistic gaze. Also, the meditative thinking involves a 
change in visual perspectives by replacing the I’s constituting gaze with the constituting gaze of 
the other. For instance, the inverse perspective depicted in the Byzantine icon aims at producing 
this very exchange of perspectives between the believer’s gaze and the iconistic gaze. On the 
account that the appearance of the divine other does not involve an authority of a first-principle 
                                                
302 Ibid., 116. 
303 Robinette, “A Gift To Theology?” 91. 
304 Jean-Luc Marion, "The Face: An Endless Hermeneutics." Harvard Divinity Bulletin 28, no. 2 (1999): 
10. 
305 Marion, In Excess, 118. In contrast to the Übermensch’s will to constitute the world, the viewer who 
contemplates the icon lets himself/herself be constituted from a divine perspective: “[f]or, as face, he faces me, 
imposes on me to face up to him as he for whom I must respond…I have therefore received (and suffered) a call [un 
appel]. The face makes an appeal [un appel]; it therefore calls me forth as gifted” (Marion 2002b, 267). 
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constituted by the power of the I (the thinking subject), the contemplation of the icon is not a 
metaphysical experience. In this regard, Marion argues that the icon can offer a solution beyond 
metaphysics if the authoritative counter-intuitive gaze of the other manifests itself as prior to 
human will and, at the same time, contingent on the very impossibility of the viewer’s gaze to 
comprehend it.  
The idea of the other as gift in Marion’s phenomenalization of the icon opens art (as idol 
and icon) to a theological mode of seeing invisibility, which is different than the one envisioned 
by Henry’s aesthetic reflections on the auto-affection of life. And for this reason, Marion offers a 
mode of critiquing, as I discuss in Chapter 4, the idolic and the iconic aspects of my own 
Byzantine-inspired artistic practice. Although both Marion and Henry are fixed on the idea of not 
subjecting the painting to the viewer’s (predefined) knowledge—a nonrestrictive approach to 
phenomena that allows them to appear as themselves—they diverge on the specific nature of 
invisibility and its mode of revelation in the visible. For Marion, the invisible is a challenge to 
the subjective consciousness in recognizing (or failing to recognize) the otherness and autonomy 
of the phenomena to show themselves as themselves.  
So, the painting gives a stronger (iconic) or weaker (idolic) perspectival understanding of 
invisibility depending on its manifestation of the face’s gaze in the visible—this 
phenomenological understanding of the icon and idol is particularly important to the Byzantine 
epistemological approach of my artwork. As Marion explains in Crossing of the Visible, the idol 
is a unidirectional vision that looks through a kind of keyhole towards the divine light that varies 
in size and form—from an abstract to a naturalistic perspective, depending on the measure of the 
human gaze. Moreover, the icon (the saturated phenomenon par excellence) is the face of the 
infinite that unveils itself through a divine light beyond the notion of Being and limits of the 
subject’s perspective. And the artist becomes responsible in providing the face of the other, 
which demands the viewer’s gaze to look beyond himself/herself (beyond personal aesthetic 
desires) to acknowledge the life of the other. For Henry, instead, the phenomena are revealed in 
their purity, as affect, only within the self. That is, they are not outside, in the visible, but inside, 
in the invisible self. For this reason, one can argue that Henry’s phenomenology is restricted to 
the transcendental I’s aim in accessing the inner life through a symbolic vision that 
dematerializes the visible. Marion avoids this radical type of symbolic vision by recourse to the 
Byzantine theology of the image, affirmed by the Second Council of Nicaea—albeit with 
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difficulty when applied to the practical Byzantine (hierotopic) way of performing an icon, as I 
outline in the next section, 2.4.3 Transgressing metaphysical iconoclasm. For him, the Byzantine 
image convincingly brings to light that an iconic vision cannot be reduced to subjective 
affectivity or to an inner phenomenon that solely lives/operates within the viewer 
himself/herself. The idolatry of Henry’s appreciation of non-figurative painting lies in its failure 
to deliver the very element of mediation between two gazes: the face of the other. In other words, 
abstract painting destroys the face of Christ by eliminating the historical aspect of a painting: the 
visible exterior object.  
Marion’s re-conceptualization of the Byzantine iconophile thought draws attention to the 
idolic nature of our own relationship to images, especially within our commercialized visual 
world. However, he has also been widely criticized for his dematerialization of the icon in an 
almost Henrian fashion.306 In the next section, I argue that the use of the icon’s visibility to 
acknowledge the existence of the other, beyond ones’ subjectivity, requires a tangible 
consideration of the Byzantine painting technique in building an iconic vision.  
 
 
2.4.3 Transgressing metaphysical iconoclasm 
 
In the previous section, I have analyzed how Marion re-conceptualizes Henry and 
Husserl’s phenomenology of a painting in order that we (the viewers and image-makers) receive 
a theoretical model which leads to a vision other than the idol. Concerned with the 
objectifying/Nietzschean power of the spectacle (eidola/copies of eikōn-appearances) on the act 
of seeing in contemporary visual culture, Marion proposes an iconic solution to the opening of 
the visible to the invisible for saving us from the idolic constitution of the image and its 
iconoclastic consequences. Departing from Plato and Nietzsche’s hypotheses on the relationship 
between image and reality, I have also analyzed in the previous sections the grounds for 
presenting the invisible and visible in figurative and abstract artistic representations. Firstly, in 
confronting the Greek concept of mimesis with the Übermensch-artist’s critique of metaphysics, 
I revealed the contradictory theoretical approaches regarding the representation of reality from 
which Western art did not escape. For Nietzsche, reality is tangible and visible, while for Plato it 
                                                
306 Some of the critics who questioned Marion’s dematerialization of the icon are: Peter Joseph Fritz 
(2009), Janice L. Deary (2007), Andrew C. Rawnsley (2007), and Steven Grimwood (2003). 
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is invisible and immaterial. This antagonism denies either the existence of the interior or exterior 
side of the human body. Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs is evocative for Plato’s theory of Forms 
whereas Barney’s concern with the evaluation of the bodily world in Cremaster epitomizes the 
Nietzschean phase of the image. From Marion’s view, contemporary art can offer the “access of 
the invisible to the visible,” if the human body is reconsidered according to the demands of the 
two dots of black paint in delivering the gaze of the other.307 If the mimetic competition between 
the original and its representation in metaphysical iconoclasm led to the Nietzschean state of 
self-idolatry, then the counter intuitive iconic gaze envisions the “knowing viewer” to allow 
his/her gaze to pass through “the objectness of the object” and see the non-mimetic relation 
between the type and prototype.308 However, the question is if Marion’s version of iconic vision, 
based solely on seeing the black holes, escapes the metaphysical tendency to constitute 
phenomenality. Theologian Peter Joseph Fritz suggests that Marion targets a new form of 
essence—that is, a new first-principle—in the painting through the phenomena’s givenness309 to 
intuition by “doing away” with “the idol, the icon, the liturgy, the eucharist, or whatever other 
phenomenon.”310 Does the visibility of the icon disappear in the process of phenomenological 
reduction? Beside the two black dots in the passage of invisible gazes, the icon’s materiality, 
with its theological meaning in relation to the historical event of Incarnation, and all the 
iconographical elements of the icon that point to the Byzantine economy of the image seem to 
take a secondary role in Marion’s construction of the iconic vision. Although he rightly invokes 
the Byzantine doctrine of the icon in his theological work, The Crossing of the Visible, as the 
divine gaze that summons the viewer’s gaze into contemplating the unthinkable Gift/God, his 
vision of the icon appears to overlook the Byzantine economy. Specifically, Marion seems to 
offer a symbolic formulation of the phenomenological reduction, which is not practically applied 
in “concrete lived situations.”311 The bodies disappear in the aim of the subjective intentionality 
to move beyond the visible that blocks the gaze. This disembodied understanding of the icon 
seems to perpetuate the metaphysical thinking about of the image as being opposed to reality. 
The scholar of philosophy and theology, Andrew Rawnsley states that “this results in a failure to 
                                                
307 Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 68. 
308 Fritz, “Black Holes and Revelations,” 418. 
309 Likewise, Henry’s mystic approach to auto-affection can be seen as a quest for essence.  
310 Fritz, “Black Holes and Revelations,” 432. 
311 Andrew C. Rawnsley, Practice and Givenness: The Problem of ‘Reduction’ in the work of Jean-Luc 
Marion,” New Blackfriars 88, 1018 (2007): 691. 
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give any account of how his philosophical polemic to strip away human-centered questions from 
his philosophical vocabulary can even be articulated without consideration of the human who 
practices philosophy.”312 For this reason, Marion disregards where the theology of the icon 
begins, specifically “in the mediation of the Word through the material and concrete…within the 
sacramental practice of the Church.”313 When contrasted to the symbolic-realistic criterion of 
analyzing the way images are made, seen, and desired (as I argue through my way of crafting a 
Byzantine iconic vision), the symbolic mode of seeing does not provide a complete 
understanding of what makes an image the target of metaphysical iconoclasm within today’s 
commoditized viewing conditions. Particularly, it does not reveal how an image is intertwined 
with the lived, performative experiences in an idolic or iconic way. Thus, Marion does not 
explain the life-world practices in which iconoclastic debates are situated.  
As an alternative to both the symbolic and realistic ways of seeing, the Byzantine 
symbolic-realistic way of making, thinking, and seeing a representation allows for a hierotopic 
viewing experience that avoids many of the conflicting conceptual approaches to an image 
conceived as metaphysically different than reality. My point is that through the inclusion of my 
reflective artistic activity in this thesis, I concretely show what the Byzantine epistemological 
approach to the image offers for avoiding the metaphysical thought. Based on the Byzantine 
technique of icon painting, this thesis argues that the representational meaning of an image in 
metaphysical terms can be critically challenged when the difference between reality and a 
representation is understood at a practical level. Starting from the premise that the Byzantine 
system of signification does not function in a realistic way—that is, it is not based on a closed 
circuit of signifiers without a referent—I claim that through my actual practice of making and 
looking at images, (as established at the Second Council of Nicaea) we can actually reflect on 
(but not necessarily to comprehend through the power of the thinking I) the non-metaphysical 
aspects of vision. And it is only through this orthopraxis method, it seems, that we can actually 
appreciate how the reason for the critique and devotion of images is inseparable from the human 
practice of seeing and making images.  




On a final note, what Marion’s critique of metaphysics calls for is an artistic way of 
practicing the Byzantine iconic vision without denying the earthly.314 The theological problem 
with his notion of phenomenological reduction in deciding what makes a painting iconic or 
idolic comes to light when the practice of seeing the icon is re-considered in relation to the 
Byzantine pictorial technique. In the next chapter, I focus on how the visibility of the icon 
enhances the construction of an iconic vision at the aesthetic, commercial, and theological levels. 
I also claim that my artistic (hierotopic) practice provides a perceptual and performative point of 
reference in understanding how the icon's performance works in its traditional and contemporary 
contexts. Specifically, from its Christian Orthodox environment to the visual framework of the 
spectacle in which artistic and commercial versions of iconic/idolic visions inform a community 
of believers/consumers to creatively participate in their ideological, consumptive, or 
metaphysical meanings. What I particularly reveal is how the Byzantine canons of crafting an 
iconic vision can be employed (or how they are already employed) in the construction of today’s 
artistic and commercial iconic visions, which have strong iconoclastic implications. For that 
reason, it is to the Byzantine hierotopic analysis of today’s spectacle that I turn in the first section 














                                                
314 The tangible interaction between the icon and viewer cannot be separated, as it would negate Christ’s 
incarnation in the sensible in order to transfigure it within the divine reality.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONTEMPORARY (METAPHYSICAL ICONOCLASTIC)  
                         CONTEXT TO AN ICONIC VISION 
 
In the phenomenological analysis of the abstract and naturalistic painting, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter, I identified the need for a broader framework in understanding 
what visual elements contribute to the formation of an iconic vision and what techniques image-
creators employ to trigger the presence of the image. That is not to claim, of course, that abstract 
or naturalistic forms of painting do not bestow on the viewer a sense of invisibility (through 
various levels of perspective). In following Marion’s account of the idolic and iconic 
phenomena, I see how the intuitive aspect of the human gaze is always in search for the invisible 
by addressing an intentional phenomenon (objects and meanings). Yet, Marion (in his aim to 
overcome the metaphysical thought) relies on theological and metaphysical textual works to 
reformulate a theoretical understanding of the icon, even though the experience of an iconic 
vision is also immersed in its own materiality. By shifting the understanding of an iconic vision 
away from the exclusive authority of the written argument and by framing the phenomenological 
inquiry through a practical, artistic experience, I add a performative knowledge that places the 
viewer inside of what it means to see iconically. In doing so, I immerse Marion’s analysis into 
the very Byzantine theology of the icon by merging the symbolic and realistic views at the level 
of artistic research. Without the symbolic meaning, the analysis is left with the mere spectacle of 
a tangible visibility and without materiality it is left with the (Kandinskyian) abstraction of 
visibility. As such, the research on the construction of an iconic vision requires a more 
comprehensive method that includes both the research on the arts and the research in the art (as 
I argued in Chapter 1, the section 1.3.3 Symbolic, realistic and symbolic-realistic 
methodologies).  
In this chapter, I look at how contemporary forms of iconic visions function within a 
culture of spectacular media images, made “ever-present” through screens.315 The consumptive 
                                                
315 The media theorist, Nanna Verhoeff formulates one definition of the screen that I believe captures its 
relation to the metaphysical modes of seeing the image as false or real: “Screens are objects, technologies, 
apparatuses and machines of vision, all at once. The screen is a technological device, an interface, a flat 2D surface 
positioned in a 3D arrangement, potentially in a 4D relationship of time and motion, a metaphor for mediation and 
vision, a frame for representation, a site of innovation and change: what I call a meta-morphing constant in modern 
culture” (16). My discussion of today’s ubiquity of screen technologies does not go beyond the critique of 
metaphysical iconoclasm and the concept of the spectacle, which targets the Nietzschean dominance or 
omnipresence of images in contemporary visual culture (as analyzed in Chapter 2). Also, this thesis does not argue 
against the idolic or iconic effects of technology per se, but keeps the conversation within the limits of how the 
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visual regime of the spectacle, made omnipresent by the rise of technological screens in the 
media industry, has been widely criticized for exposing viewers to a Nietzschean mode of 
seeing—the constitution of phenomena in a visual or conceptual perspective so well addressed 
by Marion, especially in his phenomenological mode of taking perspective.316 However, in line 
with recent investigations on the changing screen technologies, media and social theorists 
advance a performative or interactive form of vision (with metaphysical implications) that 
repositions the viewer as having an active, creative role in relation to the spectacle.317 
Technological screens are also used as an aesthetic medium within contemporary art practices to 
construct an iconic vision, which will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. It remains, first of 
all, to investigate some of the possibilities of screen media to induce the presence of the image in 
order to overcome the objectification/alienation of human identity before providing a 
demonstration of the Byzantine nature of my artistic iconic vision. The next two sections, then 
specifically focus on the performative nature of vision in the digital age of mobile (touch) 
screens to delineate a Byzantine-inspired analytical method of understanding the contemporary 
(technological) possibilities and conditions of experiencing and constructing an artistic 
iconic/idolic vision.   
 
 
3.1 Interactivity: the performance of screenspace and hierotopy 
 
Interactivity is the performative aspect of an iconic vision. It is the practical mode in 
which viewers construct the various aesthetic components involved in their vision.318 More 
                                                                                                                                                       
spectacle (artistic and commercial) might induce/perform an iconic/idolic vision and how the Byzantine icon (as I 
employ it in my analysis and practice) helps to understand those visions. 
316 The critical theorist, Theodor W. Adorno argues that the televisual screen “’holds the possibility of 
smuggling into [its] duplicate world whatever is thought to be advantageous for the real one,’ for it ‘obscures the 
real alienation between people and between people and things. It becomes a substitute for a social immediacy that is 
being denied to people’” (qtd. in Jappe 107). Additionally, the Marxist philosopher, George Lukacs states that 
commodity fetishism objectifies the way people perceive each other by leaving humans in an inactive position of 
listening and seeing everything that the spectacle dictates (Jappe 114-115). In the Crossing of the Visible, Marion 
also picks up on this critique, and he points that the consumer is invited to rediscover a sense of community solely in 
the spectacle, which is detached from every part of life, and who “monopolizes all communication to its own 
advantage and makes it one way only” (Trier 89).  
317 Some recent media theorists, particularly influenced by the Marxist critique of the capitalist aesthetics of 
commodities, that make a performative claim about the way viewers’ daily life is changed by technological screens 
are Nanna Verhoeff (2012), Eric Jenkins (2008), Brett T. Robinson (2013), Kimberly Jackson (2009), and John 
Lechte (2012).  
318 There are multiple meanings of the word interactivity, so in defining those specific aspects that relate to 
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precisely, performativity connects vision with mobility in a creative engagement with the 
virtual/invisible and physical/visible realms—a dynamic form of vision defined by the media 
theorist, Nanna Verhoeff as “performative cartography.”319 The mobile interactivity differs from 
the symbolic or realistic visions by shifting the analysis of spaces/frames for representation 
(screens) from either their content (symbolic or imaginary) or form (object or realism) to their 
creative use in private or public spatial arrangements.  
According to Verhoeff, the development of mobile digital technology has brought a 
visual mode of navigation that creates screenspaces or frames for representation by merging 
vision and mobility,320 the invisible and visible domains with a sense of narrative and agency. 
Referencing Michel de Certeau’s theory of space, Verhoeff differentiates between the notion of 
place and space: “every place can be turned into space by the practice of narrative.”321 
Comparing to fixed cinematic/televisual/photographic/painted screens, which produce images 
(on-screen space) into predefined geographical coordinates (off-screen space), the mobile (touch) 
screen becomes a software-based mediator that turns the act of seeing into a performative act of 
making/cartographing space—a mode of transporting both the viewer and screen through places 
to generate narrative events as spaces.322 Recent portable pocket screen gadgets such as 
smartphones and computer tablets include various input and output devices for digital signifiers, 
wireless connectivity, camera, GPS receiver, and direct tactile access to multitasking interfaces 
that act as multiple (conceptual and visual) points of view, e.g. panoramic mode of vision. Media 
                                                                                                                                                       
the performativity of the iconic vision I will refer to game designer Eric Zimmerman’s notions of interactivity as a 
narrative practice. One could say that all types of narratives are interactive in the sense that all experiences 
(physical, utilitarian, cognitive, emotional, etc.) require a degree of immersion. Instead of generalizing the 
interactive phenomenon of narrative experiences, Zimmerman establishes four types of interactivity in relation to the 
content and form of a narrative: 1) the cognitive, interpretive experience of the content, 2) the utilitarian or the 
functional aspect of form in its materiality, 3) explicit interactivity, which stands for the dictionary definition of the 
word: “designed to respond to the actions, commands, etc., of a user” (merriam-webster.com), and 4) the cultural 
interaction in which the narrative is appropriated, enacted, deconstructed beyond the subjective experience. The 
iconic vision overlaps all these “flavors of participation” that manifests separately or concomitantly through various 
media screens (Zimmerman 158).  
319 Nanna Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, The Visual Regime of Navigation (Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2012): 
133.  
320 The concept of mobility in relation to a frame for representation (screen) functions at two levels: 1) the 
virtual mobility of the visuals on/in the screen and 2) the physical mobility of the viewer (walking or being in a 
vehicle) with the screen-object. The performative experience of a screenspace takes place when the virtual and 
physical mobility interconnect by creating new spatial/temporal events.   
321 Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, 93. 
322 Verhoeff describes the mobile screen as a “theoretical object” that it not just a means to produce 
knowledge and reproduce/recirculate/ symbols as it is the case with any other non-portable forms of screen (from 
TV to desktop screens), but also a material object that is handheld, thus a perceptual “time-bound object-in-practice” 
(76).  
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critic, Brett T. Robinson explains that these “vital” functions of mobile devices elevated the 
status of the iPhone, for instance, to “sublime descriptors like ‘Jesus phone’”323 (I will return to 
the religious aspect of screen culture, and more specifically to the discussion of Apple products, 
in the next section). All these features, then added to the portable and tangible aspect of the 
mobile (touch) screen, immerse the viewer’s senses into a dynamic/navigational spatial 
relationship with the screen as a physical site for making, communicating, and experiencing 
images within places—places yet to become meaningful spaces.324 Verhoeff suggests that this 
active mode of making images or seeing in motion by appropriating places through narrative 
(visual) experiences turned out to be the fundamental feature of contemporary vision. 
The navigational mode of creating screenspaces challenges the scientific/Cartesian 
dualism between subject and object, viewer and visible. Whereas the Cartesian pursuit of 
knowledge aims at mapping (representing) the world based on fixed principles—a (Platonic) 
mimetic mode of thinking that separates, classifies and charts space, time, beings, and 
materiality—mobile screen-based viewing allows for an innovative experience of co-
creating/navigating a screenspace by combining the on-screen space (looking or traveling 
virtually through or beyond the screen) with the off-screen space (surrounding environment). 
The screen-based spatial arrangement encompasses a correlation between the transparency of the 
screen, which is the intentional act of looking in the screen as through a window, and the 
screen’s physicality or lack of invisibility that allows its objective existence to be used and 
handheld as a tool. When the screen is touched in order to see, it is the opacity of materiality that 
marks the presence of the image. Thus, the constitution of the screenspace is strongly dependent 
on the tangible and interactive use of the screen-based interface, which establishes a “spatial 
continuity of eyes, hand, screen [object], and screened space [virtual].”325 Verhoeff calls this 
flow between seeing and doing a screenic vision: a performative act of “live image-making” that 
combines the visual experiences of the cinematic screen, the television screen that broadcasts 
live events, the performative seeing in a performance art event, and the direct physical 
                                                
323 Brett T. Robinson, Appletopia: Media Technology and the Religious Imagination of Steve Jobs, (US: 
Baylor, University Press, 2013), 61. 
324 Here, one can also add that the mobility of a window as seen through various modes of transportation 
(cars, trains, airplanes, etc.) is a movable screen, however the position of the viewer is still that of a stationary 
spectator whose bodily awareness and agency withdraw from view. Instead of a motionless screen for the viewer to 
spectate at a distance, the mobile (touch) screen fundamentally changes the fixed spatial arrangements imposed by a 
televisual spectacle.  
325 Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, 90. 
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experience of drawing.326 The additional biological organ of the hand in the process of seeing 
shifts the conceptual/metaphysical understanding of vision from seeing through based on a 
detached engagement with the frame of the screen to looking at in order to make what is seen 
through. And for the reason that the screen is encountered first in its opaqueness in the off-screen 
space prior to what the intentional gaze 
constitutes (navigates) in the on-screen space, 
the notion of space (the meaningful place) 
becomes an important element in the 
contemporary understanding of a Byzantine 
Iconic Vision—to which I turn to later in the 
next chapter. 
The tactile screenic vision that makes 
present or brings the image from the 
invisible/virtual world onto the material 
surface of the screen is similar to the 
Byzantine icon’s performance of converting a place/tópos into a sacred/hiero space 
(hierotopy).327 The art-historian and Byzantinist, Alexei Lidov suggests that images painted on 
wooden panels by Byzantine iconographers should not be seen as immobile surfaces/screens for 
stationary visual experiences. So, the icon is a sort of mobile frame for representation that is used 
symbolic-realistically to transform a place into a sacred space. As Lidov notes:  
 
In the context of hierotopy the very concept of “spatial icons” was shaped. We mean 
images purposefully presented in space, not of some flat depictions or material objects. In 
this case, we use the notion “icon” not as a formal or ornamental term but as a conceptual 
one. With this notion we mark images-mediators designed to connect our world with 
another one, heavenly and earthly realms, i.e. in the same functioning as flat iconic 
images (made on wood, wall, tissue or metal) — this very characteristic of “mediativity” 
which differs all iconic images from common pictures on religious topics.328 
 
As investigated in Chapter 1, the Byzantine (spatial) icon, also called living image, differs 
from the artistic image that is seen from a symbolic or realistic vision in the way it 
                                                
326 Ibid., 84. 
327 Lidov, “Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces,” 32. 
328 Alexei Lidov, “Introduction, The Byzantine world and Performative Spaces,” trans. Olga Chumicheva, 
Spatial icons. Performativity in Byzantium and Medieval Russia, (Moscow: Indrik, 2011): 17. 
Figure 11: The Hodegetria Icon (double-sided), late 
12th century, Archaeological Museum. Kastoria 
(Greece). 
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performs/mediates a synaesthesis/symbolic-realistic experience.329 Like the mobile (touch) 
screen, the icon performs interactively to construct a space in which movement brings together 
the audio, visual, and tactile perceptions.330 That is, the spatial arrangement in hierotopy 
incorporates a (mimetic) correlation in movement between the faithful’s body and the play of 
absence/appearance and presence/essence at the icon’s material surface (screen). For this reason, 
I call the Byzantine icon a living screen. Lidov provides a particular example of a hierotopic 
vision in the case of the miraculous icon called Hodegetria (Pointing the Way) of 
Constantinople, which is also used as a prototype in the Byzantine depiction of the Virgin Mary 
(Fig. 11). Traditionally believed to have been painted by Saint Luke the Evangelist, the 
Hodegetria icon presents the Virgin holding the Child Jesus on one side, and on the other, the 
crucified Christ. According to various written accounts from the 12th to the 15th century, the icon 
was used in weekly rites to perform miracles in the Hodegon outdoor market place in the center 
of Constantinople. Since the late 13th century, the Hodegetria icon and the scenes of the 
miraculous events became a popular Byzantine iconographic theme. For example, in the icon, 
The Glorification of the Virgin (Akathist Hymn to the Most Holy Theotokos) (Fig. 12) the 
Hodegetria icon is depicted flying above a figure dressed in red with his arms spread out in a 
crucified position. The red garment symbolizes the sacred status of those who carried the icon 
during the rites around the market place.331 On the left and right sides of the central figure in red, 
a crowd of worshipers is depicted as witnessing a miracle. Lidov quotes a Latin text from the 
12th century that underlines the similarity of the icon with the mobile screen-based viewing 
insofar as both guide the viewer’s movements to create a sacred/screen space: 
 
On the third day of every week the icon was moved in a circle with angelic power in full 
view of the crowd, as though snatched up by some kind of whirlwind. And it carried 
about its bearer with its own circular movement, so that because of its surprising speed it 
almost seemed to deceive the eyes of the spectators. Meanwhile everyone, according to 
their tradition, beat their breasts and cried out “Kyrie eleison, Christe eleison (Lord have 
                                                
329 Synaesthesis is a term introduced by Bissera Pentcheva (2006, 2010) to differentiate the experience of 
seeing icons from the modern term synesthesia employed in art history. While the Byzantine synaesthetic  
experience involves the worshiper’s body through the simultaneity of all five senses (sight, touch, smell, taste and 
sound), synesthesia entails a concomitant experience of aesthetic sensations in that one sensation turns into another 
and so forth. 
330 Pentcheva, “The performative icon,” 632. 
331 Presumably, the people in charge with holding the icon were the direct descendents of St Luke himself.  
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mercy, Christ have mercy)”332 
 
Like the navigational vision, the icon-bearers’ activity in the rites is to geographically 
delineate a screenspace/sacred space within a commercial, urban place. Thus, the Hodegetria 
icon turns into a spatial icon through a combination of surrounding phenomena (from the crowd 
to material objects) that all contribute in forming a hierotopy. The icon is performed through 
liturgical rituals beyond its materiality as a flat pictorial image to the point of transforming the 
entire urban place within the sacred circle/space into an iconic vision. In this sacred space, 
everything (from the icon to the crowd and the visible world) coexists as a collection of spatial 
iconic images. While the visible border of the sacred space is marked by the icon’s materiality in 
the physical space of the city, the invisible border is marked symbolically at the level of the 
icon’s screen. Lidov comments that 
the icon miraculously rotated in the 
air creating a visual effect in which 
the two images of the icon appeared 
as one.333 The movement of the icon 
produced a whirlwind effect before 
the crowd’s eyes inducing an iconic 
vision that imitates the divine vision. 
Specifically, God sees every side of 
the icon simultaneously by defying the logic of the linear/Cartesian perspective—the divine 
vision is not limited to time and space.334 To that end, the space between the visible (realistic) 
and invisible (symbolic) borders of a sacred space defines the iconic vision (the symbolic-
realistic mode of seeing). 
According to Lidov, the circling of the market square by the icon-bearers is a re-
enactment of the Hodegetria rite performed by the patriarch Sergius I during the Avars’ siege of 
Constantinopol in 626. Moreover, the Byzantine victory over the Avar army is attributed to the 
                                                
332 Alexei Lidov, “Spatial icons. The Miraculous Performance with the Hodegetria of Constantinople,” 
Hierotopy.  Creation  of  Sacred  Spaces in  Byzantium  and  Medieval  Russia (Moscow, Progress-tradition, 2006), 
352.  
333 Ibid., 354. 
334 In Byzantine iconography, this iconic mode of seeing is represented in the depiction of simultaneous 
planes through the technique of reverse perspective that I discuss in the next section. For more details on this topic 
see: Clemena Antonova, “Seeing the World with the Eyes of God: The Vision Implied by the Medieval Icon,” 
Hortulus: The Online Graduate Journal of Medieval Studies 1, no. 1 (2005), 22. 
Figure 12: The Glorification of the Virgin (Akathist Hymn to the 
Most Holy Theotokos), Detail, 14th century, Russia, Novgorod 
School 
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divine intervention through the Hodegetria icon. It is believed that during the events of the siege, 
the patriarch carried the icon around the city walls (demarcating a sacred space) with his arms 
stretched out in a crucified gesture without touching the icon’s frame—a sign of the icon’s purity 
of not being touched by human hands. The patriarch’s crucified position mimics the Crucifixion 
painted on one of the sides of the icon. This mimetic behavior is particularly significant in 
understanding the difference between the mobile (touch) screen and icon—an aspect that I 
emphasize in the latter paragraphs. The mobile (touch) screen is designed for personal use, to be 
owned, and handheld to control everything with the touch of a finger. In moving through places, 
the screen user makes space or creates images that imitate himself/herself as in, for example, the 
GPS apps for the iPhone/iPad where an avatar follows along the navigator’s moves. The icon, 
instead, is made to be touched for witnessing a miracle, beyond the human control. The purity of 
the icon underlines its performative quality of creating, before the beholder, the tension between 
absence and presence in order to mimic the Christic event of merging the image of humanity and 
divinity (as described in section 1.2.2.2 The epistemological position of the image: the symbolic-
realistic vision).335 The patriarch imitates the presence of the prototype before the beholders’ 
eyes through the model of the Cross, thus simulating the divine presence of the prototype within 
the city walls of Constantinople (an urban place turned into a sacred space). Likewise, the icon-
bearers, who performed the weekly miracles in the Hodegon Square from the 12th to the 15th 
century, did not aim to reconstruct a historical event. Instead, they mimetically renewed the 
patriarch Sergius I’s participation in the icon’s performance of the prototype. Referring to the 
rites performed in the Hodegon Square, Lidov notes that they:  
 
created a kind of spatial icon, or an iconic image in space, embracing the miraculous 
event, liturgical procession, special rituals of veneration, with the common people in 
attendance and the icon of the Hodegetria itself, representing the actual iconographic 
program on both sides of the panel.336 
 
The Byzantine mimetic phenomena seen in the Hodegetria rites (from the patriarch 
Sergius I’s rite to the icon-bearers’ weekly rites) originate in the redemptive image of the 
crucified Christ. The icon of Christ is the most important mimetic model of engaging the 
participants in an iconic vision. The depiction of the Virgin Mary in the Hodegetria icon 
                                                
335 Bissera, “The performative icon,” 632. 
336 Lidov, “Spatial icons,” 354-5. 
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emphasizes this mimetic significance of Christ by pointing with Her right hand toward the Child 
Jesus (the path for creating a sacred space). Any Byzantine mimetic event is fundamentally 
connected to the active participation of the viewers in the rite of carving with the material part of 
the icon (the screen) a sacred space in the urban environment. Such Byzantine form of creating 
spatial imagery (hierotopic creativity) is perpetuated in contemporary liturgical processions 
through the iconographic depiction of an icon-bearer as shown in The Glorification of the Virgin 
(Akathist Hymn to the Most Holy Theotokos). With his arms in a crucified position and 
miraculously carrying the levitating icon, the central figure in red functions as a mnemonic 
device (as well as a mimetic device) for today’s believers to renew the appearance of the 
prototype in materiality.  
Similar to the use of the portable Byzantine icon in delineating a hierotopy, the 
movement of vision in relation to the mobile screen is not only a matter of explaining the 
human’s ability to travel from point A to point B (a physical action), but contributes to the 
intuitive experience of invisibility in visibility. This indicates, as Verhoeff states, “a collapse 
between making images and perceiving them.”337 Thus, the approach to the image as spatially 
distributed in a particular time and place, according to “the mobility of visual experience,” offers 
an alternative to the metaphysical critique of contemporary forms of iconic/idolic vision based 
on binary oppositions, such as visible-invisible or realism-symbolism.338 Particularly, it shows 
how the performative aspect of today’s screen culture transforms the experience of seeing the 
spectacle from a contemplative/informative mind-set, which leads the viewer to his/her ultimate 
reduction as a mere instrument in the dynamics of capitalist production and distribution systems, 
into an active mode of creating unique spatial representations (events) that bring to presence the 
viewer’s own image. As opposed to the metaphysical approach to screens, the performative 
analysis takes into account that the human desire to travel (imaginatively) into a virtual time and 
space is perceptually connected with the physical space in which the screen operates. And, this 
consideration helps to see how the invention of mobile (touch) screens changed the mode of 
experiencing and orienting in the world by merging the virtual and physical time and space. The 
screen then becomes the device through which the viewer overcomes the Cartesian/pre-
established coordinates of the “fixed and distancing televisual or cinematic” screens to create 
                                                
337 Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, 13. 
338 Ibid., 15.  
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new sensory-based spatial experiences that combine both the material and immaterial (digital) 
worlds.339 
According to Robinson, the tangible quality of screen technology, with its infinite 
creative possibilities, has reached a religious dimension by replacing the natural sublime with the 
digital sublime. If the traditional screen (from painting to cinema and television) was meant to 
capture and share the unexplainable aesthetic (dynamic or mathematic) encounters with the 
natural or man-made industrialized landscapes, the (touch) screen (particularly in its sublime 
form of the iPhone) connects the viewer through the “holy trinity of the telephone, iPod, and 
internet” to a mysterious, “immense, global, and decentered network.”340 The electronic 
communications system transforms the on-screen space into a collective environment that 
overwhelms human imagination and comprehension. It is a (narrative) space created by “[a]n 
army of human creators fashioning a new Tower of babel, a new nature [and myth]…outshining 
the Creator.”341 The dual character of the sublime feeling is reflected in the technological screen 
due to its capacity to both attract the viewer in the transcendental world of digital communication 
and inspire the technological fear of potential blackout, viruses, digital surveillance, and data 
loss, which Robinson compares to the ancients’ fear of an earthquake or thunderstorm.  
With the concepts of performative cartography and hierotopy in mind, it is essential at 
this point to reflect on the impact of screen technologies in shaping human vision (and implicitly 
an iconic/idolic vision). Today’s culture of mobility, “geographical and physical by means of 
travel as well as visual and virtual [imaginative] through media and communication 
technologies,” is interrelated with screen technologies.342 However, this performative mode of 
interacting with screens, dubbed “the spatio-visual or navigational turn,” fosters a panoramic 
mode of making and viewing images (for navigating through and with screens in the tangible and 
                                                
339 Ibid., 134. 
340 Robinson, Appletopia, 62. The iPhone is not just a handy object for electronic communication; it is the 
product of scientific rationalism that aims to control and tame the contingency of nature. Although the project of 
modern science is to disenchant the world from religious/magical explanations, the rational human uses the 
technological object (the iPhone) as a powerful “sacramental object” to both comprehend “all there is to know” and 
be omnipresent (Robinson 68).  Robinson goes even further with the theological explanation of the screen culture by 
describing the iPhone as interacting with the viewer in a Byzantine way. That is, it acts like a living icon/object to 
mediate/communicate the invisibility of the digital world through its (touch) screen interface (text, video, and 
voice). In other words, the sense of touch makes present the absence of the digital sphere.  
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid., 13, 133.  
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virtual worlds) that can be associated with the Nietzschean stage of the image.343 In the visual era 
of (touch) screens, the viewer not only acquires a tangible freedom for creative abilities (artistic 
or scientific), but also obtains an intimate (idolic) relationship with his/her own (panoramic) 
desires. The human vision’s idolic tendency towards the image might be explained by the 
“directed movement” of an intentional gaze towards an intentional object, which simultaneously 
makes present the (idolic) invisibility through a perspectival gaze.344 And, this induces a 
universal state of iconoclastic suspicion over the nature of knowing and image-making via media 
screens.  In writing on the history of recording media, Brian Winston explains that the challenge 
to capture the evidence of a referent in the world (its real existence) relies on the scientific status 
of the technological screen to provide an objective/realistic/analogous perception of nature.345 
The documentary value of the camera-instrument as a “nonliving agent” depends on the realistic 
mode of seeing, which perceives that the scientific recording device (from the early 
photographic/cinematic media to the latest digital devices) does not lie and that its naturalistic 
mode of representation is the most authentic way to measure captured data (to confirm the real-
presence of a referent).346 However, viewers doubt the recorded document of a historical event or 
concrete object when it is linked to the mistrust in human intervention or intentionality. The 
digital manipulation of the image, facilitated by mobile technology, challenges the faith in a 
recorded representation to the point of claiming the death of the referent—in other words, the 
spectacle transformed into its own signifier (as explained in 2.3.3 The (metaphysical) 
consequences of the spectacular image). This is the primary concern underpinning Marion’s 
                                                
343 Ibid., 133. The panoramic vision aims to perceive the world through technological screens beyond the 
spatial limitations of human senses. The panoramic experience can be categorized based on two types of 
relationships between the viewer and image: 1) seeing an object in motion through a screen (a landscape through a 
windshield or moving image through a televisual screen) while viewing from a static position and 2) seeing a static 
or a moving object through a screen while the viewer’s body is in motion. This (metaphysical) ambition to perceive 
everything, however seems to be impossible to achieve as the viewer’s relationship to a screen is always defined by 
distance and motion.    
344 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 28. To recall, the idolic invisibility manifests in the following way: “when the 
idol appears, the gaze has just stopped [from seeing the referent]: the idol concretizes that stop. Before the idol, the 
gaze transparently transpierced the visible [as in a linear perspective]….In each visible spectacle, the gaze found 
nothing that might stop it [specifically, a counter gaze as in the icon]; the gaze’s fiery eyes consumed the 
visible….[And the idol forms when] the gaze no longer rushes through the spectacle stage without stopping, but 
forms a stage in the spectacle; it is fixed in it and, far from passing beyond, remains facing what becomes for it a 
spectacle to re-spect [that is, the gaze esteems itself in a Nietzschean way]” (Marion, 1991, 11-12). 
345 Brian Winston, Claiming the Real: The Documentary Film Revisited. (British Film Institute, 1995), 38, 
40-42. 
346 James Moran, “A Bone of Contention: Documenting the Prehistoric Subject,” in Collecting Visible 
Evidence. Eds. Jane M. Gaines and Michael Renov. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 258. 
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critique of the spectacle, an idolic mirror that stops the gaze to create its own spectacle with its 
own reflection.347 Therefore, the crisis of the image in contemporary audiovisual civilization 
comes from the notion that the spectacle lost its direct connection to a physical reality by feeding 
the viewer’s Nietzschean/panoramic desire and prompting a general sense of disbelief in the 
referential relationship between on and off-screen spaces.348  
Referring to the spatial limitations of a panoramic vision constructed through a media 
screen, Verhoeff first differentiates the panoramic desire from the navigational desire by arguing 
that the former is an ambition to perceive a (narrative) space all at once in a frame for 
representation and the latter is a desire to reach a destination. Yet, the navigational desire is still 
an ambition to acquire a point of view or a viewing position that transcends the representational 
limits of space and time, with the distinction being that the viewer takes control over the 
panoramic spectacle. If the panoramic vision travels across the fixed/referential coordinates of a 
given map, the navigational desire creates the itinerary and produces the map of the environment, 
surrounding the navigator, through the direct engagement between the screen, space, and 
viewer/user. Particularly, the viewer preforms the cartography as a performative event that 
makes present the viewer’s own spatial arrangement (image).  
The idea that vision is mobile and the image is concurrently formed with the viewer’s 
direct participation in a temporal and spatial field of representation parallels the Byzantine 
symbolic-realistic vision of crafting a hierotopic space. The difference, however, is that the 
screenic vision based on the handheld, mobile screen delineates a geographical space according 
to the commands and interrogations of the user and the hierotopic vision marks the space 
according to the demands of a (divine) intentionality that is beyond time and space. For instance, 
both types of screens (the mobile technological device and icon) produce a simultaneity of 
multiple points of view (a panoramic type of vision) in the process of creating a (sacred/screen) 
space: the (touch) screen offers multiple application interfaces and the Hodegetria icon presents a 
double sided painted screen (which according to the historical accounts provided by Lidov, 
induces a compounded vision by wondrously rotating in the air). The particularity of each type of 
screen is, then, in the mode of seeing the created space: the (touch) screen is a one-way mode of 
seeing and the icon-screen is a two-way mode of seeing. The iconic vision is driven by an 
                                                
347 Marion, God Without Being, 11-12. 
348 Ibid., The Idol and Distance, 82-83. 
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additional (divine) intentionality that counters the constitutive violence of the human gaze to 
transform a place into a space through the practice of taking perspective or narrative—a counter-
intuitive experience outlined by the idea of the other as gift in Marion’s phenomenalization of 
the iconic gaze (see 2.4.2 Marion’s icon and metaphysic iconoclasm). In their analysis of video 
games with travel narratives, Henry Jenkins and Mary Fuller further this argument regarding the 
objectifying aspect of the technological screens. They explain that the practice of converting a 
place into a space is imbued with the ambition of the viewer’s gaze to colonize/constitute the 
screenspace—in other words, the screenspace is limited to the visible, spatial, temporal borders 
of human vision: 
 
Places exist only in the abstract, as potential sites for narrative action, as locations that 
have not yet been colonized. Place may be understood here in terms of the potential 
contained as bytes in the Nintendo® game cartridge or the potential resources coveted but 
not yet possessed in the American New World. Places constitute a "stability" which must 
be disrupted in order for stories to unfold. Places are there but do not yet matter, much as 
the New World existed, was geographically present, and culturally functioning well 
before it became the center of European ambitions or the site of New World narratives. 
Places become meaningful only as they come into contact with narrative agents…. 
Spaces, on the other hand, are places that have been acted upon, explored, colonized. 
Spaces become the location of narrative events. As I play a Nintendo® game and master 
it level by level, I realize the potentials encoded in the software design and turn it into the 
landscape of my own saga.349 
 
The invisible borders, marked symbolically at the level of the on-(touch) screen space, is 
a Nietzschean projection of a navigational vision that imitates the navigator’s moves. And for 
this reason, I call the technological screen a dead screen—that is, an object without intentionality 
that merely mirrors the viewer’s own image (an image that can be positioned at the level of the 
artificial image in a Nicephorian sense). Although the advertisement campaigns of the mobile 
screens such as of the iPhones, iPods, and iPads stress the connectivity between users/navigators 
and the sharing of the screenspace experience—a quasi-hypostatic involvement through media 
screens that I will explore later in Eric Jenkins’ analysis of the iPod ads—the pocket size devices 
are particularly designed/commercialized for individual use to personalize/control/create one’s 
own world of images, e.g. Facebook. The commercial message of social networking stands, in 
fact, for an experience of a lonely gaze that constitutes phenomena solely based on the power of 
                                                
349 Mary Fuller and Henry Jenkins, “Nintendo® and New World Travel Writing: A Dialogue.” in Steven 
G.Jones (ed.) Cybersociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1995), 57-72. 
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the individual's intentional gaze—similar to the spectatorship of the spectacle on a static 
cinematic/televisual/photographic/painted frames for representation. Verhoeff’s statement 
regarding the discourse of connectivity in the age of technological screens supports my 
argument: “the term sharing is deceptive, and clearly belongs to the discourse of advertisement 
parasitical upon social needs and problems of our time.”350 However, what the (touch) screen 
navigation technology has changed in contemporary human vision is this on-screen space, 
synchronized with the pedestrian or vehicular off-screen space, that takes the bodily and spatial 
relationship with a static screen351 to a new level of creativity, mobility, and interactivity in the 
surrounding environments/coordinates. But when comparing this creative mode of transforming 
the spectacle into a screenspace to a Byzantine iconic vision, I would like to firstly draw 
attention to the modern metaphysical tension between technology and Christianity, which is 
reflected in Pope Benedict XVI’s statement:   
 
Is a Saviour needed by a humanity which has invented interactive communication, which 
navigates in the virtual ocean of the internet and, thanks to the most advanced modern 
communications technologies, has now made the Earth, our great common home, a 
global village? This humanity of the twenty-first century appears as a sure and self-
sufficient master of its own destiny, the avid proponent of uncontested triumphs.352 
 
Pope Benedict XVI’s concern with today’s technological state of the image suggests that 
the intermingling of technological screens with metaphysical desires misleads the viewer in 
finding redemption through the Nietzschean attitude to life of the self-sufficient master—the 
viewer as the central point of view within his/her field of vision. Nevertheless, the question is if 
the spectacle has the power to induce a creative (iconic) vision, and if so, how can this creativity 
be critiqued without limiting the conversation to metaphysical/iconoclastic debates? This 
question is essential in outlining a Byzantine artistic framework that understands an iconic vision 
                                                
350 Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, 90.  
351 Although there is a movement of hands when touching the screen and when the viewer’s body travels in 
different locations (walking or in a vehicle ride, for instance) with a handheld screen, the on-screen space still 
functions as an immobile frame through which we can look beyond as into a window. The mobility and creativity of 
today’s technological mode of vision, and where it overcomes the objectifying power of the spectacle, lies in its 
relationship with the changing/ever-transforming off-screen spatial environment. The best examples of a viewer’s 
agency, on-screen space, and off-screen space synchronization, as previously mentioned, are the Google map 
application or any GPS app that show the virtual location of the human body/vehicle while on the move in the 
physical time-place.  
352 “Urbi Et Orbi Message Of His Holiness Pope Benedict Xvi,” Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Christmas 




beyond the metaphysical tendency to see the image as visible—that is really present. A 
Marionian solution would be (as argued in Chapter 2) in the phenomenological interpretation of 
the Byzantine icon that breaks the dualism between the artistic (idolic) and theological (iconic) 
image. The practical level of this research complements Marion’s initiative into outlining a non-
metaphysical approach to image (that does not see the idolic image as completely opaque and 
visible to the constitutive gaze), but also does not stop at the phenomenological critique of the 
televisual screen culture. Through my artistic analysis of the Byzantine iconic vision, I aim to 
present a series of Byzantine rules that help the viewers (and the artist/image maker) to recognize 
common techniques of constructing a contemporary vision at a religious, artistic, consumptive, 
or technological level. Moreover, the key aspect of my practice is that I do not make any 
metaphysical claims in analyzing the structural elements of an iconic vision. My conceptual 
intention is non-metaphysical in the sense that I follow Nicephorus’ epistemological 
interpretation of the icon (as explained in Chapter 1), which regards the image as completely 
transparent and outside notions of dualism and claims of real-presence.  
Indeed, a red herring that arises in the contemporary artistic construction of an iconic 
vision is the presumption that the symbolic meaning of the work is subjective or embedded in a 
specific cultural/religious context and inextricably linked to a specific community of viewers, 
thus making it inconsistent with interaction. However, the symbolic value per se concerns the 
specific interpretations of a referent (religious or otherwise) and the evaluation of such 
negotiations is a metaphysical issue that does not explain the artistic techniques of performing an 
iconic vision. My argument (and where my concern lies) is that the organizational structure of all 
iconic visions (that include old or new media) are always premised on the non-essentialist 
relation between a signifier and signified. An icon is the mnemonic device that forms a 
communion between humanity (viewer), signifier (visible), and signified (invisible) by making 
(performing/interacting) present the absence of the image. Conversely, the idol is the mnemonic 
device that forms the communion by making present the image as if really present. As a point of 
comparison, I will look in the next section and the last Chapter at how commercial image-
makers, contemporary artists, and I (as a Byzantine-inspired artist) use accessible materials to 
guide viewers in performing an iconic/idolic vision. From this evaluation, I identify 1) how both 
the iconic and idolic visions are formed when the organizational structure of the content supports 
the particular interpretations, desires, or beliefs of a viewer and 2) the goals, aesthetic rules, and 
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specific techniques for interacting with screens that frame the symbolic content in an iconic or 
idolic way. 
Returning to the Nietzschean visual regime of screen technologies that made the 
spectacle ubiquitous, I will investigate in the next section, on one hand, how this creative mobile 
vision addresses the idolic human need to fulfill the constitutive desire of the gaze. Verhoeff in a 
way validates this argument by stating that the navigational and panoramic effects that the 
mobile (touch) screen brings in the spatial positioning of the viewer generate a sense of 
alienation “from fully merging with the spatial configuration of a position in the world.”353 Even 
though it enables a sense of control by interacting with what is displayed (the spectacle), the 
media screens impose a spatial limitation on the field of vision within the bounds of “the 
technology of mobile visibility.”354 In turn, the media screens regulate how the gaze constructs 
the space in perspective. On the other hand, I consider how the viewer acquires the ability to 
virtually co-create the spatial construction of visibility, which relates to Marion’s positive 
outlook on the phenomenology of the idol. I explore this creative possibility in my hierotopic 
practice in order to see how this union between the screen, representation, and viewing positions 
(makes present) the image in a material and spatial arrangement that simultaneously activates an 
imaginary world and a concrete touchable experience. Again, my aim is not to construct an 
iconic vision and expect the viewer to experience it as such—this claim is based on a 
metaphysical argument that is beyond the interest of this practical-based research. Instead, the 
focus is on the performance of viewing iconically to reveal that the image is not a 
Platonic/eternal/static picture of reality, frozen in time, but created and performed by the viewer 
through haptic visuality.355 This Byzantine mode of viewing the image as invisible (not really 
present) facilitates the non-metaphysical understanding (beyond iconoclastic judgments) of the 
spectacle as a site for creative expression. In relation to the mobile use of today’s technological 
screen, my practice highlights that the image is concurrently created with the touch of the screen 
(wood panel) and the intentional movement of vision. It concretely shows where the creative 
(performative) experience of the frame for representation lies and how this interactivity brings 
together the object, representation, and viewer. Seen from the Byzantine perspective, this union 
                                                
353 Verhoeff, Mobile Screens, 19.  
354 Ibid., 21. 
355 The meaning of haptic refers to the sense of touch that is intertwined with the sense of sight in 
visualizing the appearance of an object. 
 126 
between a signifier, signified, and viewer can be judged by avoiding the logic of referentiality, 
which is the very source of metaphysical iconoclasm. I also claim that since with the 
interactive/navigational turn brought by the technological screen (mobile (touch) screen in 
particular), the Byzantine theology of the image is as relevant today in understanding the nature 
of the image as it was during the iconoclastic wars that occurred between 730 and 843 CE. 
Therefore, in the next section, I elaborate on Jenkins’ symbolic-realistic analysis of the Apple 
ads to develop a method of reading the Byzantine aspects of the technological screen. Like the 
icon, the iPod/technological screen allows for a haptic (application-based) interaction with the 
invisible/virtual world without inducing a sense of separation between the object (the screen) and 
representation (image) as in the classic/modernist, purely optical, and passive experience of a 
cinematic/televisual/pictorial screen.356  
In response to the Nietzschean spectacle and its objectifying effects in the age of 
technological screens (to answer Pope Benedict XVI’s question above) my approach to the 
metaphysical critique of seeing (and implicitly of the iconic vision) does not turn into arguments 
surrounding the novelty of technological/scientific developments per say, as it would limit the 
conversation to factual (realistic) assumptions on the nature of reality. It is not in the (idolic) 
fascination for the latest technological innovations that I look for in analyzing the construction of 
an iconic/idolic vision, but on how the viewer engages with the screen as the target of 
metaphysical iconoclasm. Regardless of technological advances, humanity “has always been the 
same: a freedom poised between good and evil, between life and death."357 Moreover, although 
Verhoeff’s performative approach to mobile screen technologies might seem to account for a 
spatial understanding of vision that is overlooked in Marion’s phenomenology of the idol/icon, 
the viewer’s ability to move virtually and physically in time and space within and with the screen 
is still dependent on the human nature of taking perspective. The construction of visuality 
through any given field of vision, in a 3D environment, screen-based (virtual) interface or a flat 
abstract surface, entails the gaze’s investment of invisibility (space) in visibility. As a 
consequence of this, my focus is rather on how frames for representation connect with the 
metaphysical tendency of the human gaze to constitute and commodify phenomenality and how 
                                                
356 The icon is designed to fulfill the particular purpose of informing the viewer of the presence of an 
absence that combine all human senses and faculties. Similarly, the mobile (touch) screen is designed for 
interactivity by incorporating pieces of software, camera, speakers, and various devices for output and input.  
357 “Urbi Et Orbi Message Of His Holiness Pope Benedict Xvi.” 
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the Byzantine aesthetics provides an alternative to the confines of the Nietzschean vision in a 
contemporary context. Thus, in making a parallel between Verhoeff’s analysis of a mobile vision 
and the Byzantine icon, I argue that the Byzantine hierotopic (navigational) vision offers a 
creative mode of critiquing the spectacle that challenges the viewer to consider the counter-
intuitive gaze of the other (as Marion puts it). Precisely, I claim that the artistic and performative 
reconsideration of the theological and Incarnational arguments regarding the mystery of Christ’s 
in-imagination (a mode of seeing what is human in the divine and what is divine in the human) 
provides a broader understanding of the limits and possibilities of the creativity enabled by the 
tactile nature of technological screens. And, if the creative act is an event of making new 
meaning, beyond what is already objectified by the viewer’s gaze and already offered in the 
spectacle, than the artistic practice of the Byzantine (Christic) mimetic act can reveal a non-
predefined/creative way to interact with contemporary screens. For this reason, I look, in the next 
section, at the particular Byzantine canons that form a contemporary iconic vision to practically 



















3.2 A Byzantine view of the spectacle and the metaphysics of the technological screen 
 
Corporations seek to develop consumers with “brand loyalty” devoted to their 
commodities and beholden to their brand image. …This raises the question: How does a 
corporation, one obviously committed to the vulgarities of profit and materialism, inspire 
the devotion of a cult following?358 
“Image making‘‘ in advertising, propaganda, communications, and the arts has replaced 
the production of commodities in the vanguard of advanced capitalist societies.359 
 
Technological screens not only affect the viewer’s mode of seeing, but also enhance the 
consumptive character of the spectacle within the Nietzschean regime of visuality. The 
commodity’s cult value is no longer bound to a passive mode of spectating images, and now 
manifests through performative strategies that are similar to the canons employed by Byzantine 
iconographers in constructing icons. Media theorist, Eric Jenkins observes this parallel in the 
iPod silhouette commercials designed by art director, Susan Alinsangan in 2003.360 These well-
known commercials have been regarded, even by Steve Jobs himself, as the most unexpected 
success “in the history of Apple—and in the history of consumer electronics.”361 The simplicity 
of these ads incorporate compositional aesthetic rules that illustrate how Byzantine canons might 
be used to critique the construction of an image within today’s consumerist state of the spectacle.  
In discussing Jenkins’ analytical method of using a Byzantine critical framework, I will acquire a 
starting point in Chapter 4, where I delve into my solitary artistic practice of outlining a set of 
canons for balancing symbolism and realism—a coordinated movement of the image and 
materiality within the icon defined as chōra. The difference between Jenkins and my artistic 
methodology in considering the Byzantine icon as an effective and significant approach to visual 
criticism is that he takes the role of the observer (an outside/scientific perspective) and I take the 
role of the enactor (first person artistic experience). This distinction is crucial for appreciating 
the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis. While the scientific nature of Jenkins’ analysis 
opens up the metaphysical/iconoclastic tensions regarding the reality of an iconic vision, the 
artistic nature of this interdisciplinary research complements the critique of an iconic/creative 
                                                
358 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 467. 
359 W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 202. 
360 Eric Jenkins’ Byzantine analysis of the iPod adds in his article entitled My iPod, My iCon: How and 
Why do Images Become Icons? (2008) has been recently followed by Brett T. Robinson’s book on the religious aura 
of Apple products entitled, Appletopia: Media Technology and the Religious Imagination of Steve Jobs (2013). 
361 Ken Segall, “Bringing Icons to Life,” Insanely Simple, The Obsession That Drives Apple's Success, 
(USA: Penguin Group, 2012), 75. 
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vision with a performative experience of the Byzantine canons. As noted in Chapter 1, this 
artistic addition to the analytical eye of the observer suggests a hierotopic way of moving the 
critique beyond the metaphysical/iconoclastic debates. The idea of hierotopy in my solitary role 
as an image-maker is to spatially situate my body within a canonic context, without necessarily 
involving or requiring the observer’s direct engagement. My performative act is especially 
important for drawing an aesthetic experience through a combination of lived experiences, 
(erlebnis or the experiences of consciousness from lived stuff and immediate time and space), 
personal (idolic desires), and theological, historical theoretical accounts.  Furthermore, my first 
person artistic experience is put forward as a canonized aesthetic judgment (a spectacle), which 
is different than the traditional monastic experience. This point will be explained in Chapter 4. In 
recording on video/photographic documentation, my artistic research can be further observed or 
visually re-experienced from the character of the observer’s erlebnis. For art practice as 
research, these documentations are not about vivifying an actual iconic vision. More accurately, 
they fulfill (in Chapter 4) a symbolic or realistic function in describing, affecting, and 
interpreting the desire to frame a representation of an iconic vision. But this is not to say that the 
original event—as put into practice through research in the arts by canonically crafting an 
image—is not essential for the analytical method of research on the arts. Beyond its role as a 
source for documentation/facts and textual analysis, the performative knowledge of physically 
enacting the canons brings experiential awareness in pointing 1) the metaphysical struggles that 
exists between a signifier and signified and 2) the Incarnational dimension of the image. 
According to Apple’s creative director, Ken Segall the success of the iPod silhouette 
campaign comes from transcending the very metaphysical problems in depicting notions of 
reality: “It had a hook that really was captivating, and it didn’t try to impress us with the 
coolness of any particular person…. It created an iconic image that came to immediately 
communicate ‘Apple’ and ‘iPod.’”362 One of the iconic features of this campaign is the depiction 
of the human body both abstractly and naturalistically to avoid the imposition of a specific 
human identity, such as race and age. This representational strategy, which is similar in form and 
concept to the Byzantine technique of painting, invites a larger group of viewers to identify with 
the products/iPod. Jenkins endeavors to theoretically outline a Byzantine critical eye for reading 
the spectacle in opposition to the more common academic scientific approaches to the image:  
                                                
362 Segall, “Bringing Icons to Life,” Insanely Simple, 75. 
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the symbolic and realistic visions.363  He uses the iPod silhouette ads to offer a symbolic-realistic 
ground for contrasting and comparing the Byzantine aesthetics and commodity aesthetics.364 Like 
Verhoeff’s idea of performative cartography, Jenkins discusses the mobile aspect of the iPod as 
facilitating a Byzantine-like, quasi-hypostatic interaction (through music with the surrounding 
environment) in which the spectacle and viewers form a single identity. Jenkins’ aim in defining 
a symbolic-realistic vision is to prove that by stepping outside the metaphysical/dualistic mode 
of thinking (symbolism versus realism), visual criticism acquires the necessary tools for 
analyzing the objectifying power of commercial images. As such, he proposes a Byzantine 
logistic in critiquing the iPod ads to unveil their ideological/commercial imperatives.365 
However, the critical eye should always have in mind the constantly changing behavior of the 
spectacle in mirroring desires.366 Unlike the Byzantine icon, which persevered its original 
aesthetic form until preset day, the original style of the iPod silhouette campaign did not remain 
a constant feature of the iPod advertisement. While the “iconic look of these ads became 
instantly recognizable to anyone exposed to the marketing effort—which was pretty much 
                                                
363 As pinpointed by Jenkins, the problem with the two different critical approaches based on realism and 
symbolism is that they fail to address the reasons for the devotion that commercial images inspire and, more 
importantly, why they trigger iconoclastic controversies. As opposed to symbolic-realism, the realistic and symbolic 
accounts do not show what makes an image perform and be performed within a commoditized context.  
364 Regarding the sale of goods and services in a modern economy, the Marxist thinker Wolfgang Haug 
coined the term commodity aesthetics to define the spectacle as the sensual appearance aimed to increase the sale of 
goods in a supersaturated market (119). Such images, prominent in fashion, architecture, and politics, appeal to 
human needs and desire by promising more than the product can deliver. Thus, agents of capital create ads 
promoting seductive illusions to control consumers’ desire rather than serve it.  
365 As explained in Chapter 1, Byzantine theology of the image emerged from an iconoclastic war that 
tested the limits of hand-made representations in claiming, organizing, and harmonizing both the visible and the 
invisible worlds into one economy. In contrast, commodity aesthetics concerns only the economy of the visible 
world. Moreover, Jenkins explains that to escape skepticism and stimulate confidence in the purchase of their 
products, corporations adopt iconographic techniques into commodity aesthetics to declare non-materialistic values 
or spiritual meaning as opposed to messages of financial gain and power. 
366 From a Marxist critique of the capital, products with the same content are differentiated through labels 
due to the pressure of the market competition. Advertisements and labels are constantly changed in their shape, 
color, and description to meet the financial objectives set out by corporations. On one hand, the individual gaze is 
manipulated to see as a homogeneous group of people that follows a similar pattern of consumption. Guy Debord 
describes in his book, The Society of the Spectacle how people seek to copy ideals, enforced through advertisements, 
which can easily shift from household products to propaganda for Fuhrer. The ultimate purpose of culture industry is 
to present images that would make people give up the lifestyle they previously had and give people a sense of 
identity similar to the popular faces of the entertainment industry. On the other hand, consumers consistently covet 
purchasing products, such as clothing, electronic gadgets, and cosmetics to fulfill their incessant need in satisfying 
desires. Just as labels give a face to a product, the product displays a viewer’s desire. The commodification of the 
viewer manifests in a social group created as “categories of persons” based on “categories of objects” (Baudrillard 
1988, 16). A community of consumers is formed when a viewer’s identity becomes a mere extension of a specific 
social group’s chosen product/desire. 
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everyone on earth,”367 the later campaigns, such as for the iPod nano, have taken various 
representational approaches that range from abstract to photographic approaches. For instance, 
the human figures in the 2nd generation of iPod nano commercials take on realistic features and 
the background colors show abstract forms. But these variations in design do not disproof the 
validity of a Byzantine frame for analyzing the spectacle—a point that will become clearer as I 
discuss my own artistic practice. In fact, it points to Marion’s phenomenological argument 
between the idol and icon in overcoming metaphysical dualism. From a Marionian view of the 
idol/icon, the fluctuating relationship between symbolic and realistic elements within a frame for 
representation constructs various degrees of invisibilities toward seeing the image. Specifically, 
it is a consequence of the metaphysical eye in either feeling the presence or claiming the real-
presence of reality.  To put this into a phenomenological view, the iconic vision includes, in 
addition to the human gaze, the perspective of another (divine) gaze. The idolic vision, instead, 
engages the viewer into a performative event within the limits of the human act of taking 
perspective. The follow up question is: do the iPod silhouette commercials really induce an 
iconic vision? From a theological perspective, the ads are not iconic as they mainly emphasize 
human desires. Here, an important distinction is made in the notion of desire. While the icon 
prompts the viewer to acknowledge God’s desire to unite the shared image of His Son and 
humanity (as explained in Chapter 1), the idol incites the viewer to see his/her own desires as the 
only reference point to reality. Consequently, the theological view of the idol is that it induces a 
sense of anxiety by preventing the knowledge of what God desires.  From a metaphysical 
perspective (Jenkins’ view), the ads induce a hypostatic experience due to their Byzantine quality 
of avoiding materialistic claims and of inviting the viewers in “a cult celebrating the immersive 
experience”368 in music. Before exploring Jenkins’ analysis of the iPod ads, it is important to 
note that although he reveals the similarities between the Byzantine icon and the ads in their 
formal/canonical structure, his critique does not make a concrete move out of the metaphysical 
mode of thinking. There is a lingering metaphysical contradiction in his analysis (to which I will 
return at length in the last section of this chapter, 3.2.2 Why the Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision in the symbolic-realistic critique of the spectacle) in the fact that the ads 
                                                
367 Segall, “Bringing Icons to Life,” Insanely Simple, 74. 
368 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 466. 
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are described as iconic due to their cult following while, additionally, promoting Apple’s 
consumerist ideology.  
And so, my aim is to enrich my artistic research methodology with Jenkins’ method of 
referencing the Byzantine icon in relation to the spectacle to move the critique, in the next 
Chapter, into a non-metaphysical terrain at the practical level through a Marionian 
phenomenological view of the icon/idol. From Jenkins’s canonical inquiry, I will shift to a 
broader understanding of the image by 1) connecting the Byzantine icon with the aesthetic 
feeling and 2) proposing a practical engagement with the traditional canons to see the 
differences/similarities between an idolic/iconic creative experience. As it will become clearer in 
Chapter 4, the canons are not forms of representation in themselves, but techniques of vivifying 
the presence of an image. I do not use the canons to impose a predefined understanding of a 
creative experience, but as tools in learning how to present the invisible in an aesthetic lived 
experience.  For example, in the video documentation, Performing the Icon I pay attention to the 
materials and techniques of constructing a Byzantine-like icon to continue (at the sensorial level) 
Jenkins’ inquiry into how a viewer reacts to various symbolic-realistic elements by bestowing a 
commodity (and in my artistic practice, intentional objects as apprehended by my psychological 
subjectivity) with idolic value. And from this technical and practical consideration of the canons, 
I advance the possibility of the Byzantine icon to serve as a productive lens for visual criticism 
and art practices. It is a practice-oriented lens that investigates the need of the image to break 
away from its own referentiality in order to craft a creative/iconic vision—thus probing Marion’s 
view of the idol within the contemporary regime of the spectacle.  
While the obvious social scientific route to Jenkins’ use of the Byzantine canons is to 
further analyze the objective/subjective properties of his symbolic-realistic claim, based on 
quantifiable data (interviews, etc.) it is also impossible to prove the reality of an iconic vision 
within a metaphysical framework. The analytical observer might describe what the artist’s 
intention was in creating the iPod silhouette commercials or how many viewers have seen them 
in a Byzantine way, but this point of view of the observer will not be able to reveal how an 
iconic vision is actually performed. The scientific validity of the Byzantine canons (in triggering 
a performative event) adds more quantifiable data to a metaphysical perspective without proving 
the Incarnational dimension of an image. Such a rational attempt sends the analysis back to the 
basic questions of representation posed during the Byzantine iconoclastic war, as discussed in 
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Chapter 1. Hence, even if Jenkins (or any other media theorist) might attempt to present a 
defensible Byzantine claim to the iconicity of the iPod commercials (or any other spectacle), the 
visual critique will enter (and end) within the domains of symbolism or realism, which is 
doomed to iconoclastic suspicions. It is for this reason that I propose an artistic mode of enacting 
the canons that offers an alternative to the metaphysical endeavor in analyzing the image. My 
attention, therefore, is not on the accuracy of an objective/scientific view of the canons for 
discovering the manifestation of a Byzantine iconic vision in the commercial world, or in taking 
Jenkins’ analysis into a metaphysical debate. These metaphysical frameworks will, in fact, defeat 
the very purpose of this practice-based thesis for the simple reason that there is no true point of 
reference (either seen from a symbolic or realistic lens) to guarantee the meaning of an iconic 
vision.  
Now that I have noted my methodological interest in the visual techniques pinpointed by 
Jenkins’ parallel between the canons and spectacle, the next section focuses on the Byzantine-
like compositional structure of iPod silhouette commercials to examine 1) his analytical method 
of canonically decoding an authentic/hypostatic experience of the spectacle and to what degree 
this analysis adds an Incarnational dimension to visual criticism, and 2) how the canons provide 
a technical/design view of a contemporary cultural event in discovering visual strategies that 
deviate iconoclastic accusations or transcend the viewer’s gaze from corporate financial gains 
toward the individual’s needs and spiritual values. With these observational insights, I will 
develop (in Chapter 4) a contemporary Byzantine canonical framework for the artistic 
exploration of an iconic vision—hence, the interdisciplinary aspect of this thesis. In other words, 
Jenkins offers me a concrete and technical example of how to extract symbolic-realistic elements 
within a contemporary context of the spectacle in order to build a Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision. And from my point of view as an enactor, this theoretical incorporation 
into the actual practice of the canons informs the in-imaginational mode of viewing metaphysical 






3.2.1 Performing the spectacle through Byzantine canons 
 
Churches, cars and computers share a secret affinity. They help us escape. The really 
special ones are works of art. Chartres, Ferrari and the iPod are all cathedrals - each one 
transporting us in different ways.369 
 
In critiquing the aesthetic experience of mass media images, Jenkins refers first to 
symbolism (Platonic) and realism (Nietzschean) as the most prevalent (iconoclastic) modes of 
seeing imagery in current visual criticism.370 He, then, affirms that there is little theorization of 
the ways in which to address the role of symbolic-realism in the spectacle, such as the Apple 
brand image.371 Critiquing the cult value of products from a symbolic and realistic mode of 
seeing will not be sufficient enough to show how commoditized images attract a devoted group 
of followers and reveal the power of corporate aesthetics of commodities to mediate the 
relationship between visual representation, body, and desire.372 The symbolic critique focuses on 
the meaning embedded in the image to explain their ideological, economical, political, or 
emotional power, thus diverting the critique from the visual form towards the cultural context of 
images without explaining how they come to impact the viewer in their market circulation. By 
contrast, the realistic interpretation of the image focuses on the visual form and their photo-
realistic resemblance of the signified. This materialistic stance claims a direct physical 
relationship between a signifier and signified and ignores the creative mode of seeing required in 
the interpretation of the image, thus leading to a narrow definition of an iconic vision. While 
both the symbolic and realistic interpretations provide valuable information on iconic imagery, 
they fail to explain reasons for iconoclastic debates around commercialized images because they 
offer a fragmented interpretation of the particular visual techniques employed in their creation.  
To that end, Jenkins claims that the Byzantine icon is a viable alternative to the symbolic 
and realistic ways of critiquing and that the symbolic-realistic type of vision can be experienced 
in various areas of contemporary visual culture, one of the most prominent being the 
                                                
369 Robinson, Appletopia, 10. 
370 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 468. 
371 Ibid., 483. 
372 Here, the meaning of image is used in the Byzantine sense. It does not refer to a referential relationship 
between a (visual/conceptual) representation and an original model, but to how viewers create/perform an image in a 
physical environment through a quasi-hypostatic union between the human body, on-screen space, and off-screen 
space. A commoditized image, then, is a space/frame for representation designed for profit in a way that it forms a 
quasi-hypostatic union between the consumer’s body, product, and a metaphysical desire that contributes to the cult 
value of a product.  
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advertisement industry. His discussion of the iPod silhouette commercials conceived by art 
director, Susan Alinsangan, in relation to Byzantine canons is especially indicative of the 
performative power of an iconic vision—a significant aspect to take into account when 
evaluating the creative intentions and (iconoclastic/consumptive) effects of image-makers (and 
images today). Considering the dancing silhouettes, Jenkins’ explains how the Byzantine 
aesthetics turn the iPod into an event.373 After providing a symbolic description of the iPod ads, 
Jenkins begins his analysis with an emphasis on four Byzantine iconographic techniques: the 
inverse perspective, light, color, and gesture.374 I will analyze next these Byzantine canons to see 
how they help in designing commercials that “synecdochically embod[y] a hypostasis of 
immersion in music.”375 Particularly, how the ads display 1) an invitation for embodying a 
metaphysical experience through music by holding, dancing, walking (navigating) with the iPod 
in off-screen spaces and 2) the Byzantine canons of inverted perspective light, color, and gesture 
to construct a quasi-hypostatic union between the viewer/consumer’s body, the iPod 
(object/screen), and the on-screen space (music and the visual representations of the dancing 
figures). 
In opposition to the linear perspective that predominated in Western art since 
Renaissance, Byzantine iconographers developed, as the icon painter and art historian Leonid 
                                                
373 Consistently shown on television, print ads, posters, and the Internet, these commercials contain five 
essential features, such as the bright colored background, the dancing dark human figures, the iPod in a distinctive 
white color, rhythmic songs from both mainstream and slightly unknown artists, and a minimal quantity of text. 
374 Defining the ideological/symbolic components of the ads, Jenkins separates these into three different 
groups. Firstly, he identifies the message of hip; an idea of what is trendy and young-looking which is 
communicated by upbeat music and different neon colors animating the background of the ad (generally referencing 
nightclubs and urban environments). The idea of hip suggests, among other things, a certain freedom of thought and 
action (perhaps even evoking the impression of a release from traditional forms of authority). Secondly, Jenkins 
identifies the notion of individual liberty and the idea of the uniqueness of the self. These ideas are expressed by the 
solid black figures of the ads, which are imaged in various poses—generally each is captured performing a unique 
dance step. The figures display a distinctive fashion and hairstyle, which change each time the camera angle 
changes. These postures and appearances speak to a particular and popular image of individualism, an image 
associated with personal independence, free expression and even a sense of abandon. Analyzing the images, Jenkins 
remarks that “the self is condensed to body through the darkness of the silhouette and the association with the 
sensual pleasure of dance; yet the amazing [dance] moves allow individualism to shine through” (Jenkins 2008, 
476). Thirdly, Jenkins calls attention to the enthusiastic ambience created by the ad. This feeling is generated 
especially in the images of energetic dance moves (performed by the black human-shaped silhouettes) following a 
progressive musical tempo and reaching a climax before the display of the textual message and the Apple logo.  
While the symbolic interpretation gives a significant understanding of iPod’s popularity, Jenkins argues 
that at this stage, the critique cannot reveal the commercial’s attempt to communicate a quasi-hypostatic absorption 
in music.  Thus, I will focus next on his symbolic-realistic approach to analyze the particular visual techniques and 
iconic forms that are used in iPod ads. 
375 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 480. 
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Ouspensky calls, an inverted perspective.376 To imitate the physical universe with its depth 
perception as seen with the naked eye (or intentionally, in a Marionian sense), Renaissance 
artists developed the linear perspective that constructs pictures based on parallel lines converging 
in invisible spots known as vanishing points. The illusion of depth (or the insertion of invisibility 
in visibility through the power of the intentional gaze) directs the viewer somewhere faraway in 
the background of a painting. This method is inverted in the Byzantine perspective by diverging 
the lines from the horizon, whereby the nearest objects to the observer appear smaller than the 
more distant ones. The effect of depth is removed and the vanishing points are placed in the 
foreground to give the impression that the background is enlarging and opening up in the real 
space of the onlooker. In opposition to some distant point or invisible space in the horizon, the 
reverse perspective draws attention to the iconic figure, giving the feeling that the painted gaze 
(and the invisible space of the background) counters the beholders gaze by protruding through 
the flat surface of the icon, thus taking an active role in the construction of a hierotopy. The 
Byzantine perspective that Jenkins discerns in the iPod ads is partly provoked by the uniform 
bright background colors and the missing shadows of the silhouettes, which take away any effect 
of depth. The dance movements of the black figures are also meant to address the viewer as 
models for mimetic behavior. Instead of watching the ads passively (as one would when looking 
into a linear perspective or a cinematic screen), the shifting camera angle of each scene—from 
close-ups to full point of views—urges the viewer to picture himself/herself in the event.  
The second point of resemblance between the Byzantine aesthetics and iPod commercials 
is the use of light (in the frame for representation) to symbolically differentiate the terrestrial 
aspect of a human figure from the heavenly aspect of the colors in the backdrop. Traditionally, 
iconographers cover the background of icons with gold leaf to symbolize the divine light and use 
darker colors for saints and vegetation to reference the earthly world of humans. The golden 
background is applied to separate the saints from the natural world by raising them above the 
visible reality.377 However, the golden light is not seen as a representation of the divine light; it is 
part of a series of visual element that are performed in the icon’s interaction with the believer. In 
the hierotopic event, the light radiating from the gold is considered to come “from the motif 
                                                
376 Ouspensky, Theology of the icon, 1992a, 492-495. 
377 Bychkov, Victor. Byzantine Aesthetics, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. Vol.1 (New York: Oxford Press, 
1998), 38. 
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itself, and not, as in the case of realistic painting, from a conjectured exterior source of light.”378 
An additional element to the concept of eternal light in the icon is the nimbus that is placed 
around the heads of the saints. Likewise, the telluric silhouettes of the ads are surrounded by a 
shiny neon light performing a saintly quality. Jenkins notices a parallel between the soft gleam 
surrounding the dancing silhouettes and the whiteness of their ear buds with the image of the 
halo depicted in Orthodox icons as well.379 
In the third example, Jenkins observes a similarity in the way colors are used to render 
the figures of both the Byzantine saints and the dark silhouettes of the iPod ads (which stand out 
from the glowing neon colors of their background). In both cases, such a technique gives these 
focal figures something between a realistic and a symbolic representation. In icon painting, the 
portrayal of saints has neutral bodily features along with an unusual olive skin tone380 and an 
ascetic facial expression. Saints are depicted with limited hand gestures in colors ranging from 
reds (earthly colors) to bright blues (heavenly colors).381 Ouspensky argues that “the human 
body, although represented in a manner, which is not naturalistic, is, however, with very rare 
exceptions completely logical: Everything is in its place. The same is true of clothing….”382 
Without resembling a particular person, the facial features of the saints reduce any potential 
distractions allowing the viewer to focus on the transcendental rather than the human form. The 
same is true with the dark silhouettes against the glowing neon colors from iPod ads. The bright 
background colors (bright blues, reds and yellow) recall a spiritual experience much like the 
heavenly colors of the Byzantine icons. The earth-colored silhouettes of the ads also give a 
realistic representation of ordinary young people while their specific identities are erased (for 
example, racial or facial details are omitted). The anonymity of the human figures in the ads 
thereby facilitates an easy identification with them on the part of the viewer.  
                                                
378 Nes, S. The mystical language of icons (2nd ed). Grand Rapids. (MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2004), 20.  
379 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 479. 
380 The first rule in icon painting is to start with a dark layer of color. The iconographer successively applies 
lighter tones of that particular background color by adding a certain amount of white. This process, called 
scumbling, is seen as a spiritual journey from a state of being in darkness towards a transcendental light. 
381 The color red symbolizes humanity; the blue signifies the kingdom of God in heaven; the white stands 
for spiritual purity, the green and brown refer to the transitory living condition on earth; and the black portrays evil 
and demon like beings. For example, in the Byzantine icons, Mary, the mother of Jesus (Greek: Theotókos), is 
depicted with a blue garment underneath an outer red one. The blue stands for her divine nature and the red for her 
human character. Contrarily, Christ is represented wearing clothing with a reversed color structure—the blue is 
outside and the red is inside. This indicates that the heavenly nature prevails over his human existence.    
382 Léonide Ouspensky, Theology of the Icon. Trans. Anthony Gythiel. (1. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1992b), 187. 
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In the fourth common aspect, Jenkins argues that the apparently opposite gestures of the 
continuously moving silhouettes from iPod ads and the stillness in depictions of Byzantine saints 
from Orthodox iconography communicate/perform the same meaning, the presence of a divine 
experience. The dancing figures, holding the bright white iPods, are immersed in music, 
performing “astounding flips, splits, twists, and turns [that] are simultaneously realistic and 
extraordinary.”383 Likewise, the Byzantine saints are enveloped “by the divine, captured in 
prayerful communion or penitent reflection.”384 Both characters reveal/perform a transcendental 
experience (symbolism) in concrete grabs (realism) encouraging the viewer's participation. By 
portraying a quasi-hypostatic experience, the commodity, in addition to its symbolic, exchange 
and use value, is now invested with a cult value.385 As is the case with Byzantine iconography, 
these iPod ads create an incomplete scenario where the missing component of the scenario is the 
viewer/consumer him or herself. The scenario becomes complete only when the viewer 
participates in the performance of seeing the commodity through a symbolic-realistic lens. This 
happens (that is, the quasi-hypostatic event ultimately crystallizes) at the moment when the iPod 
turns into “my icon.”386 
Ouspensky asserts that the genuineness of the Orthodox icon stems from all its parts 
forming a synchronized union between the on-screen and off-screen: “as the space represented in 
the icon is united to the real space in front of it, so the depicted event which took place in a time 
past is united to the present moment.”387 As argued in Chapter 1 (See 1.2.2.2 The 
epistemological position of the image: the symbolic-realistic vision), this unity that creates a 
hierotopy/iconic vision/screenspace is based on the Trinitarian economy, which refers to an in-
imagination of the Incarnational logic of the image. And the in-imagination is made possible 
only by constructing (at the technical/visual level) a balance between the constitutive element of 
the icon—the narrative-structure, the raw materials, and the visual techniques/composition. The 
materials and the technique used in painting the icon, which I reveal in Portrait of an Icon 
Maker, are of equal importance in determining the construction of an iconic vision as its 
                                                
383 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 479. 
384 Ibid, 480. 
385 In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains that every labor-product has a use 
value that facilitates the satisfaction of a human need. When labor-products are traded as a commodity in markets, in 
addition to use value, they acquire an exchange-value that is translated as money (Marx 1904, 38). 
386 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 481. 
387 Ouspensky, Theology of the icon,1992a, 499. 
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narrative that is symbolically linked to the Byzantine economy.388 Likewise, iPod ads combine 
the necessary visual ingredients (after the manner of Byzantine iconography by using the 
elements of perspective, light, color, and gesture) to in-imagine the ecstatic experience of music 
through earphones. Apple’s success in depicting the quasi-hypostatic immersion in music is to 
naturally fuse elements in a way that the dancing figures, the neon background settings, the 
upbeat music, and the music player/mobile (touch) screen become one economy. Every 
component included in the commercial is needed to see the world through music. In the span of 
30 seconds, iPod ads seek to reproduce a nearly universal, phenomenological experience 
(dancing or being captivated by music). Reflecting on this shared experience, Jenkins comments; 
“anyone who has traversed public space while entranced in their favorite song recognizes the 
experience, similar to the feeling one gets when consumed in dance. The world seems to become 
mute [free of any prescribed/intentional meaning], while people appear to move in harmony with 
your song.”389 IPod commercials incorporate short sound breaks in their structure to specifically 
recall that mute moment (the iconic vision) when one is fully submersed in music. By claiming 
to sell this quasi-hypostatic experience “of a spiritual quality,”390 the iPod becomes more than an 
ordinary commodity in the capitalist market competition. Therefore, Apple Inc. declares itself as 
different from other corporations whose ultimate motive is only profit and consumerism. An 
identical compositional configuration is illustrated in the Byzantine icons to invite the viewer in 







                                                
388 The Orthodox theologian, Pavel Florensky emphasizes the importance of selecting the materials and 
technique for painting the icon: “Neither the technique of the icon painting nor the materials used can be accidental 
in the relation to worship…It is difficult to imagine, even in formal aesthetics analysis, that an icon could be painted 
with anything, on just any surface, and by just any method” (qtd. in Ouspensky, 1992a, 499). All the materials and 
ingredients used in making the icon are derived from mineral, vegetable and organic materials. I elaborate on this 
topic in the next chapter. 
389 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 477. 
390 Ibid., 468. 
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3.2.2 Why the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision as a symbolic-realistic 
critique of the spectacle 
 
Jenkins makes known that the Byzantine techniques of constructing an image reveals the 
(idolatrous) process in which commercial imagery objectify human identity. To summarize, 
Byzantine symbolic-realism is the mode of seeing that bestows the icon with a cult value through 
a rich sensorial experience. The Byzantine analysis of iPod commercials asserts that it is through 
this very participatory mode of seeing that the spectacle of today’s mass-media images dominate 
over human desire and perception of reality. What is intriguing in this claim, however, is the fact 
that both the Byzantine icon and iPod are seen in the same symbolic-realistic manner. On the one 
hand, Jenkins follows the Marxist and Marionian critique of capitalist idolatry and looks at the 
Byzantine theory of image to expose how corporate image-makers deceive viewers in buying 
products.391  In essence, he wants to strengthen the critique against the spectacle by showing how 
the Byzantine technique of making the icon helps to see the performative way in which 
“commodities and corporations accrue cult value.”392 On the other hand, Jenkins does not 
question how the iPod (or any other product that acquires cult value) can be seen iconically while 
acting as an idol simultaneously.393 This analogy between the Byzantine icon and iPod seems to 
contradict the Incarnational logic of the image if the difference between the icon and idol is not 
clearly stated: the symbolic-realistic structure of the iconic vision constructs the presence of the 
image as absence and, the structure of the idolic vision constructs the image as the real-presence 
of reality by oscillating between symbolism and realism. Moreover, I find that Jenkins’ parallel 
between the icon and commodity validates Marion’s (non-iconoclastic) outlook on the idol in 
revealing a lower level of invisibility. This means that the symbolic-realistic experience does not 
necessarily imply a strict association with the Byzantine icon itself. In conforming the 
compositional structure of an aesthetic appearance to various Byzantine canons, an image can 
manifest through various intensities of transparency.394 However, to what extent a Byzantine 
balance between symbolic-realistic elements can be crafted in an aesthetic experience requires a 
                                                
391 Idolatry consists in worshiping a spectacle disconnected from the real due to the death of signification 
via simulation (as discussed in 2.3.3 The (metaphysical) consequences of the spectacular image). 
392 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 483. 
393 Although Jenkins’ analysis into the icon’s performativity is closer to the Incarnational logic of the 
image, he seems to overlook Marion’s point regarding the iconic and idolic intentionality in critiquing the spectacle. 
394 One of the main research questions that I explore in my artistic practice is if the canons of reversed 
perspective, light, color, and gesture are universally applicable to any type of images (religious, commercial, etc.). 
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practical/performative inquiry at the level of artistic research, which I offer in the next Chapter. 
Without elevating the idol to the status of the icon and vice versa, my artistic proposition is to 
develop the symbolic-realistic lens for enabling various modes of critiquing a frame for 
representation (saturated with either commercial or religious symbolism): from a symbolic 
(idolic) to realistic (idolic) and symbolic-realistic (iconic) experience of the image. As such, I 
argue that it is important for visual criticism to address how the symbolic-realistic structure of an 
image is constructed at a practical level (using artistic means based on Byzantine canons) when 
focusing on the mediational nature of the screen in relation to iconoclastic/consumptive debates.  
In addition to performatively revealing the modes of purchasing/worshiping commercial 
imagery, the Byzantine icon discloses metaphysical reasons for consumptive debates. For 
instance, while commercial images (pop icons, brand images, etc.) may not completely fit the 
Byzantine canons of forming a hierotopy, the consumer invests them with a cult value when 
what is viewed in the product retains a mimetic relation between the symbolic value (the 
message of a product such as being young and cool) and the use value (the material and 
utilitarian use of the product).395  A product is bought/worshiped only when its symbolic value is 
considered as one and the same with its tangible/utilitarian form—that is, the symbolic content is 
seen as present. The consumers believe in this union between the symbolic value and use value 
when they participate in the consumption of the product through a mode of seeing that parallels 
the Byzantine symbolic-realistic mode of seeing. It is important to emphasize here that the 
theological perspective of the Byzantine symbolic-realistic mode of seeing is strictly connected 
to evoking the image of Christ. From an artistic/phenomenological perspective, the symbolic-
realistic vision triggers an evocation that actualizes a referent beyond the mere function of a 
representation. Within the context of commodity aesthetics, symbolic-realism specifically refers 
to the way viewers respond with faith to products or the way in which the product is perceived as 
an icon—thus, the possibility of every frame for a representation to contain iconic elements and 
act as an icon to a certain extent. 
Consumptive controversies arise from debating the juxtaposition of the concrete form 
with the symbolic meaning of the product (Byzantine iconoclasm arose from a similar 
affirmation that the icon/signifier is one and the same with God/signified). Claiming that the 
                                                
395 A commercial icon sells a particular invisible message/desire (symbolic value) in concrete grabs (use 
value). In the advertisement world, therefore, the image of a product turns into an experience (a transformative 
desire) that attracts the consumers’ gaze so that they purchase the product.  
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image of the product offers exactly what it sells (the real-presence of the content), invites for 
questioning the metaphysical relationship between the inner and outer experience of the world 
and the commoditization of the body according to consumers’ desires. In line with the Marxist 
critique of the spectacle,396 a metaphysical desire (with commercial implications) relies on a 
collective belief in the power of realistic/naturalistic representations to accurately depict notions 
of reality—a conviction defined as the “documentary mode.”397 And, the trust that consumers 
place in naturalistic illustrations (as presentations of an objective, genuine world) hinges on 
using advertisements that avoid any iconophobic attitude regarding the product. Today’s 
iconoclastic controversy surrounding the spectacle becomes evident in the paradoxical use of the 
technological screen (from cinematic/televisual to digital mobile screens): while it has the power 
to convince onlookers about its neutral stance in presenting authentic events, it can as well be 
used to disseminate information that reflects the interest of those advocating an ideology or 
belief. Jenkins exemplifies that “critics quickly viewed images as a way to advance claims that 
would be either illegal or unethical if expressed directly in words (such as cigarette smoking 
makes one youthful).”398 As such, consumers’ general suspicion towards advertisements 
determined the brand image-makers to employ iconic techniques for hiding the dual quality of a 
frame for representation—its naturalizing capability through concrete depictions of a narrative 
and its “persuasive power and propagandistic implications.”399 Jenkins’ analysis of iPod 
television ads demonstrates how the visual language of icons reemerges as a marketable tactic. 
By introducing the Byzantine concept of iconic hypostasis in the creation of commercials 
prevents the iconophobic tendencies of consumers and criticism. The icon techniques can 
accommodate the products endowed with transcendental meaning to the consumers’ 
understanding without forcefully linking their physical body to abstract ideas/advertisement 
slogans. Thus, by portraying a quasi-hypostasis in advertisements, corporations manage to keep 
                                                
396 In brief, the Marxist critique of the capital is based on the idea that a commodity is not an object that 
simply satisfies the human basic needs. A commodity has a theological meaning that reflects the presence of 
invisible images.  
397 Finnegan, C. A. “Documentary as art in U. S. Camera,” RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 31(2), 
2001, 37. Following the same line of thought, Roland Barthes refers to photographs as having the power to 
naturalize a story/fiction by making the claim of “having-been-there” (44).  
398 Jenkins, “My iPod, My iCon,” 474. 
399 Ibid. For example, the false statement, poison is good for the health is obviously unbelievable to 
consumers when communicated through words alone. However, the same message can be communicated visually 
through iconic techniques and appear, in fact, as a positive message.  
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themselves away from accusations of designing commercials that mislead and persuade the 
public. 
In applying the Byzantine tradition of icon painting, I am not only continuing Jenkins’ 
parallel between the Byzantine canons and commodity aesthetics, but also complicating his 
symbolic-realistic interrogation at the phenomenological level by considering Marion’s approach 
to the icon/idol. As previously stated, Marion finds a similarity between the icon and idol in the 
way they reveal the invisible with different intensities (see 2.1 The phenomenology of the idolic 
vision). So, when comparing and contrasting the Byzantine icon with a brand image, it is 
important to consider this phenomenological resemblance by further investigating 
(practically/artistically) the two modes of creating images iconically in a liturgical space and 
idolically in a commoditized space. Regarding the relevance of the doctoral level practice-
oriented research into the construction of an iconic vision, the following performative inquiries 
occur: Is the Byzantine based artistic framework capable of addressing what academic research, 
based on the symbolic and realistic arguments, fails to do: 1) a non-dualistic understanding of an 
iconic vision—that is, beyond iconoclastic susceptibilities that only limits the analysis to a 
metaphysical mode of thinking and 2) what are the practical, technical, and artistic reasons for 
the devotion that contemporary media imagery inspire within a commoditized context. It is the 
answer to these questions that occupy my practice of a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic 
Vision. Based on Byzantine visual techniques, I will concretely show what makes a frame for 
representation perform and be performed iconically or idolically. These differences and 
similarities will become clearer once I turn (in the following sections) to the aesthetic 
construction of my Byzantine iconic vision in relation to other contemporary artistic modes of 
seeing reality as present.  
From a phenomenological view, Jenkins overlooks the fact that the Byzantine icon 
acquires a cult value beyond one’s intentionality whereas the iPod attains a cult following 
through a voyeuristic participation within the limits of consumers’ intentionality—as Marion 
puts it, the televisual screen mirrors one’s desires and stops/violates the gaze with its dazzling 
appearance. According to Jenkins’ analysis, a viewer of the iPod ads is immersed in music, when 
the meaning/image of the ads are not perceived as something imposed on the ads themselves. 
Rather, this meaning is constructed in the act of viewing itself; specifically as in the Byzantine 
symbolic-realistic perception of the image. The Byzantine-ish elements of the ads prompt the 
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spectator into a creative immersion where essential values are revealed—a “secret meaning 
‘given’ in the phenomenal being of the object.”400 Jenkins argues that due to their self-
referentiality, the meaning of the ads emerge (or rather its effect arises) by breaking the 
separation between a viewer’s mental process of ascribing meaning and his or her sensual-
physiological experience of the object/iPod. Therefore, the ecstatic experience of music (heard 
through earphones) is accomplished when the user harmonizes, performs, or mimics the visual 
experience of the on-screen space (based on perspective, light, color, and gesture) within the off-
screen space. Consequently, the particular iconic elements (the dancing figures, the neon 
background settings, the upbeat music, the music player, and the consumer) form a 
screenspace/hierotopy when they appear as devoid of any particular meaning—that is, they 
present themselves as “purely ‘sensual’ phenomena.”401 In this manner, the user is invited to 
construct an individualized/Nietzschean path through the off-screen. Here, the formula is: self-
referentiality + intentionality = idol. While this might seem a mode of overcoming the 
objectifying power of the spectacle, the investment of the phenomena in the quasi-hypostatic 
experience of the iPod with the user’s intentionality and desires is itself an idolic imposition of 
meaning (an authorial control over the phenomena). In addition, Jenkins’ claim that the profit-
driven intention of the corporate image-makers is hidden behind the Byzantine visual rules in the 
ads is rarely explicitly religious to viewers. This means that his symbolic-realistic critique of the 
spectacle becomes more comprehensive and instructive for scholars of theology, art history, and 
visual culture when considering Marion’s point regarding the intentionality of the iconic/idolic 
gaze and my artistic practice into the Incarnational dimension of an iconic vision.  
From an artistic research perspective, the above phenomenological issues can be seen in a 
non-iconoclastic light by reflecting on how the Byzantine icon allows the viewer to create new 
meaning and values beyond human intentionality. This Byzantine type of reflective artistic 
activity, which I propose in the next Chapter, brings a restorative and creative critique of the 
performative practice of seeing that has been lost in the age of mobile interactivity.402 For 
example, Robinson explains how the (touch) screen of the iPhone is designed for an instant 
                                                
400 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance, 142. 
401 Ibid.,140.  
402 During a speech at the Vatican in Saint Peter's Square on August 5th, 2014, Pope Francis has addressed 
the need (to a crowd filming him on smartphones) for “calm, reflection, and tenderness…if…the high-speed world 
of online social media…was to be ‘a network not of wires but of people’” (“Stop wasting your life on smartphones, 
web - Pope Francis,” www.rt.com, Published time: August 06, 2014 03:34). 
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gratification of the self to the point where “there is a social obsession with efficiency via process 
and technology…. Whether we own an iPhone or not, the ethic of speed [or mobility] is built 
into nearly all our cultural practices.”403 The performative freedom of controlling, transiting, and 
visualizing every social aspect of one’s life according to human intentionality through screen-
mediated consumption does not facilitate the monastic/solitary kind (orthopraxis) of meditation 
that specifically contemplates on how the tangible experience of the elements from an on-screen 
space are seen as if they were physical realities in an off-screen space. 
To sum up, this research takes the stance that a claim for symbolic-realism can be made 
within the corporate aesthetics of commodities—a position that parallels Marion’s 
phenomenological turn in redefining the theology of the icon/idol. Peter Joseph Fritz clearly 
describes Marion’s viewpoint: “In the face to face, the cross of gazes, Marion locates the essence 
(even the salvation) of all images, which includes all paintings (even idols).”404 Nevertheless, I 
also keep in mind that the Byzantine icon induces a type of vision within a hierotopy that moves 
the viewer beyond metaphysical desires (as argued in Chapter 1 when analyzing Nicephorus’ 
epistemological view of mimesis). Although Nicephorus’ non-essentialist approach to the icon 
can still be categorized as an iconoclastic claim by a contemporary viewer committed to 
metaphysical values, I argue that, through an epistemological turn to the mystery of Incarnation 
(the image of Christ as God and man), the artistic research can provide a valid alternative to 
metaphysical iconoclasm in analyzing the image and the construction of a contemporary 
iconic/idolic vision. The difference between an icon and a commercial icon/idol, I reinstate, can 
only be analyzed and understood when the practical (artistic) level is also included. This thesis 
considers the actual form and content of the Byzantine icon—an approach that neither Jenkins 
nor Marion has been prepared to do—to shape an iconic vision (within the limits of the academic 
artistic research) for viewers to concretely see and experience the particular visual techniques of 







                                                
403 Robinson, Appletopia,70. 
404 Fritz, “Black Holes and Revelations,” 428. 
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CHAPTER 4: MY CONTEMPORARY BYZANTINE-INSPIRED ICONIC VISION 
 
We must be careful not to distort the human figure…to avoid the risk of becoming 
caricaturists…For these reasons, the Orthodox Church requires that all iconographers 
conform to an ensemble of Canons, which are at once guides and safeguards intended to 
guarantee…the doctrinal unity that are valid beyond all national boundaries.405       
 
…[the iconic vision of an] artist and painter does not reside in…[creating] abstract [or 
naturalistic] forms, but rather in a rediscovery of the human face, since the Incarnation of 
Christ…postulates this very fact.406 
 
In Chapter 3, I focused on the performative nature of vision in the digital age of mobile 
screens to highlight the contemporary (technical and metaphysical) context for constructing an 
iconic/idolic vision. Jenkins’ Byzantine approach to the spectacle tells that one must be critically 
aware of how (instead of what) a screen for representation induces a quasi-hypostatic vision. By 
using the Byzantine canons—more precisely, the aesthetic elements of inverse perspective, light, 
color, and gesture to balance the symbolic and realistic modes of representation—
idolic/materialistic claims can be framed iconically and grounded in the commercial world in 
such a way that the viewer’s intentionality is invited to worship, navigate, contextualize, and 
create new meaning. One critical observation that can be taken from iPod advertisements is the 
disjuncture between the Byzantine technique of portraying the hypostasis of Christ and the 
objectifying effects of the quasi-hypostatic event between the iPod and consumer. The Byzantine 
canons (theologically defined in Chapter 1, 1.2.2.2 The epistemological position of the image: 
the symbolic-realistic vision and aesthetically described through Jenkins’ analysis of iPod 
advertisements) were developed to avoid iconoclastic concerns in depicting notions of 
truth/reality, so when the critique considers them only in light of ideological/metaphysical 
connotations, the attention shifts from how to what forms an iconic vision. Consequently, in 
place of critiquing a vision’s symbolic or realistic link to an origin beyond the screen, this 
chapter particularly focuses on the (orthopractic) construction of an artistic iconic vision in terms 
of the canons to provide a route for revealing ways to dress up an idolic/aesthetic vision as 
iconic. In so doing, I offer an alternative artistic mode of analyzing the ideological implications 
of the spectacle as a container of objectivity/reality.  
 
                                                
405 Michel Quenot, The Icon, Window on the Kingdom, Trans. by a Carthusian Monk (Crestwood, New 
York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1991), 67. 
406 Ibid.,148. 
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4.1 The traditional role of the canons in my artistic research  
 
In my artistic practice, the Byzantine canons do not act as a way to contain the essence of 
an image (a referent), but rather, I see them in a similar fashion as time (a referent) is displayed 
by the rules (canons) of a clock according to the number of hours, minutes and seconds. More 
precisely, my aim is to see how the canons allow the depiction of an invisible reality without 
claiming real-presence. This means that the canons are always contextualized within a 
constructed space (a place turned into a narrative space, e.g. a screenspace or hierotopy), and not 
some pure Platonic abstractions, separated from the material world.407 In this view, I want to 
stress that my artistic research intention is to iteratively use these canons within the designed 
environment of an art installation. My purpose is to prompt a performative inquiry into the 
universality of Byzantine canons’ formal structure to mediate images that make the world 
present to viewers. Said differently, to see how the canons articulate a symbolic-realistic solution 
to a wide range of ideological meanings. With regards to the artistic validity of the canons in 
constructing an image (in space), theologian and cardinal Christoph Schönborn explains that any 
human created image (that is, to actualize the presence of an absence) affirms an intimate 
connection to “the concept of the mystery of Christ as God and man.”408 I quote at large the 
following text to encompass where art and Byzantine iconography meet:  
 
The Incarnation not only transformed our knowledge of God, it also changed man’s view 
of the world, of himself, and of his activity in the world. The work of the artist, too, was 
drawn into the spell of this mystery. If Christ appeared on earth in order to renew man in 
his total being, to form man after his own image, then we must also say that the artist’s 
eyes,…and his creative powers, are included in this re-creation as well….For both art  
and ritual, have in common their flowing from an encounter [emphasis mine] between 
heaven and earth, between divine and human reality, and living out this encounter ever 
anew. [An encounter that] all religions…express obliquely or clearly, finds its 
unexpected fulfillment in a human face. The face, the eyes, the voice, the countenance of 
a man, the One who is God and man, has become God’s own word, his personal gesture, 
his self-expression—this we believe without a full understanding.409   
                                                
407 For instance, the Byzantine iconographic canons of painting Jesus’ portrait are not made-up abstractions 
as they were formulated based on the material evidence of acheiropoietic icons. In Christian tradition, acheiropoietic 
icons of Christ, the Virgin Mary, Veronica’s veil and those marks imprinted on the Turin Shroud, have been 
worshiped for centuries as pure in origin; that is, as true appearances untouched by the human hand. The 
significance of these icons (made without hands or painted from the life subject during Jesus and Mary’s lifetime 
such as the Hodegetria icon by Saint Luke) has played a fundamental role in authenticating the role of the canons to 
bring to presence (as absence) the real historical referent (the Incarnational event).  
408 Schönborn, God’s Human Face, 238.  
409 Ibid.  
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The Incarnation of Christ demands His visual understanding by depicting Him in a 
human form. Accordingly, the challenge to represent Christ is similar to the task of representing 
the human being in general, whose image is one with God. The canons that guide the icon 
technique of painting/imprinting the shared image of God and mankind follow the result of the 
Incarnation:  the icon of Christ—which “is the basic model for every other representation of the 
human face. This face of God-become-man sanctifies the faces of all humanity: black, white, red, 
yellow, and mixed races of every color.”410 And from the iconophiles’ perspective, those (the 
iconoclasts) who reject the idea that the face of another human could mirror the face of God 
commit the true heresy.411 
According to the Second Council of Nicaea, “[o]nly the technical aspect of the work 
depends on the painter; its design, its disposition, its composition depend quite clearly on the 
Holy Fathers.”412 Before taking up a performative position on the role of the technical in the 
construction of my Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision (in the section 4.4.5.1 
Technical/realistic and symbolic description), I will add now to Jenkins’ classification of the 
canons by further drawing upon the nature of icon painting, that is, the traditional role of canons 
in describing the icon’s design/color/light, disposition/gesture, and composition/perspective. This 
return to a broader canonical understanding of Byzantine iconography will help, in the next 
sections, to position the Byzantine aspect of my art in (Kantian) aesthetic terms.   
By delving into the need and use of the canons, I must first re-emphasize the following 
fundamental Byzantine principle. Comparing to the rules of depicting notions of divine presence 
in other major forms of religious art, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam,413 the beauty414 
of the Byzantine icon emanates from its elaborate (almost mathematical) organization of 
symbolic and realistic, on and off-screen spatial elements for addressing the unity of Christ’s 
human form and His invisible image. Furthermore, the iconic image is not related to the 
iconographer’s artistic talent of painting/drawing, his/her power of reason, or personal aesthetic 
                                                
410 Quenot, The Icon, 147-148. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Nicea, 6 a, sess. 252 C, qtd. in Quenot, The Icon, 67. 
413 Similarly, Islamic calligraphy, Hindu and Buddhist mandalas follow strict/geometrical representational 
rules to communicate revelation.   
414 The difference and similarity between Kant’s aesthetic feeling of beauty (as opposed to imagination and 
emotion) and the Byzantine image will be discussed later in the section 4.3 Aesthetic constrains in the Byzantine 
appreciation of the spectacle. 
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emotions and imagination—secular values that came to be appreciated in the Western Christian 
art, after the Romanesque era.415 The symbolic role of the canons is to specifically 
restrain/counteract (but not to oppress human creativity, as I argue in the next sections) the 
sensual satisfactions (or consumerist desires) gained from imagination and materiality.416 This 
symbolism is established based on thematic parameters (constant reminders of His Incarnation) 
in which the depictions of Christ, the Virgin, and saints take on certain details: from the gesture 
of hands to the color of clothing and the position of figures in relation to vegetation and 
architecture.417 Regarding the regulatory role of canons in liberating the iconographer’s creative 
power, the contemporary iconographer Mrs. Fortunato-Theokretov explains that the canons 
guide the painting of the human body (using the right colors, facial expression, and clothing) to 
become the vehicle of the Holy Spirit: “Byzantium succeeded in discovering the perfect formula 
that we [the icon makers] still recognize today, and to this very moment every other attempt to 
express and represent the idea of a transfigured body has failed….”418 On a similar note, I have 
explained in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5 A form of performativity in the Byzantine performance that 
the performative turn in contemporary arts (as it stems from Austin’s theory of speech acts) 
identifies a creative, performative act when the human body is seen as self-referential (for 
“avoiding” metaphysical dualism).  From this Austinian perspective, any form of symbolism 
performed in an artistic event is critiqued for imposing an authoritative I/essence, which prevents 
the performance of a new creative act. In the case of icon painting, however, human vision does 
not implement the canons as an end in itself. Through their use, the canons contextualize the role 
of the iconographer’s gaze in complementing the Incarnational symbolism. And I argue (through 
my practice) that the canon’s function to contextualize an iconic image is non-aesthetic (in a 
non-Kantian sense). My artistic view does not take the canons as predefined value judgments of 
what an iconic experience should be or some kind of acting rules in playing an original 
script/event on a stage. They act as a method of learning and seeing in an iconic way by framing 
realistically the possibility of human vision to actualize an image as a real life event in a non-
                                                
415 Quenot, The Icon, 72. 
416 Quoting from the decrees of the Council of Moscow (Stoglavy Synod) held in 1551, Quenot says that 
the icon-maker “must be humble, gentle and pious, avoiding immoral conversations and mundane scurrility; he must 
be neither quarrelsome nor envious of others, neither a drunkard nor a thief; he must practice both spiritual and 
corporal purity” (68).  
417 For a comprehensive list of themes and icon technique instructions see: Dionysius of Fourna, The 
Painter’s Manual, trans. P. Hetherington, California: Oakwood Publications, 1989.   
418 Quenot, The Icon, 70. 
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referential way. I return to this argument later in the section 4.3 Aesthetic constrains in the 
Byzantine appreciation of the spectacle, where I equate the Kantian image of beauty with the 
Byzantine theology of the image (even if Immanuel Kant’s stance on aesthetic experience 
contradicts the Incarnational dimension of the image). Specifically, I claim that the canons, 
somehow, help to reset all predefined symbolism (produced by human intentionality alone), 
allowing the elements involved in the icon’s performance to reach a point of self-referentiality, 
however without stopping at the sensual perception or the form of the object. In contrast to a 
performative act that denies symbolism in favor of creativity—that is, to stop at realism to create 
new meaning out of human intentionality, as described in Chapter 1 from Fischer-Lichte’s view 
of contemporary performance art419—the Byzantine canons move the human gaze towards an 
essence, which is a form of symbolism that challenges the limits of human vision with its own 
invisible image. The Byzantine view of a performative act demands symbolism as much as it 
needs realism—it is not one more important than the other. So, the iconographer’s creativity does 
not lie in creating performative events from self-referential acts as new forms of symbolism 
(which is nothing else than a Nietzschean mimetic behavior of producing one’s own image), but 
to take an active, creative role in completing the lack of an invisible reality (an absence of the 
image that is acknowledged symbolically at the performative/realistic level).  
At this point, it is important to specify some additional key Byzantine canons that expand 
or provide further support to the Byzantine model of vision in critiquing the spectacle. For the 
purpose of showing how the canons can be used in a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic 
Vision, it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive presentation of all the iconographic 
canons. Nonetheless, for a detailed list of thematic and technical instructions/canons, the most 
popular iconographic manual is called Hermeneia, written between 1730 and 1734 by the 
Athonite monk, Dionysius of Fourna.  Therefore, I will be quite selective in my analysis in order 
to address only those canons that I consider and rethink in my icon practice to propose an 
alternative to metaphysical iconoclasm. Based on the archpriest, Michel Quenot’s Orthodox 
perspective on the icon, the traditional/monastic approach to icon painting poses the following 
general principles: 
                                                
419 And even if Fischer-Lichte would argue that the performative act needs to remove old, predefined 
meanings to create new meanings from self-referential acts, this idea of creativity directly parallels the Nietzschean 
imposition of human intentionality over notions of reality/truth, thus sending the critique back to metaphysical 
issues. This radical elimination of symbolism for a new form of symbolism only perpetuates iconoclastic debates. 
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1) The Signature. The iconographer’s intentionality should be eclipsed by the person 
depicted on the icon in the manner portrayed by John the Baptist: “He must become greater and I 
must become less.”420 As a consequence, the wood panel painting should not be signed or, in the 
opposite case, the signature should be preceded by the remark By the hand of…,. The reason for 
this is that on the icon, the written name is existentially linked to the person of Christ, which has 
the power to actualize/make present His absence.421 In the Byzantine theology of presence, the 
name and person creates an intimate bond between vision and hearing—a topic that I exemplify 
later, in the section 4.4.1 Orthopraxis: the technical + the image + body = canons. 
2) The Unity of the Elements. The materials of the icon reflect the organic and mineral 
(pigments, chalk, egg, wood, etc.) states of the visible worlds (as opposed to the artificial/man-
made materials). The totality of the natural world brought together in the icon by the work of the 
iconographer mimics God’s creation of matter. The use of plastic or acrylic paint, for example, is 
a Nietzschean perversion—that is, a “manifestation of the human being’s emancipation from 
nature, from God’s creation, from all His works destined to glorify Him”422  
3) The Symbolic-Realistic technique. As stated throughout this thesis (particularly, in 
Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.2 The epistemological position of the image: the symbolic-realistic 
vision) the symbolic-realistic painting technique is neither representational/naturalistic nor non-
representational/abstract. It is a mode of creating an image that breaks the customary relation 
between the maker, artwork, and viewer with another invisible presence. Similarly to the 
effacement of the iconographer’s personality in the process of icon making, the onlooker’s 
intentionality withdraws before the icon’s authoritative (divine) gaze. However, since this divine, 
invisible gaze cannot be represented in a tangible/realistic way, Byzantine iconographers 
searched for a way to faithfully depict Christ’s bodily characteristics, without producing a 
dematerialized, abstract perception of His identity.  The result of such a mode of painting the 
human body requires that:  
 
a) The Background. The surrounding landscape (including architectural elements, 
animals, and vegetation) follows the geometric logic of the reversed perspective 
                                                
420 Jn 3:30, New International Version (NIV), www.biblegateway.com, accessed 10 October, 2014. 
421 The Greek acronym for Jesus Christ is IC XC and for the Theotokos (the Mother of God) is MP-ΘY. 
Also added to Christ’s halo is the inscription oΩυ (“He who is”). 
422 Ouspensky, Theology of the icon,1992a, 500. 
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(as explained in the previous chapter). Instead of a fixed independent stage for 
events to take place, all the background elements defy the gravitational and 
proportional laws of this world in order to take part in the foreground together 
with the viewer’s act of seeing. In a way, the canon of the Byzantine perspective 
removes the depicted event from particular historical periods and locations so that 
all times and spaces meet in the present, in front of the viewer.  
 
b) The Face and Body. There is no icon without a full frontal view of the human 
face. A profile face prevents the crossing of the gazes between the icon and 
viewer, which allows full authority to the viewer’s objectifying gaze. In icons, 
profile views of human bodies are used to comment on people who did not 
achieve holiness. Quenot notes that “the ancient Greeks called a slave aprosopos, 
i.e., he who has no face.”423 Understood in contemporary terms, the process of 
objectification/depersonalization under the capitalist conditions of image-
production involves the defacement of the human being by the desiring gaze. 
Quenot likewise agrees, with this comment in relation to the spectacle of screen 
culture, when he declares that “[d]espite a profusion without precedent of media 
at his disposal, modern man experiences a growing difficulty to meet or encounter 
his neighbor, whose face he so often does not even notice.”424 Hence, from this 
commoditized condition of “slaves without faces—aprosopos-because of sin 
[desires],” the icon reconstructs the human face in God’s own image based on the 
logic of Incarnation.425 To attain a face is to acknowledge the face of the other and 
upraise his/her presence to the divine level of Christ’s image.   
Every element of the face is painted with earthly colors and takes a 
specific (symbolic) role in directing all senses towards the image—that is, to 
perceive more than the visible.426 Symbolizing an infinite invisibility, the eyes are 
disproportionally large, staring at the viewer from pronounced orbitals under a 
curved forehead marked with deep wrinkles. The nose is overextended vertically 
and the mouth is painted with closed, thin lips to indicate that smell and taste are 
not simple detectors of the physical world but also made for contemplation.  
Similarly, the ears have unnatural shapes to signify that they are also listening to a 
mysterious invisible world.   
And an additional note on the face is that it establishes the size, posture, 
and placement of the human body in the icon’s composition. Usually, the head fits 
ten times in the length of the body. The elongated way of painting the hands, 
fingers, and beard emphasize this unearthly aspect of the body.  
 
c) Stillness and Movement. The garments are not mere pictorial elements for 
highlighting the naturalistic shape of the human body. They do not render 
material accessories that might compete with the center of the human body—
                                                
423 Quenot, The Icon, 93. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid. 
426 A brief symbolic description of the colors in Byzantine iconography was provided in Chapter 3, footnote 
377. For a thorough understanding of the Byzantine use of colors and their psychological effects see Michel 
Quenot’s book The Icon: Window on the Kingdom, the section from page 111 to 119. 
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which is, as Marion puts it, the gaze that pierces back at the viewers through the 
black dots of the eyes. In opposition to the apparent stillness of the bodies, the 
cloaks directly expose, through their folding, color and light, the movement of an 
invisible presence. 
 
d) The Gold, Color, and Light. The purpose of the colors is not to illustrate shadows 
and depth in a linear perspective, but to emanate different intensities of light. 
Symbolizing the divine pure light, the gold leaf (used around the heads or to cover 
the entire surface of the icon’s pictorial background) helps to see the face as 
witnessed by the biographer of Saint Seraphim of Sarov, Nikolay Motovilov: 
“Picture to yourself the face of a man who is speaking to you from the middle of 
the sun at its midday brightest. You can see the movements of his lips and the 
changing expresions of his eyes; you hear his voice and you feel his hands on 
your shoulders, but can neither see his hands, his body, nor your own, but only a 
blinding light for many yards all around you…” (Quenot 100-101). Gold has a 
special value in the Byzantine color palette as it symbolozies the brightest 
available natural light that is the closest to divine light, which is beyond human 
vision. All the other colors of the rainbow are of lower light intensity (subdued), 
thus used to paint the visible enviroment.  
 
 
4.2 The iconic and idolic roles of the canons in my artistic research 
 
  In defining the above traditional (or ideal) visual elements of the Byzantine icon to craft 
an artistic mode of presenting the absence of a subjective/artistic image, I do not aim to 
formalize the viewers’ interpretation of the Byzantine canons—that is, if a person, according to 
his/her social/cultural background decides whether to see in a realistic, symbolic, or symbolic-
realistic mode. Jenkins clarifies that “an icon achieves the status of a divine image only when it 
becomes culturally accepted as a natural fusion of meaning and form through continued use.”427 
An image-maker can perform and present the artistic visual conditions for an iconic vision, but 
cannot control how those conditions will be estimated and instantiated by a viewer. Everything 
that implicates human intentionality or interpretation is, arguably, changeable and contextual. As 
an artist, I can only guess how my work will be interpreted or performed. From the perspective 
of viewers, I could say that my artistic iconic vision can be defined as idolic when it stops the 
viewer’s gaze to what I (subjectively) imagine, in the sense that the gaze sees a Nietzschean 
celebration of my own identity (see in particular my discussion on Marion’s phenomenological 
view on idolic art in Chapter 2, 2.2.2 The realistic artistic vision). Moreover, in the idolic vision 
                                                
427 Jenkins, My iPod, My iCon, 480. 
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of my artwork, the viewer could identify his/her own (materialistic or metaphysical) desires, as 
in a mirror, with my own imagined narratives. In this case, the (mimetic) communication 
between my work and the viewer manifests strictly at the level of human intentionality—the 
same mirroring effect happens in the worshiping of pop-culture icons and products. Conversely, 
my artwork could become iconic in intent, if it confronts the viewer’s intentionality as defined by 
Nicephoros’ epistemological understanding of the icon. If my iconic vision poses a visual 
challenge to the viewer’s own desire and interpretation of the visual elements included in my 
narratives, then my work can produce a type of (symbolic-realistic) reassessment of predefined 
values and objectifying judgments. Also, if in my iconic vision, the viewer rediscovers a sense of 
otherness (in the form of a human gaze that counteracts the viewer’s own gaze), then my work 
can trigger an iconic experience.   
From the perspective of an iconographer, it is essential to note, firstly, that the Byzantine 
approach to an artist’s imagination is that it always acts as an idolic pool of images and the role 
of the canons is to not limit, but to free the artist’s creativity from the limits of human 
intentionality. The only way to acquire an iconic intent in presenting an image is to obey the 
Byzantine canons both symbolically and realistically in unity with the Incarnation of Christ, 
“who was God’s image incarnate.”428 In following the canons either symbolically (as in an 
abstract mode of representation) or realistically (as in a naturalistic mode of representation) 
subsequently exposes the artistic intent to a metaphysical tendency, on the part of the artist, that 
claims the real-presence of an image. The same goes with the symbolic and realistic modes of 
seeing, on the part of the viewer, which stir the perpetual iconoclastic debates between image 
and reality, visible and invisible. The idolic/iconic intent and form of my artwork, however, will 
be discussed further in the next sections, where I propose a new list of Byzantine criteria to 
analyze the construction of a contemporary hierotopy. And with this list, I critique how the 
artistic intentionality can be masked as iconic in “form” by using visual techniques that parallel 
(or are similar to) the Byzantine canons. This artistic approach in seeing the human gaze’s 
tendency to objectify/dominate the world and project a predefined identity onto it, I believe, 
contributes significantly to the critique of the spectacle. For instance, in using my icon practice 
as an artistic testing ground, I can see, on one hand, how my performance of marking/tracing in 
the visible a subjective/invisible image (as in Portrait of an Icon Maker) parallels the 
                                                
428 Ibid., 473. 
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performative way of experiencing the Byzantine iconic vision, and, on the other hand, how my 
personal interpretation implicit in this event makes for a weak symbolic link to iconicity or to a 
sense of otherness. If I delve into the twin pitfalls of (artistic) subjectivism, as originated from 
the metaphysical dualism between subject and object, I can state that my Byzantine technique of 
combining the visual elements in my iconic vision comes from my own imagination. 
Particularly, I illustrate an imaginary spectacle in a manner that combines figures taken from 
Byzantine iconography with animated cartoons and products from American entertainment 
industry. This is evident in the following wood panel paintings:429 
 
1) The Holy Earbuds (Fig. 14) Description: Bugs Bunny takes the role of archangel Michael 
holding a rosary made of iPod earbuds. 
 
 
Figure 14: Holy Earbuds, 8” x 11”, genuine gold leaf, egg tempera, pigments on Wooden Panel, 2011. Available on 




                                                
429 For my older versions of wood panel paintings (made prior to entering the doctoral program at 
Concordia University, 2010), see Figure 13 from the List of Figures, a video documentation of my work exhibited 
in 2010 at the Art Gallery of Windsor, Ontario, Canada entitled The Holy Corner. The video is also available at: 
http://youtu.be/8IF8KWlNNns 
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2) Play with me, you mother (Fig. 15) 
Description: Kermit the Frog and Miss Piggy engage in an imaginary Byzantine world 
 
 
Figure 15: Play with me, you mother, 5” x 8”, genuine gold leaf, egg tempera, pigments on Wooden Panel, 2011 
 
 
3) Figure 16: Video documentation of Tom and Christ's grace (2012), 5” x 6”, genuine gold 
leaf, egg tempera, pigments on photograph and wooden panel. Available on the companion 
DVD and at: http://youtu.be/uYb_paRaaig  
Description: The American animated character Tom takes the face of Christ as a Byzantine 
icon. The sound element is a personal interpretation of the Byzantine chants in combination 
with sounds from the song Sola Gratia by the Dutch minimalist composer, Jozef van 
Wissem.  
 
4) Figure 17: Video documentation of Icon (2012-work in progress), Video documentation of 
Icon, 14” x 17”, egg tempera, pigments on wooden panel. Available on the companion DVD 
and at: http://youtu.be/PVAXipH3bSg 
Description: It explores the classic theme of the Crucifixion by incorporating imaginary 
characters and forms painted in the Byzantine style of symbolic-realism. The sound element 
in the video documentation is a personal interpretation of the Byzantine chants. This 
particular wood panel paint is also part of my installation work entitled, Performing the Icon, 
which I discuss later in section 4.4.5 Probing the Byzantine framework 2: Preforming the 
Icon. 
 
The idolatry of my artistic vision occurs from taking the following steps: 1) While guided 
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by my power to take perspective, I look at the spectacle of today’s advertisement industry. 2) My 
gaze gets caught up into what mirrors my own desires such as Apple products, Looney Tunes 
characters, and parts of the human body, particularly hands and feet. 3) I collect and mix them 
using the icon painting technique to generate an imaginative scenario that pleases my own 
personal interests/desires.430 Simply said, I create narratives that agree with my own subjective 
judgment.431 Nevertheless, I can also state that the solitary, monk-like method of painting 
according to the Byzantine canons stems from the monastic practice of the mystical prayer of the 
solitaries (hesychasts) called The Prayer of Jesus.432 In the hesychastic tradition, the practice of 
prayer refers to a relentless repetition of the words “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy upon me a 
sinner” in order to attach the mind to the memory of Christ’s image. In my private icon 
performance, I continuously repeat the same prayer/sounds and actions through the Byzantine 
technique of painting. Based on the hesyhast practice of this prayer, I composed a list of 12 
Hierotopic sounds (Figure 18, see List of Figures) that are incorporated in Portrait of an Icon 
Maker. The sounds are a mix of Byzantine prayers (recorded in an Orthodox monastery years 
ago) with sounds extracted from chants, bells, carpentry tools, and wind blowing through the 
monastery’s chambers.    
To some extent, my artistic/subjective/idolic approach to the Byzantine icon corresponds 
to the way Apple’s image is framed/performed iconically to imitate a quasi-hypostatic union 
with its distinct corporate identity, which is idolic/objectifying in intent to trigger consumerist 
desires. A product like the iPod illustrates a technique of using the Byzantine canons, to design 
iconically a materialistic desire. As discussed in Chapter 3, 3.2.1 Performing the spectacle 
through Byzantine canons, corporate image-makers are faced with the challenge to frame an 
image in such a way to mask any profit driven intentions. It is key to sell a product with a real 
intention to accommodate the consumer’s needs/desires; the profit goal is to sell as many 
                                                
430 There is a parallel between my approach to creating a composition and the Byzantine technique: “[a]n 
experienced iconographer either draws it [the icon’s composition] from his head [inspired by the thematic canons], if 
the subject is well known to him, and guided by the meaning of the image, lays out the composition and the figures 
as he wills, or, if the theme is little known to him, he uses the help of other icons, iconographic manuals, preliminary 
sketches and so forth (Ouspensky 1999, 53).”    
431 On the meaning of the agreeable, I refer later when discussing Kant’s idea of aesthetic judgments.  
432 Hesychasm (from the Greek word hesychia,) stands for “calm, solitude, interior peace” (Quenot 94). It is 
a solitary practice of prayer that began in the first centuries of Christianity and revived in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries in the monasteries of the Eastern Orthodox Church (Quenot 94). My personal experience of this practice 
started at Sihăstria Monastery (North Moldova, Romania) after listening to abbot Ilie Cleopa’s talks in the summer 
of 1995. For more on hesychastic tradition see Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox way, London: Mowbrays, 1979. 
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products as possible and the best way is to attract and shift consumers’ attention beyond the 
usefulness of the product. In the market competition, the battle of products takes place at the 
level of the image and who finds the most honest/successful way—thus, the importance of the 
Byzantine canons—to frame an image of an ultimate desire wins the competition. And in this 
world of commoditized images, the consumer is expected to perform creatively in view of their 
fidelity to a product. And so, like my performative inquiry, the iPod commercials seem to fail in 
making a strong symbolic link to an iconic experience, but succeed in using a canonized visual 
structure to engage performatively the consumer with the iPod (object). The same blurring effect 
may happen between the artist’s imaginative intent and the iconic framing of an artwork (not 
noticeable by neither a symbolic nor realistic critical eye), which I explore later in this chapter in 
Isar’s analysis of contemporary hierotopic visions (see 4.4.4 Probing the Byzantine framework 1: 
Isar’s chorographic reading of Bill Viola’s technological screens) and through my artistic 
research into the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. 
Thus, in this fourth chapter and through my practically situated symbolic-realistic 
approach, I offer an artistic means to critique how the screen-based creativity actualizes or 
frames iconically an idolic/subjective image. If the Byzantine analysis of the iPod ads provides 
an understanding of the canons’ use and complexity outside of their traditional context, similarly, 
my attention on framing an alternative artistic hierotopic scenario plays an important role in 
inferring how the performative nature of viewing offers insight into a commodity’s cult value 
and spectacular quality. Particularly, my contribution is in the symbolic-realistic manner of 
crafting a solitary experience of presenting/performing a subjective image (as in Performing the 
Icon, where I incorporate Byzantine and pop-culture figures with Apple products). As mentioned 
earlier, while iconoclastic assumptions433 about my version of an iconic vision may make sense 
within communities of viewers governed by symbolic or realistic principles surrounding the 
metaphysical meaning of the image,434 the advantage of exploring iconic experiences in the 
context of art practice as research is that the academic critical eye can draw practical and 
aesthetic conclusions on the performative power of these canons to help outline a symbolic-
realistic approach to visual criticism. While there might be an iconoclastic fear that the 
                                                
433 If my artistic intention would be that to claim the real-presence of my aesthetic judgments, then I would 
position my art installations/performances under the scrutiny of the metaphysical eye.  
434 Especially since my approach triggers a challenging symbolic tie to the Incarnational logic of the icon, 
given the idolic/commoditized value of the symbolic elements included in my icons.  
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techniques and rigidity of the Byzantine canons reinforce a formalist mode of making an image, 
the limitation of the iconic technique opens up a rich performative realm for artistic research into 
a challenge of depicting the invisible or a truthful representation of reality. A closer look 
(through my icon practice) at how the canons foreground the formal structure of the icon, can be 
used to artistically frame an image as present, which in the end, can serve as a means to critique 
the metaphysical assertion of such a subjective/aesthetic view. Moreover, I can now expose the 
core interdisciplinary claim of this thesis, which bridges visual criticism, artistic research, and 
Byzantine theological convictions: a symbolic-realistic mode of critiquing the spectacle that is 
sensitive to the Incarnational dimension of the image. Beside the usual triangle in the 
artistic/visual/spatial/screen-based experience between the image-maker, the artwork, and the 
viewer, the icon broadens visual criticism with another layer of consideration that eclipses the 
subject-object relationship in iconoclastic/metaphysical judgment: a visible trace/absence of an 
invisible (sacramental) presence. In the following sections, I continue my investigation into the 
Byzantine theology of the image towards developing an aesthetic vision that helps to see how 
instances of hierotopy (of image-making) are performed as if miraculous events. More explicitly, 
my focus is not on proving that an iconic vision is a miracle per say (although seeing with the 
symbolic-realistic eye implies taking part in the mystery of the Incarnation through the 
performative relationship between the type and prototype), but rather on how contemporary 
Byzantine-like aesthetics helps to perform a subjective vision as present.  
 
 
4.3 Aesthetic constrains in the Byzantine appreciation of the spectacle 
 
The investigation from Chapter 1 into the Byzantine theological foundation of the image 
revealed the logic of Incarnation in the icon, which configures the symbolic-realistic structure of 
an iconic vision. St. Theodore the Studite says that “those who in principle reject the icon, 
ultimately also reject the mystery of the Incarnation.”435 It is significant to note that the phobia of 
icons, which defined iconoclasts in the medieval controversy, did not emerge strictly from a fear 
of aesthetic ideas, but rather from a controversy over Christological/ontological and 
epistemological principles. Particularly, it was not the fear of artistic images per se, but the threat 
                                                
435 Schönborn, God’s Human Face, 237. 
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inspired by the use of impure metaphysical pictures of reality (being fashioned by human 
hands).436 This fact is explained, “at least in part,...[by] the entire literature of that time (for and 
against images), [which] does not contain any discussion about questions of aesthetic or artistic 
theories.”437 So, given that the theological concerns were focused more on the metaphysical 
limits of the use of human-produced images of God, how can an artistic vision be crafted 
iconically (based on the act of taking perspective) to provide a contemporary symbolic-realistic 
mode of critiquing the spectacle? And this is the main question that I consider in this section.  
Having in mind that the aim of this thesis is to understand how the spectacle induces an 
iconic/idolic vision—beyond the metaphysical analysis of the spectacle as a mirror of objectified 
images that act as their own origin—the issue is if a creative intentionality, susceptible to a 
Nietzschean decline in an awareness of the Incarnational mystery, can arrive at a symbolic-
realistic mode of seeing and critiquing. The first thing one should investigate is the relation 
between an intentional attitude towards a screen for representation and the Byzantine iconic 
experience, and additionally, the possibility to attain an Incarnational synthesis through artistic 
research in order to form an alternative Byzantine approach to the realistic and symbolic modes 
of seeing and visual criticism. John Lechte explores the Byzantine image in relation to art in a 
way that challenges the metaphysical approach to an aesthetic experience: “it is the absolute 
transparency of the image which makes it beauty’s intimate ally….if there is beauty in the image 
this is because of what it takes us to—as in an evocation.”438 The concern, I can now reinstate, is 
to offer the aesthetic groundwork for a Byzantine mode of understanding the image as invisible, 
which explains the construction of human vision in making present the absence of invisibility.  
In rethinking Immanuel Kant’s idea of beauty as presence of absence, Lechte endeavors 
to connect the aesthetic experience of new-media screen installations (particularly of The Golden 
Calf, by Jeffery Shaw, Fig 17, that I discuss in the next section) to the Byzantine theology of the 
                                                
436 In his doctoral dissertation, “A Picture Held Us Captive": Investigations Towards An Iconoclastic 
Praxeology, Janice L. Deary explains that while iconoclastic gestures of the metaphysical aesthetic type focus more 
on the ontological critique of idolatrous concepts as mental pictures that hide illusory or ideological messages, the 
iconoclastic critique of the religious type places more emphasis on the epistemological status of images, that is, the 
way images are used in idolatrous practices. Byzantine iconoclasm provides a practical perspective on the aesthetic 
issues of the image as a copy of reality, and it is from this practice-based perspective that I aim to understand 
contemporary iconoclastic/consumptive discourses.  
437 Schönborn, God’s Human Face, 237. 
438 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 136. 
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image.439 Although the Kantian notion of beauty is a subjective mental (intentional) process that 
is exclusively concerned with the realistic (form, shape, organization, etc.) appearance of an 
object,440 it also depends on a sensus communis—a universal, disinterested recognition of beauty, 
by which Kant means an a priory/transcendental principle of our cognitive faculties.441 It is in 
the “idea of universal communicability”442 between a subjective and collective feeling of the 
beautiful that a parallel between the aesthetic experience of an artwork and the Byzantine iconic 
vision can be discovered. Lechte suggests that the feeling of beauty forms a type of third space 
or a mediating link between symbolism and realism that helps to see how viewers interact with 
the spectacle both in the off-screen space (at the bodily level) and in the on-screen space (at the 
virtual level) in order to perform iconically or idolically.  
For Kant, all judgments (determinate/scientific judgments of natural objects and 
reflective/aesthetic judgments of taste) are mental processes (contingent on human intentionality) 
that are formed based on a relation between understanding/concepts and the intuition of sensible 
experiences (including imagination).443 Determined judgments are dependent on a particular 
context and formed from a union between understanding and imagination.444 An 
aesthetic/reflective judgment of beauty is formed when one’s imagination does not match a 
concept.445 In other words, the sensible experience of an object’s form (and not the mere 
subjective judgment, e.g. like/dislike, of an object’s content) overwhelms imagination to the 
point of creating new meaning/concepts. The difference between a subjective judgment and an 
aesthetic judgment is that the former finds an object beautiful for the sake of one’s own (idolic) 
pleasure and the latter feels pleasure as a result of disinterestedly finding an object beautiful. 
                                                
439 In its Greek original form, aesthesis was opposed to technē in understanding the world. Plato 
appreciated technē as a practical, applied way of knowing the forms. Aesthesis was seen negatively since it was 
linked to the senses and knowing the form through semblance. In Kant’s aesthetics, aesthesis was associated to art 
and feeling and elevated to the highest mode of knowing the world, as I will explain later in this section.   
440 Douglas Burnham, An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press [in the US, Columbia University Press], 2000), 55. 
441 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 146-149. Kant’s claim of 
a disinterested, decontextualized, autonomous universally communicable feeling (which is contrasted to emotion 
that is linked to a particular context) was rejected by Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch-artist, who dismisses any 
form of transcendentalism as (Platonic) idealism. 
442 Burnham, An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. 56. 
443 Douglas Burnham, “Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Available from 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantaest; accessed September, 2014), b. The Deduction of Taste. 
444 Ibid., a. The Judgment of the Beautiful.  
445 The notion of sublime can also be included as an aesthetic judgment. 
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Moreover, a subjective judgment is solely concerned with the symbolic content of an object 
(natural or artistic), which relies on the agreeable and relates to personal interests/desires.446 
With respect to an aesthetic judgment, it is a feeling of beauty that moves beyond a 
particular/subjective narrative and context towards universally valid, logical concepts, which are 
recognized by “all Subjects as unreservedly as if it were an objective judgment, resting on 
grounds of cognition and capable of being proved to demonstration.”447 Specifically, while 
beauty “explodes” both the materiality of a particular object and “the very subjectivity of the 
subject,”448 it is an immediate subjective feeling of an unforeseeable phenomenon, free of any 
historical/geographical context, and universally appreciated visible incarnation—the form of an 
object is, for Kant, the only access to beauty.449 Therefore, in its universality, an aesthetic 
judgment of taste remains, ironically, a subjective experience of “the individual’s own feeling of 
pleasure in an object.”450 This disruption of the dualism between the subject and object in the 
aesthetic experience is where Kant’s aesthetic meets the Byzantine symbolic-realistic mode of 
seeing the notion of reality.  
In order to argue for the possibility of the Byzantine theology of the image to act as an 
artistic mode of critiquing the spectacle, it is essential to understand that beauty, for Kant, is not 
an ideal Platonic form, independent of human intentionality, but always the outcome of human’s 
faculty of reason—which is also the fundamental base of Husserlian phenomenology (see 
Chapter 2, 2.4.2 Marion’s icon and metaphysic iconoclasm). The autonomy of beauty from a 
particular context does not refer to an invisible counter-intuitive divine gaze—as seen in the 
Byzantine icon. It only defines its independence from the agreeable and emotion, which are 
feelings reducible to merely subjective states and determinate judgments. For instance, a tattoo 
design losses its beauty once it is imprinted/contextualized on an individual body, thus subjected 
to a particular circumstance. As opposed to an iconic vision, Kant’s idea of an aesthetic vision of 
beauty remains solely a function of the human reason and intentionality and contradicts the 
                                                
446 Burnham, Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics, 5. 
447 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, (trans. James Creed Meredith, Oxford: University of Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1973) §33, 141. Some universal concepts are space and time that are produced by every human 
mind. 
448 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: The will to power as art, (Trans. David Farrell Krell, HarperCollins 
Publishers: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 123. 
449 Burnham, Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics, 5. 
450 Kant, The Critique of Judgment, §36, 145. 
 163 
Incarnational dimension of the image in which the divine gaze takes an equal role with the 
human gaze in forming an iconic vision.  
Inspired by Kant’s notion of beauty, Lechte argues that what makes an object beautiful is, 
actually, its power to perform an evocation (an invisible image) through a universally 
communicable feeling that induces a sense of otherness. On one hand, this argument is essential 
to understand why the Byzantine theology of the image is relevant for artistic research and, on 
the other hand it clarifies where an artwork and the Byzantine icon meet and diverge (as clarified 
in the above paragraphs). In Chapter 1, section 1.2.4 The Byzantine view about the sacred space 
and Contemporary hierotopy, I stated that the perception of the Byzantine icon in terms of a 
Christian aesthetic object does not provide a full understanding of the two mimetic levels of 
correlations in the icon’s Incarnational logic, which helps to see how an image is 
formed/performed in a context. From a theological standpoint, treating the icon as if an art object 
is an iconoclastic/metaphysical attitude. This leads to the obvious conclusion that a Byzantine 
icon, in its context, is not beautiful. But what Lechte is pointing at is the importance to take a 
theological turn when critiquing how an image is constructed/signified in aesthetic terms. The 
Incarnational understanding of the image not only enriches contemporary visual criticism with a 
new, symbolic-realistic mode of seeing, but also helps to understand the phenomenology of the 
idol. As a matter of fact, it adds a critical eye that questions the power of the spectacle to signify 
itself as a decontextualised appearance (image as simulacrum).451 And if the idolic phenomenon 
(in an abstract or material form) partially reveals low levels of invisibility, then this limitation is 
best analyzed through an aesthetic experience of today’s spectacle that considers the 
transparency of the image (hence the importance of my icon practice in constructing a 









                                                
451 Lechte adds that “[d]espite appearances certainly being to the contrary, it is not certain that the image as 
simulacrum is in fact the way the image operates today, and that the discontinuity…between an experience of God 
through the image in Byzantine culture (the ‘Holy Image’)…and that of the modern era of art [in the sense of the 
spectacle] might be too radical” (151). 
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4.3.1 Beauty and the Image: The performance of a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic 
Vision by merging performativity (body as realism) with symbolism (tracing the 
invisible in the present) 
 
The aforementioned art installation, The Golden Calf (Fig. 19), offers an evocation of a 
Biblical iconoclastic incident in which a Golden Calf, idolized by the Israelites,452 was burned 
down by Moses who announced the Words of God: “You shall have no other gods before me. 
You shall not make for yourself an image in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth 
beneath or in the waters below.”453 The installation is constructed from a mobile digital screen, 
placed on a pedestal, that displays a virtual version of the calf. When the viewer touches and 
moves the screen around the pedestal, the virtual calf appears as if present in the physical space. 
In short, the viewer is invited in a performative 
event that combines elements from on-screen space 
(the Biblical narrative and virtual reality) and off-
screen space (the mobile digital screen, pedestal, 
and the viewer’s body in the physical environment 
of a gallery). How is the contemporary viewer 
expected to see the reconstruction of the 
original/historic (idolic) event in an art installation 
form? If the calf is seen as an object at the virtual 
or material level, then the viewer interacts with a spectacle.  However, Lechte suggests that, in 
fact, The Golden Calf forms a contemporary Byzantine type of iconic vision as a trace of the past 
onto the present. Such a Byzantine reading of an interactive art installation not only deepens the 
understanding of an aesthetic experience in the era of televisual screens, but also reveals that the 
image does not operate on its own. The spectacular image of the Golden Calf takes on a 
qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) slant connected to a transcendental/religious feeling of 
                                                
452 Exodus 32:4 
453 Ibid., 20. The prohibition of human-produced images was rooted in laws of separation. One example of 
this paradigm is found in the book of Leviticus, where observance of food laws mandates a separation between 
blood (considered pure and offered to God through offerings/sacrifices) and flesh (regarded as impure and 
appropriate for human consumption). For the Byzantine iconophiles, however, the Incarnation had challenged any 
simple division between humanity and divinity, or between matter and spirit. Christ had made Himself visible in 
human flesh. The Incarnation, according to the iconophiles, abolished a simplistic division between pure 
incorporeality and impure corporeality. The Last Supper was further evidence of the insignificance of such 
divisions; it brought humans together to consume a mixture of blood (wine) and body (bread) at the same time. 
Figure 19: The Golden Calf (1994) by Jeffrey Shaw 
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something that is totally present in its absence. This might seem ironic since the 
symbolic/Biblical meaning of the Golden Calf is defined by its idolic opacity or lack of 
transparency in forming an image. Nevertheless, according to Shaw’s artistic statement, the 
installation is not about worshiping a simulacrum: “the real space actions of the observer, 
therefore affect the virtual representation of the room and become a “dance” around the virtual 
idol.”454 This means that the viewer is invited to actualize or literally feel the presence of a 
historical (idolic) image, which is different than idolizing an object/concept. Although the viewer 
looks at an idol, he/she experiences an evocation of the Biblical narrative that Incarnates an 
image by holding the mobile digital screen—a hierotopy/screenspace is, thus, created. The artist 
further elaborates on the performative nature of his installation when saying that by “moving the 
monitor screen up, down and [a]round the pedestal, the viewer performs what looks like a 
ceremonial dance around a technological pilaster constructing an almost tangible phantasm.”455 
Therefore, Lechte emphasizes that the iconic vision occurs not when the viewer recognizes the 
calf as a “’real’ idol, but…[when] the ‘virtual idol’…becomes an evocation…of the idol in the 
Biblical story.”456 This aesthetic mode of transforming an idol (an opaque appearance) into an 
image (invisibility) directly parallels my own Byzantine approach in performing a subjective 
artistic image—as documented in the Portrait of an Icon Maker. This is also the major concern 
of my artistic practice in general. In all my Byzantine experiments with the symbolic outcome of 
my determinate judgments (subject to my intentionality) regarding commercial/religious 
products/figures, I search (through new media, performativity, and Byzantine canons) for the 
possibility to evoke/feel the presence of an image that is quite removed from the actual space of 
the performance/installation. This quest for an aesthetic type of iconic vision is, in fact, a means 
to question the nature of the spectacle.   
To what extent the new media idols that I incorporate in my Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision can be experienced as transparent (that is, as an image) and not just 
simply as references to commercial products? Could it be that the potential beauty of my 
Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision lies in what it points towards rather than what it 
represents in itself? Lechte’s aesthetic interpretation of the image in the context of visual digital 
                                                
454 Jeffery Shaw, “Abstract,” The Golden Calf, 1994b. 
455 Jeffery Shaw, The Golden Calf. A computergraphic instalation,1994c. 
456 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 152. This type of 
evocation can occur even if the artists’ “real interest is in facilitating actions in real time around the three 
dimensional virtual object/image displayed on an LCD screen” (Lechte 152). 
 166 
art reveals how the Byzantine icon moves the metaphysical critique of the spectacle (in the age 
of the technological screens) beyond its decontextualized/virtualized status as pure appearance (a 
simulacrum that plays the role of a signified).457 Precisely, Lechte argues that  “an image is not, 
equally, a commodity,” which became “difficult to appreciate…[since] images [as simulacrum, 
seem] to circulate endlessly in a globalized ether.”458 A key metaphysical point (as in Marion’s 
critique of the spectacle) is that the spectacle is discontinuous with the referential logic between 
a copy and model. The aesthetic issue with this interpretation comes from equating the 
spectacle’s ontological feature of effacing the referent (an original context) with an aesthetic 
experience. In principle, this is a misinterpretation of Kant’s idea of beauty that leads to a 
parallel between the aesthetic judgment of displacing/circulating an art object (from its original 
environment into the decontextualized place of a museum/gallery) and the process of 
decontextualisation of all signifiers (on-screen space) induced by digital technologies—a process 
that is believed to have begun with the mechanical reproduction during the Industrial 
Revolution.459 However, there is a difference in meaning between the decontextualization of the 
beautiful and of the digital reproduction. Kant’s idea of decontextualization enables the 
universalization and inimitability of beauty. Without depending on a subjective or determined 
judgment of utility and perfection, Kantian beauty acts as an embodiment of its own model in a 
unique/non-reproducible object that is felt a priory within a “community of feeling,” aka, sensus 
communis.460 The post-Nietzschean spectacle is critiqued for having an opposite effect; it 
reproduces a copy of a model to the point of completely decontextualizing it in favor of an 
individual (idolic) desire. Thus, the spectacle induces (from a Kantian perspective) an emotional 
delight “centered in sensation rather than feeling,” which is linked to 
objectifying/conceptualizing an object by its end (judging an objects’ utility/perfection) in a 
particular context, as it is pinned down by an intuition.461 In other words, the spectacle depends 
on a subjective judgment of the agreeable. By inference, the spectacle is not beautiful—and 
                                                
457 In light of the advancement of screen technologies, for example, Bernard Stiegler provides a radical 
critique of the decontextualisation of the signifier from its signified. He argues that now, with the dissemination of 
information via screens at the speed of light we witness a radical form of decontextualisation that occurs as a two 
way process: “no longer would decontextualisation be solely that of the initial story, however distant globally, but 
that of its ‘reception,’ which would thus tend toward, purely and simply, the complete loss of all context” (Stiegler, 
2009, 116-117). 
458 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 138. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid., 148. 
461 Ibid.,147. 
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therefore, not a source of artistic inspiration—since it is “marked by regularity and can be easily 
[digitally] reproduced.”462  
Someone could also argue (in a Marionian or Baudrillardian sense) that in its simulation 
of reality, the spectacle acquires its own universality/perspectival space as an independent mirror 
that reflects the intentionality of all consuming eyes. If the spectacle operates in a 
decontextualized sensus communis, then the Kantian idea of aesthetic judgments can take a new 
contemporary artistic function if an artist considers Marion’s interpretation of the idol as a low 
level of invisibility that is revealed according to the measure/perspective of the human. However, 
reference to Lechte allows questioning if this dematerialized view of the spectacle regards, in 
fact, the object (the frame for representation or the form of an object) superfluous, which is a 
significant element in both Kant’s aesthetic experience and Byzantine theology of the image.  
What forms an image is not the technological capacity to reproduce a virtual reality (VR) 
in itself, but the symbolic reflection of “a material incarnation of beauty” (such as through a 
mobile screen or wood panel icon), which, in Kant’s view, is the only way to experience an 
aesthetic judgment.463  Therefore, where does the aesthetic appreciation of the spectacle truly lie? 
The existence of the spectacle cannot be simply regarded as a mere simulation that 
simultaneously plays the role of a copy/signifier and model/signified. If we follow the Byzantine 
theology of the image, the nature of the spectacle needs to be understood as both experienced 
(realistically) and observed (symbolically). To that end, Lechte reconnects beauty to context 
through the performative act of screenic vision. The idea of beauty, as its own (invisible) image, 
is not just a symbolic convention for aesthetic elitism to objectify and decontextualize the art 
object from its own functionality, history and maker.464 Instead of a mere contemplative 
judgment, beauty is now a performative act with transcendental implications—a redefinition of 
creativity that contradicts Fisher-Lichte’s view of an artistic event from Chapter 1. Like the 
Byzantine image, beauty is not really present in an object/place or an autonomous ideal reality, 
but created by the viewer through a feeling of presence as absence.  
Similarly to Jenkins’ symbolic-realism and Verhoeff’s interest in seeing how the dynamic 
vision of performative cartography overcomes the omnipresence of the spectacle and its power 
                                                
462 Ibid., 147. 
463 Ibid.,146. 
464 According to Kant, beauty assumes its purity when completely removed from its existence or the 
context in which it is used and taken for granted (1973, §15, 69).  
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to decontextualise (by recontextualising a place into a narrative space), Lechte investigates how 
the integration of the mobile digital screen into an interactive art installation (e.g. Jeffery’s The 
Golden Calf) immerses the viewer in the image of beauty. This very Kantian aspect of beauty as 
its own image correlates to the Byzantine creation of an iconic experience, which I apply through 
my Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision to the critique of the spectacle. What Lechte 
questions in today’s visual criticism and art making, however, is the lack of a symbolic 
understanding of the image and body in the viewer’s realistic (performative) experience of 
digital technology: 
 
…the problem arises when the results themselves [of neuroscience that explain bodily 
experiences in space in relationship to cognition and perception such as frequencies] of 
brain impulses and speed of recognition, or visceral sensations…become equivalent to an 
aesthetic mode.465    
 
This is because the body’s affective function to embody the virtual digital worlds through 
interactive technology is taken for granted by “describing the intricacies of the digital idiom…[as 
the basis for] formulating a new framework for aesthetics.”466 Put differently here, realism is 
confused with symbolism. The aesthetic issue in questioning an iconic vision, as I see it, is when 
visual criticism ascribes a performative value (that decontextualizes or reduces the human body 
to “information (‘0-1’)”467) to the viewer’s body, which removes symbolism (a significant role of 
the imagination in an aesthetic judgment).  I made the same point in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5 A 
form of performativity in the Byzantine performance, with regards to Fisher-Lichte’s 
performative analysis of contemporary performance art. Her critique of Abramovic’s work, for 
example, in prompting a transformative event (a performative experience, beyond metaphysical 
dualism, in which the audience takes an active role of shaping the artwork) is based on denying 
referentiality or the link to an invisible essence (symbolism). Fisher-Lichte’s reason for this is 
that myths, any form of signification, or semiotic values enforce a Cartesian mind-body dualism 
and predefined/referential meanings that prevent viewers’ connection to new phenomena. 
Whereas the dissolution between the subject and object is a prerequisite to the union between 
symbolism and realism in an iconic vision—equally affirmed by media theorists like Jenkins, 
Robinson, and Verhoeff in relation to interactive media screens—it is possible to address 
                                                
465 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 140. 
466 Ibid., 139-140. 
467 Ibid, 139. 
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Lechte’s concern regarding the necessity of symbolism in visual criticism if Nicephoros’ idea of 
in-imagination (discussed in Chapter 1) is considered at a practical/artistic level. I will take this 
challenge myself in practicing the Byzantine painting technique with a goal of performing my 
aesthetic judgment as its own image. In the next section, I particularly focus on understanding 
the symbolic role of my own body in contextualizing an event of in-imagination.  
The ever-greater role of the viewer in the determination of an image entails the 
Incarnational approach to the aesthetic/visual dimension of a screenspace/quasi-
hypostatic/artistic event. The point is to connect back the body to symbolism (the experience of 
the body from a reflective point of view) or to aesthetic ideas (religious or commercial) that 
invite the viewer to construct an image—as seen in the Byzantine hierotopic encounter with the 
icon. Consequently, I argue that the practical solitary experience of painting in a Byzantine 
manner—an iconographic technique that is fundamentally linked (through canons) to the 
symbolism of the in-imagination—helps to spell out the aesthetic implications of the image as 
beautiful/invisible in the viewer’s interactive relation with the spectacle. Lechte makes clear that 
visual criticism requires not only a focus on the impact of screen technology over experience (in 
the sense that it considers the technical part of experimentation as if the spectacle forms its own 
aesthetics apart from the human), but also a concern with the object’s form (the finality of 
beauty) that “disappears in a maze of digital gadgetry.”468 Since the finality of the icon’s form is 
determined by the Byzantine canons (the symbolic meaning of the technic and material used to 
construct an iconic vision), I elaborate next on how they move the critique from “the technical 
for its own sake” towards formulating an art-aesthetic framework that reveals the power of 
“things to signify and…the place of the body (drives and affect) [and object/product] within 
signification and aesthetics.”469 This will be discussed by reflecting on the Byzantine nature of 








                                                
468 Ibid., 149. 
469 Ibid., 141. 
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4.4 Symbolic-realistic research: canons as artistic reflective practice in the Contemporary 
Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision 
 
4.4.1 Orthopraxis: the technical + the image + body = canons  
 
Thus I had to deny knowledge…and the dogmatism of metaphysics…in order to make 
room for faith.470 
 
…the impact the beauty has on our senses…reaches the depths of our soul which quite 
naturally turns to God, who is beauty itself, source of all goodness and Giver of life.471  
 
Humans live in a medium (technics) as fish live in the medium of water (McLuhan), even 
though, in seeing the fish, one does not see the water.472 
 
After analyzing where the Byzantine icon meets and diverges from the aesthetic 
appreciation of the image, I now make a theological and Marionian (phenomenological) turn 
within the framework of an orthopraxis (a canonical understanding of the tools and materials in 
the construction of an iconic vision).473 This canonized technique-based model of vision allows 
me to practically address the Incarnational dimension of the image in view of its aesthetic/idolic 
reconsideration for an alternative mode of seeing notions of reality within metaphysical 
iconoclasm.  
As it was discussed in the previous sections, the Byzantine canons are always 
contextualized, thus form the medium (= icon technique) of an iconic vision. The nature of the 
icon’s medium is not autonomous from the image-maker’s bodily senses, and if visual criticism 
does not see it as an inherent element in the act of critiquing an iconic vision, the image risks to 
be reduced to the old metaphysical issues of the mind–body dualism. What I suggest here is that 
the Byzantine canons can be a viable alternative to metaphysical iconoclasm as long as they are 
not reduced to the artefactual. That is, the icon technique should not be reduced to what is 
commonly understood by the tools and materials used to create a work of art in a particular 
aesthetic style. From the perspective of the icon-maker, the icon technique forms a medium or a 
                                                
470 Kant Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx. 
471 Quenot, The Icon, 65. 
472 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 154. 
473 In my icon practice, I make a direct connection between my idolic creativity and Marion’s idol as half-
presence of absence. This parallel is particularly interesting in light of the traditional exposition of the canons in the 
first section of this chapter, 4.1 The traditional role of the canons in my artistic research. Under point d) The Gold, 
Color, and Light, I explained the relation between colors/the symbolic use of pigments and gold in relation to divine 
light. The Byzantine color palette is symbolically organized based on their power to reveal different intensities of 
divine light. Similarly, Marion regards the idol as a form of semi-invisibility defined by a deficiency of light.  
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performative environment (hierotopy) that visualizes the mneme (memory) of God through the 
interaction of the on-screen with the off-screen spaces (in the sense that one space leads to the 
other and vice versa).474  
This two-way process (that is discussed by Marion in the crossing of invisible gazes) in 
the construction of an iconic vision is best exemplified by the art historian Nicolletta Isar’s 
example of the Byzantine icon, Christ, Chōra tôn zôntôn (Fig. 20).475 The specific way in which 
the icon’s performance induces a sense of participation in 
the image—a relation between the receiver of the image 
(viewer) and sender of the image (through the frame for 
representation) that characterizes how all forms of iconic 
visions take place in any context. Christ, Chōra tôn 
zôntôn presents Christ in a standing position looking 
directly in the viewer’s eyes. He holds in one hand an 
open book while indicating with the other hand to His 
own “hypostatic identity” or Christ’s personal 
existence.476 As I explained in Chapter 1, the notion of hypostasis is fundamental in 
understanding the icon and refers to the particularity of the three persons that form the Trinity. 
While the image of Christ is one with His person (hypostatic identity), the image is different 
                                                
474 The icon’s performative power leads to the discussion of Byzantine mimesis, analyzed in Chapter 1 and 
throughout this thesis in general. To recap, Byzantine mimesis imitates (as a mark or trace in the visible) the 
presence of the invisible prototype through a performative interaction of the type with the faithful. While in modern 
Western culture the mimetic perception of the image emerged from metaphysical mimesis, which rests on the 
Platonic idea of form, in the Byzantine icon it functions as the imprint (typos) of form. This means that the icon does 
not copy, but enacts/performs, in its making and viewing experiences, the presence (tangible/type) of absence 
(intangible/prototype). Some viewing experiences are the aspasmos (the kissing of icons) and the proskynesis 
(prostration and performing the cross in front of the icon). According to Pentcheva, this phenomenological and 
participatory aspect of the icon is overlooked in the study of art history (631, 2006). Therefore, Byzantine 
mimesis/performance refers to the icons’ role in imitating the appearance of the prototype in visibility—an 
appearance performed through its materiality that saturates the believers’ senses in order to prompt a symbolic-
realistic mode of seeing.   
475 This concrete example of how the iconic vision is performed through the icon of Christ, Chōra tôn 
zôntôn at the Church of the Chōra in Constantinople demonstrates how Nicephorus’ version of mimetic behavior 
differs from the Platonic and Nietzschean mimesis in the way it hypostatically unites the symbolic and realistic 
vision into one vision.   
476 Isar explains that the name “Christ” is what “defines Him hypostatically and distinguishes Him from 
other people, therefore circumscribes Him” (2000, 64). Words such as hypostasis, presence, person, image, and 
name have specific significances in the Byzantine theology of the image. 
Figure 20: Christ, Chora tôn zôntôn (mid 
14th century), Chora Monastery 
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from His nature.477 Christ, Chōra tôn zôntôn engages the viewer in a direct dialogue with the 
image through Christ’s hand gesture, gaze and the text from the book, a quote from Matthew 
11:28: “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.”478 The 
meaning of the text synchronizes with the role of the right hand in pointing to the person of 
Christ (me) who addresses the viewer (all ye/you). According to Isar, this simultaneous 
coordination between the textual message, the hand gesture, and the aim of Christ’s gaze 
establishes an immediate, deictic connection between the image and viewer “in the field of 
representation.”479 The icon, therefore, is not a simple imitation of a Platonic reality, but an act of 
naming the person of Christ that takes place in the present tense, right before the viewers’ gaze. 
The representational aspect of the icon does not refer to a metaphysical reality that is somehow 
opposed to our lived life, but it points to the directly lived experience of seeing the image. This 
coexistence between the iconic image and viewers is defined by a paradoxical space, called by 
the Byzantines chōra.480 In naming (the function of the type) His name (the prototype), the icon 
establishes the chōraic space for the viewer to recognize the relationship between the type (that 
which it names) and the prototype (that which is the name itself). The type makes present the 
prototype (the absent) in the moment when the viewer recognizes (enacts) the relational 
(mimetic) function of the type in naming the prototype. The type imitates the prototype as 
presence as a trace in the visible, similarly to the way Veronica’s veil has an imprint of the face 
of Christ. For Theodore, the type is the way of naming the name, which is Christ’s hypostatic 
identity. Thus, Christ is made present by the icon in the sense that what is named by the image is 
identical to the name—the name of Christ is indistinguishable from His hypostatic identity. Isar 
clarifies that “the naming, just like the Incarnation, allows ‘the visible image to communicate 
with the archetype’ in the icon.”481 In other words, the pictorial trace of the icon makes present 
the name of Christ in the visible by hypostatically defining Him as a person. Consequently, the 
                                                
477 Nicoletta Isar, “The Vision and Its ‘Exceedingly Blessed Beholder’: Of Desire and Participation in the 
Icon.” Anthropology and Aesthetics 38 (Autumn, 2000): 59. Isar also adds that “to disregard this identity of person 
in the image would be ’severing from the image the might and glory of the model’” (2000, 59).  
478 Ibid., 62.  
479 Ibid., 61. 
480 The concept of chōra originates from Plato’s thought, where it means a specific type of space that gives 
place for things to come into existence. Although uncontainable itself, the chōraic space contains (from a Byzantine 
perspective) the type or the presence of absence in the pictorial trace of the icon—a type that is recognized as such 
by the entire community of believers. The concept of chōra is similar to the a priory feeling of beauty that is 
commonly perceived by everyone, i.e. the “community of feeling” or sensus communis (Lechte 148).  
481 Isar, “The Vision and Its ‘Exceedingly Blessed Beholder,’” 64. 
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construction of such an interactive medium according to the Byzantine theology of presence 
necessarily involves a two-way operation in which the image-maker’s mediational role is 
basically technical. This is precisely what I consider in the next section and in Portrait of an Icon 
Maker. In this canonized context, however the meaning of the word technical is not taken in a 
utilitarian way of reaching mechanical perfection in (re)producing a product/icon. Due to its 
Incarnational symbolism, the technical becomes the medium of life experience for the image-
maker—the orthopraxis of the iconographer’s activity of mneme. Yet, in following Lechte’s 
insight on the relation between the visual digital art and the aesthetic image, I get a sense that the 
iconographer’s performative level of experiencing the (invisible) image as if present is, in fact, 
the fundamental nature of human’s relationship to images in any context (even in the idolic 
context of the spectacle).  
If in the previous section, I have conceptualized the Byzantine iconic vision in terms of 
the aesthetic judgment of beauty—which, for Kant, is an innate feature of human nature—at the 
orthopraxis level of this research, I focus on what cannot be described through words: the 
Nicephorian non-essentialist connection between an invisible, inaccessible origin/past event and 
a present/contemporary performative experience in the spatial construction of an image. As I 
have tried to reveal throughout this thesis, it seems that through their Incarnational meaning, the 
canons transform the icon-technique into a “part of what it means to be human,” which simply 
means that the image cannot be defined separately from the human action.482 The image cannot 
be critiqued “in general because each image is beholden to its mode of incarnation in technics (= 
medium).”483 And it is this symbolic-realistic mode of seeing an image that exposes the fallacy 
of understanding the spectacle as disembodied or decontextualized.484  Again, my understanding 
is that by elaborating on the Incarnational dimension of an aesthetic experience (as seen in the 
video documentation of my way of experiencing the techniques of making an icon), visual 
criticism acquires the necessary technical knowledge to analyze the possibility of constructing an 
image in the age of technological screens. What I exactly explore in my icon practice is the 
                                                
482 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 154.  
483 Ibid., 154. The quote is Lechte’s take on Bernard Stiegler’s work regarding the relationship between 
technology and human body. See Stiegler, Bernard. Technics and Time. 1. The Fault of Epinetheus, trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
484 It is a “fallacy of technical modernity” to insist that the spectacle acts as an autonomous visual 
battlefield (a simulacrum opposed to reality) in which the viewer objectifies the visible and the image-makers strive 
to dominate the consumers (Mitchell 2002, 172). The idea that the spectacle is a product of new media technologies 
“displaces moral and political panic onto images [as]…‘convenient scapegoat’” (Deary 201). 
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performative exchange of invisible gazes in an iconic vision that moves the image beyond the 
Marionian dematerialization of the visible (see 2.4.2 Marion’s icon and metaphysic iconoclasm). 
I do so by considering the Byzantine epistemological view of the iconistic intentionality at the 
pictorial trace of the prototype, which in turn allows me to pose the following questions: Is there 
an iconistic intentionality that manifests at the level of the spectacle? And if so, how does the 
spectacle contextualize an image in a phenomenal form? My view is that the critical eye needs a 
more complex/performative understanding of the crossing of the gazes between the receiver and 
the sender in order to see how (and if) the image is embodied at both levels: that of the viewer 
and that of the spectacle.  
Furthermore, my approach to the Byzantine model of vision is not quantitative, but more 
focused on the Incarnational meaning of the canons that directly expresses itself in the icon. It is 
a form of symbolism that is quite different than the metaphysical symbolism expressed by means 
of intellectual speculation, which makes the aesthetic consideration of the icon technique not a 
matter of making an object for either cognitive or empirical observation.485 So, instead of 
describing the role of canons in their traditional/monastic context (as in 4.1 The traditional role 
of the canons in my artistic research), my aim is to discover, through my own icon practice, how 
the contemporary artist can further take their function of making present an (invisible) image to 
critique the viewer’s interaction with the spectacle. It is not by quantifying the canons/medium in 
a realistic way, based on the amount or type of materials involved in the act of making, but in 
reflecting on those fundamental elements that construct the viewer’s experience beyond the 
individual level, in a chōraic space where the image is brought to presence as absence. 
On this score, Portrait Of An Icon Maker (video work in progress), that I discuss in the 
next subsection records various stages involved in the process of icon making. In presenting the 
canons at the solitary level of artistic reflection, I explore a practical shift of the canons into an 
aesthetic realm. Such a Byzantine framework for performing an iconic vision enables a useful 
way to think about beauty without falling back into metaphysical debates surrounding the real-
presence of an artistic image, e.g., of my subjective/idolic/artistic vision. My icon performance 
(and installation) reflects a situated response to various canonized visual structures that 
eventually determine a viewer’s understanding/involvement in the construction of an image. 
                                                
485 Having said that, I also see this artistic/academic process of extracting conceptual and practical insights 
from the Byzantine painting technique a continuous work in progress. 
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Ultimately, I create an alternate Byzantine space (hierotopy) of union between my body, desire, 
artistic intention, and canons to acquire a sort of monastic mode of analyzing the dominance of 
today’s technologically fashioned images over my (human) perception of reality. While the 
theological role of the canons is to construct performative reenactments of Christ’s Incarnational 
event, I use the icon-technique to bring my aesthetic judgment of the spectacle to presence in a 
sensus communis. In this way, my approach corresponds to Lechte’s Byzantine reading of the 
installation, The Golden Calf in which the viewer constructs through a screen an image in space, 
i.e. screenspace, by interacting with a Biblical idol. And, in taking the idols of mass media—
idols that mirror my own desires/metaphysical beliefs as an image-maker—and frame their 
presence through the solitary Byzantine practice of icon painting, I attempt to reveal how an 
image operates through a performative act.   
 
 
4.4.2. Portrait of an Icon Maker: my Byzantine reflective artistic practice 
 
 
Figure 21: Still image from Portrait of an Icon Maker and the wood panel painting Holy Earbuds. Video 
documentation Portrait of an Icon Maker (33 min.) available on the companion DVD and at: http://youtu.be/wvF-
kDpBtk8 
 
Here, I explore the possibility to manifest an iconic vision beyond the interaction of the 
black dots in the crossing of gazes (as in Marion’s idea of the icon). Subsequently, I search for a 
tangible, canonized spatial view of the icon/idol by delving into Nicephoros’s theory of presence 
in the pictorial technique of inscribing a trace (type) that is “contained in the uncontainable 
 176 
chōraic space.”486 This very Byzantine iconic technique of non-mimetically performing a type as 
a trace of a prototype, I believe, enriches visual criticism with the Incarnational/in-imaginational 
property of the image.487  
In the following paragraphs, I may seem to deviate from the main theme, the iconic 
framing of the spectacle to address the role of the Incarnation in the critique of the spectacle, 
“but in order for immediacy [of the image, through canons,] to have any real purchase it is 
necessary to have a clear grasp of medium and mediation.”488 Therefore, Portrait of an Icon 
Maker—a video project that focuses mostly on the first stages of preparing an icon board—
documents my experience of exploring the meaning of the iconic gaze from the Byzantine 
epistemological position of tracing the presence of an absence.489 Specifically, I document my 
symbolic seeing of today’s spectacle according to the canons. The video starts with carving the 
wood, then making the glue to join the wood panels, covering the icon board with cotton fabric, 
applying/polishing the gesso ground, making the emulsion, and finally painting with pigments 
(natural organic and earth/mineral). The method of the icon-technique is a living tradition 
preserved by iconographers through a series of precise consecutive operations, which I carefully 
employ and document:  
 
1) The Wood. In building the board, I used basswood that is commonly known for 
its advantageous properties in relation to a gesso ground. Other suitable types of 
wood are birch, alder, and cypress. The basswood was naturally dried for more 
than a year in a warehouse (from the winter of 2011 to the Spring of 2013)—if 
left in the sun, the wood cracks and warps. I purchased wood panels that are 2 ½” 
thick, 4” in width, and 8’ in length. It is important that the wood has few or no 
knots as they induce cracks in the gesso.  
 
2) The Casein. After planning and trimming the panels to a size of 18” x 12 ½”, I 
glued them with casein. Casein is a protein extracted from mixing milk and 
vinegar.  
 
3) The Braces. The back of the icon-board is reinforced with two horizontal braces 
(¼“ thick) made from red oak, which is a harder wood that prevents warping.  
 
                                                
486 Nicoletta Isar, “Chôra: Tracing the Presence,” Review of European Studies 1 (June, 2009): 42. 
487 In Chapter 1, section 1.2.2 The Byzantine view about the image, I have explained the reason for using 
the egg-tempera painting method on wood panels. Additionally, Leonid Ouspensky argues that the technique of 
painting on wood panels exemplifies best to the Incarnational view of the image (53). 
488 Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and its Digital Future, 154. 
489 While in documenting my performed reenactments of the canons, the main focus was on the technique 
of marking the presence of an absence, I consider the painting of the gaze per se in Performing the Icon.  
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4) The Recessed Area. On the front side, in the center area of the panel, I carved an 
area at about ¼“ deep. This space is meant to receive the drawing and painting 
and has a strong significance in sheltering the (invisible) image. It helps the 
painter in painting the icon without touching the surface.   
 
5) The Size Solution. The icon-board is covered with a few coats of liquid rabbit 
skin glue and left to dry over night. The glue is made from pieces of dry skin 
soaked in water that turns into a gel like consistency. The recipe for the size is:  
100 grams of skin + 1 litter of distilled water. In order to apply the glue, the gel 
needs to be liquefied or warmed up to a maximum of +70 degree Celsius. It 
should not be brought to a boil as it loses its properties.     
 
6) The Cheesecloth. The icon-board is covered with a piece of cheesecloth (100% 
cotton) that was soaked in liquefied rabbit skin glue. The cloth helps to create a 
strong bound between the wood and the gesso ground. It also prevents the 
cracking of the surface and paint, in the event that the wood warps. 
 
7) The Gesso Ground. After the icon-board (on which the cheesecloth has been 
glued and left to dry for a few days) a gesso ground is prepared and applied in 
seven thin coats. The recipe for the ground is: 1 part of size solution + 1 part of 
powdered chalk + 1 part of white zinc. In the mixture, a ¼  cup of linseed oil is 
added (this adds to the elasticity of the gesso and prevents cracking). The mixture 
is blended with a wooden spoon for ½  hour by avoiding rapid movements. The 
consistency of the gesso needs to be similar to that of a thick sour cream, and 
when heated, it should dissolve into a uniform solution. The method of warming 
the gesso should be carefully observed in order to avoid the appearance of 
bubbles. For this, the glue should be warmed up in a double boiler. When the 
water has almost reached a boil state, the containers should be removed from the 
flame. At this point, the first few layers are applied with a brush every 30 minutes 
by alternating the directions of each application (layer) between horizontally and 
vertically. If the gesso thickens in the process of application, I usually add a little 
more water to the mixture. For the last layer, I use a plastic card that has the 
elasticity of a credit card to create a smooth surface.  
 
8) The Polishing. To make a perfectly glossed surface for painting onto, the gesso is 
polished with a piece of stone (preferably agate) or the base of a small glass 
bottle.   
 
9) The Marks. The proposed drawing is, then, lightly impressed with a sharp tool 
onto the surface by following the details and outlines of the compositional 
elements.490 These permanent marks engraved in the gesso become a guide during 
the act of painting.  
                                                
490 As mentioned earlier in section 4.2 The iconic and idolic roles of the canons in my artistic research, the 
design of my compositions is inspired from several traditional icons and televisual screens. I return to the symbolic 
use of these elements later when discussing Performing the Icon. For now, I resume my analysis to how I perform 
an iconic vision according to the canons.  
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10) The egg-yolk emulsion. In its current production stage, Portrait of an Icon Maker 
ends with preparing the egg-yolk emulsion for the actual painting. I separate the 
yolk from the white between my hands. The white of the egg should not get in 
contact with the emulsion as it provokes the flaking of the paint. Therefore, I 
gently poke the yolk and squeeze it in a container where I add some distilled 
water and vinegar. Distilled water is recommended as it does not contain minerals 
that affect the chemical composition of the organic and mineral pigments. After 
stirring the emulsion well, I use it as a binder for the pigments to apply, with a 
brush, the first layers of color. 
 
11) Colors. The powdered pigments require different amounts of water and yolk. So, 
controlling the right proportion between the pigments and emulsion is key to 
create properly prepared paint. Specifically, when dried, the paint should be matte 
and resistant when lightly scratched with the fingernail. If there is too much 
emulsion in the pigments, the paint becomes shiny and eventually cracks. 
Although there is a symbolic restriction in the use of colors (vis-à-vis the 
particular features of saints, such as the color of their clothing, the short or long 
beard and hair), an iconographer can exercise his/her imagination as concerns the 
variations of color hues, architectural details, and landscape.  
 
12) The Painting Method. Regarding the actual Byzantine technique of painting 
(which “goes back…to Greek portraiture”), I employ the method of painting from 
darker tones towards the lighter ones.491 Initially, I apply “the basic tone for 
darks” on which I retrace the outlines with black paint.492 With each consecutive 
layer, I add a small amount of white to each tone. I continue this process of 
lighting the color tones until I reach the highlights. Paying attention to how the 
brush strokes determine the relation between layers, I connect them by directing 
the tip of my brush towards the darker layers from underneath. The last stages of 
this painting method are to redraw the outline (covered in the process of painting) 
with black paint and write the name of the figures, usually in the background 
around the head or directly onto the halo. 
  
There are two more essential steps that need to be employed in completing Portrait of an 
Icon Maker:  
 
13) The Gilding. Gold or genuine gold leaf is applied to the background. Normally, 
the gilding is done before the painting starts so that the gold leaf does not stick to 
the paint.  Since I do not know the exact, final design of my composition I am 
forced to leave this process for later.  
   
14) The Olifa. The application of olifa, which are final protective layers (usually three 
                                                
491 Léonide Ouspensky, and Lossky, Vladimir. The Meaning of Icons. (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1982), 54.  
492 Ibid.  
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layers) of heated linseed oil (some amber is also added to create a yellow/golden 
shine that is specific to the icons). The olifa is a process that involves the 
distribution of the oil from the center/face towards the edges in order to penetrate 
and unify all the layers of color. Before the drying process, the excess of oil is 
removed—a process that can last up to eight hours. 
 
To argue that Portrait of an Icon Maker documents my performance of experiencing the real-
presence of an essence (invisible image) is a metaphysical statement with iconoclastic 
implications. Equally, it is against the art practice as research to convince my viewers that they 
see the real-presence of an image through the video documentation. Hence, Portrait of an Icon 
Maker stands for a performative insight into what is involved in performing an iconic vision 
from the perspective of an artist (as an image-maker). What I do is to perform the traditional role 
of the Byzantine canons into an aesthetic space constituted by my active, creative view of the 
spectacle of media entertainment. It is a space of canonical inquiry into making present my 
aesthetic judgment as its own image. In a way, my interaction with the wooden panel parallels 
the navigational vision of a viewer engaged with a mobile (touch) screen for representation in the 
off-screen space. In Verhoeff’s terms, I generate a screenspace through a mobile screen-based 
viewing in which the wood panel turns into an object to think with. This performative knowledge 
(knowing the intricacies and secrets of how to use the canons in building an image) will assist 
me later in reflecting on a list of Byzantine rules to critique contemporary hierotopic endeavors, 
including Performing the Icon. 
In the light of research in the arts, it is fair to say that Portrait of an Icon Maker portrays 
how I employ the Byzantine iconographic method of participating in a hypostatic event (of 
making and seeing an image) to vivify an aesthetic judgment of the spectacle. And, seeing how 
the canonical making of such a vision shapes my imaginative intent into a symbolic-realistic 
mode of seeing—an aspect that is more important in relation to Portrait of an Icon Maker than 
the finished piece (my symbolic depictions on the wood panel)—the viewers acquire a non-
iconoclastic/non-metaphysical understanding of the techniques required to critique the mediation 
of images in general.  
Some of my own reflective thoughts about Portrait of an Icon Maker as a performative 
investigation relates to the difficulty of balancing the realistic and symbolic modes of seeing 
when constructing an iconic vision in an installation/aesthetic form (as I strive to do in 
Performing the Icon). The biggest challenge is to avoid accusations of real-presence of an image, 
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in the sense that the viewer, when looking at my Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision 
(an environment specifically designed based on canons to induce an iconic vision), says: I see it 
or I don't see it. Maybe my artistic capacity to represent/imitate a narrative from an imaginative 
source brings a narrow path of signifiers confined to my own spectacle—thus, limiting the visual 
experience in a way that stops the performance of another creative gaze/intent (a gaze other than 
my own).493 The Nietzschean mimetic relationship of the Übermensch-artist with the physical 
world was discussed in Chapter 2, but the performative inquiry into what disrupts the formation 
of an iconic vision—even if my subjective image is discounted as monological/idolic—conveys 
additional information into the role of canons in the viewer’s evocative understanding of an 
image. This very creative capacity of the viewer to bypass an artist’s own creative intent due to 
the canonical framing of an aesthetic judgment is of particular importance (and a major argument 
of this thesis) in critiquing the participation into an iconic/idolic vision. 
Reflecting on the canons The Unity of the Elements, The Background, and The Gold, 
Color, and Light (explained above) in relation to the idea of a screenspace, I searched, in 
Portrait of an Icon Maker, for a way to bridge what I imagine/depict on the wood panel painting 
(on-screen space) with the physical anchoring that a performative experience requires (off-screen 
space). For me, the canons took the role of providing a way to handle and move the tools and 
materials for an evocative experience of my imagination. Yet, during my artistic act, I was 
confronted with a shift in viewing perspectives. According to the Byzantine theology of image, 
the fundamental aspect of the icon is to confront the viewers’ intentionality in acknowledging 
Christ’s image as the face of every human. And the “sacrosanct presence of the Incarnation” is 
revealed when the viewer becomes/takes part in the union with Christ’s image—thus avoiding 
any form of objectification/commodification that transforms the visible into an extension of the 
human gaze.494 It is essential for the (divine invisible) image to keep its distinctiveness/otherness 
without being contingent on human intentionality and perspective. How does this play against 
the evocation of a subjective image—the effect of an image-maker’s faculty of reason and 
imagination? By following the demands or reductionist nature of the canons, my bodily 
movements were (paradoxically) framing iconically the symbolic outcome of my own gaze as if 
                                                
493 Or, in spite of my artistic intention, the viewer’s power to take perspective picks on the 
realistic/symbolic details that are incidental to my iconic vision. This is also defined by Marion as an 
idolic/Nietzschean relationship with the visible—especially in relation to the spectacle.  
494 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 39. 
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acknowledging another intentionality. Was I here unavoidably experiencing a phenomenological 
reduction (as was discussed in Chapter 2) of my own intentionality? These questions refer to a 
phenomenological challenge or awareness in perspectives that need to be considered when 
constructing a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision for inviting viewers to form new 
meaning (beyond his/her intentionality). From this very performative inquiry, I hope to show 
how, in fact, the image and spectacle cannot be critiqued as operating on their own—that is, to 
signify themselves or to form their own aesthetics without the participation of a viewer.  
Additional thoughts on working with the chorographic aspect of the canons in Portrait of 
an Icon Maker can prove instrumental in the aesthetic approach to designing an iconic vision. 
Byzantine Chorography, a concept termed by Nicoletta Isar, refers to the appearance of presence 
by both filling up and incorporating a space, which is the iconic technique of performing the 
Incarnational economy.495 Referencing Marie-Jose Mondzain’s extensive research on 
Nicephorus, Isar explains that the “chorographic performative inscription in the visible” is the 
“iconic line [trace/inscription] (graphē) in the visible of the chōra space of the Logos, which 
reveals itself completely only as an imaginary (hennoēsai) place, yet to be fully enacted in the 
liturgical performance.”496 I should perhaps elaborate here on Isar’s application of the 
Nicephorian epistemological definition of the icon/living image to the human body’s imitation of 
the chōra in transforming a place into a hierotopy—as this will clarify my performative approach 
to the canons, space, and movement. The original Platonic notion of chōra (described in the 
dialogue Timaeus) presents the creation of the cosmos and humans as a paradox. It is a “space-
in-the making” or an inexplicable, neutral space “in-between” the visible and invisible without 
having either the features of an “intelligible” object or the movements/alterations of a “sensible” 
object.497 While an essential third space in the appearance of visibility, Plato’s chōra is always 
imperceptible and:  
 
                                                
495 Ibid., 43. The term chōra was incorporated in the Byzantine theory of the image at the end of the 
iconoclastic war by Nicephorus to define the structure of the image-matter (Incarnation), venerated in the icon and 
through the liturgical performance of hierotopy (Isar, 2009, 42). As defined in Chapter 1, 1.2.2 The Byzantine view 
about the image, Christ’s artificial image (human form) is imprinted (circumscribed) in matter/tópos and His natural 
image is uncircumscribed in such a way that the “iconic inscription (graphē) is a trace that defines a space that is 
and is not there (achôrêton) (Isar, 2009, 42).” Said differently, His form is contained in tópos and His image is 
uncontained in chōra. The word tópos stands here for its Aristotelian meaning as circumscribed matter. 
496 Ibid., 42. 
497 Ibid., 40, 43. 
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[a] characterless sort of thing, one that receives all things and shares in a most perplexing 
way in what is intelligible, a thing extremely difficult to comprehend…And in so far as it 
is possible to arrive at its nature on the basis of what we’ve said so far, the most correct 
way to speak of it may well be this: the part of it that gets ignited appears on each 
occasion as fire, the dampened part as water, and parts as earth or air in so far as it 
receives the imitations of these.498 
 
For Plato, the appearance-being copies the essence through “the movement of the 
primordial elements” (fire, water, earth, and air) in the womb of creation (chōra).499 In short, 
although chōra provides access for the elemental properties of phenomena to make the world of 
appearance-beings, it is invisible and its reality cannot be made present in the sensible world of 
appearances (transported into being).500 The Platonic chōra can only be perceived in a dream 
through a “kind of bastard thinking.”501 From this ontological ambiguity or contradictory 
position of the chōra—as a space that incorporates the process of creation without belonging to 
what is contained in the creation—the Byzantine iconophiles claimed the possibility of its 
manifestation in the “performative spatial inscription” of the icon’s graphē. That is, chōra is 
made present as absence in the movement of the trace/type performed by the viewer’s interaction 
with the icon—“the presence of the chōra could be only glimpsed in this movement, therefore 
we could call it a ‘motional presence.’”502 
The Byzantine chōra is more than a figure of speech in explaining the mysterious 
phenomena of the Incarnation. Isar clarifies that the ancient Greek meaning of chōra was 
particularly connected to the physical/geographical space and the farming method of threshing 
and winnowing. Similarly to the removal and distribution of the grains from chaffs by the sieves, 
the primordial elements are moved/organized through chōra to form phenomena. Accordingly, 
Plato makes a parallel in Timaeus (52e-53a) between the land marked by the outdoor threshing 
floor and the chōraic space:  
 
[earth, air, water, and fire] are winnowed out…like grain that is sifted by winnowing 
sieves…. separating the kinds most unlike each other further apart and pushing those 
most like each other closest together into the same region….before this took place the 
four kinds all lacked proportion and measure, and at the time the ordering of the universe 
                                                
498 Plato, “Timaeus. 51b,” Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper. (USA: Hacket Publishing Company, 
1997), 1254.  
499 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 40.  
500 Isar notes that Jacques Derrida advocated the idea that chōra is total absence in his concept of 
différence, thus denying the Incarnational role of the icon to manifest the presence of absence.  
501 Plato, “Timaeus. 52b” Complete Works, 1255.  
502 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 41. 
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was undertaking, fire, water, earth and air initially possessed certain traces of what they 
are now. They were indeed in the condition one would expect thoroughly god-forsaken 
things to be in. So, finding them in this natural condition, the first thing the god then did 
was to give them their distinctive shapes, using forms and numbers.503  
 
Isar uses Plato’s parallel between the configuration of the cosmic chōraic and agriculture 
activities (in tracing the iconic graphē or manifesting the “coinciding trace between content and 
container”504) to exemplify how the Byzantine chōral movement is performed (with the icon) 
during the “Earthly Liturgy” as the type of the “Heavenly Liturgy”/prototype.505 Here, the idea of 
movement is always seen in relation to generating or delimiting an iconic space for imprinting 
the presence of the image. Lidov’s example of the Hodegetria rite performed by the patriarch 
Sergius I (described in Chapter 3, section 3.1 Interactivity: the performance of screenspace and 
hierotopy), showed how a communal/liturgical response to the icon through chorographic 
movement reflecting praise established an interaction with an invisible agency, thus forming a 
hierotopy. The meaning of movement in relation to chōra is particularly important for the 
construction of an iconic vision. For example, Isar refers to three types of coordinated movement 
for tracing the visible (with the invisible) that can be categorized as follows: 1) withdrawing 
from a space to create room (a trace) as argued by Marion when defining the icon according to 
the effacement of Christ’s visibility through His crucifixion (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 
Marion’s icon and metaphysic iconoclasm), 2) moving forward “to be in motion or in flux” as in 
Verhoeff‘s navigational vision based on the mobile (touch) screen506 (see Chapter 3, section 3.1 
Interactivity: the performance of screenspace and hierotopy), and 3) collective dancing (chōros) 
in a circle “around (perichoreúousa) an eternal knowledge of” the divine as in Lidov’s example 
of the Hodegetria icon of circling a profane space in the Hodegon Square.507 Moreover, referring 
to the chōral dancing in the liturgical performance, Isar says: “Byzantine church performances 
frequently refer to actions...[whereby] humans could and should join the angelic 
performance…[in order to] partake into the great cosmic praise…[like dancing] in a choir, or in a 
circular manner…in which the whole of creation takes part.”508 In Portrait of an Icon Maker, I 
                                                
503 Plato, “Timaeus. 52e-53b,” Complete Works, 1255-1256. 
504 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 42. 
505 Ibid., 43. 
506 Ibid., 41. 
507 Ibid., 43.  
508 Ibid. Another Byzantine example of inscribing a hierotopy according to the “circular movement” is the 
liturgical performance “around the church at the Resurrection” (Isar, 2009, 50). The presence of the divine image is 
liturgically performed in a series of mimetic movements. Isar refers here to Pseudo-Dionysus’s Ecclesiastical 
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add, instead, a new understanding of the chōral movement: the solitary aesthetic exploration of 
the canon-directed movement, which can also be called a canonized motional presence, that is 
choreographed to address the Incarnational dimension of the image at the pictorial level of the 
icon. Like the role of the sieve in giving shape to phenomena in Plato’s Timaeus, the canons that 
I employ in my practice can take the meaning of organizing/balancing symbolic and realistic 
elements to manifest the chōraic trace. 
 Furthermore, at the center of Isar’s idea of chorographic inscription is the mimetic role 
of the human body in performing the chōraic movement: “[g]esture, motion, choreography—this 
is the” creative mode of expressing an iconic vision.509 Returning to Plato’s Timaeus, Isar 
evaluates the appearance of presence in a performative event by associating the bodily sickens 
and desires to an unbalance in the chōraic movement—from a Marionian critique of the 
spectacle, I can also make a parallel here between disease and the viewer’s idolic desires and the 
objectification of human identity based on brand images. At the level of the cosmic chōra, 
disease is translated into a sense of chaos/disturbance that prevents the phenomenal process of 
creation whereby the invisible is mirrored (marked or made present) in the visible. To maintain a 
sense of well being in the human body in order to allow the “emergency of presence in the bodily 
chōra,” then one needs to copy the cosmic chōra’s orderly fashion of creating the world.510 In 
Plato’s terms: as much of essence’s presence in the visible as of likeness in an appearance-
being.511 Like in the canonized relationship between the icon and faithful, in which the image of 
humanity is shaped according to the divine image of Christ, “man should constantly adjust his 
image to the archetype by imitating the chōra…[to] stay tune to his creator.”512 This christic 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hierarchy to amplify the mimetic movement between the faithful and angels in the Byzantine Chorography. In the 
book The Celestial Hierarchy, Pseudo-Dionysius describes the organization of the celestial and terrestrial world 
(including social structures) on a hierarchical order through which the divine knowledge is disseminated to humans 
in the form of illumination. He gives an essential role to aesthetic elements in the process of spiritual uplifting of 
human beings to God. The divine elevation is realized “by means of antinomical ‘likening’ to and ‘imitation’ of 
(mimesis), God.” (Bychkov, 321-323) 
509 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 44. 
510 Ibid. Isar explains that Plato locates the bodily chōra in the liver, which replicates in the human body the 
exact regulatory function of cosmic/nurse chōra. In fact, the surface of the liver is compared to a mirror that reflects 
the image of the soul (thoughts) in the human body in the same way as the cosmic chōraic womb mirrors 
phenomena through movement.  
511 In discussing the moment when the presence of the image is revealed to the human gaze, I would return 
to Plato’s allegory of the Cave (mentioned in the Introduction) in which one of the prisoners managed to escape 
from the cave and see the true “sun itself, in its own place [chōra ]” (Plato 1997, 1134). The presence of the sun is 
given as gift to humans by blinding his/her vision, which means that the access to full presence confronts the power 
to take perspective. 
512 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 44. 
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mimetic behavior of replicating the chōra is particularly relevant to assessing the canonical 
method of tracing the motional presence of a subjective interpretation (desire) of the spectacle.  
Portrait of an Icon Maker is my attempt to express symbolic and realistic elements in 
space to ask how the image-maker differs from his/her own image. While in the on-
(wood)screen’s content, I take perspective in the spectacle by combining religious and pop 
culture symbolism, in performing the canons I had to constantly deal with tools and materials. 
This was a learning experience in seeing how matter (that was simply filling out a place before 
my eyes) transformed in the very access to my (spatial) stories. My bodily movement was not 
just physically positioned in a landscape (tópos) but also performing, in an experiential space, the 
manifestation of something invisible—similarly to Verhoeff’s notion of performative 
cartography. Based on the Byzantine idea that an image is invisible, Portrait of an Icon Maker 
presents my attempt to initiate a dialog with invisibility through imaginative characters. It is 
ostensibly a performance about following the Byzantine technique with a purpose of constructing 
an iconic vision, but digresses symbolically into negotiating with a mirror of my own ideas and 
desires. However, since the performance is canon-based, my aesthetic judgment necessarily 
advances a quest for an iconic experience that “exceeds and precedes the thinking I.”513 
Particularly, the symbolic-realistic technique  (as described above under The Signature, The 
Background, The Face and Body, Stillness and Movement, The Gold, Color, and Light, The 
Painting Method, and Color) projects the compositional elements of my wood panel painting into 
an inverse perspective that counters the cultivation of artistic originality (in a Nietzschean sense). 
While taking advantage of the pictorial liberty that is given by the canons (from the way I play 
with the layers of paint and the combinations of colors and forms), the Byzantine figurative 
format of painting—which combines the naturalistic and abstract visions, as analyzed in Chapter 
2—restricts a full Platonic or Nietzschean projection of my artistic vision. By connecting the 
compositional elements with reflections of my own desires, Portrait of an Icon Maker turns into 
an event of witnessing desires as given in my understanding as a thinking I. This moment of 
reflection creates a sense of disjuncture between my power to represent these elements and 
narratives and their actual, real-presence, which pulls my attention away from their referentiality 
between two opposites (my intentionality and their symbolic meaning) and towards the 
performative action itself. In other words, my gaze shifts to my present/performative experience 
                                                
513 Marion, The Reason of the Gift, 3. 
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as an image-maker. So, it is possible to say that I am crafting a particular type of space through a 
canonized coordinated movement of tracing my aesthetic judgment (the invisible) in the visible, 
which is similar to “the presentification of the chōra in performance.”514 I could feel and speak 
of my imaginary image only in movement, which, again, unveils the fact that an image cannot 
operate without a human body. This performative glimpse into an orderly manner of making 
present the spectacle of my aim (idol) in the physical space is instrumental for my thesis 
argument that the critique of the spectacle in relation to the image should not be resumed to a 
symbolic recognition or a realistic assessment.  
Moreover, to what degree can I critically appraise the amount of presence in my affective 
experience of performing my own spectacle? Portrait of an Icon Maker is less about quantifying 
and formalizing the embodied affect/pathos from an aesthetic experience, and more about paying 
attention to how the canons mediate an aesthetic judgment as its own image—in a similar 
manner as the face of Christ is given/gifted to the believer by an invisible gaze. This also applies 
to the viewers’ affective engagement with the Portrait of an Icon Maker. The point with my 
performative inquiry is not to imitate an essence—to claim a strong symbolic bond to an idea of 
reality—and measure the viewer’s degree of engagement in its presence accordingly. Thus, it is 
not about calculating if my own artistic actions induce ethical/metaphysical concerns or 
emotional responses (desires, boredom, etc.). A Henrian focus on subjective affectivity would 
only send the analysis back to a basic form of symbolic vision, which abstracts the visible 
phenomena in favor of a transcendental I (as I discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 Marion’s 
icon and metaphysic iconoclasm). And this limitation to a dematerialized inner phenomenon 
restricts visual criticism from acknowledging the Incarnational operation of the image within an 
iconic vision. Instead, the point is to imitate the canons through a performative inquiry and 
uncover rules that reveal techniques for evoking an image and which might be applied repeatedly 
(however in a different manner) in various visual/symbolic contexts. Particularly, in navigating 
through canons, my screenspace emerges in an aesthetic space for reflecting on the viewer’s 
capacity to perform an invisible image (an evocation) by enacting my symbolic mirrors. In turn, 
this inquiry helps to better understand claims to real-presence and symbolic/realistic assumptions 
about an iconic vision. 
 
                                                
514 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 43. 
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4.4.3. Byzantine Framework: basic aesthetic rules for artistic reflection 
 
Presence is participative [hence] there is no presence per se, but an experienced 
presence.515 
 
The Incarnational importance of the canons has brought my performative inquiry a long 
way from a simple symbolic or realistic description of the Byzantine icon. In the previous 
section, I have reflected through artistic research on a series of canons (from the preparation of 
materials to the symbolic use of colors and shape of the human body) to see 1) how they 
connect/contextualize my physical body and imagination to a space and 2) how this experience 
threatens to override the design goal of an iconic vision. I have also mentioned above how, 
through the canonical technique of painting, the invisible was meant to violate my own desires. 
However, this theological turn in critiquing the image from a Byzantine canonic mimetic 
behavior should not be limited to an academic (historical or scientific) quest for the mystery of 
an iconic vision, but understood from an aesthetic experience of receiving the (Incarnational) 
mystery. Both, the viewer and image-maker are already physically immersed in the mystery of 
an image through movement in space. The performative medium (hierotopy) of an image is 
gifted not esteemed.516  
After reflecting on the chorographic movement of the Byzantine painting technique—
thus, moving beyond a dematerialized phenomenology of the image—what are the contemporary 
artistic possibilities to craft the presence of an image using new media installations? How does a 
Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision work as hierotopic installation? Particularly, in 
a visual culture that is dominated by technological screens (the favorite medium of today’s 
spectacle). Given Lechte’s Byzantine reading of Jeffery’s The Golden Calf (analyzed above in 
section 4.3.1 Beauty and the Image) and Isar’s idea of hierotopic creativity (whose view of Bill 
Viola’s video work I explore in the next section), there is a promising avenue for providing an 
aesthetic access to an iconic vision through a performative event. Nonetheless, in critiquing an 
aesthetic visualization of an image, it is essential to remember, firstly, that the image is not the 
same with its object of representation and the on-screen space acquires referentiality only by 
                                                
515 Ibid., 44. 
516 The goal of this thesis is not to classify my artistic practice into an idolic or iconic vision to yield a 
metaphysical proof regarding the construction of an image. An image cannot be analyzed by only following this 
metaphysical logic that limits the critique to the referentiality between two opposites (icon versus idol). I point, 
however, to a broader understanding—that is, beyond the dualistic views that fluctuate according to the perspective 
of a viewer—of the image as a canonized performative act (realism) of feeling the presence of symbolism.  
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enacting a signifier in the off-screen space. And, secondly, that a Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision is formed when symbolic and realistic elements are combined and 
balanced according to a compositional structure similar to that of a Byzantine icon—equally 
showed by Jenkins’ critique of the iPod adds.  
The Byzantine aesthetic view (hierotopy) opens up a new, interdisciplinary field of 
research that is yet non-practically or insufficiently explored and which may offer an alternative 
to the metaphysical iconoclasm surrounding the idea of the spectacle (and to the general view in 
the humanities) regarding the end of the “metaphysics of presence.”517 In reflecting on Viola’s 
use of icon technique, Isar proposes a hierotopic reading of how viewers interact with 
artworks/artists to claim or receive new meaning and creative experiences.518 She recognizes that 
Viola is doing similar things to what a Byzantine iconographer is attempting to do in presenting 
symbolic content when using an interactive screen (wood panel painting) for framing canonically 
an image. Isar’s point is that a hierotopic vision gives the contemporary artist an opportunity to 
go one step further in using a perfomative event, not simply in a realistic manner (as exemplified 
in Chapter 1 by Fisher-Lichte’s view of Abramović’s performances), but to reconnect the 
viewer’s body to Incarnational symbolism that constructs an image. In other words, to acquire a 
symbolic-realistic understanding of what it means to participate in a process of in-imagination by 
joining a creative space of accessing the presence of an absence, dubbed by Isar an act of 
“presencing.”519  
Before delving into Isar’s hierotopic analysis, which reveals iconic elements addressing 
metaphysical symbolism that may be commonly incorporated in artworks, my concern is to 
underscore first the contemporary role of the Byzantine canons in the symbolic-realistic critique 
of the image. If the scope is to understand what it means to preform an iconic vision, then the 
canons provide a mode of incarnating the invisible that is not based on referentiality or 
myth/signified/invisible versus ritual/signifier/visible, but grounded on their mnemonic/mimetic 
use for performing an “experienced presence.”520 There is no aesthetic recipe on how to 
construct an iconic vision, but there are particular technical methods for seeing/feeling the 
presence of an image. Some initial questions from Portrait of an Icon Maker in proposing a 
                                                
517 Isar, “Vision and Performance,” 336. 
518 I mean here the idea of claiming a full picture of reality versus receiving reality as gift.  
519 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 44. 
520 Ibid. 
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series of Byzantine aesthetic guidelines for visual criticism are: 
 
1) The canons were employed to evoke a subjective, solitary, and tangible point 
of view on image making. How do their aesthetic and performative considerations 
reconnect body and symbolism in critiquing the spectacle? 
 
2) How does the aesthetic context in which the canons are implemented, change 
the structural elements of an iconic vision (from the surrounding to the 
compositional forms)?  
 
The above two questions address primarily the phenomenological power of the canons to 
induce an evocation through the chorographic technique of blurring the symbolic and realistic 
visions. The integration of the canons into an art installation context, however, requires further 
explanations concerning the realistic, symbolic, and symbolic-realistic representational 
approaches between a signifier and signified. In order to clarify the relevance of the canons for a 
contemporary artist in constructing an image, I will focus next on how these three types of vision 
maintain at the artistic/technical level distinctive referential links to notions of reality.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the realistic vision (that parallels naturalism, particularly the 
photographic type of representation) is built on a strong Nietzschean link between the signifier 
and signified to measure reality according to the viewer. Only when esteemed by the viewer, the 
signified becomes present and stops acting as a pointless Platonic abstraction—paradoxically, it 
seems that the signifier becomes useless in the realistic vision. Therefore, by merging canonical 
elements with naturalistic/photographic representations can disrupt the iconic visual 
composition, and to some degree dominate (realistically) the aesthetics. The realistic power of a 
depiction has been famously described by Roland Barthes: “the Photograph is violent: not 
because it shows violent things, but because on each occasion it fills the sight by force, and 
because in it nothing can be refused or transformed.”521 Contrasted to the symbolic-realistic 
technique of painting (that I discuss later in relation to the rotoscoping technique of tracing the 
real, as developed by the animator Max Fleischer in 1917), the photographic picture stimulates 
spectatorship (for inducing a sense of real-presence) without making enough room for the viewer 
to perform the image as present.522  
                                                
521 In this context, the word violence takes the meaning of imposing the real-presence of an image. Roland 
Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Trans. R. Howard, (London: Vintage, 2000), 91. 
522 Paul Ward, “Animated Realities: The Animated Film, Documentary, Realism.” Reconstruction 8.2 
(2008): Paragraph 14, http://reconstruction.eserver.org/Issues/082/ward.shtml, accessed 25 Dec 2014.  
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Oppositely, the symbolic vision (in the sense of an abstract or conceptual type of 
representation) constructs a weak link between the signifier and signified to the point were the 
signifier is taken as an unreal medium toward the actual reality of the signified. The signified is 
an appearance-being that is never really present—this Platonic attitude to representation was 
analyzed in Chapter 2. Thus, the symbolic power of an abstract representation would have the 
same disruptive effect on the aesthetics of an artistic iconic vision by leaving too much space for 
interpretation (as in Kandinsky’s abstract painting or Kosuth’s conceptual art discussed in 
Chapter 2, sections 2.2 The symbolic and realistic artistic visions and 2.4 The phenomenology of 
the iconic vision) or by confusing consciousness to the point of blocking the viewer’s 
intentionality in the act of taking perspective (as explained in section 2.4.1 Abstract painting as 
an aesthetic of the invisible). 
The above explanation of the two opposing representational tendencies of naturalism and 
abstraction leads to the symbolic-realistic vision. This third Byzantine type of visualization is 
built, to use media theorist Paul Ward’s words, “around the relative realism attached to” Christ’s 
bodily features as part of “the real world of lived, material actuality (and, crucially, history).”523 
It is essential to reiterate here that the realistic and symbolic visions differ from the symbolic-
realistic vision in the representational relation between the signifier and signified. In the icon, the 
signifier takes the active, performative function of tracing (type) the prototype (model) to create 
a phenomenological move in the perception of the real: the signified is felt present and absent at 
the same time. From a phenomenological view, the best way to explain how this shift happens is 
to analyze the experience of seeing a naturalistic representation, such as a photograph, video, or 
hyperrealistic illustration of someone being killed. The ethical feeling that a viewer might 
experience when looking at such a depiction does not come from its objective/realist 
representation of the event, but from the fact that it originates from a real event. This difference 
between the naturalistic and the real in implicating a viewer unveils the crucial role of the icon’s 
symbolic-realistic link between a signifier and signified for depicting the real/historical body of 
Christ. Specifically, in order to create an evocation, the image has to be felt and not imprisoned 
as if really present in a frame for representation. Due to its claim to reality, the naturalistic 
depiction competes with the original model and, therefore, inserts a sense of disbelief in the 
viewing experience of the real/Christ event.  More importantly, as Marion also argues in The 
                                                
523 Ibid., Paragraph 1. 
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Crossing of the Visible, naturalism limits the viewer’s intentionality to simply acknowledging the 
real, without implicating him/her in an act of evocation (the feeling of presence). Conversely, the 
abstract depiction removes all clues regarding the existence of an original event by dissolving the 
bond between a signifier and signified.  
From a purely technical stance, an instance of a symbolic-realistic technique—which 
artists can use to create an evocation—is exemplified by the practice of rotoscoping imagery that 
is employed in the cartoon animation industry. In my attempt to 
provide a Byzantine canonic lens to the contemporary artistic/critical 
eye, I will connect next, Fleischer’s technique of rotoscoped 
animation with the Byzantine painting technique. However, I must 
mention first that this parallelism addresses an idea of movement 
between the viewer, frame for representation, and image (in order to 
actualize the real) that mostly relates to the Marionian 
dematerialized view of the crossing of two gazes.524 Still, when this 
shift happens, lets say, in the exchange of two immobile gazes, it can 
play a significant role in the artistic construction of an image by 
prompting a sense of otherness.  
Like the Byzantine technique, the rotoscoped animation was 
developed as “an instructive example of a representational strategy 
that appears to be both animation [imaginary/symbolic] and live 
action [realistic], rather than simply one or the other.”525 For 
example, Fleischer depicted the character Betty Boop dancing the hula in the animation Betty 
Boop’s Bamboo Isle (1932) by tracing the movements of a (real) Polynesian dancer recorded on 
film.526 This very method of creating animated frames provides an interesting similarity to how 
iconographers transfer onto the new surface of a wood panel the outlines of the holy figure, 
which are preserved in acheiropoieta traces or old icons.527 Although this connection may appear 
                                                
524 To recall Marion’s idea of the icon, the feeling of a gaze that pierces out of the screen to confront the 
viewer’s perspective is framed as if the body stands still, in a contemplating attitude that almost eliminates all bodily 
sensible functions and movements.  
525 Ward, “Animated Realities,” Paragraph 16. 
526 Betty Boop’s Bamboo Isle, Fleischer Studios, Runtime 8 minutes, 1932.  
527 Jesus Himself imprinted the very first acheiropoitos trace, also known as the Mandylion. According to a 
4th century legend, He miraculously left the marks of his face on a piece of linen for the leprous King Abgar of 
Figure 22: Adrian Gorea, The 
Offering of Elmo’s Head (2014), 
Video available on the companion 




odd from a theological or consumerist perspective, this resemblance in tracing the real has 
captivated my artistic vision to merge American animated cartoons with Byzantine figures. 
Therefore, in the wood panel painting, The Offering of Elmo’s Head (Fig. 22), I have combined 
both techniques of tracing of an icon and photographic documentation of popular culture 
characters. The table below (Fig. 23), sketches my (technical) point and how I see it unfolding in 
four specific stages. 
 
 
Figure 23: The Trace of the Real in Byzantine and Rotoscope Techniques 
 
                                                                                                                                                       




The Offering of Elmo’s Head juxtaposes iPod ear buds, a human body part (foot), the red 
monster Elmo, and a miscellaneous character from the television show Sesame Street with John 
the Apostle, painted by Theophanes the Greek in the icon entitled The Transfiguration of Jesus 
(15th century). By following the Byzantine style of painting, I was able to create a new on-screen 
narrative that shifted my solitary, artistic experience towards a symbolic-realistic vision. More 
closely, I have managed to evoke a subjective/aesthetic reality by responding to it with the faith 
afforded to a Byzantine icon (equally to the way I show in Portrait of an Icon Maker). This 
means that the use of canons allowed me to ground my aesthetic judgment in the material world 
(performatively) in a way that guided my intentionality toward acknowledging a symbolic source 
(Stage 1) beyond my own imagination. From an image-makers perspective, the canons prove to 
be a powerful aesthetic tool in understanding the inherent structure of a viewing experience that 
transforms into an iconic vision. What is revealed is the chain of thought and actions within the 
complex process of making an image present from transparency to visibility. Then, what exactly 
does emerge from the artistic engagement with the canons? Well, the significant emerging 
insight is that the Byzantine icon provides compelling tools for an artist to see/critique the human 
desire for real experience without the clear cut representational distinction of an image as real-
presence or complete absence.528 In other words, the canons turn the (iconoclastic) critique from 
what is the real in a frame for representation to how and when a referent becomes transparent 
enough before the human gaze to witness the represented as if really existing in the same space 
with the viewer.  
In The Offering of Elmo’s Head, for instance, my fictional association of the 
compositional elements was concomitantly filtered through an ongoing awareness of the canons 
by moving from Stage 1 to Stage 4. Particularly, the act of tracing my aesthetic judgment based 
on the canonical link between an original source (Stage 1) and a frame for representation (Stages 
2 and 4) restricted my intentionality in esteeming the presence of my own imaginary narrative in 
a self-referential way. What I am suggesting here, is that the act of creating is not an immersion 
through the frame for representation to the point of claiming the total disappearance of the 
signifier in favor of the signified, akin to Marion’s dematerialized version of the icon. This is a 
misconception of the complexity of image making that disregards the practical/technical mode of 
                                                
528 As explained in Chapter 1, in the context of a Byzantine icon, a real experience is defined when a 
viewers performs or completes the image of Christ. Similarly, in the case of an artwork, a real viewing experience 
actualizes a symbolic meaning. 
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a viewing experience from the very position of where the viewer stands in a tangible space.  My 
epistemological contribution to artistic research lies, then, in revealing a Byzantine thinking 
framework for the artists based on the four stages of vivifying an aesthetic experience in 
relationship to a referent. This practical insight in bringing to life an artistic image reveals that an 
iconic vision cannot be resumed to a feature of the artist’s imagination alone. The image does not 
simply belong to an inner, artistic self. Instead, it should be discovered in the fine balance 
between symbolism and realism that contextualizes an iconic vision’s relationship with a referent 
beyond the sphere of metaphysical dualism.  
Returning to the effect of rotoscoping, this visual technique creates a very life-like 
animation. The viewer is confronted with the ambiguity of how to see an animated cartoon, such 
as Betty Boop: from a pure subjective/imaginary type of visualization (as it comes from an 
artist’s imagination) to a “serious History lesson [as recorded on film], one which requires the 
stylistic shift from ‘cartoon’ to the ontologically (therefore epistemologically?) distinct 
“rotoscoped animation.”529 While the fictional/cartoonish features of Betty Boop (silhouette, 
proportions of the facial elements, colors, etc.) stem from Fleischer’s imagination, it also offers a 
connection to an origin (based on the video documentation of the Polynesian dancer) that can be 
acknowledged by the viewer in the very act of seeing. This connection is not offered in a specific 
naturalistic, linear perspective, or 3D manner.530 Instead, the rotoscoped animation invites the 
viewer himself/herself to make the link to the real.531 The same mode of seeing takes place 
through the hierotopic interaction with the Byzantine spatial living icon. The evocative effect in 
the rotoscopic trace of the real corresponds to the Byzantine canonized balance between 
symbolism and realism in painting the image of Christ (and holy figures in general). Moreover, 
this parallel between rotoscoping and icon painting helps to practically consider the canons in an 
artistic context/visual criticism (as in my wood panel paintings). It shows the non-referential role 
of the canons in critiquing when and how an aesthetic experience changes into a 
phenomenological turn that evokes the presence of an image. And, when the canons are 
implemented at the artistic level of research, it allows reflecting on metaphysical questions of 
                                                
529 Ward, “Animated Realities,” Paragraph 15.  
530 The reverse is also true as Fleischer does not provide an abstract representation of the Polynesian 
dancer’s movements. 
531 Ward explains that due to the simplistic or formulaic aspect of the rotoscope in communicating the 
complexities of a subject matter, the technique is “closely associated with discourses of instruction and training in 
‘the government...industry...and educational institutions’" (Donald Crafton quoted in Ward, “Animated Realities,” 
Paragraph 14). 
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real-presence: whether the image is seen from a realistic vision by claiming a strong link to 
reality, or from a symbolic vision by seeking a weak link to reality. Of course, any artistic vision 
that incorporates canons can be critiqued from a symbolic or realistic view of reality, but what is 
important to remember is that an image is always crafted somewhere between symbolism and 
realism—as exemplified by the Byzantine icon. The canons are not an idealized/de-
contextualized form of viewing behavior, but rather they are what anchors symbolism in realism 
(and vice versa) without the dualism between a form of representation and a notion of reality. 
Likewise, the canonized movement (outlined above in relation to Portrait of an Icon Maker) 
should not be thought in the metaphysical terms of having a strong or weak link between the 
signifier and signified. Thus, the canons do not have a representational function themselves and 
should not be limited (in my artistic view) to the specific Byzantine context and medium. Like 
the Byzantine icon, an artwork can put in a specific physical context, through the image-maker’s 
body, the canons that anchor the desire for transparency in seeing the real. Such an artistic 
reflection over the canons also points towards the Incarnational dimension of the image, which 
consequently moves visual criticism toward reconsidering the metaphysics of presence beyond 
metaphysical iconoclasm. As I observe later in this chapter, Isar provides in her hierotopic 
reading of Viola’s use of the digital screens a meeting point between the artwork and Byzantine 
icon in the canonic manifestation of the chōraic movement.  
To that end, my artistic proposition is that a customized basic list of Byzantine guidelines 
for constructing a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision provides a compelling 
framework for critiquing an iconic/idolic vision in the commoditized age of televisual screens 
(beyond metaphysical issues). So it is my aim to redefine a list of canons that will guide me in 
the next sections through Isar’s hierotopic analysis and the critique of my installation Performing 
the Icon. More broadly, I see some theological points in critiquing metaphysical claims to an 
image in: 1) the role of the image-maker’s intentionality, 2) the tangible use of the frame for 
representation, and 3) the balance between the naturalistic/realistic and abstract/symbolic 
approaches—as previously mentioned, an overuse of either of them would disrupt an iconic 
vision’s visual composition. Following these insights, there are specific reasons image-makers 
(an implicitly visual criticism) would want to consider when critiquing an iconic/idolic vision 
through contemporary artistic means: 
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1) Eikōn-Appearance/Copy as Gift. The creative process should be seen as a gift 
to the viewer for renouncing the image-maker’s self.532 The artistic purpose is to 
preserve the presence of an image in the hierotopic project without stopping the 
gaze at the artist’s own spectacle. This renunciation is a form of creating room for 
the chōraic trace and can be explored in the movements (withdrawal, 
navigational, or canonical, which is the movement that I explore in Portrait of an 
Icon Maker) between intentionality and (archetypal) imagination.533  
 
2) Technique of In-Imagination. To perform aesthetically an iconic vision is to 
follow a rigor of seeing the body in a context from a canonic reflective manner—a 
mimetic mode of seeing that has been lost in the age of mobile screens, as argued 
in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 Why the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic 
Vision in the symbolic-realistic critique of the spectacle. Thus, the role of 
symbolism in the aesthetic experience has to take an Incarnational dimension to 
avoid the referential logic between a ritual/signifier and myth/signified.   
 
3) Living Essence/Model. There should always be a hand-made connection 
between the artist and the object of depiction to allow an extraction of images 
from a living source or signified. The reason for this is that the artist’s body needs 
to be tangibly involved in the act of tracing the presence of an absence/image. 
And the technique of tracing requires an aesthetic strategy to present the images’ 
play of absence and presence somewhere between an abstract and naturalistic 
pictorial inscription of the human face.  
 
Since I am rethinking/extracting Byzantine canons from an interdisciplinary perspective 
at the level of an artist’s solitary experience, the above three points of consideration for an 
image-maker/visual criticism require a certain touch of interpretation. However, based on the 
Byzantine theology of the image, this list provides a basic way of critiquing how (as opposed to 
what) a transformative viewing activity, in response to the spectacle, turns iconic/idolic in intent 
or inspiration. Or, from an aesthetic perspective, how various artistic/hierotopic approaches to 
create a frame for representation (that does not necessarily include Christian motives) integrate 
iconic elements to transform a viewer into an image-maker; namely, to present a performative 
event by enacting/mimicking invisible images from an unseen dimension of images (from a 
sensus communis).  
 
                                                
532 The notion of an image-maker does not refer only to the artist, but also to the viewer’s interaction with 
the work.  
533 The idea of an archetypal imagination is taken from Isar’s discussion of Bill Viola’s work that I analyze 
later in the next section. It is the symbolic mode of seeing in its Incarnational/chōraic function of inscribing an 
image in a sensus communis. 
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4.4.4 Probing the Byzantine framework 1: Isar’s chorographic reading of Bill Viola’s 
technological screens 
 
Viola’s thinking illustrates in a most exemplary way a phenomenon manifested in 
contemporary performance art, shared by some other artists, which shows a return to the 
metaphysical properties of the image and presence, which I call ‘contemporary 
hierotopy’, after Lidov’s concept.534 
 
In this section, I look at how Isar applies a canonic and hierotopic critical eye on Bill 
Viola’s work, which she finds representative of how contemporary art could induce an evocation 
in a Byzantine sense. Particularly, she analyses how the chōraic movement might be traced in a 
digital screen. While in Byzantine hierotopy, the mimetic device is based on the model of the 
Cross, Isar indicates that in Viola’s hierotopic vision, the mimetic model is based on the inner 
image, which manifests through human’s capacity of imagination to create symbolism in an 
Incarnational sense.535 She explains that “[i]mage is not only ’that which’ one sees, but also ’that 
by means of which’ one sees by an act of imagining.”536 Image is generated through an 
“imagining perspective,” which is a performative event that equally involves the human body, 
the invisible/inner image and context/environment.537 Like in the Byzantine icon, the 
prototypical nature of the inner image is not limited to the perception of bodily senses and 
emotions, in which the physical eye (the outer eye of personal desires) filters or selectively 
grasps mere pictures from the visible world. Therefore, Viola makes a difference between a 
picture and an inner image. A picture is a phenomenological mode of framing (taking 
perspective) what is visible or what is presented to the senses (body) from the outside of the 
mind and an inner image is an event of imagining in which the image is perceived from the 
inside (mind) in the physical world. Viola’s view of an event of imagining takes a theological 
turn in the Nicephorian sense of in-imagination: although transparent, an image is not a Platonic 
symbol that is in some way opposed to reality. The image is an experienced presence of reality 
itself. This performative aspect of the image corresponds to the metaphysics of presence in the 
christic mimetic act of rejoining the image of humanity and divine in the icon. For both, Viola 
                                                
534 Isar, “Vision and Performance,” 347. 








Figure 24: The Catherine’s Room (2001) by Bill Viola 
 
In his work, Viola explores the prototypical quality of his own images through what he 
calls “continually repeating actions” that direct the human gaze towards eternity—much in the 
same way I canonically explore the presence of my imaginary images in Portrait of an Icon 
Maker.539 The idea of eternity recalls the Byzantine icon technique of inverse perspective, in 
which past and future events unfold simultaneously into one, present time and space. Viola 
explains that the knowledge of eternal time (as opposed to the chronological, linear, Cartesian 
time) was best experienced in the ancient agrarian rituals/festivities that connected “the larger 
[cyclical] sense of Nature Time” with the human body and the individual time of daily life.540 In 
describing the notion of chōra, Isar makes a similar point in the connection between the cosmic 
chōraic movement and the repeated agricultural outdoor practice of threshing and winnowing. 
So, Viola keeps the gaze into eternity by using the video screen technologies to provide an 
artistic means (based on the canon of inverse perspective) towards “simultaneous levels of 
time.”541 For example, in the video work, The Catherine’s Room (Fig. 24), he installed five flat 
screens displaying Catherine performing daily ritualistic tasks (yoga, lighting candles, etc.) 
during the five moments of a day, from morning to evening. Here, the viewer is confronted with 
an inverse perspective that takes place in the present time of viewing: 
 
 [it] represents the idea of parallel time, the fact that right now you can call someone in 
Rome and simultaneously partake in their field of existence halfway around the world. 
This was not possible for humans, at least for those without special psychic powers, until 
the recent developments of communication technologies.542    
                                                
538 Ibid., 337. 
539 Bill Viola: the Passions, Ed. John Walsh, (London: J. Paul Getty Museum in association with the 
National Gallery, 2003), 214. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Ibid.. 212. 
542 Ibid., 214. 
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The technological screen turns into the frame of constructing a symbolic-realistic vision, 
which is an experienced presence of “the larger field of time,” beyond the 
objectified/commoditized/linear view of time.543 Isar claims that Viola’s video installations are 
not to be visually seen, but meant to activate (perform) the imagining aptitude of the “inner 
eye”—which is the “soul itself”—in relation to the viewer’s body, space, and the medium 
(screen for representation) of his work.544 His hierotopic endeavor is, then to create universally 
valid mimetic devices for viewers to gaze into “the archetypal imagination, for which the source 
of all images is to be found inside oneself.”545  The idea of the archetypal imagination parallels 
the Kantian notion of sensus communis or the hierotopic space in which the shared image 
between God and humans rejoin in the crossing of their gazes.  
As stated above, the presence of the inner image involves an interaction between body, 
mind, and medium—as Isar notes, “an image is by definition one and only when seen.”546 Viola 
uses the digital screen as a medium to project and share his own images—and this is the very 
purpose of a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision.  For 
example, in his video installation Memoria (Fig. 25), Viola delves into his 
memories to reach infinity/the inner image. Memory, for Viola, is a mode 
of creating an imaginary/artistic image that transcends time. By inscribing 
memories in matter (the digital screen), Viola embodies the infinite in a 
chōraic manner. Isar describes Viola’s use of the digital screen as having 
the quality of flesh that Incarnates mental images as light.547 Like the 
Byzantine icon of the Mandylion, Memoria presents a face projected on a 
piece of silk that moves slowly between the visible and invisible. While 
the gaze in the screen directly addresses the viewers’ intentionality as a gateway to “inward 
looking,” the movement of the face enacts as if breathing the chōraic trace of the inner image 
(the other) in the visible.548  
                                                
543 Ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Isar, “Vision and Performance,” 337. 
546 Ibid., 338. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ibid. 
Figure 25: Memoria 
(2000) by Bill Viola 
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Isar outlines a hierotopic aura to Bill Viola’s video installations from an aesthetic desire 
to test the metaphysical limits of the image. According to Viola’s phenomenology of the image, 
all viewers shape their existence in the world by generating images from an ontological condition 
that bounds human nature to constantly seek the invisible other (the archetypal imagination). 
Despite this fact, in order to reach the true inner perception beyond the (idolic) self, the viewer 
needs to challenge the limits of his/her “imagining perspective.”549 From Isar’s view, artworks, 
such as made by Viola, can provide the very challenge to think the unthinkable through the effect 
of the hierotopic vision. Or to put this differently, art as an imaginative event can turn into a 
performative act of presencing the inner image, which allows the viewer to recognize the 
prototypical nature of all images beyond the horizon his/her own spectacle. And, if the critique 
of the spectacle is incomplete without an evocative understanding of the image, this means that 
an imaginative experience is key in gaining knowledge on how viewers construct images by 
performing a prototypical/inner image. 
In light of Isar’s Byzantine description of Viola’s use of the technological screen, I want 
now to recall my Byzantine aesthetic guidelines and address some metaphysical concerns 
regarding the artistic notion of inner image. In the previous discussion of my canon-directed 
movement employed in Portrait of an Icon Maker, I pointed out that the visualization of an 
artist’s aesthetic judgment has the potential to construct an iconic vision if it turns into its own 
image550—depending on how the source of the artist’s visualization is filtered through canons. 
Quenot’s theological view of the icon reveals, for instance, that any artistic attempt (as opposed 
to a Byzantine iconographic activity) to visualize an aesthetic judgment reflects the artist’s own 
quest to estimate an invisible reality.551 This aesthetic search is a non-theological mode of seeing 
the image for the reason that it fosters an artistic originality that cultivates the cult of personality, 
which inevitably deviates towards the two extremes of representation: symbolism or realism. I 
have summarized this theological concern regarding the artist’s imagination under the first point 
of my basic Byzantine aesthetic rules, Eikōn-Appearance/Copy as Gift. Consequently, the artistic 
tendency to personalize an aesthetic language seems to trigger, on the part of the viewer, a 
metaphysical suspicion regarding the artist’s intention. What if all the viewer sees in an artwork 
is a presentation of the artist’s own spectacle? After all, Isar notes that Viola’s phenomenology 
                                                
549 Ibid., 337.  
550 To recap, an image acts as its own image when it is not a mere extension of human intentionality. 
551 Quenot, The Icon, 71. 
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of the image relies on the power of the artist’s gaze to turn pictures into images.552 Is Viola’s 
inner image just a visualization of his own Nietzschean estimation of the world to mirror an 
idolic desire for real-presence of his imagination?553 From this iconoclastic view, one can argue 
that Viola’s idea of inner image stands for, yet, another metaphysical principle in providing an 
ultimate explanation of human existence.  
Therefore, it is the iconoclastic doubt in contemporary cases of image making (from 
artistic images to the cult of commercial identities) that I try to challenge in this thesis from a 
practical view of the Byzantine canons. My attempt is to question how does the canonic practice 
of painting a Byzantine icon unveils the evocative aspect of the image (in an artistic, tangible 
context), which the metaphysical thought categorizes as real and unreal/appearance or idol and 
icon. The answer to this should open a path in critiquing the image that is wider than 
metaphysical concerns. As discussed throughout this thesis, an image can be critiqued/seen from 
an idolic or iconic view depending on what metaphysical argument is employed to challenge 
notions of reality or claims to real-presence. The difference between the idol and icon, therefore, 
appears to make sense within a metaphysical framework of thinking that is concerned with what 
makes the image symbolic or realistic. Again, this approach to visual criticism gets stuck when 
describing and defending a metaphysical perspective of reality in either a Platonic or 
Nietzschean direction. These two metaphysical views “[stand] out as an enduring attitude in the 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.”554 Rather, my artistic concern is more focused 
on how the transparency of the image is actualized in the visible world to offer an alternative 
mode of critiquing the possibility of the image to attain presence. In fact, through my aesthetic 
approach to the Byzantine canons (and where I contribute to opening the critical eye to the 
metaphysics of presence), I reveal that the image is formed when symbolism and realism are 
canonically combined or spatially balanced. I particularly explore this spatial relationship 




                                                
552 Isar, “Vision and Performance,” 337. 
553 The meaning of imagination here is taken in its Kantian sense. 
554 Isar, “Chōra: Tracing the Presence,” 40. 
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4.4.5 Probing the Byzantine framework 2: Preforming the Icon  
 
 
Figure 26. Performing the Icon, Divine Expo, Hillel's center of University of 
Montreal, Nov.-Dec., 2014. Video documentation available on the companion 
DVD and at: http://youtu.be/tI887PLtJ0E 
 
4.4.5.1 Technical/realistic and symbolic description 
 
The installation includes two elements:  
 
1) Single-channel (split screen) video projection with sound (Fig. 26). The video 
documentation of the installation in the Divine Expo exhibition at Hillel's center of 
University of Montreal, Nov.-Dec., 2014, shows some of the viewers’ reactions to the 
work.  
 
2) Wood-panel icon (in progress), gold leaf, egg tempera paint pigments, wooden panel, 
18’ x 12 1/2’, 2014 
 
To create the installation, the wood-panel icon was placed on a stand in front of the video 
projection—a slanted position towards the viewer is key to radiate light directly from the screen. 
Some chairs were also placed at a distance from the installation for viewers to sit and watch like 
in a theatre. The main conceptual implication of Performing the Icon alludes to the traditional 
mode of performing a Byzantine icon by incorporating imagery belonging to a different visual 
culture (the American entertainment industry) and treating it as if a true icon. I was inspired by 
the mnemonic function of the icon in the Byzantine context (church, public outdoor events) to 
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visualize a mental (divine) image in the real physical space. Mimicking this mental image 
through a poly-sensory experience with the icon, the Byzantine viewer forms a union between 
his/her body and the material world that moves past senses (in a way that he/she feels the 
presence of the invisible (divine) image). In this installation, designed for an art gallery space, I 
explored with new and old screen media the role the canons, such as The Symbolic-Realistic 
technique, The Face and Body, Color, Light, Stillness, and Movement to generate an event of 
image-making (a Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired iconic vision). From an artistic perspective, I 
see Performing the Icon as a learning visual experience that touches on how we spatially 
construct images in general.  
The wood-panel icon depicts in a Byzantine style and through the classical theme of the 
Crucifixion, mass media, and human physical elements presented in the video projection. I have 
been working on this particular wood panel painting for two years now, however from my 
perspective as an artist, the purpose is not to finish it right away. The theological/conceptual 
implication of painting in a Byzantine canonic manner is that although I incorporate imagery 
from the capitalist/entertainment industry, I develop an aesthetic technique of making and seeing 
an image that challenges the pictures of my own imagination. I believe that this very iconic 
experience is possible in a consumerist context due to the Byzantine techniques of ritualistically 
using the tools and materials in a hierotopic way—that is, a performative mode of creating an 
image in space that mimics the presence of the sacred/invisible. 
The top right side of the video projection shows the first stages in preparing the wood-panel 
for painting. These are video clips taken from Portrait of an Icon Maker. In the top left side of 
the video projection, I present a sequence of human hands and feet, Disney animated characters, 
and Apple products. The human elements are included to draw attention to the importance of the 
human body in preforming an icon. They ground the conceptual use of images in our most 
visceral experience of the world. The reason for choosing the commercial imagery is due to their 
cult following, which parallels the religiosity surrounding the Byzantine icons in the way they 
incite consumers to participate in their consumption.  
The merging of religious iconography and pop-culture images (the liturgical and consumer 
symbolism) in the wood panel painting for this installation is not as overt as in my previous 
Byzantine-ish icons such as in Holy Earbuds or The Offering of Elmo’s Head. For example, the 
figure of Bugs Bunny appears discreetly, from the darkness of the cave underneath the cross, 
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with his face illuminated by a small light from a candle that he holds in his hand. This 
unobtrusive association of pop culture with the Byzantine visual language allows me to test the 
limits of the image to perform a Byzantine iconic vision in a non-monastic environment, such as 
in the space of a gallery—an aspect of this project that is more important than the finished piece. 
The bottom half of the video projection was designed to directly engage a digital wavering 
candlelight with the wood-panel icon in the physical space of a gallery. The electronic flickering 
light (that imitates the real light of a wax candle) creates a visual effect that sinks and recedes the 
wood-panel in shadow.  
Additionally, the video contains an experimental sound piece that includes Byzantine 
elements heard in monasteries such as chants, bells, and carpentry tools.  
 
 
4.4.5.2 Byzantine reflective analysis 
 
From my video documentation and observation of viewers’ interaction with Performing 
the Icon in the Divine Expo exhibition at the Centre Hillel (November to December, 2014) the 
metaphysical-critical eye could argue that there is a conflict in the viewing experience between 
the video projection and the wood panel—one that prevents a full aesthetic/immersive 
experience.  The viewer might be challenged with two situations here: one that requires 
spectatorship (as if watching a narrative on a TV/cinema screen and one that invites for a direct 
tangible aesthetic relationship with the painting). 
  The top part of the projection is descriptive, showing a narrative (predefined symbolism) 
of making the wood panel and the bottom part asks the viewer to discover, under a flickering 
digital light, in a dim space, a hand made painting positioned right in front of the projected 
image. The viewer can make the point that the connection between the real/physical painting and 
the artificial/cold digital candlelight creates a link between the digital light of computer screens 
and the material world, which can be felt as disconnected in today’s audio visual culture. 
Particularly, the aesthetic feeling is potentially triggered by the unusual connection between the 
old media (wood, pigments, etc.) and new media (technological screen), which creates a 
phenomenological shift in seeing and feeling the digital light projected on the wall and the wood 
panel as the real warm light of a candle. Like Viola’s Incarnational approach to the digital 
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screen, I investigate this phenomenological shift in chōraic manner of in-imagining the digital 
light.  
This technological simulation of a real candlelight in my installation is not the same as 
the targeted spotlights that illuminate an art object in a museum/art gallery. The spotlights are too 
still, uniform, and harsh for viewers to understand how a Byzantine icon performs under the 
natural light of a candle. Although cold as it comes from the projectors’ beam, I manipulated the 
mechanical, digital existence of the light to act in the physical space of the installation with the 
life and warmth of a natural wax candle. In my artistic view, the digital candlelight parallels the 
light projected in the back of the cave from Plato’s allegory.  Similarly to the light from the cave 
referencing the true light of the sun, the digital light from the installation references the real light 
of a wax candle. The tangible aspect of the wood panel also emphasizes this animated 
appearance of the electronic beam of light. What is interesting about the digital imitation of the 
wax candle is that it perceptually challenges the viewer to ask what is real and illusory in 
Performing the Icon. Having in mind that the wood panel painting is a physical object and the 
digital light is vibrating as if a real wax candle, the viewer is faced with a spatial effect that is 
both tangible and imaginary. Could the cool, however pulsating simulation of the wax candle 
evocate, in the neutral space of the gallery, the invisible image of the sacred as in a Byzantine 
context (hierotopy)? This is a question that addresses a universal concern regarding our faith in 
visual representations (religious or otherwise) to depict notions of truth and reality. And, to add 
another layer of meaning in the illusory effect of the installation: once the viewer notices the 
intrusion of commercial images in the classic religious theme of the Crucifixion, do they still see 
the wood panel painting as a traditional religious piece? 
The cinematic type of viewing that the projection might induce prevents the actual 
viewing experience of the flickering light for the reason that the narrative/symbolism at the top 
of the projected screen can dominate the viewer’s gaze. It can direct the gaze away from a 
potential transformative/performative aesthetic experience triggered by the odd spatial effect 
created by the electronic light of the digital candle in relation to the physical wood panel icon—I 
use here the word icon, as the wood panel painting may appear to be a traditional (Byzantine) 
icon only at the first sight.  Later, after closely seeing, the viewers can recognize the non-
religious/commercial/subjective symbolism in the composition of my painting, such as the 
cartoon character Bugs Bunny underneath the cross. 
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I noticed, as well, how groups of people were sitting and standing quite far away from the 
wood panel to simply gaze upward for making sense of the story provided in the video 
documentation. However, ironically, the flickering digital light was transforming their faces 
(looking upward toward the projected video on the wall) into a play of shadows and light that 
reminded me of the believers’ upright gaze in a church while praying in front of an icon wall. 
There were also viewers who directly went towards the wood panel trying to distinguish 
the painting under the flickering light. What was interesting was that the movements of light and 
shadow, reflected on the surface of the wood panel, gave them a hard time to see the painting. 
Basically they had to position their heads a bit lower, to see more clearly the actual painting. 
Again, they almost seemed to kiss the painting as if believers in front of a Byzantine icon.  
But to me (as an artist), the most intriguing viewing attitude was of those hesitating in 
seeing the wood panel under the gaze of the other viewers. The hesitating behavior came from 
those standing and walking towards the wood panel to get a close look. They first looked at the 
top of the screen, imitating the group of viewers who were already positioned in front of the 
installation (particularly the viewers sitting on the chairs like in a theatre). When the standing 
viewers showed signs of curiosity in seeing the actual wood panel, they seemed quite hesitant for 
not disturbing the others’ viewing experience. And in turn, this hesitation of the viewers sent the 
message to everyone gazing at that moment that the wood panel is the very center of everyone’s 
attention—to be seen one person at a time like a Byzantine icon in front of a viewer’s individual 
moments of veneration. I feel that the flickering light had also contributed to this sense of 
curiosity and uncertainty in the viewing attitude. 
To conclude, Performing the Icon allows the viewer to participate in a type of aesthetic 
engagement through a multisensory experience (sound, light, and a physical icon appealing to 
the sense of touch) that portrays, in the Byzantine mode of making and seeing images, my 
experience of embodying (making present) social media products and religious figures. If this 
illustration of an iconic vision would be seen as eerie-looking to the consumptive eye or 
blasphemous to the theological eye, it would raise questions on the role of images in instigating 
iconoclastic/consumerist debates. For instance, through the Byzantine technique, the Looney 
Tunes’ characters take on religious features, thus challenging their usual representation in mass 
media and the viewers/consumers’ expectations. Conversely, by integrating pop-idols into 
Byzantine icons, I challenge the traditional understanding of the religious figures. These 
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conflicting interpretations around images are a pressing issue in today’s visual culture. We are 
currently witnessing an increasing exploitation of images through mass-media strategies to 
enforce ideological convictions from corporate agenda to religious acts of terror.555 Thus, 
although this experimental installation merges a digital projector (new media technology), with 
Byzantine canons of painting an icon, I do not imply that the viewer should transform the 
surrounding elements into an evocation of my aesthetic judgment. What I offer is an 
understanding of an iconic experience in a space designed for displaying art so that the viewers 
will be able to see and question the role of the beholder in perceiving it (as an image or a 
picture). 
My Byzantine reflective analysis into the phenomenological shift of light in Performing 
the Icon exposes that an image turns into a creative event when the human gaze moves through a 
performative process of in-imagination (an experience that is theologically defined as iconic). In 
aesthetically probing the Incarnational elements that craft the feeling of presence in the 
Byzantine icon’s performance, visual criticism acquires a practical view into the meaning of an 
iconic/idolic vision. It is a view that does not limit the understanding of performativity to a 
“collapse of the metaphysics of presence’”556 in contemporary art. It is also a view that does not 
stop at critiquing (symbolically or realistically) metaphysical claims to reality within a dualistic 
framework, such as real/truth versus illusory, idol versus icon, etc.. So, I suggest that through a 
practical Byzantine inquiry into image making, the relationship between art and theology 
(initiated by Marion through the phenomenology of the icon and idol) can turn into a more 
complex (symbolic-realistic) method of analyzing a creative event/experience.  
Based on key canons of incarnating the invisible, which I summarized in my Byzantine 
list of aesthetic guidelines, such as Technique of In-Imagination, Living Essence/Model, and 
Eikōn-Appearance/Copy as Gift, the critique can contemplate in Performing the Icon on the 
mediational role of the wood panel painting to trigger the phenomenological shift. Without the 
theological union between 1) the materiality of the frame for representation, 2) the image, and 3) 
the viewer/artist, visual criticism cannot explain the relation between symbolism and realism in 
the process of image making. That is, when and how symbolism and realism dominates over the 
other in the abstract and naturalistic visual experiences that subject the image-maker 
                                                
555 This point regarding today’s state of the spectacle is particularly emphasized by Bruno Latour in the 
exhibition catalogue, Iconoclash (2002), and by Sven Lütticken in his book, Idols of the Market (2009). 
556 Isar, “Vision and Performance,” 328. 
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(artist/viewer) to metaphysical pictures of reality. Or, when the spatial construction of symbolism 
and realism is harmonized/canonized by evoking a feeling of presence/participation in an image. 
The effect of this Byzantine framework is that it allows 1) contemporary artists to reflect on the 
various levels of creativity in making an image present and on the role of a hand-made frame for 
representation to mediate the invisible (the face of the other) and, 2) visual criticism to question 
the image in relation to presence by avoiding “any moral overtones—in terms of opening onto 
























                                                
557 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 125. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary of Byzantine symbolic-realism  
 
Throughout the past four chapters, I have analyzed the symbolic and realistic suspicions 
towards the image that mark the metaphysical limits of human vision and desire. These fears of 
images are driven by iconoclastic/consumptive arguments that categorize them as either idolic or 
iconic (depending on their relation to notions of reality). In turn, these metaphysical viewing 
attitudes impact the modes of making, seeing, purchasing, and critiquing a screen for 
representation (from paintings, installation and performance art to televisual and touch screens). I 
have examined the interactive form of the Byzantine icon (conceptually and practically) to probe 
how the Byzantine appreciation of an aesthetic judgment (contingent on an artist’s intentionality) 
regarding the spectacle informs and influences these debates with an eye for presence—
especially since the increasing dissemination of screen technologies worldwide transforms 
today’s consumer society into a fundamentalist spectacle.558  
 To better understand the Marionian critique of the spectacle (as a picture in a linear 
perspective versus an image in the crosses of two gazes), I have noted the Byzantine iconoclastic 
dispute that stems from the clash of the two metaphysical conceptions of reality (and the sinful 
practice that accompanies it): the realistic and symbolic. Primarily, the iconoclasts have accused 
the icon-worshippers of blasphemy on the account that 1) the icon circumscribes the divine, 
therefore it reduces Christ to human flesh (this is a mode of seeing the image realistically) and 2) 
the icon represents only the image (a symbolic representation) of Christ’s body, which lacks 
divinity.559 The purpose of this Byzantine theological account of the image was not to provide a 
historical/scientific (symbolic or realistic) research on the ontological and epistemological 
arguments about the icon, which defined the iconoclastic debates during the church councils 
from 727 to 843 CE. Rather, the focus was to outline an aesthetic alternative to the critique of the 
spectacle that acknowledges the image as totally transparent and symbolic-realistically 
contextualized.  
                                                
558 Or a spectacle of the extreme ends of metaphysical beliefs: the symbolic and realistic. For an extensive 
critique of the fundamentalist spectacle and the war of images, see Sven Lütticken (2009), Bruno Latour (2002), 
W.T.J. Mitchell (2011), Boris Groys (2008).  
559 Elsner, “Iconoclasm as Discourse,“ 379. 
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Therefore, I have looked into the theorization of the image during the eight and ninth 
century to specifically pinpoint the performative relationship between the type (image) and 
prototype (Christ himself). I have examined the redefinition of Damascene’s shift to Christology 
in defending the icon by the Patriarch Nicephorus and St. Theodore the Studite in the second 
Iconoclastic era560—an epistemological shift in viewing the icon that marked the end of the 
Byzantine iconoclasm. This move from ontological concerns toward the epistemological 
interrogation of the icon’s relationship to the prototype made possible, according to the art 
historian Jaś Elsner, “a fully thought-through theoretics of the image in which its materiality, 
sanctified by God having become matter in the person of Jesus, allowed epistemological access 
through ritual to the holy.”561 The Christological arguments over images offered by the eighth 
and ninth century Byzantine theologians point to the icon as an object-to-think-with.562 So, in 
adopting the practical mode of making an icon, this thesis facilitated a concrete aesthetic access 
to the Byzantine “theoretics of the making and the…[venerating] of icons” that account for “one 
of the deepest conceptual contributions to the [metaphysical] problem of the image as 
representation ever conducted.”563 I then used this Byzantine framework of crafting the presence 
of an image to discuss examples of performative events (given by contemporary Byzantine 
thinkers and scholars of performativity) that pick up essential canons of framing a relationship 
between the symbolic and realistic modes of seeing. Mainly, I used Jenkins as he uses the 
Byzantine icon to critique the canonical framing of a product’s cult following; Verhoeff and 
Lechte as they analyze the creation of a screenspace by actualizing or making present (in a non-
referential/hierotopic way) the on-screen space in the off-screen space; and Isar as she enables an 
aesthetic critique of an iconic vision through the Byzantine idea of chorographic movement. In 
conjunction with these performative inquiries, I rethought the Byzantine tradition of icon making 
within the context of an art practice as research. The video documentations, Portrait of an Icon 
Maker and Performing the Icon, illustrate canonical elements for constructing an artistic iconic 
vision (in a solitary and public space) with the aim of exposing the metaphysical constraints in 
critiquing the making of images. As a result, I have identified a list of key 
Byzantine/Incarnational criteria to address and see performative strategies for crafting the 
                                                
560 The second Iconoclastic era began with the ascent to power of Leo V (813-20) who has convocated the 
second iconoclast Council of Constantinople of 815.  
561 Elsner, “Iconoclasm as Discourse,” 385. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid., 385-86. 
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presence/real-presence of an image in a frame for representation, without limiting the analysis to 
strictly iconoclastic/consumptive debates. The goal of this doctorate was to offer visual criticism 
to image-makers by combining an interdisciplinary approach to theological/metaphysical/art 
historical studies with a practical/performative sense of the canonical technique of creating an 
icon—which I dubbed the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. In the next section I 
recap on how the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision offers an evocation of an 
aesthetic form of truth/reality (from the view of an artist), grounded/contextualized symbolic-
realistically in the physical world. This performative-canonized act provides, in turn, a critique of 
image/picture-making in relation to the screenic vision of the spectacle that transcends 
metaphysical iconoclasm into an aesthetic mode of speaking about presence.  
 
 
5.2 Summary of the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision aesthetic contribution 
to visual criticism  
 
My artistic approach to visual criticism was (and will continuously be) to follow the 
Byzantine symbolic-realism through its painting techniques, which cultivates an awareness of a 
counter-intuitive gaze in the construction of an iconic visual experience. I do not suggest, of 
course, a complete return of contemporary art to the doctrine and Church by saying that an iconic 
vision cannot be built without believing in the Incarnation. The reverse is also not my concern: it 
is not by modernizing the Byzantine style of painting to incorporate new symbolism in creating a 
Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision. But rather, my research interest lies in how the 
artistic use of the canons, that visually/spatially frame the mystery of God’s image as human, 
helps to acquire a new/in-imaginational way of critiquing the cult value of the spectacle.   
Based on Marion’s phenomenology of the idol/icon in relation to the Byzantine theology 
of image, I can state that the notion of creativity in an iconic and idolic vision takes different 
levels of perspectives, without the clear-cut metaphysical differentiation between real and unreal, 
symbolic and realistic, internal and external, visible and invisible, etc. In an iconic vision, a 
creative experience opens the viewer’s perspectival gaze/imagination to an inverse perspective 
outside of the power of the thinking and sensitive viewer. In front of an icon, the viewer 
venerates an image as its own origin by making it present in the very act of performing it. In an 
idolic vision, creativity stops at a particular (conceptual or visual) perspective that turns into a 
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picture of the I. In front of an idol, the viewer responds like a reflection to an image of his/her 
own metaphysical demand for reality (categorized/pictured/framed conceptually and/or 
sensually).  
Having in mind that human vision is bound to a perspectival gaze in both the iconic and 
idolic vision, to what degree is an idol (especially in today’s spectacle of technological screens) a 
creative experience? To what extent can a spectacle that draws attention to an artist’s self—or, in 
a broader sense, to an image-maker’s power of reason and imagination—turn into an image? 
Does a creative/performative event mean to experience a totally new phenomenon, and if yes, 
can this experience actualize an aesthetic judgment? This practice-oriented research contributes 
significantly to these questions. In using the Byzantine method of creating an image at the 
solitary level of the artistic perspective, I offer an aesthetic approach that can be seen either 1) 
idolic by representing a picture of a subjective symbolism/narrative or 2) iconic by monastically 
performing an evocation. It is important to recap next the difference in meaning between the icon 
and idol from Plato and Byzantines, to Marion and the Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic 
Vision.  
Plato’s eidôlon-appearance manifests as a false being or a copy that has no connection to 
an essence. Marion connects this Platonic version of the idol to the current state of television 
screens and the spectacle: a world of signifiers that stopped referencing any real referent by 
mirroring the human’s perspectival gaze. Nevertheless, in his phenomenology of painting, 
Marion rediscovers in the idol a sense of invisibility in the referentiality between the copy and its 
model. In a way here, Marion seems to regain faith in Plato’s eikōn-appearance to reveal a half-
presence of essence/image/invisibility. Although imperfect due to its material likeness, Marion 
reassesses the idolic painting (Plato’s eikōn-appearance) as a semi-transparent phenomenon that 
reveals the invisible “by a lack of light.”564 Therefore, he makes an important step that draws 
away from metaphysical dualism. For the Byzantines, on the contrary, the idol is an 
epistemological issue referring to a wrong way of seeing images. They make a difference 
between how the idol and icon are worshiped.565 The idolic vision takes the copy for its model 
and the iconic vision contains the model (prototype) only in its absence as a trace (type) through 
                                                
  564 Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon,” 196-7. 
565 As noted in Chapter 1, section 1.2.2 The Byzantine view about the image, John of Damascus’ 
Christological view clarifies that the matter of the image-matter (Christ) is honored in light of its prototype (Father). 
The Idol is worshiped directly for what it is. The best example of idolatry would be when the statue of an emperor is 
worshiped as if it multiplied the emperor himself.  
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a performative event. In the Byzantine icon, the unbalanced metaphysical relationship between 
the copy/inferior/unreal and model/superior/real turns into a canonical/balanced/chorographic 
movement between the type and prototype without claiming one more real/present than the other. 
Marion acknowledges this iconic relationship between the type and prototype in the crossing of 
the human and divine gazes, however he appears to have a dematerialized understanding of this 
interaction. For him, the material opaqueness of the human body seems to be in the way of 
revealing the divine light. Instead, the Byzantines take the materiality of the human body as 
central for the Incarnational logic of the image and the canons become the in-imaginational 
technique of venerating (instead of worshiping a picture through an idol) the image in the 
tangible space and present time. Accordingly, the Byzantine icon is constructed from the 
canonical relationship between the human body, the image, the frame for representation, and the 
spatial context.  
Returning to my solitary artistic practice of the canons (Contemporary Byzantine-
Inspired Iconic Vision), my wood panel painting(s) can be seen as follows: On the one hand, 
idolic if it is seen in a referential relationship with my power to take perspective—that is, what I 
represent is a copy/eikōn-appearance of my own aesthetic judgment. On the other hand, iconic if 
my performative act is seen by way of evocation, as described in Lechte’s analysis of Jeffery 
Shaw’s The Golden Calf. Even if the symbolic source of the image in my evocation is as idolic 
as the Golden Calf, the icon is formed in the present moment between my body, the 
environment, and the canonic mode of inscribing the image in the frame for representation—and 
this is how my practice-based doctorate makes a step forward towards a metaphysics of presence 
through Marion’s phenomenology of the invisible. Due to these two modes of critiquing the 
Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision, visual criticism can acknowledge 
(theoretically) how an image shifts between an invisibility and visibility according to in-
imaginated canonized performance or claims for real-presence. From a practical view, I unveil 
that 1) the very metaphysical struggle between an iconic and idolic perspective in the 
performance of image/picture-making and 2) the possibility of an icon to transform into an idol 
and vice versa—a shift in modes of seeing that causes the ongoing iconoclastic battle over the 




5.3 Last reflections on the fine line between the iconic and idolic visions in response to 
metaphysical iconoclasm 
 
My discussion of metaphysical iconoclasm in Chapter 2 (and throughout this thesis), 
indicates that the metaphysical ambiguity of frames for representation comes from their 
mediational function. Visual tools/screens oscillate between an iconic or idolic status in the 
process of negotiating perceptions/notions of reality. For example, the consequence of 
positioning Christianity under the framework of metaphysical thought is that it turns the image of 
Christ into an idol. The idols of metaphysics are the effects of humans’ thinking skills to define 
and reach their transcendental desires. In modern idolatry, the subject’s intuition is approached 
as a base for abstracting and formulating objective knowledge of the tangible and non-tangible 
world. In this conceptual framework, the I becomes the authoritative figure (the 
transcendental/absolute subject in Kant and Husserl’s work or the immanent force of the will to 
power in Nietzsche’s idea of the overman) in the subject-object relationship, who aims to signify 
phenomena and name the truth.  
Nietzsche believed that the Death of God opens a non-metaphysical/iconic space that is 
freed from the restrictive moral values of an other/Platonic invisible world. By disclosing the 
Christian “God” under “full daylight”—at “[n]oon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the 
longest error,”566 the madman’s gaze not only aims at eliminating the divine world, but also the 
understanding that the physical world is an apparent/inferior one. Thus, Nietzsche claims that the 
metaphysical dualism is abolished when the things of this world are seen in their clearest forms: 
“the thing appears in the full light where not even the least shadow obscures it from a complete 
evidence.”567 The visible light that allows the world to be seen in its concrete form, without 
reference to a reality beyond itself, brings forth the Übermensch’s own perspective over the 
world. Marion interprets that Nietzsche is just reversing the metaphysical perspective (the 
superiority of the invisible world over our material world) with a human perspective. Despite the 
fact that he desired to overcome metaphysical idolatry, Nietzsche perpetuated another idolatrous 
perspective in which the overman plays the role of Being of beings, i.e. the evaluator of the ens 
communes. In unmasking the idols that live in the dark corners of a temple, the world is engulfed 
                                                
566 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Twilight of the Idols,” The Portable Nietzsche, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1954), 486. 
567 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 38. 
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by a visible/earthly light that in fact obscures its natural forms defined by shadows in 
perspective: “[l]ight without shadow allows the world to freeze, or to dissolve—it doesn’t matter 
which, precisely because a world demands a perspective. Only shadow establishes relief, 
delimits forms, puts things in place.”568 Marion points to the logical disjunction in Nietzsche’s 
text, when saying that a world without shadows denies “the perspectival character of being 
(Dasein).”569 The overman is doomed to fail in eliminating the true/divine and apparent/physical 
worlds since his quest of making a new world (an icon of the Übermensch) is bound to beings’ 
dependency on perspective. One can only evaluate, organize, and place things in the world by 
way of seeing forms as revealed by shadows in a perspective.570 Finally, the Dionysian will to 
power inverts the psychological process of inventing idols based on feelings of ressentiment, 
merely to offer an opportunity for beings to affirm themselves as Being in the same 
metaphysical/idolatrous organization of the world.  
Returning to the idea of a creative vision as an alternative to the metaphysical critique of 
the spectacle, I would like to recall the question: having in mind the perspectival character of the 
viewer, to what extent is the idolic vision a creative experience? The answer requires three 
explanations: 1) theological, 2) phenomenological, and 3) artistic/practical. 
1) From a Byzantine view, the image constructs a communion between the visible and 
invisible, and the face of Christ becomes a performative event of acknowledging that all humans 
in-imagine the same divine image—a mutual-image transfer between the divine and humans that 
materializes in the Christian society through the concept of economy. The icon is constructed 
when this common image (given/gifted in a pictorial trace beyond the individual 
perspective/desires of a thinking I) is made present through the canonized mimetic performance 
of the icon. The idol appears to prevent this sense of iconic communion by addressing the real-
presence of a particular picture of reality. If the answer to the above question reflects 
Christological concerns, the icon is the only creative event as it opens onto new phenomena, 
beyond the viewer’s finite mind. Since the idol is limited to human intentionality, it does not 
create new phenomena.  
                                                
568 Ibid., 39. 
569 Ibid. 
570 This Marionian statement outlines, in fact, the importance of his idea of the idol in attaining a sense of 
invisibility.  
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2) In his theological work (up to his central work The Crossing of the Visible), Marion 
endorses the Byzantine difference between the icon and idol, but only to a certain point by taking 
a phenomenological turn (a shift that is developed in In Excess): both the idol and icon are 
creative events according to the degree of invisibility present in the frame for representation.571 
The notion of creativity corresponds to the level of constructing a phenomenon in perspective 
and its power to challenge human intentionality. From a phenomenological view of the 
Incarnational logic of the image, the iconic vision invites the viewer to generate an image that 
recognizes a viewer’s self in the self of another (divine) viewer—as Marion puts it, through a 
feeling of love that reveals the face of the other. The icon, therefore, is defined as the full-
presence of the shared image between the divine and humanity in the crossing of the gazes. The 
idolic vision, instead, invites to fashion an image that reveals a viewer’s self in the image of 
his/her own self. The phenomenology of the idol is, then, the half-presence of the common image 
between the divine and humanity since it is acknowledged only from the human’s perspective. 
Although the idol is resumed to the perspective of a human gaze, its very deficiency of light also 
unveils low levels of transparencies. From this phenomenological position of seeing in the 
icon/idol various intensities of perspectival experiences, I have attempted to find a common 
ground between the epistemological definition of the Byzantine icon and the Kantian idea of 
aesthetic experience in the parallel between chōra and sensus communis. In so doing, I located 
where my contemporary artistic practice can integrate Nicephorus’ epistemological definition of 
the icon in order to connect the human body and symbolism in the aesthetic experience of the 
image.  
3) From my artistic/practical approach to the canons, the link between aesthetics (idol) 
and the Byzantine icon was required to show how today’s critique of the spectacle can be 
enriched with the Incarnational dimension of the image. And, through the Byzantine theology of 
image, I have proposed a series of canonized artistic techniques to understand how my aesthetic 
judgment of the spectacle turns into an iconic or idolic vision. The core question in my practice-
oriented research is whether the level of artistic creativity is directly proportional to the amount 
of invisibility of the image. Does a true creative event demand a total transparency of the image? 
From this Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision—also employed (conceptually) by 
Jenkins, Verhoeff, Lechte, and Isar in their analysis of the technological/digital screens—the 
                                                
571 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion, 125. 
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aesthetic universality of the canons can be explained by their technical function of making 
present (incarnate) an uncircumscribable (divine) image. Furthermore, my performative claim is 
that the line between what makes an image an idol or icon is drawn in the eye of the beholder 
according to the symbolic/realistic and symbolic-realistic modes of seeing. This oscillation 
between the iconic and idolic visions applies to the spectacle as much as it applies to a Byzantine 
wood panel painting. A traditional religious painting or a pop culture figure/product can be 
idolized and placed into a human perspective or can be seen as an icon and taken outside of any 
human perspective.  
 
 
5.4 The future of the Byzantine-inspired artistic research  
 
This thesis has proposed a mode of observing the Byzantine process of image making at 
the level of artistic research that is especially relevant when critiquing the iconic/idolic 
appearance of the spectacle. With this aesthetic understanding of how I (as an artist) perform an 
iconic/idolic vision through the practical implementation of the canons, image-makers and visual 
criticism can note a number of practical insights that are difficult for textual/verbal criticism to 
make: 1) in what way an image is reduced to a metaphysical perspective or elevated to an inverse 
perspective, 2) how the viewers take the mimetic role of copying (desire/product) in the idolic 
community of emotions and tastes and how viewers take the active role of creating/manifesting 
an image in the iconic community of feelings, and 3) to what extent the idolic vision draws its 
creativity from reproducing an image presented/circumscribed to a certain Nietzschean point of 
view and how the iconic vision turns into a creative event by imitating an image that cannot be 
circumscribed in any human perspective.  
In sum, the artistic research into the epistemological/Incarnational dimension of the 
image shifts from the moral and metaphysical insinuations of the symbolic and realistic eye 
toward the visual techniques of constructing an idol/icon in space. In future artistic research, an 
image-maker could implement the canonic infrastructure of tools and methods to probe the 
evocative effect of various modes of taking perspective, even if limited to a solitary experience 
or to a specific metaphysical belief/desire.  The proposed Byzantine reflective analysis allows to 
practically research how (as opposed to what it depicts) a frame for representation presents an 
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image or declares the real-presence of a picture. By explicitly incorporating the Byzantine 
canons into an interdisciplinary context, this thesis provides in a concrete way of critiquing a 
creative visualization of the spectacle, which includes current metaphysical concerns regarding 
the impact of technological screens. Thus, this study strives to influence future artistic research 
into how an image is performed and in-imagined in the way it framed the Byzantine theology of 
the image as a productive lens for contemporary artistic practice. My performative shift to the 
Byzantine canons helps to further investigate how and when an idol acts like an icon or the other 
way around, which is particularly relevant for critiquing the viewers’ interaction with screen 
technologies. It is a fine relationship between the idolic and iconic modes of seeing that is best 
analyzed through the Byzantine canonical balance of symbolism and realism at the level of 
artistic research. 
One artistic research question that persists regards the idolic creativity of the Nietzschean 
type of artist: can the spectacle induce an iconic vision? As argued throughout this doctorate, 
Nietzsche’s artistic vision liberates the image from its Platonic status—the relation of similitude 
between the visible and invisible is reversed so that the image is not seen as an imperfect 
imitation of an ideal (invisible) reality. Further artistic research is needed on the 
performative/evocative process of reversing the signifier and signified. For example, 
anthropological philosopher René Girard (1996) provides a performative and a mimetic 
perspective on the creative aspect of Nietzsche’s style of writing that opens the door for 
exploring the role of evocation in an idolic vision.572 The point made by Girard is that the 
aesthetic aura of Nietzsche's work comes from the dramatic meaning of the madman’s 
announcement regarding the collective murder of God. The sense of deictic involvement that we 
subconsciously experience when reading the news of the murder in the Aphorism 125 from The 
Gay Science (“We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers. But how did we do 
this?”) “resembles…our general reaction to the theme of the collective murder of God” in a 
contemporary context.573 The artistic vision (the idolic creativity) of Nietzsche's text stems from 
this performative shift in the perception of God as being dead to being killed. The announcement 
unconsciously involves today’s reader as much as it did a century ago, to literally evoke (like in 
Jeffery Shaw’s The Golden Calf) the symbolic implication of the collective crime. God’s death 
                                                
572 René Girard, The Girard Reader, ed. James G. Williams. (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 243-261.  
573 Ibid., 254. 
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becomes our crime. Although Marion points to the role of the will to power in constituting 
individualization, which renders destitute Nietzsche’s genealogical project of disclosing the 
psychological process of inventing Platonic “Gods,” the Übermensch-artist should not be simply 
disregarded for the metaphysical treatment of his/her claims/idols. Rather, visual criticism needs 
to see the aesthetic appeal of the Dionysian counter-narrative to Christianity beyond any 
metaphysical approaches. A Contemporary Byzantine-Inspired Iconic Vision on what places 
Nietzsche’s text and artistic vision close to the theology of the image can provide a broader, 
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